JUDGMENT - Khatri S.N., J.-This judgment disposes of four proceedings, being A. O. No. 501 of 1979 arid 18 of 1980, Civil Revision Application No. 788 of 1979 and Writ Petition No. 249 of 1980. Ail these matters are directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune, (Shri P. B. Datar) passed under section 17 of the Arbitration Act in terms of an impugned award, after upholding its validity. A. O. No. 501 of 1979 and Civil Revision Application No. 788 of 1979 are filed by Shri Birdichand Lalchand Navlakha, Bansilal Lalchand Navlakha, Ghanshyamdas Lalchand Navlakha, Smt. Nandubai Lalchand Navlakha, Smt. Premilabai Nensukh Navlakha and Smt. Sushilabai Premraj Pagaria. For sake of con-venientreference I shall hereinafter collectively refer to these parties as 'Navlakha group' or 'Navlakhas'. The other two proceedings are filed by Shri Chajidrabhan Dakhale, Madanlal Dakhale and Smt. Padambai Bafna (for short, 'Dakhale group' or 'Dakhales'). 2. The facts which are not in dispute are these: Navlakhas and Dakhales were the partners of a firm called “Nawa Swadeshi Oil Mill and Refinery” carrying on business at Jadcharla in Mehboob Nagar District of Andhra Pradesh. The partnership is evidenced by a Deed dated 7th Decero-ber 1964. The business had, however, actually started on 7–1-1964 in anticipation of the deed. On 9–2-1972 Birdichand Navlakha dissolved the-partnership by a registered notice and on 25–6-1972 he referred the disputes-to arbitration in terms of a clause in the deed. The Navlakha group appointed one Shri Ramnarayan Raghunath Zanvar as their arbitrator, while-the other group appointed one Shri Uttamchartd Bhikamdas Pbkarna as-their arbitrator. They are made respondents Nos. 4 and 5 in Appeal No. 501 of 1979 as well as in Civil Revision Application No. 788 of 1979 both of which are filed by the Navlakha group. One Shri K. N. Hingne was appoint-ed as Umpire by the arbitrators. On 3–12–1974 both the arbitrators made-a unanimous award. By this award it was directed that the Navlakha group-should pay to the Dakhale group a sum of Rs. 13,54,634.49 Ps. as their dues. It was further directed that the Navfakbas would be liable for the sum of Rs. 9,63,297.58 Ps. which was found due as on 9–2-1972 to their other con-cerns from the suit partnership. By this award it was directed that the Navlakha group-should pay to the Dakhale group a sum of Rs. 13,54,634.49 Ps. as their dues. It was further directed that the Navfakbas would be liable for the sum of Rs. 9,63,297.58 Ps. which was found due as on 9–2-1972 to their other con-cerns from the suit partnership. Thee there is an important term in the award, whereunder all the assets and liabilities of the partnership were-retained with the Navtakha group, and they were required to pay a sum of Rs. 58,000 to each of the three partners constituting the Dakhale group. 3. The above award was not registered under the Registration Act. The arbitrators filed this award in the lower Court on 12–3-1975. This matter came to be registered as Special Suit No. 139 of 1975. Within 30 days of the service of notice of filing of the award, the Navlakbas filed in the lower Court on 23–5-1975, an application under section 30 of the Abitration Act to set aside the award, The award was challenged mainly on the grounds that it was compulsorily registrable under section 17 (1) (b) of the Registra- tion Act, that the arbitrators had misconducted themselves and the proceed- ings and that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority under the reference. This application (Misc. Petition No. 350 of 1975) was naturally opposed by the Dakhale group and the two arbitrators. None of the contentions raised by the Navlakhas found favour with the learned trial Judge, who dismissed the application. Eventually the learned Judge proceeded to pass a judgment and decree in accordance with the terms of the award, acting under sec- tion 17 of the Arbitration Act. Here it may be stated that before the arbitrators the Dakhale group had claimed interest @ 9% p. a. on the amount of Rs. 9,63,297.58 made payable to them, from the date of the award till the date of the decree. This claim was not entertained by the arbitrators on the view that they had no power to grant future interest after the date of the award. 4. Being aggrieved, both the groups have approached this Court by filing proceedings as stated in the opening paragraph of this judgment. The Navlakhas reiterate their prayer for setting aside the award and the conse- quent judgment and decree passed by the tower Court under section 17-of the Arbitration Act. 4. Being aggrieved, both the groups have approached this Court by filing proceedings as stated in the opening paragraph of this judgment. The Navlakhas reiterate their prayer for setting aside the award and the conse- quent judgment and decree passed by the tower Court under section 17-of the Arbitration Act. The challenge of the Dakhale group is limited to a solitary point, namely, the arbitrators' refusal to grant them future interest. 