JUDGMENT - GINWALA, A.A., J.: - This revision application has been filed against the order passed by the learned District Judge, Buldana on 11-8-1982 dismissing the appeal which the present applicants had preferred against the order passed by the trial Court on 30-4-1982 granting temporary injunction in favour of the present non-applicants, restraining the applicants from obstructing them in the user of their way to their field bearing S.No. 31/3 which belongs to the applicants, for going to field S.No. 31/1, which belong to the non-applicants. The suit has been filed by the present non-applicants against the applicants for declaration that they have a right of way to approach their field S.No. 31/1 through the field S.No. 31/3, belonging to the applicants and for a permanent injunction restraining them from obstructing this way. At the same time an application for temporary injunction pending the suit was filed which, as said above, was allowed by the trial Court. 2. Mr. V.M. Kulkarni, the learned Counsel for the applicants, challenged the impugned order of the Appellate Court on three counts. He firstly submitted that the non-applicants had already initiated proceedings under the Mamlatdars' Courts Act which were pending at the time when the suit was filed. According to Shri Kulkarni, if those proceedings were pending, in which the non-applicants had claimed some relief which they are claiming in the present suit, the trial Court should have refrained from proceeding with the suit. Mr. Kulkarni secondly submitted that both the courts below have not taken into consideration the fact that in the sale-deed dated 16-9-1952, under which the original owner, namely Surajmal had sold the field S.No. 31/3 to Vishwanath, who is predecessor-in-tile of the applicants, no mention has been made of the way through S.No. 31/3 through in the sale-deed executed by Surajmal on the same day in respect of field S.No. 31/1 such a mention has been made by interpolation of a line in the recital in the sale-deed executed by Surajmal in favour of Vishwanath ought to have been given due weight by the Courts below and non-consideration of this aspect seriously affects the decision. Thirdly Mr. Kulkarni submits that no public documents have been produced to show that the way existed through field S.No. 31/3 for approaching field S.No. 31/1. Thirdly Mr. Kulkarni submits that no public documents have been produced to show that the way existed through field S.No. 31/3 for approaching field S.No. 31/1. According to him, normally if there is a right way through the field, there would be a mention of it in the relevant revenue records. 3. Mr. Khapre, the learned Counsel for the non-applicants, raised preliminary objection to the maintainability of the revision application on the ground that the order of the trial Court was appealable order and kif that was so, the present revision application would be barred under sub-section (2) of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). For this proposition he relies on the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in (Ramdeen v. Ramswaroop)1, 1981 M.P.L.J. 575. Sub-section (2) of section 115 of the Code states that the High Court shall not, under section 115, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. The plain reading of this sub-section would indicate that the party will not be entitled to invoke the revisional proceedings can be taken up in the Court under section 115 of the code against a decree or an order which is appealable. Now the present revision application has been filed against the order passed by the learned District Judge in an appeal against the order passed by the trial Court under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code. What is challenged before this Court is not the order of the trial Court but the order of the Appellate Court. In fact, the order of the trial Court has merged in the order of the Appellate Court. Now appeal was filed before the learned District Judge under the provisions of Order 43. No second appeal is permitted against the decisions from appeals preferred under Order 43. No second appeal is permitted against the decisions from appeals preferred under Order 43. In short, therefore, the order which has been passed by the learned District Judge in this case is not appealable order and if that is so, revision application would not be barred under sub-section (2) of section 115 of the Code as urged by Mr. Khapre. 4. In short, therefore, the order which has been passed by the learned District Judge in this case is not appealable order and if that is so, revision application would not be barred under sub-section (2) of section 115 of the Code as urged by Mr. Khapre. 4. No doubt the facts in Ramdeen's case have been more or less similar to the facts of the present case and similar point seems to have been raised before the learned Single Judge in that case. The judgment proceeded mostly and mainly on the propriety of interfering with the impugned order in the revisional jurisdiction of the Court. However, referring to sub-section (2) of section 115 of the Code the learned Single Judge observed as follows: “It may be further observed that by the Amending Act, 1976, sub-section (2) has been inserted in section 115 of the Code. It is enjoined by the said provision: “The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.” This obviously is also a clear bar for exercising the power of revision under section 115, particularly when the appeal against the trial Court's order under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 had already been preferred, and decided by the lower appellate to Court.” It would appear that the learned Single Judge has clearly missed the point that the revision application was filed against the appellate order and not against the order of the trial Court and obviously no appeal has been provided against the appellate order. Unfortunately the learned Single Judge has not entered into a discussion on the applicability of sub-section (2) of section 115 to the facts of the case before him. It seems to me that the observations quoted above have been passingly made by him, through the revision application was dismissed, as I have stated above, on the ground of propriety of interfering with the revisional jurisdiction. I, therefore, do not find myself in agreement with what has been stated by the learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramdeen's case with regard to applicability of sub-section (2) of section 115 of the Code to the facts of the present case. The preliminary objection is, therefore, overruled. 5. I, therefore, do not find myself in agreement with what has been stated by the learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramdeen's case with regard to applicability of sub-section (2) of section 115 of the Code to the facts of the present case. The preliminary objection is, therefore, overruled. 5. Coming to the merits of the case, in so far as the first ground urged by Mr. Kulkarni is concerned, it has to be borne in mind that section 9 of the Code confers jurisdiction on courts to try suits of civil nature excepting the suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Now there is nothing either in the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906 or the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, which expressly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try a suit in respect of a matter which is pending before the Mamlatdar under the Mamlatdar's Courts Act or the revenue authorities, under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. The only thing which remains to be seen is whether there is an implied bar by any of the provisions under these two Acts. Section 5 of the Mamlatdars' Courts Act empowers the Mamlatdars inter alia to remove any obstruction which may be caused in the user of a right or customary way in respect of agricultural land. Section 143 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code also confers power on the Tahasildar to make inquiry into and decide claims by persons holding land in a survey number to a right of way over the boundaries of other survey numbers. Now the relevant provisions contained in these two Acts would show that these provisions are meant to serve as summary remedies for providing expeditious relief, to the aggrieved party. These provisions would further show that the decisions of the authorities concerned under these two Acts are not meant to be conclusive but rather subject to the decision of the Civil Court. All this would, therefore, indicate that the Legislature never intended to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court even impliedly by enacting the relevant provisions in these two Acts. It is not, therefore, possible to uphold this contention of Mr. Kulkarni. 6. In so far as the second and third contentions of Mr. Kulkarni are concerned, they relate to the appreciation of evidence. It is not, therefore, possible to uphold this contention of Mr. Kulkarni. 6. In so far as the second and third contentions of Mr. Kulkarni are concerned, they relate to the appreciation of evidence. It is now well settled that a revisional Court cannot interfere with a finding of fact howsoever grossly erroneous it may be, unless the error goes to the jurisdiction of the Court. Simply because the courts below have not looked to a particular document or have not considered the question of absence of any entries in the village records, does not mean that any jurisdictional error has been committed. I am not, therefore, inclined to interfere with the impugned order on this count. 7. The result, therefore, is that the revision application stands dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs. Application dismissed. -----