ORDER N.D. Ojha, J. - The respondent No. 3, Umed Ali, is the landlord of a house. The said house had been let out to the petitioner. An application was made about 20 years back near about the year 1963 by respondent No. 3 under S. 3 of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for permission to file a suit for ejectment against the petitioner before the Rent Control & Eviction Officer on the ground that the said house was needed by respondent No. 3 bona fide for his personal use. This application was dismissed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer on 17th Nov. 1964. Respondent No. 3 filed a revision against that order before the Commissioner, which was allowed by the Additional Commissioner and the permission prayed for was granted on 14-12-1965. Against that order the petitioner made a representation before the State Government under S. 7-F of the Act. The State Government passed an interim order staying the operation of the order dated 14-12-1965 passed by the Commissioner during the pendency of the representation made to it. The order aforesaid seems to have been communicated to respondent No. 3 by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer through his letter dated 29-1-1966, a copy whereof has been filed along with the writ petition as Annexure I. The respondent No. 3 filed an objection before the State Government on 7-2-1966 but even before the final orders could be passed on the representation made by the petitioner a suit was instituted by respondent No. 3 inter alia for ejectment of the petitioner on 12-3-1966 on the basis of the permission granted by the Additional Commissioner on 14-12-1965. The State Government ultimately allowed the representation made by the petitioner and set aside the order dated 14-12-1965 passed by the Additional Commissioner. 2. The order of the State Government was challenged by respondent No. 3 in a writ petition before this Court, which was allowed on 14-10-1968 and the order of the State Government was quashed. The effect of the order of this Court dated 14-10-1968 was that the order dated 14-12-1965 passed by the Additional Commissioner granting the requisite permission to respondent No. 3 was revived. The suit which had been instituted by respondent No. 3 on 12-3-1966 remained pending during this period. The effect of the order of this Court dated 14-10-1968 was that the order dated 14-12-1965 passed by the Additional Commissioner granting the requisite permission to respondent No. 3 was revived. The suit which had been instituted by respondent No. 3 on 12-3-1966 remained pending during this period. It was taken up after the decision of the writ petition by this Court. 6-12-1968 was a date fixed for hearing of the suit. The petitioner absented and the suit was decreed ex parte on that date. An application was made by the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte decree which was rejected on 7-1-1969 on the finding that no sufficient cause had been made out for setting aside the ex parte decree. 3. The petitioner appears to have simultaneously filed an appeal against the ex parte decree. This appeal was dismissed on 29-5-1969. The petitioner preferred a second appeal in this Court which too was dismissed on 1-2-1972. Thereafter the petitioner filed an appeal against the order dated 7-1-1969 where by his application for setting aside the ex parte decree had been rejected. This appeal was obviously time barred having been filed after three years of the passing of the order appealed against. The appeal was dismissed on 27-10-1972. The petitioner then filed a civil revision against that order before this Court which seems to have remained pending for nearly seven years and was dismissed on 14-2-1979. The execution of the decree for ejectment passed on 6-12-1968, however, remained stayed during this period of about eleven ears. 4. After his revision was dismissed by this court the petitioner filed an objection under S. 47 of the Civil P. C. before the Executing Court on the ground that since the operation of the order of the Additional Commissioner dated 14-12-1965 whereby permission was granted to respondent No. 3 to file a suit for ejectment against the petitioner had been stayed by the State Government In the representation under S. 7-F of the Act filed by the petitioner and the order of stay was operative even on 12-3-1966 when the suit on the basis of that permission was filed, the suit was not maintainable and the decree passed therein was a nullity. Reliance in support of the objection was placed on S. 3(1) of the Act which inter alia provides that subject to any order passed under sub-sec. Reliance in support of the objection was placed on S. 3(1) of the Act which inter alia provides that subject to any order passed under sub-sec. (3) no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds mentioned therein. 5. Emphasis was placed on the word "filed" which has been used in S. 3 (1) of the Act. The objection, however, did not find favour with the Executing Court and was dismissed on 23-7-1979. The petitioner filed a revision against that order before the District Judge which too in his turn was dismissed by the 1st Additional District Judge on 2-2-1980. The petitioner then filed a review application before the Additional District Judge on 13-3-1980 which was dismissed on 25-10-1980. Thereafter he instituted the present writ petition on 23rd Dec. 1980 with a prayer that the order of Executing court Dated 23-7-79 and of the 1st Additional District Judge Dated 2-2-1980 and 25-10-1980 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge may be quashed. 6. The same plea which was raised by the petitioner before the Executing Court and before the 1st Additional District Judge and was repelled by the impugned orders has been raised before this Court also. It has been urged by counsel for the petitioner that since in view of the order of stay passed by the State Government in proceedings under S. 7-F of the Act operation of the order of the Additional Commissioner Dated 14-12-1965 granting permission to file a suit for ejectment stood stayed on 12-3-1966 when the suit on the basis of that permission was filed the institution of the suit was invalid and the decree passed in that suit was a nullity. 7. Having heard counsel for parties I am of the opinion that there is no substance in the submission. 