5. Shri Agarwal who appears for the Navlakhas has pressed the follow- ing points: (i) The award was compulsorily registrable under section 17 (1) of the (Registration Act, inasmuch as, admittedly the partnership owns immoveable property worth over Rs. 100. As the award is not admittedly registered, the lower Court was precluded from using it as evidence under section 49 of the Registration Act and was not justified in passing judgment and decree on its basis. (ii) The award is vitiated on account of the arbitrators' failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 48 of the Indian Partnership Act. This omission on their part amounts to legal misconduct within the meaning of section 30 (a) of the Arbitration Act. (iii) The learned trial Judge was wrong in rejecting an application for amendment made by the Navlakha group giving particulars of personal mis-conduct oh the part of the arbitrators, and (iv) The arbitrators have exceeded their authority conferred on them by the reference. I shall proceed to discuss these questions serially. 6. Before I proceed to consider the question whether the award was compulsorily registrable, I shall dispose of a preliminary objection raised by Dr. Naik for the Dakhale group, that the appeal and revision of Navlakhas are not maintainable, inasmuch as the lower Court had no power to consider the objection about want of registration. To appreciate the contention, it is necessary to advert to certain facts. It is common ground that the objec-tion on the ground of non-registration of the award was not taken by the Navlakha group in their parent application which was filed on 23–5-1975, They filed an amendment application on 15–6-1977, long after the limitation for preferring an application under section 30 read with section 33 of the Arbitration Act had expired. This amendment was allowed by the learned trial Judge. According to Dr. This amendment was allowed by the learned trial Judge. According to Dr. Naik, the learned Judge had absolutely no jurisdiction or power to allow this amendment application, inasmuch as it was preferred after the expiry of limitation. He has cited a ruling of this Court in Hastimal v. Hiralal1. It is held by this Court that it a party to an award wants to challenge the validity of the award on any ground and desires that the award should either be remitted or set aside, he has to make an application in that behalf under section 33 within the time prescribed by Article 158 of the old Limitation Act of 1908. It is further observed that a Court has no jurisdiction to condone delay which a party may make in filing an application under section 33 as section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to such an application. Now according to Dr. Naik, inasmuch as the parent application did not contain any objection on this ground, the lower Court was in error in permitting the Navlakhas to raise the objection toy an application, preferred after the expiry of limitation. I am afraid the reasoning founded on section 5 of the old Limitation Act will not hold good after the advent of the present Limitation Act of 1963. Benefit of old sec-tion 5 was available only in case of those applications to which that section was made expressly applicable. The position has materially changed under the present Limitation Act, whereunder all applications, with the exceptions of those under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are covered by sec-tion 5. There is no force left after 1963 in the proposition that an applica-tion under section 30 read with section 33 of the Arbitration Act must be made in all cases within 30 days of the service of notice of award on the parties and that the limitation cannot be extended under section 5 of the Limitation Act for any reason whatsoever. Now even the parent application-can be entertained after the expiry of the period of limitation, provided, of course there is sufficient cause for the delay which naturally will have to be explained by the party concerned. It follows, an amendment application could also for the same reasons be preferred after the expiry of limitation. Now even the parent application-can be entertained after the expiry of the period of limitation, provided, of course there is sufficient cause for the delay which naturally will have to be explained by the party concerned. It follows, an amendment application could also for the same reasons be preferred after the expiry of limitation. Indeed, as the factual position is, this particular objection on the ground of limitation was not raised by the Dakhales before the lower Court. I do not find anything remiss in learned Judge's granting this application. 7. Even assuming that the amendment application was wrongly reject- ed, this does not in any way affect the final position. The law is well settled that if an award requires compulsory registration under section 17 of the Registration Act and if it is not registered, the Court cannot, in view of the peremptory oparation of the disability imposed by section 49 (c) of the Registration Act, receive the award as evidence of the transaction affecting the immoveable property. In other words the Court cannot simply have a look at the award. It follows that it will be helpless in passing any judg- ment or decree on its basis. If any authorities are needed, reference may be made with advantage to (Ratanlal Sharma v. Purshottam Harit)2, (Satisft Kumar v. Surinder Kumar)3, (Smt. Kusumlataben v. Prafulchandra)4 and Nani (Bala Saha v. Ram Gopal Saha)5. