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1983 DIGILAW 145 (KAR)

S. N. GONDAKAR v. COMMR. OF COMMERCIAL TAXES

1983-07-04

K.J.SHETTY, S.R.RAJASEKHARA MURTHY

body1983
K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition under Sec. 23 (1) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (the Act) raises a narrow but not very easy point. The question raised for our consideration is whether the pickle jar or otherwise commonly called "bharani" falls under Entry 112 or entry 118 of the Second Schedule to the Act. For immediate reference we set out those two Entries below :"112. Chinaware, Porcelain ware and Stoneware other than those falling under any other entry eight per cent 118. Containers other than gunnies. Four per cent. " ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a dealer registered under thq provisions of the karnataka Sales Tax Act For the assessment year 1975-76 the petitinoer submitted the return of turnover declaring taxable turnover at Rs. 23,758-88 out of which the turnover of Rs. 19,938-68 pertains to sales of pickle jars. It was contended before the assessing authority that that turnover should be brought to tax at the rate of 4% under Entry 118. But the assesssing authority did not accept thalt contention. That turnover was taxed at 8% treating the pickle jars as Chinaware or Porcelainware under Entry 112. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Dharwad Division, challenging the order of the assessing authority. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal. The petitioner's further appeal to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal was also dismissed. ( 3 ) BEFORE the Tribunal, the petitioner produced the copies of previous orders of the assessing authority and that of the Tribunal relating to the earlier assessment years in which like turnover was brought to tax under Entry 118. The petitioner also produced a Circular instruction issued by the Commissioner of Commercial taxes in Karnataka ("the Commissioner" ). The Commissioner in, that' circular No. MSR. CR-553175-76 has stated, that the jars made of clay are taxable at 4% under Entry 118 of the second Schedule to the Act. The tribunal, however, did not give credence to the Circular on the ground that it was not applicable to the case of the petitioner. The Tribunal finally concluded :"the next point for consideration is whether the bharanj made of china clay falls under entry 112 or entry 118. Entry 118 relates to the containers other than gunnies, while entry 112 relates to chinaware and procelainware. The Tribunal finally concluded :"the next point for consideration is whether the bharanj made of china clay falls under entry 112 or entry 118. Entry 118 relates to the containers other than gunnies, while entry 112 relates to chinaware and procelainware. As there is a special entry for these chinaware i. e. , bharani, the bharani sold by the appellant falls under special entry No. 112, taxable at 8%. Entry 118 is a general' entry which relates to all containers. Therefore the lower authorities are perfectly right in holding that pickle jars i. e. , bharani which are made of china clay fall under no. 112 of second schedule taxable alt 8%. " ( 4 ) THE first submission of Mr. E. R. Indrakumar in this revision petition is, that the Circular issued by the commissioner treating the jars as taxable at 4% under Entry 118 of the second Schedule to 'the Act, is binding on all the authorities constituted under the Act and it is not open to them to deviate from the said Circular and tax the turnover of jars under entry 112 at 8%. Before dealing with this contention, it is necessary to state that the said Circular was withdrawn by the commissioner in 1979. Bu', the assessment year concerned in this case is admittedly prior to 1979. Therefore, withdrawal of that Circular has no consequence on the decision which we make in this case. ( 5 ) THE said Circular is found even in the Commercial Taxes Bulletin for ihe quarter ending March 1976 issued under the authority of the Sate Government. It is stated therein that the jars made of clay are taxable at 1% under enfry 118 of the Second Schedule to the Act. This Circular was evidently issued by the Commissioner 'in exercise of his power under Sec. 3-A of the Act. Section 3-A provides :"instructions to subordinate authorities- (1) All officers and persons employed in the execution, of this act shall observe and follow the orders, instructions and directions of the State Government and the Commissioner (Proviso not necessary) it is clear from the above provision that the Circular issued by the Commissioner or the Government is binding on all officers and persons employed in the execution of the Act and they shall faithfully follow the instructions or the directions thereunder. " ( 6 ) MR. " ( 6 ) MR. S. Rajendra Babu, learned counsel for the Revenue, however, submitted that the opinion expressed by the Commissioner in regard to classification of articles for the purpose of levy cannot be binding on this Court and it is therefore necessary to determine whether pickle jars would fall under Entry 112 or under Entry 118 of second Schedule to the Act. It is true that such Circulars may not be binding on this Court. But, we are not