JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - This and the connected writ petition (No. 833 of 1981. Smt. Usha Agrawal and another v. State of U.P. and others) raise a common question of law in identical circumstances. 2. The petitioners have fitted Video Games Machine in premises to which entry is free to everyone. According to the petitioners any one, who inserted two fifty paise coins or a single coin of rupee one, into any of the machines could test his skill in respect of an electronic game like driving or shooting The machine was not operated by any other human agency. The respondents, treating it to be a place for entertainment, required the petitioners to comply with the provision of the U.P. Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1979 (for brief, the Act). This was not legal for, according to ' the petitioner, the Video Games Machines which they were permitting to be operated could not be treated to be an entertainment provided by them which could be subjected to levy of tax under the Act. 3. The attempt of the respondents to require the petitioners to pay entertainment tax has been characterised as being without the authority of law on various grounds. These grounds, except for one to which we shall presently advert, have been dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in its judgment in writ petition No. 591 of 1981 (Gopal Krishna Agarwal v. State of U.P. and others), connected with several other petitions decided by it on March 4, 1982. The Bench repealed the submission made before it and concluded (in paragraph 14 of the Report) thus : "In our opinion, entertainment tax for admission to Video Games falls within the ambit of the Act. The impugned notification specifying the rate of entertainment tax for Video Games is perfectly valid. The decision is reported as Gopal Krishna Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others. 1982 A.C.J. 262. 4. Sri Rajesh Tandon appearing for the petitioners in these writ petitions, has not been able to pursuade us that the view taken in the aforesaid decision was erroneous in law justifying a contrary view. The decision is reported as Gopal Krishna Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others. 1982 A.C.J. 262. 4. Sri Rajesh Tandon appearing for the petitioners in these writ petitions, has not been able to pursuade us that the view taken in the aforesaid decision was erroneous in law justifying a contrary view. He has, however, made an additional submission in these petitions which was not made in Gopal Krishna's case and it is this : "Entry 62 of List II of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution permits levy of tax upon an entertainment which is provided objectively to a person and not upon an activity which requires that person to participate in it himself and by his skill alone get an entertainment," 5. He has relied mainly upon the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Harris Wilson v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1982 M.P. 171 , in which the view taken was that no Entertainment Tax was payable in respect of Video Games Parlour run by the petitioner under the M.P. Entertainments Duty and Advertisement Tax Act, 1936 which had a charging provision similar to Section 3 of the U.P. Act. 6. The submission of the learned counsel principally is that where a person plays a game contributing his own skill to it and derives pleasure himself by efforts, the activity cannot rightly be treated to be an entertainment provided by the person running the parlour where the requisite machine is made available to such a person. The ambit of the words "entertainment oi amusement" occurring in Entry 62 must be confined to entertainment or amusement provided objectively that person without his own participation therein by his skill and since in the case of Video Games, it is admitted that no entertainment or amusement is objectively provided to any person, levy of tax upon that activity under the Act was ultra vires the Constitution. 7. We may notice the entries in List 2 of the Second Schedule which are relevant for our purpose ; "Entry 33. Theatres and dramatic performances subject to the provisions of entry 60 of List I, sports, entertainments and amusements. Entry 62. Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling." In Western India Theatres v. Cantonment Board, AIR 1959 S.C. 582 , a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed that,. Theatres and dramatic performances subject to the provisions of entry 60 of List I, sports, entertainments and amusements. Entry 62. Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling." In Western India Theatres v. Cantonment Board, AIR 1959 S.C. 582 , a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed that,. ".............As pointed out by this Court in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City, 1955 S.C.R. 829 ; (s) AIR 1955 S.C. 58 , following certain earlier decisions referred to therein, the entries in the legislative list should not be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. It has been accepted as well settled that in construing such an entry conferring legislative powers the widest possible construction according to their ordinary meaning must be put upon the words used therein. In view of this established rule of interpretation, there can be no reason to construe the words "taxes on luxuries or entertainments or amusement" in entry 50 as having a restricted meaning so as to confine the operation of the law to be made thereunder only to taxes on persons receiving the luxuries, entertainments, or amusements. The entry contemplates luxuries, entertainments, and amusements as objects on which the tax is to be imposed. If the words are to be so regarded, as we think they must, there can be no reason to differentiate between the giver and the receiver of the luxuries, entertainments, or amusements and both may, with equal propriety, be made amenable to the tax ", 8. The same Bench observed in Y.V. Sri Nirasamurthy and others v. State of Mysore and others A.I.R, 1959 S.C. 894, that under Entry 62, it was permissible to enact a law imposing a tax on theatre, dramatic performances, cinemas, sports and the like, even though these words were not mentioned specifically in that Entry. 