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this proposition. Indeed, in Ratanlal Shanna's case the lower Court had dismissed the application under section 30 of the Arbitration Act as time-barred, and yet had declined to pass judgment and decree on the basis of the unregistered award, inasmuch as it required compulsory registration. Vimadalal J. speaking for this Court in Kusumlataben's case, has observed that in such a case even if neither party makes an application in this behalf, the Court can and indeed, should, even suo motu go into the question as to whether it has jurisdiction to pass a decree in terms of the award, and if the award suffers from the infirmity of want of compulsory registration, it should dismiss the notice of motion taken out for passing judgment and decree in terms of the award under section 17 of the Arbitration Act and “strike the award off the file”. It is thus obvious that the Court cannot turn a Nelson's eye to the infirmity in the award for want of compulsory registration, and will have to take due notice of it before passing any judgment under sec* tion 17 ibid. There is thus no merit in Dr. Naik's preliminary objection that the question of non-registration of the award cannot be taken into consideration. 8. Coming to the crux of the question, again the law is well settled that where a partner assigns or relinquishes his share as such in the partner- ship, registration of the award is not necessary even if the partnership owns immoveable property worth more than Rs. 100. However, if the impugned transaction involves the transfer of the immoveable property belonging to the partnership, as contradistinguished from a partner's share, registration will be compulsory, if the immoveable property involved is worth more than Rs. 100. I need refer only to one ruling of the Supreme Court, namely, Ratanlal Sharrna's case, already adverted to above. As observed in this case by the Supreme Court, the share of a partner in the partnership assess is equal to the value of his share in the net partnership assets after deduction of all liabilities and prior charges. Such share in effect is eventually quanti-fiable in terms of cash. Thus the assignee of a partner's share gets only the right of receiving the share of profits of the assignee. The 'share' of a partner in this sense is moveable property, and its transfer does not require registra-tion, irrespective of the value. We have thus primarily to see whether under the impugned award it is the share of the Dakhale group that has been assigned to the Navlakha group or whether it is the. immovable property belonging to the partnership, that is transferred to Navlakhas. This natur-ally takes me to the relevant provision made in the award. 9. The award is written in Marathi and the material clause runs as under:- 10. The English translation of the award is not made available to the Court. The terminology in Marathi is not very happy. However, I think that the following should be an adequate translation of the above. “The partnership Mill in dispute all estate all property assets and liabilities, discharge of Government taxes of all kinds etc.-'all responsibility regarding these and other things to rest with defendants Nos. The terminology in Marathi is not very happy. However, I think that the following should be an adequate translation of the above. “The partnership Mill in dispute all estate all property assets and liabilities, discharge of Government taxes of all kinds etc.-'all responsibility regarding these and other things to rest with defendants Nos. 1 to 6 (Navlakha group) and the Same has been accordingly hereby fixed up on them (confirmed). In this regard the defendants 1 to 6 (Navlakha group) absolutely indemnify the plaintiffs and defendants 7 and 8 (the Dakhale group).” The natural and obvious interpretation of this term will be that all the property (including immoveable property) of the partnership, stands vested in the Navlakhas. Clause 5 of the award further provides in effect that in return by way of consideration a sum of Rs. 58,000 will be payable by the Navlakhas to each of the three members of the Dakhale group. Clause No. 4 does not purport even by implication, much less expressly, to assign only the share of the Dakhales to the Navlakhas, in the sense in which the term 'share' is interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ratanlal Sharma's case. Indeed the language of Clause 4 of our award substantially resembles the language obtaining in the award in Ratanlal's case. 11. The question under consideration has been dealt with by the learned trial Judge in paragraphs 39 to 48 of his judgment. The learned Judge has reached the contrary conclusion, mainly because he is under the impression that any property, may be even immoveable property, is to be regarded as moveable property, simply because it becomes part of partner-ship assets. This test is obviously wrong. Although he has referred to a string of rulings, this basic misconception has all the way vitiated his final conclusion on the point. hold that the impugned award purports to vest all the partnership assets including immoveable property, admittedly worth more than Rs. 100, in the Navlakhas, as distinguished from assigning Dakhales' shares to them. This being so, the award requires compulsory registration under section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. The infirmity of want of registration goes to the root of the matter and the Court is precludedfrom having a look at the award, in view of peremptory bar im-posed by section 49 of the Registration Act. This being so, the award requires compulsory registration under section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. The infirmity of want of registration goes to the root of the matter and the Court is precludedfrom having a look at the award, in view of peremptory bar im-posed by section 49 of the Registration Act. I am aware that this bar operates against