7. Having heard counsel for parties I am of the opinion that there is no substance in the submission. Reliance in support of this submission has, apart from the use of the word "filed" in S. 3(1) of the Act, been placed on the decision of this Court in R.P. Agnihotri v. State of U.P., 1970 All LJ 11 where it was held that when the permission to sue is suspended by the State Government during the pendency of the proceedings under S. 7-F there would be no permission to sue and if suit is instituted notwithstanding the suspension of the permission by the State Government it shall be deemed to have been filed without the permission contemplated by S. 3 of the Act. That was a case where a suit had been instituted by the landlord on the basis of permission granted under S. 3 of the Act by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer whose order was affirmed on revision by the Commissioner. However, on the date on which the suit was instituted the permission stood suspended in pursuance of an order passed by the State Government on a representation being filed by the tenant under S. 7-F of the Act. Subsequently the Rent Control and Eviction Officer made a report to the State Government about the filing of the suit and the State Government without going into the merits of the representation made by the tenant dismissed it simply on the ground that the suit having already been instituted the proceeding before the State Government had become infructuous. It is in this context that it was held that since the suit had been instituted at a point of time when the permission stood suspended the filing of the suit could not divest the State Government of its jurisdiction to decide the representation made to it under S. 7-F of the Act by the tenant before the institution of the suit. In my opinion on the facts of the instant case the impugned orders cannot be quashed on the basis of the aforesaid observation made in the case of R. P. Agnihotri (1970 All U 11) (supra). 8. Coming to the facts of the instant case it may be pointed out that the impugned orders had been passed in execution proceedings. In my opinion on the facts of the instant case the impugned orders cannot be quashed on the basis of the aforesaid observation made in the case of R. P. Agnihotri (1970 All U 11) (supra). 8. Coming to the facts of the instant case it may be pointed out that the impugned orders had been passed in execution proceedings. A similar plea appears to have been raised before this Court in Second Appeal No. 1386 of 1969 arising out of the decree passed in the suit. The plea was, however, repelled. The relevant finding in this behalf is quoted in the impugned order Dated 2-2-1980 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge. Kanpur. It was held by this Court that the effect of the order of the High Court passed in the writ petition filed by the landlord whereby the order of the State Government was quashed was that the order of the Additional Commissioner was revived and that the suit filed on the basis of the permission granted by the Additional Commissioner would still be a valid suit. In view of the decision of this Court on this point in the second appeal it was not open to the executing court to go behind the order passed by this Court and take a contrary view. 9. Even otherwise I am of opinion that the impugned orders do not deserve to be quashed on this ground. The final order passed by the State Government allowing the representation made by the tenant under S. 7-F of the Act was quashed by this Court in the writ petition filed by the landlord on 14-10-1968 i. e. much before 6-12-1968, the date on which the suit filed on the basis of the permission granted by the Additional Commissioner was decreed. The submission made by counsel for the petitioner has to be considered in this context. 10. An almost similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in R.C. Das v. P.L. Sharma, 1975 All LJ 262 : AIR 1975 All 280 . In that case permission to file a suit for ejectment of the tenant was granted to the landlord under S. 3 of the Act by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 11-3-1966. In that case permission to file a suit for ejectment of the tenant was granted to the landlord under S. 3 of the Act by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 11-3-1966. The tenant filed a revision before the Commissioner who passed an interim order on 30-3-1966 staying the operation of the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Even so, the landlord filed a suit on 26-4-1966 on the basis of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The revision was, however, ultimately dismissed by the Commissioner. A representation made to the State Government and thereafter a writ petition filed in this Court by the tenant failed. It was urged in that case, as in the instant case, that since on 26-4-1966 when the suit on the basis of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was filed, the operation of the permission stood stayed by order of the Commissioner Dated 30-3-1966 the institution of the suit was bad and the decree passed therein was invalid. The submission aforesaid was repelled by the Division Bench. It was held that the permission having been upheld up to the stage of the High Court, the decree for ejectment could not be challenged on the ground that the suit was not maintainable, having been filed without a valid permission. 11. In Purshottam Das v. Smt. Rajmani Devi, 1968 All LJ 1023 : AIR 1970 SC 763 the provisions of S. 3 and S. 7-F of the Act came up for consideration. In that case a suit was instituted on the basis of a permission granted under S. 3 of the Act by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. During the pendency of the suit the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer granting permission to the landlord was set aside in revision by the Commissioner. Subsequently, however, the State Government on a representation made by the landlord, held that in the interest of justice the house should be available to the landlord for his use and set aside the Commissioner's order revoking the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction officer. Subsequently, however, the State Government on a representation made by the landlord, held that in the interest of justice the house should be available to the landlord for his use and set aside the Commissioner's order revoking the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction officer. The State Government made a further direction in its order that the landlord "is advised to file a suit for eviction from the house in suit against the opposite party in a civil court under S. 3 of the Act, which will be applicable four months after the date of the order". The order of the State Government was dated 30-3-1963 and the period of four months referred to therein expired on 30-7-1963, The suit which had already been instituted as aforesaid remained pending during all this time and was decided on 2-3-1964. It was held that the effect of the order of the Commissioner revoking the permission was that the suit which had validly been instituted after obtaining permission from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer became incompetent It was further held that the effect of the order passed by the State Government was that the landlord had an effective permission to institute the suit under S. 3 (1) of the Act on the expiry of four months from Mar. 30, 1963, i. e. from July 30, 1963. The decree in the suit was passed on Mar. 2. 