9. The same Bench observed in Y.V. Sri Nirasamurthy and others v. State of Mysore and others A.I.R, 1959 S.C. 894, that under Entry 62, it was permissible to enact a law imposing a tax on theatre, dramatic performances, cinemas, sports and the like, even though these words were not mentioned specifically in that Entry. 9. The earliest decision to which our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his submission was the one in State of Bombay v. R.M.D.C. and others AIR 1956 Bombay 1, wherein Chagla, C.J. speaking for a Division Bench, held that the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and Tax Act, 1948 was within the legislative competence of the State legislature, inasmuch as, it was embraced within the term "gambling' ' as used in Entry 34 of the Second List of Schedule 7. The learned Chief Justice then proceeded to consider the alternative submission made by Sri Seervai for the State of Bombay that even if the topic was not betting and gambling, it was entertainment or amusement and the Act under examination was covered by it. He observed (in paragraphs 23 and 24) thus : "(23) Therefore, in our opinion, the impugned legislation deals with lotteries, and the scheme promoted by the petitioners is a lottery, and therefore, the Act is applicable to them. (24). In this view of the case perhaps it would be unnecessary to consider the alternative submissions made by Mr. Seervai that even if the topic of legislation was not betting and gambling, it was entertainment or amusement or in the further alternative luxuries. If we are wrong in the view that we take that this legislation deals with the topic of betting and gambling, then we are not prepared to accept the contention of Mr. Seervai that this legislation deals with entertainment and amusement or with luxuries. The entertainment and amusement contemplated by entry 33 of List II with regard to legislation and entry 62 of List II with regard to taxes is not the subjective entertainment or amusement which a person may receive by solving a crossword puzzle or by indulging in other mental or intellectual pleasure. The entertainment and amusement contemplated by entry 33 of List II with regard to legislation and entry 62 of List II with regard to taxes is not the subjective entertainment or amusement which a person may receive by solving a crossword puzzle or by indulging in other mental or intellectual pleasure. The entertainment or amusement contemplated is something objective outside the person amused or entertained, and with regard to the tax on entertainment and amusement, the tax also is on the spectator who witnesses some amusement or entertainment. Therefore, although it may be said that a person who solves a crossword puzzle is amusing himself or entertaining himself, this is not the amusement which the Constitution contemplates in placing the topic of entertainments and amusement in the relevant entries. With regard to luxuries it is significant to note that the plural and not the singular is used, and the luxuries in respect of which a tax can be imposed under entry 62 is a tax on goods or articles which constitute luxuries, and it is again significant to note that the topic of luxuries only is to be found in entry 62 in the taxation power and not in either entry 33 or 34. That clearly shows that, what was contemplated was a tax on certain articles or goods constituting luxuries and not legislation controlling, an activity which may not be necessary activity but may be necessary and in that sense a luxury". 10. Taking assistance from these observations, the learned Judges of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Harris Wilson ( supra ) observed (in paragraph 6 of the Report) that, " ....If for deriving entertainment, a visitor has to perform something then what he sees or hears as a result of his performance is not entertainment provided by the petitioners. It is true that in the course of performance, a performer may also feel entertained but that is not what is contemplated by the charging section. To bring an activity of the proprietor within the net of the charging section, that activity by itself, without anything more, should be likely to amuse or entertain a person.'" 11. It is noticeable that the observations of Chagla J., in R.M.D.C. case were mere obiter. To bring an activity of the proprietor within the net of the charging section, that activity by itself, without anything more, should be likely to amuse or entertain a person.'" 11. It is noticeable that the observations of Chagla J., in R.M.D.C. case were mere obiter. The concept that to bring an activity of the proprietor within the net of the charging section, the activity by itself, without anything more, should be likely to amuse or entertain a person fails to notice the consideration that amusement is in the nature of a pleasurable occupation of attention or diversion of mind and entertainment includes amusement in that sense. It is, as defined in shorter Oxford Dictionary, an action of occupying attention agreeably, that which affords interest or amusement. The learned Judge who decided Gopal Krishna Agrawal's case, were, with respect, plainly right when they said that, "It is not at all necessary that there must be public performance and there must be an entertainer and the entertained and the persons entertained should not be a part of the entertainment provided. A person who is required to pay for the use of the Video Machine (is) himself the entertainer and the entertained as in the case of a person playing on the Piano or the Sitar. The pleasure or amusement which such a person derives is entertainment................... 