receipt of evidence of the transaction only so far as it affects immoveable property. However, as the facts in the present case are, the award is tangled with several clauses and, therefore, cannot be enforced in some parts, severed from the bad parts. Dr. Naik was also very fair in conceding that in case the instant award is held to be bad for want of registration, it will not be possible to separate the good part from the bad. 12. In view of the discussion above, this Court will have to set aside the order of the learned trial Judge, passing judgment and decree under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. This result follows irrespective of the consequence whether the proper order with regard to the award will or will not be to set it aside. It is held in Rani Bala v. Ram Gopal that want of registration is a defect de hors the award or. the decision of the arbitrator and in the case of an unregistered award which requires compulsory registra- tion the Court cannot either set it aside or supersede the arbitration. The proper course in such a case is only to pass an order dismissing the applica- tion made for securing judgment and decree under section 17 of the Arbitra tion Act. As I have already indicated above, the view of this Court as expressed by Vimadalal J. in Kusumlataben's case is also substantially the same. So the proper order in the present case will be to set aside the judg- ment and order passed by the lower Court under section 17 ibid. 13. In view of the conclusion reached above, it may not be necessary to deal with the rest of the points in extenso. I shall, therefore, refer to them only sketchily. There is substance in the contention of the Navlakha group that the award suffers from another fatal infirmity, in that the arbitra- tors have flouted the provisions of section 48 of the Partnership Act. I shall, therefore, refer to them only sketchily. There is substance in the contention of the Navlakha group that the award suffers from another fatal infirmity, in that the arbitra- tors have flouted the provisions of section 48 of the Partnership Act. In this regard we have a ruling of this Court which is reported in Sherbanubai v. Hooseinbhoy6. The short facts of this case were that the award directed the two partners Sherbanubai and Hooseinbhoy to satisfy the liabilities of the firm half and half. Further all the assets of the partner- ship were allotted to Hooseinbloy alone, on his paying.an amount of Rs. 31,000 and odd to Sherbanubai. Sherbanubai's submission was that she might be obliged to satisfy the debts of third parties from her own property, if the other partner failed to discharge his liability to the extent of half. Her grievance was that in that case she could not fall back on the partnership assets in this case. Chagla C. J. and Bhagwati J. (as he then was) held that the arbitrators had not complied with the mandatory provi-sions of sections 46 and 48 of the Indian Partnership Act and that the award was, therefore, vitiated on this ground. Dr. Naik is right in his submission that the error of law committed by the arbitrators should be patent on the face of the award, to enable the Court to strike it down on this ground. An error of law which is not so patent on the face of the award/is not enough to set aside the award. Now going through the award before us, there is no indication in it at all that the arbitrators, before transferring all the assets and liabilities of the firm on Navlakhas, had tried to apply the provisions of section 48 ibid. The fact that these provisions had been ignored completely, is apparent on the face of the award. 14. The learned trial Judge has rejected the contention of the Navlakha group in this regard by observing that the arbitrators had no alternative before them but to give the impugned directions, inasmuch as the Navlakha group did not co-operate with them in furnishing necessary data about the partnership assets. The learned Judge further relied on two Purshies Exs. 14. The learned trial Judge has rejected the contention of the Navlakha group in this regard by observing that the arbitrators had no alternative before them but to give the impugned directions, inasmuch as the Navlakha group did not co-operate with them in furnishing necessary data about the partnership assets. The learned Judge further relied on two Purshies Exs. 79 and 80, filed by the two groups before the arbitrators to hold that the arrangement was made by the arbitrators with the consent of both groups. He also relied on a case of the Calcutta High Court reported in (Pannalal v. Padmabati)7, to hold that the Navlakha group could not make any grievance, because the arrangement was not prejudicial to them, but on the other hand it was to their benefit. I cannot persuade myself to agree with the conclusions reached by the learned Judge. The Purshies Exs. 79 and 80 in the first place do not spell out any consent on the part of the Navlakha group to accept all the assets and liabilities of the partneship firm as such. It appears that these Purshies were filed before the arbitrators, pursuant to their “express directions to work out certain amounts on parti-cular basis fixed up by the arbitrators, themselves. Indeed, Dr. Naik has also made it clear that he does not rely on those Purshies to spell out any consent on the part of the Navlakha group, so as to empower the arbitrators to ignore the provisions of section 48 of the Partnership Act. His main attack rests on the ground that the Bombay ruling stands