called upon to adjudicate the question independent of the orders made by the" statutory authorities. We are exercising a revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 23 of the Act. We cannot therefore altogether ignore the Circular issued by the competent authority and examine the question with pristine purity. ( 7 ) SECTION 3-A of the Act is similar to Sec. 119 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. While dealing with the Circulars issued by the Central Board of Revenue under sec. 119 of the Income Tax Acti, the supreme Court, at least in three decisions, has stated that such Circulars are binding on all officers and persons employed in the execution of the Income tax Act, even if the Circulars deviate from the provisions of the Act [see : navnit Lal C. Javeri vs. . K. K. Sen, a AC (1), Ellerman Lines Ltd. vs. CIT (2) and K. P. Verghese vs. I. . T. O ernakulam (3)] We, therefore, do not see any good reason to ignore the Circular which has a material bearing on the question raised in this case. On the contrary, we must proceed on the basis that the Circular issued by the commissioner stating that the turnover relating to the sale of pickle jars is liable to tax only at 4% under Entry 118, is binding on those who are charged with the duty to implement ihe provisions of the Act and it is not' open to them to ignore that Cicular and tax such turnover at 8% stating that jars in question fall under Entry 112 of the second Schedule to the Act ( 8 ) THERE is also one other reason why we should not ignore !the Circular issued by the Commissioner. . . Apart from its binding character on the statutory authorities, it is in our opinion, clearly in the nature of contemporanea expositio furnishing lei'tmate aid in the construction of Entry 112 and Entry 118. Dealing with this principle of cons'ruction, the Supreme Court in yerghese' case (3) observed an page 612 :"the rule of construction by reference to con'temporanea, exposito is a well estblished rule for interpreting a statute by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority though it mus' give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. This rule has been succinctly and fedicitiously expressed in Crawford on Statutory Construction, 1940 Edn. , where it is stated in paragraph 219 that 'administrative construction (i. e,. , contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is overturned; such a construction, commonly referred to as practical construction although non-controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight, it is highly persuasive. The validity of this rule was also recognised in Bhaleshwar Bagarth vs. Bhagirathi Dass (1908) ILR 35 Cal. "701, 713, where Mookerjee, J. stated the rule in these terms :"it is a well settled principle of in tepretation that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it, at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been! to construe, execute and apply it' and this statement of the rule was quoted with approval by this Court in Deshabandhu Gupta and Co vs. Delhi stock Exchange Association Ltd. .) (1979) 4 SCC 565 . AIR 1979 SC 1049 " ( 9 ) MR. Babu, however, submitted that the principle, of contemporanea expositio has no application to modern statutes and in support of his contention, he relied upon the decision of house of Lords in Governors of Campbell College Belfast v. Commissioner of Valuation for N. Ireland (4) wherein lord Upjohn said:"as to contemporanea expositio, this doctrine is, I believe, truly confined to the construction of ambiguous language used in very old statutes. 3 where indeed the language itself may have had a rather different meaning in those days. "but, our Supreme Court appears to have applied that doctrine even to modern statutes where the language is ambiguous as it would be clear from the decision in Verghese's case (3 ). 3 where indeed the language itself may have had a rather different meaning in those days. "but, our Supreme Court appears to have applied that doctrine even to modern statutes where the language is ambiguous as it would be clear from the decision in Verghese's case (3 ). We have, therefore,, no good reason fur not depending upon the doctrine of contemporanea expositio, to clear the mist in the understanding of the nature of' an article, the components and classification of which are not as plain as plain could be. ( 10 ) APART from that, we find that there is no justification for the Tribunal to depart from the view consistently taken in the previous assessment years upto 1974-75 in the case of the same assessee. Consistency " in the judicial administration should not ordinarily be sacrificed unless there is compelling reason. The Tribunal, while taking a different view, has not given any justifiable reason except stating that the Circular of the Commissioner was not applicable to the case. That could hardly be said to be a reason to be given by a quasi judicial authority. ( 11 ) IN the result, this petition is allowed, the orders of the authorities are set aside and the 'matter stands remitted to the assessing authority to modify the assessment order by taxing the, turnover, relating to the sale of the pickle jars under entry 118 of the Second Schedule to the Act. --- *** --- .