12. Confining the competence of the State Legislature to legislate only in respect of such activity of entertainment where the person entertained or amused does not participate in the activity himself but obtains pleasure objectively from some body else performance would be reading the words of the entry not in their widest possible amplitude but in narrow manner which ts opposed to settled principles for interpreting the entries 13. In Calico Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, AIR 1961 M.P. 257 , the question was whether the display of fabrics of the petitioner Mill manneguines on a stage in a Dome put up by the Mills amounted to an entertainment. The Bench which decided the case observed (in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Report) that, "..............The exhibition for sale of the fabrics themselves in elegant surroundings under a canopy put up by the petitioners did not afford any gratification, diversion or amusement. It was no more than a display of cloth and apparels in a well-decorated shop. The Bench which decided the case observed (in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Report) that, "..............The exhibition for sale of the fabrics themselves in elegant surroundings under a canopy put up by the petitioners did not afford any gratification, diversion or amusement. It was no more than a display of cloth and apparels in a well-decorated shop. The display by mannequins was simply a spectacle of living people of instead of dummy models showing oft' the fabrics for impressing on the visitors the 'chic' of the material manufactured by the petitioner-Mill. To call such an exhibition "entertainment" is to give a very strained meaning to the words and to the language of the Act The token of Rs. 2/- obtained by a person visiting the Dome during evening hours was nothing more than a part advance payment towards the purchases that may be made." 14. We may notice that the amount of Rs. 2/- was adjustable against purchase made by a visitor to the exhibition of fabrics. This decision does not advance the petitioner's case. 15. In Maharaja of Jaipur Museum Trust City Palace Jaipur v. State of Rajasthan and another AIR 1971 Raj. 151 , the trust permitted visitors to the museum known as the City Palace Museum on payment of certain fees prescribed by the Trust. The levy of Entertainment Tax on the proceeds so received was challenged by the Trust. V.P. Tyagi, J. upheld the validity of the levy under Entry 62 by noticing the principle that the entries were not to be read in a restrictive manner but had to be considered in their widest possible amplitude. 16. The submission of Sri Tandon also is that the fact that no amount was charged for entry to the parlour where the Video Game machines were installed led to the conclusion that the taxable event, namely, "payment for admission" to an entertainment, could not be said to have taken place at all so that the petitioners were not required to make payment of any amount by way Entertainment Tax. This submission over-looks the definition of the' expression contained in clause (1) of section 2 of the Act which includes any payment, by whatever name called f or any purpose whatever, connected with an entertainment, which a person is required to make in any form as a condition attending or continuing to attend the entertainment, either in addition to the payment, if any, for admission. In view of definition, it is difficult to sustain the submission made by Sri Tandon. We respectfully agree with the Division, bench when it observes in Gopal Krishna Agrawal's case that, " The payment may be for any performance connected with the entertainment which a person is required to make as a condition of attending or continuing to attend the entertainment. The admission to the premises where the entertainment is provided for may be free but if payment is made for admission to entertainment it will attract the provisions of the Act." 17. We are unable to hold, on the basis of the additional question canvassed by Sri Tandon in these petitions, that the provisions of the Act were inapplicable to the petitioners. We may add that in exercise of powers under section 11 (1) of the Act, the State Government exempted certain classes of entertainments from payment of Entertainment Tax with effect from August 16, 1981 through notification No. XXX-EB-6 (2)/76 Finance (Ent. Tax Section) dated July 22, 1981 of Vitt. (Manoranjan) Kar Anubhag which was published in the U.P. Gazette Extra-ordinary dated July 22, 1981 at page 2. At item No. (9) of this notification occurs the following entry ; "(9) Games and sports whether held by registered sports associations or by any other body (excluding games of Skill and Video games or any other game of electronic devices by whatever name called)." 18. It is obvious that the Video Games are treated by the State Government as an item of sports and games. An item of sports and Games, in any case, is comprised within the ambit of Entry 62 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution where it talks of "entertainment and amusement." 19. In sum, the petitions fail and are dismissed though the parties are left to bear their own costs. 20. An item of sports and Games, in any case, is comprised within the ambit of Entry 62 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution where it talks of "entertainment and amusement." 19. In sum, the petitions fail and are dismissed though the parties are left to bear their own costs. 20. While the judgment was being delivered, learned counsel for the petitioner made an oral prayer that a certificate may be granted to the petitioners to take the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court as envisaged by Article 134-A of the Constitution. Since there is divergence of opinion in the view taken by this Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court, we certify under Article 133 of the Constitution the case to be fit for appeal to the Supreme Court as it involves a substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.