N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) ALL these References are made to this Court by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad under sec. 133 read with Order 46 Rules 2 and 4 of the Civil Procedure Code in the matters of the Civil Suits Nos. 2770/77 2773 3321 3764 4043 4044 77 493 942 2084 3158 and 197/78. The suits have been filed by various citizens challenging the notices of the Municipal Commissioner issued under secs. 212 and 213 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 hereinafter referred to as the Act for brevitys sake. One of the grounds challenging the said actions was that secs. 212 and 213 of the Act were ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India in so far as they unreasonably provided for a notice only to the owner and not to the other interests like those of tenants to be heard before the drastic action under secs. 212 or 213 of the Act was taken. The argument found favour with the learned Judge who by his common order referred the following two questions to this court : (I) Are not the provisions of sec. 212 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India in so far the said provisions provide due opportunity of being heard to the owners of buildings whereas it does not provide such opportunity to tenants occupying the said buildings falling within the regular line of street; in this context are not the owners as also the tenants of such buildings quite alike and yet differentially treated by the said section without any intangible differentia ? (II) Is not sec. 213 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act liable to be struck down on the ground that it is violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice viz. audi alteram partem in so far as before asking the owner/occupant of the land to hand over possession thereof to the Municipal Commissioner it does not provide an opportunity to such occupant/owner to show cause why the roadline earlier prescribed may not be implemented and why the land in his ownership/occupation acquired ? ( 2 ) THE learned Advocate Mr. audi alteram partem in so far as before asking the owner/occupant of the land to hand over possession thereof to the Municipal Commissioner it does not provide an opportunity to such occupant/owner to show cause why the roadline earlier prescribed may not be implemented and why the land in his ownership/occupation acquired ? ( 2 ) THE learned Advocate Mr. P. V. Nanavati appearing for the various plaintiffs urged that it was ex-facie unreasonable on the part of the Legislature to hear only the owners and exclude the other interests that were likely to be adversely affected by the actions under sec. 212 or 213 of the Act. We do not elaborate his arguments because in effect be reproduced the very arguments which were advanced before the learned trial Judge. ( 3 ) TO us it appears that the question is no longer open to be agitated it having been set at rest by the Supreme Court before which the question had been taken against the order of the Division Bench of this court in the case of GIRDHARLAL GANPATRAM GANDHI V. THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF CITY OF AHMEDABAD and ORS. 8 G. L. R. 500 Chief Justice N. M. Miabhoy as he then was sitting with N. K. Vakil J. in that case held that secs. 211 212 213 and 216 of the Act had been designed to convert private property into part of a public street directly and those powers could be brought into play after the Municipal Commissioner had prescribed a road-line under sec. 210. The Bench held that those provisions embodied a scheme for compulsory acquisition of private property and therefore directed the Municipal Commissioner to treat the notice or notices issued under sec. 12 of the Act as null and void and further directed not to act on the same. In paragraph 42 of the said judgment the learned Judges ultimately held that sec. 212 of the Act was bad. They stated that none of the powers conferred upon the Municipal Commissioner by sec. 212 could be salvaged as the scheme of acquisition as embodied therein was bad. In the circumstances the learned Judges held that the provisions contained in sec. 212 conferring various powers of issuing notices requiring demolition or authorising demolition must be held to be unconstitutional. They stated that none of the powers conferred upon the Municipal Commissioner by sec. 212 could be salvaged as the scheme of acquisition as embodied therein was bad. In the circumstances the learned Judges held that the provisions contained in sec. 212 conferring various powers of issuing notices requiring demolition or authorising demolition must be held to be unconstitutional. ( 4 ) THE said judgment was challenged by the Municipal Corporation before the Supreme Court and the Judgment of the Supreme Court delivered by the Five Judges is to be found in the case of AHMEDABAD MUNICIPALITY V. STATE OF GUJARAT A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1730. The Supreme Court in terms held that judgment of the High Court referred to above was bad because in sec. 216 referring only to the owner as a person to be entitled to compensation there was implicit full indemnification in accordance with judicial norms for all interests including owners. The Supreme Court