BEBERA, J. ( 1 ) UPON hearing Mr. P. K Misra, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Rath, the learned Additional Standing Counsel, I am of the view that the impugned order passed by Mr. A. P. Das, the learned Sub divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bhadrak, under section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, the Code) summoning the petitioner as an accused person in a case in which Chanda Dei and Waish Ahmed have been facing trial for commission of an offence punishable under section 3 (a) of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act. 1966 (for short, the Act), has been passed without jurisdiction and in flagrant violation of the provisions made in section 319 of the Code and it would be noticed, for the reasons to follow, that the impugned order has been passed not to further the ends of justice and it has caused serious injustice and prejudice to the present petitioner. ( 2 ) THE prosecution came forward with a case that accused Chanda Devi was in wrongful possession of railway property and that consequent upon her statement, railway property had been recovered from a rented house in the occupation of the other accused person, namely, Waish Ahmed. The petitioner is the landlord and he had given out the house to the co-accused Waish Ahmed on rent. The petitioner had been named as a witness for the prosecution in the prosecution report. After examination of the Sub-Inspector of Railway Protection Force, the learned Sub- divisional Judicial Magistrate considered the question of framing a charge against the accused person standing trial and while doing so, passed the impugned order summon in the petitioner as an accused person holding that he found prima facie material against the petitioner for commission of the offence punishable under section 3 (a) of the Act. Although not expressly stated in the order, the impugned order had been passed under section 319 of the Code. ( 3 ) SECTION 319 of the Code reads: -p319 Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence. Although not expressly stated in the order, the impugned order had been passed under section 319 of the Code. ( 3 ) SECTION 319 of the Code reads: -p319 Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence. (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which be appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purposed aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence, which he appears to have committed: (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub section (1), then a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-heard b) Subject to the provisions of clause (a) the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the injury or trial was commenced. ( 4 ) IN the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohatgi and others the Supreme Court, dealing with the scope of section 319 of the Code, observed and held: this provision gives ample powers to any Court to take cognizance and add any person not being an accused before it and try him along with the other accused. This provision was also the subject matter of a decision by this Court in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, where Tulzapurkar, J. , speaking for the Court observed thus: a plain reading of section 391 (I), which occurs in Chapter XXIV dealing with general provisions as to inquiries and trials clearly shows that it applies to all the Courts including a Sessions Court and as such a Session Court will have the power to add any person, not being the accused before it, but against whom there appears during trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence, as an accused and direct him to be tried along with the other accused. In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the Court that the other accused or who have not been arrayed - as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed have also committed the offence the Court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. But we would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken. . . ( 5 ) A court of trial bas jurisdiction to proceed against a person who has not been named as an accused person in the complaint, charge-sheet or prosecution report if there are justifiable grounds to take cognizance in respect of any offence against him and to summon him as an accused person; This power shall, however, be exercised sparingly and for compelling reasons. ( 6 ) THE impugned order has been passed on the basis of the evidence Of the sole witness examined by the trial court at the stage when the order was passed. His evidence was that railway property had been recovered from the shop which was in the occupation of the co-accused Waish Abmed. As the shop had been closed and the person in occupation of it had allegedly absconded, the help of the petitioner, who was the owner of the house, was taken to open it and with the help of a key, the petitioner opened the lock. As the shop had been closed and the person in occupation of it had allegedly absconded, the help of the petitioner, who was the owner of the house, was taken to open it and with the help of a key, the petitioner opened the lock. On fails to comprehend as to how merely on the basis of this evidence and in the absence of any other evidence, the learned Sub divisional Judicial Magistrate chose to summon the petitioner as an accused person. As has been submitted at the Bar, there was no evidence whatsoever that any railway property had been recovered from the occasion of the petitioner. The learned Sub divisional Judicial Magistrate had not given any reason as to how he came to find that there were materials to proceed against the petitioner for commission of an, offence punishable under the Act. The impugned order is a cryptic one and would give a clear indication that it had been passed without application of mind. I thus find that the learned Magistrate had exercised his jurisdiction illegally and bad summoned the petitioner as an accused person in violation of the provisions made in section 319 of the Code. To allow such an order to stand would mean travesty of justice. ( 7 ) IN the result, I would allow the revision, quash the impugned order and with it, the criminal proceeding in so far as it relates to the petitioner. Revision allowed .