1963, and on that date the landlord had a valid permission to institute the suit. The suit was, therefore, maintainable. In view the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Purshottam Das (supra) it is parent that on 6-12-1968 when the decree was passed in the apparent case in the suit filed by the landlord-respondent against the petitioner the landlord-respondent had a valid permission to institute the suit and the suit was, therefore, maintainable. 12. Counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that the facts of the case of Purshottam Das ( AIR 1970 SC 763 ) (supra) were distinguishable inasmuch as in that case when the suit was instituted on the basis of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the operation of the order granting permission had not been stayed. 12. Counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that the facts of the case of Purshottam Das ( AIR 1970 SC 763 ) (supra) were distinguishable inasmuch as in that case when the suit was instituted on the basis of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the operation of the order granting permission had not been stayed. According to counsel for the petitioner since in the instant case on 12-3-1996 when the suit was instituted by the landlord respondent the operation of the permission granted by the Additional Commissioner stood stayed the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of the Purshottam Das (supra) was not applicable. I find myself unable to agree h this submission. The ratio decision of decision of the Supreme Court in the of Purshottam Das (supra) is that what to be found out is as to whether on the to when the decree in the suit was passed valid permission to institute the suit was or as not in existence. If the answer was in the affirmative the suit was maintainable. 13. Reliance was also placed by counsel for the petitioner on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Satyendra Pal v. R.T.A. Agra, 1982 All LJ 310. In that case on a writ petition filed by Satyendra Pal a Division Bench of this Court had passed the following interim order (at p 311): "Issue notice. The Regional Transport Authority may in the meantime consider the application but shall not pass final orders. Respondent 2 may in the meantime try to dispose of the appeal of the petitioner." A meeting of the Transport Authority, Agra took place on 1-10-1980 on which date a copy of the interim order passed by this Court was produced before the said Authority. In spite of that the Transport Authority issued permanent permits on the basis of the pending application in this behalf on 3-10-1980. In this context it was held that proceedings taken by an authority in flagrant disregard of an order of court are nullity and the court should have no compunction in putting the hand of the clock back and restoring the status quo ante. In my opinion the decision in the case of Satyendra Pal (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner. In my opinion the decision in the case of Satyendra Pal (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner. In the instant case the decree which was passed on 6-12-1968 in the suit filed by the landlord-respondent was not passed in disregard of any order passed by a court. S. 3 (1) of the Act only created a bar in the institution of a suit and the bar was removed on the grant of a permission under the said section. Since in the instant case on 6-12-1968 there was a valid permission in existence in view of the quashing of the order of the State Government by this Court on 14-10-1968 no exception can be taken to the decree passed on 6-12-1968. 14. Reliance was also placed by counsel for the petitioner on the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Baleshwar Dayal v. State, AIR 1972 All 12 where it was held that the State Government while exercising the powers under S. 7-F of the Act had jurisdiction to pass interim orders including stay orders which it may consider necessary in the interest of justice. The only effect of the decision of this case on the facts of the instant case would be that the interim order passed by the State Government staying the operation of the permission granted by the Additional Commissioner would be treated to be a valid order but in view of what has been stated above this circumstance would not invalidate the decree passed on 6-12-1968. 15. The matter can be looked into from another angle. On account of the order of stay passed by the State Government the institution of the suit on 12-3-1966 was bad. It continued to be an incompetent suit till the order of the State Government was quashed by this Court, as aforesaid. Thereafter the invalidity of the suit ceased. Even if a contrary view is taken and the writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders are quashed on the technical ground urged by counsel for the petitioner the landlord can still avail of the permission granted in his favour by the Additional Commissioner. The only effect will be that litigation which continued for about two decades would become infructuous and the parties will be driven to a fresh litigation. The only effect will be that litigation which continued for about two decades would become infructuous and the parties will be driven to a fresh litigation. Article 226 of the Constitution is in my opinion not meant for driving a party to this desperate state of affairs simply because the delay suits the other party. It is well settled that proceedings by way of certiorari are not "of course". The writ petition is accordingly liable to be dismissed on this ground also. 16. In the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The order holding that the need of the landlord for the house in question for his own use was bona fide was passed by the Additional Commissioner more than 17 years back on 14-12-1965. Even the decree which has now been put in execution was passed more than 14 years back on 6-12-1968. The petitioner has already had sufficient time to vacate the accommodation in question. Even so one month's time from today is granted to the petitioner to vacate the said accommodation.