overruled by the Supreme Court ruling reported in (N. Chellappan v. Kerala State Electricity Board)8. Dr. Naik also argues that as held by the Supreme Court, it is only when an erroneous proposition of law is stated expressly in the award which forms the basis of the award, that the award can be set aside or remitted on the ground of error of law appa-rent on the face of the record. According to him the impugned award before us does not misstate the provisions of the section 48 of the Partnership Act, and as such it will not be open to this Court to see whether section 48 has been flouted. According to him the impugned award before us does not misstate the provisions of the section 48 of the Partnership Act, and as such it will not be open to this Court to see whether section 48 has been flouted. I have gone through the ruling carefully and find that there is nothing in it to hold that the Bombay ruling has been overruled expressly or even by implication. That the error of law should be patent on the face of the award, was very much present to the mind of the learned Judges who were dealing with the Bombay case. This will be evident from the last sentence in paragraph 28 of the judgment of Bhagwati J. The reasons why infraction of section 48 will render an award bad are too obvious to be stressed. Section 48 in substance requires that the partner-ship assets should in the first instance be made applicable in paying the debts of the firm to third parties, then next in paying rateably to each partner what is due to him from the firm for advances as distinguished from capital and thirdly in paying to each partner rateably what is due to him on account of the capital. It is only after all this is done that the residue, if any left, shall be divided among the partners in the proportions in which they were entitled to share profits. As observed.by the Division Bench in Sherbanubai, what a Court of law cannot do judicially, an arbitrator also cannot do. Needless to say that section 48 is the sheet anchor of the provisions of the Partnership Act, dealing with the winding up of the affairs of firm after its dissolution. No Court can flout the provisions of this section, while disposing of assets of a dissolved partnership. ]t follows that an arbitrator also cannot make any award, in breach of section 48 of the Partnership Act, unless all parties have consented to any other method of disposal. 15. The learned trial Judge was also wrong in applying the principle adumbrated in the Calcutta case of Padmabati, because there is no groundmade out to show that the provision made by the arbitrators with regard to the allotment of the assets to the Navlakha group is beneficial to them. 15. The learned trial Judge was also wrong in applying the principle adumbrated in the Calcutta case of Padmabati, because there is no groundmade out to show that the provision made by the arbitrators with regard to the allotment of the assets to the Navlakha group is beneficial to them. A cursory look at the terms of the award will show that apart from other liabilities this group was required to pay a sum of Rs. 23 lakhs and odd to Dakhales and other concerns of Navlakhas who, it appears, were creditors of the suit partnership. It is true that according to the estimate given by the Navlakha group to the arbitrators, the total assets were worth Rs. 15 lakhs (See.Purshies Ex. 103). However, from this it cannot be spelt out that the exclusive allotment of the assets to them (burdened with all liabilities) was in any way beneficial to them. Prima facie disproportionately heavy burden has been thrown on the Navlakhas. Even the Calcutta case in substance holds that the Courts are empowered to allot the properties exclusively to a party, only when he is willing to take them at a valuation fixed by the Court or the arbitrator. There is nothing to show that this important condition has been fulfilled in the present case. The conclusion is inescap- able that the arbitrators have allotted all the, assets to and imposed the liabilities on, the Navlakha group exclusively, in patent contravention of the mandatory provisions of section 48 of the Partnership Act. As held by this* Court in Sherbanubai's case the award is liable to be set aside on this ground also. 16. The next submission of Shri Agarwal that the lower Court was in error in disallowing the amendment application of the Navlakha group seek-ing to give particulars of personal misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, is also not without substance. Dr. Naik supports the lower Courts' order on the ground that this plea was sought to be raised belatedly after the expiry of limitation prescribed for an application to set aside an award. It is true that the amendment application was filed long after the expiry of the limita-tion. Dr. Naik supports the lower Courts' order on the ground that this plea was sought to be raised belatedly after the expiry of limitation prescribed for an application to set aside an award. It is true that the amendment application was filed long after the expiry of the limita-tion. However, a perusal of the parent application which was admittedly filed in time, will show that in paragraph 7 thereof, the Navlakhas had averred in so many words that the arbitrators had misconducted themselves as well as the proceedings. The amendment application filed later on, only purported to give the particulars on this ple . The application which was made on 25–6-1977 states that it was only four days earlier