in terms stated as follows :the involvement of Civil Courts in finally determining compensation imports judicial norms. Since full indemnification in accordance with judicial norms is the goal set by the Act it is implicit in such a provision that the rules for determination of compensation shall be appropriate to the property acquired and such as will achieve the goal in full indemnity against loss. In other words. the Act provides for compensation to be determined in accordance with judicial principles by the employment of appropriate methods of valuation so that the person who is deprived of property is fully indemnified against the lossin paragraph 14 also it has been specifically provided that two sections (sec. 216 (1) and sec. 389 (1) ) read together make it clear that full indemnification in terms of money for the loss caused is to be made to the owner of the property or other interests affected by reason of the exercise of power under sec. 212. (Emphasis Supplied ). It is also laid down there that since every kind of loss is required to be compensated as a consequence of the order passed by the Commissioner under sec 216 of the Act the question whether the Act need have provided for compensation as on the acquisition of the building or a part of the building which is pulled down under sec. 212 does not survive. 212 does not survive. ( 5 ) IT is to be noted with pertinence that the Division Bench of this court in the Girdharlals case (Supra) specifically rested its decision on the meaning of the word owner as defined in sec. 2 (45) of the Act. The learned Judge restricted that term to the definition as given in sec. 2 (45) of the Act and therefore held that sec. 216 and correspondingly sec. 212 were ultra vires Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India. ( 6 ) ONCE for some reasons any provisions of law are declared by the highest court of this land to be intra-vires it is not open to this court to question that decision because certain arguments were not advanced before the Supreme Court. Mr. Nanavati however in this connection invited our attention to paragraph 19 of the Supreme Courts judgment wherein the Supreme Court remanded the matter for reconsideration of the question under Art. 14 but in view of the settled legal position we find that this court cannot go behind that question. After remand this High Court had upheld these provisions. Mr. Nanavati also urged that the Supreme Court had not specifically dealt with sec. 212 and it had confined its discussion to sec. 216 of the Act only. This argument is of little avail to the original plaintiffs at whose behest these References have been made to this High Court. Sec. 216 deals only with an owner to be compensated. The Division Bench of this court struck that sec. 216 and also incidentally sec. 212 as ultra vires because other interests likely to be adversely affected were left without any compensation inspite of the loss of the proprietary rights or interests. Simply because sec. 212 had not been specifically dealt with it cannot be said that the Supreme Court was not alive to the challenge to sec. 212. In our view the Supreme Court has specifically dealt with this question that not only the owner is to be protected but other interests are also to be protected. In other words the Supreme Court has interpreted the word owner to mean not only the owner as defined in sec 2 (45) of the Act but also including other interests ( 7 ) AS far as these References are concerned they are not accepted and stand rejected. In other words the Supreme Court has interpreted the word owner to mean not only the owner as defined in sec 2 (45) of the Act but also including other interests ( 7 ) AS far as these References are concerned they are not accepted and stand rejected. As a corollary it would follow that the other interests as can be reasonably identified with reference to public records like City Survey Records or the records with the Municipality in the form of assessment books are required to be served with a notice under secs. 212 and 213 of the Act. Some difficulties are bound to be experienced by the Municipality in doing so but that cannot be helped because the law requires that interests are to be heard before such drastic actions are intended to be taken to the detriment of those interests. Without laying down any law but by way of only a suggestion we would say that if the Municipality in such cases affixes a notice on the conspicuous part of the property to be dealt with under sec. 212 and 213 of the Act it may in all probability serve the purpose though it is always desirable to locate the interests as can be located reasonably and by reasonable search and serve them with notices. These References are accordingly rejected and stand disposed of. ( 8 ) AT this stage Mr. Nanavati applied for leave under Article 133 of the Constitution of India. As we have simply followed the judgment of the Five Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of AHMEDABAD MUNICIPALITY V. STATE OF GUJARAT (SUPRA) A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1736 we do not think that a question of law of general importance has arisen in this case which is required to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence the oral request is rejected. .