JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - The Petitioner assails the order passed by the trial court u/s 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short. 'the Code') taking cognisance of an offence punishable u/s 411 of the Indian Penal Code against him and summoning him as an accused person to stand his trial along with the accused Jagannath Mishra, who, on the basis of a charge-sheet placed against him, stood charged for commission of offences punishable under Sections 457 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused Jagannath Misra, it was alleged, had committed theft from the dwelling house of Bairagi Charan Barik of village Shankarpur during the night of September 9/10, 1980. In the charge-sheet, the Petitioner and Rankanidhi Sahu, against whom the trial court has also taken cognisance for an offence punishable u/s 411 of the Indian Penal Code for his trial the same case, had been named as witnesses for the prosecution as the other accused, namely. Jagannath Misra, bad allegedly sold some stolen articles to them. After examination of three witnesses for the prosecution, the learned. Magistrate passed the following orders: Accused is produced today I.O. is present examined, cross-examined and discharged as P.W. 3. It appears from the P.W. 1 and 3 that the accused person had sold the stolen articles to Sri Bachulal Mehata s/o Champaklal Meheta of Chandana Bazar P.S. Bhadrak and Rankanidhl Sahu slo Paramananda Sahu of Pur una bazar, P.S. Bhadrak. So It discloses an offence u/s 411, I.P.C. against this above named two persons. So I took cognizance offence u/s 411, I.P.C. against these two persons. Issue summons against them to appear in the court and to face their trial in the court of law. Put up on 23-1-1982 for appearance. Accused Jagannath is remanded to jail custody up to 5-1-1982, 19-1-1982 and 23-1-1982. It is this order which is challenged in this revision as illegal and Improper. 2. Mr. S. Misra-I, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has submitted before me that there was complete absence of evidence to indicate that the Petitioner had dishonestly received or retained any stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the same to be a stolen property and the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to proceed u/s 319 of the Code and pass the impugned order. It has been submitted at the Bar that Rankanidhi Sahu, the other accused person against whom cognisance has also been taken by the impugned order, has not come up in revision. I have, however, put the learned Additional Standing Counsel to notice and to submit as to whether the impugned order passed against the other accused person who has not challenged the order should not also be set aside. The learned Additional Standing Counsel has submitted that on the materials on record, the learned Magistrate went wrong in proceeding against the Petitioner and Rankanidhi Sahu. I am of the view, for the reasons to follow, that the contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner shall prevail and the concession made by the learned Additional Standing Counsel is fair and reasonable. 3. The impugned order has been passed u/s 319 of the Code. While considering the scope of Section 351 of the old Code, the Law Commission had suggested that it should be made fairly comprehensive so as to cover the summoning of a person, other than the accused who was concerned with the offence, but was not present in the court. It had also suggested that the newly added accused could be tried for an offence connected with the one for which the original accused was under trial. It was, therefore, proposed to recast Section 351 of the old Code making it comprehensive and providing that there would be difference in the mode of taking cognisance if a new added during the proceedings, though the evidence heard in the presence of the newly added accused, that the provision has been made in the new Code. 4. In a recent case reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others their Lordships of the Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 319 of the Code and observed and held: This provision gives ample powers to any Court to take cognizance and add any person not being an accused before it and try him along with the other accused. This provision was also the subject matter of a decision by this Court in Joginder Singh and Another Vs. This provision was also the subject matter of a decision by this Court in Joginder Singh and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Another, where Tulzapurkar, J., speaking for the Court observed thus: A plain reading of Section 319(1), which occurs in Chapter XXIV dealing with general provisions as to inquiries and trials, clearly shows that it applies to all the Courts including a Sessions Court and as such a Sessions Court will have the power to add any person, not being the accused before it, but against whom there appears during trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence, as an accused and direct him to be tried along with the other accused. In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the Court that the other, accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed have also committed the offence the Court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. But, we would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken.... In the case of Dr. S.S. Khanna v. Chief Secretary, Patna and Anr. 1983 (1) Crimes 1049, the Supreme Court has laid down that a person against whom a complaint has been made along with some other person and who, after an inquiry u/s 202 of the Code, is not proceeded against by the Court, can be summoned at a later stage u/s 319 of the Code to stand his trial for the same or connected offence or offences along with the other person against whom process had been issued earlier by the court. 5. It would thus be noticed that a court of trial has ample jurisdiction to proceed against a person u/s 319 of the Code if there are justifiable reasons to do so, but as has been laid down by the Supreme Court, this power has to be exercised sparingly and for compelling reasons. In the instant case, according to the learned Magistrate, the evidence of P.Ws. In the instant case, according to the learned Magistrate, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3 would be the foundation for proceeding against the Petitioner and the other person, namely, Rankanidhi Sahu, u/s 411 of the Indian Penal Code. It may be stated at the cost of repetition that on the completion of investigation, these persons had not been proceeded against and had, on the other hand, been named as witnesses in the charge-sheet for the prosecution. The State had not made an application for addition of these persons as accused persons u/s 319 of the Code. The learned Magistrate proceeded suo motu and had passed the impugned order. 6. All that P.W. 1 bad stated in his evidence was that the accused Jagannath Misra had given out that he had sold the stolen articles to the Petitioner and Rankanidhi Sahu. P.W. 3, who was m charge of investigation of the case, had merely stated about the seizure of some articles from the Petitioner and Rankanidhi Sahu. There was no material that either the Petitioner or Rankanidhi Sahu had received or retained the property having knowledge or having reason to believe that the property was a stolen one. There was no evidence either that the alleged stolen articles had been sold to the Petitioner and the other person at much lesser price than their value. The learned Magistrate had not recorded any finding that there were prima facie materials indicating the ingredients which would make out an offence punishable u/s 411 of the Indian Penal Code. No entrance of dishonest intention or retention of a stolen article can be drawn from the mere fact that the articles had been sold to the persons from whom the articles were seized and such an inference can legally and legitimately be drawn if other circumstances would point to the fact that the persons who had purchased stolen articles had the knowledge or had reason to believe that the articles were stolen ones. The offences made punishable u/s 411 is not the receipt of the stolen property from any particular person or its retention, but the receipt or retention of such property knowing or having reason to believe that it has been stolen. The word 'believe' is a much stronger word than the word 'suspect'. The offences made punishable u/s 411 is not the receipt of the stolen property from any particular person or its retention, but the receipt or retention of such property knowing or having reason to believe that it has been stolen. The word 'believe' is a much stronger word than the word 'suspect'. There is thus the necessity to show that the circumstances were such that a reasonable man must have felt convinced in his mind that the property with which he was dealing must have been stolen property. It is not sufficient to show that the person receiving or retaining such property was careless or that he had reason to suspect that the property was stolen or that he did not make sufficient enquiry to ascertain whether it had been honestly acquired. The learned Magistrate did not keep these principles in mind and without incriminating materials against the Petitioner and Rankanidhi Sahu, went legally wrong in passing the impugned order u/s 319 of the Code by taking cognizance and summoning the Petitioner and Rankanidhi Sahu. Although Rankanidhi Sahu has not made an application In revision, this Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, can set at naught the Impugned order even in respect of him by giving notice to the State, as has been done by me, to have its say and without giving notice to that person as the order annulling the one passed by the learned Magistrate would be to his advantage. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the criminal proceeding against the Petitioner and Rankanidhi Sahu shall have to be quashed and the proceeding in so far as the Petitioner and Rankanidhi Sahu are concerned is quashed. The impugned order is set aside.