that the Navltkhas came to know that the two arbitrators had had financial dealings with the other firms of Dakhale group. This statement is made on oath and remains unrebutted. Indeed, in the say opposing the amendment application, not only the Dakhales but the two arbitrators also have admitted that there were financial dealings between them during the course of their business. Their opposition to the amendment was based mainly on the ground that the Navlakhas had previous knowledge of these dealings and inspite of this knowledge they had agreed to their appointment as arbitrators. Now there is no reason to reject the assertion of the Navlakhas in their affidavit that they had come to know of the particulars of these dealings, only four days before the filing of the amendment application. It need not be stressed that the amendment raised serious and effective ground for challenging the award. The learned trial Judge should not have shut out the particulars by disallow-ing this amendment application. I do not mean to cast any aspersion on the integrity of arbitrators as such. However, the fact remains that if the averments were true in fact, then notwithstanding that the arbitrators might have acted honestly in utmost good faith, the allegations do technically constitute misconduct wihin the meaning of section 30 of the Arbitration Act. However, as the Navlakhas are succeeding on other grounds, it is not necessary to labour this point further. 17. Before parting with this point, I must advert to an objection raised by Dr. Naik. As the admitted facts are, the Navlakhas had approached this Court in revision against the order of the lower Court refusing the amend-ment application. However, as the Navlakhas are succeeding on other grounds, it is not necessary to labour this point further. 17. Before parting with this point, I must advert to an objection raised by Dr. Naik. As the admitted facts are, the Navlakhas had approached this Court in revision against the order of the lower Court refusing the amend-ment application. This revision was dismissed by my learned brother Pendse J. summarily on the ground that the order sought to be revised was an interlocutory order. Thereafter the Navlakha approached the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal. This petition was also withdrawn by them in the Supreme Court. Dr. Naik suggested that in view of all this, it is not open now to the Navlakhas to agitate this question. I am afraid I cannot agree. Pendse J. did not dismiss the revision on merits; but on the ground that it was not competent under the first proviso to section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This order does not preclude the Navlakhas from reagitating the question before me now? I leave the point here. 18. This takes me to the last submission of Shri Agarwal, namely, that the arbitrators have exceeded their authority under the terms of reference. In this connection he has drawn my attention to the clauses 2 and 3 of the award and also Purshies 79 and 80 on the basis of which the amounts paya-ble by the Navlakha group to the two groups were computed. It was pointed out that the amount payable to the Dakhale group, consists of Rs. three lakhs or so as principal and the balance of Rs. seven lakhs or so by way of interest. This according to Shri Agarwal was clearly in contravention of the rule of Damdupat. Now in the first place the alleged infraction of the rule of Damdupat is not apparent an the face of the award. The award does not show as to how the total amount was arrived at. In the premises it will not be fair to draw a conclusion that the arbitrators had committed infraction) of the rule of Damdupat. I need not labour this point any further. 19. The award does not show as to how the total amount was arrived at. In the premises it will not be fair to draw a conclusion that the arbitrators had committed infraction) of the rule of Damdupat. I need not labour this point any further. 19. Coming to the Writ Petition and the appeal' preferred by the Dakhales, there is now no need to consider the merits of their plea that the Arbitrators had power to grant interest from the date of award till the date of decree of the Court, for the simple reason that the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge under section 17 of the Arbitration Act are being set aside. If the award had been found operative, perhaps, their above plea would have been allowed. 20. In the result the Writ Petition No. 249 of 1980 and Appeal No. 18 of 1980 preferred by the Dakhales are hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal No. 501 of 1979 and Civil Revision Application No. 788 of 1979 are allowed with costs throughout. The judgment and decree passed by the lower Court under section 17 of the Arbitration Act are hereby set asida and the award is directed to be struck off the file. I regret that the effect of this order will perhaps be to open gates for a second round of protracted litigation. But in the circumstances of the case, this Court is helpless in preventing it. 21. Shri Agarwal says that at the time of granting stay, the appellants were directed by this Court to deposit 1/10th of the decretal amount in the lower Court. If this amount has not yet been withdrawn by the Dakbale group from the lower Court, the same shall be paid to the Navlakhas. How-ever, in case they have already withdrawn it, the Navlakhas will be at liberty to take proceedings according to law for the recovery. Order accordingly. ——