Judgment :- 1. The Executive Sub Divisional Magistrate, Trichur had passed a conditional order dated 28-3-1979 under S.133 (1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing respondents 1 to 3 to cut and remove three poola trees and one jack tree standing on the northern boundary of the petitioners' com-p6und dangerously situated and liable to fall on the house of the petitioners. That order was passed on the basis of the reports submitted by the Tahsildar, Trichur and Sub Inspector of Police, Trichur, Town West and directed the respondents to cut and remove the said trees on receipt of the order and also called upon them to show cause why that order should not be enforced and made absolute. 2. The respondents filed their objections in answer to the preliminary order, interalia contending that this is a civil dispute and not a public nuisance, in relation to which alone, the power under S.133 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be exercised. During the course of the proceedings, the respondents herein filed, a revision petition, before the Court of Sessions, Trichur under S.397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also obtained an order of stay against the conditional order. The petitioners, who raised a preliminary objection before the Court of Session submitted that in view of S.397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petition would not lie against the interlocutory and conditional order under S.133 of the Code. Sessions Court dismissed this objection for the reason that if on acceptance of the objection, the proceedings would have, ended the order rejecting that objection would be revisable under S.133 of the Code since that would be a final order and not an interlocutory order. The Court of Session therefore directed that the revision petition might be taken on file and numbered. The petitioners have come up in revision against that order of the Sessions Court. 3. The counsel for the petitioners reiterated that no revision could have been entertained against an interlocutory order passed under S.133 of the Code, directing the respondents to show cause on a specified date. It is submitted that the respondents could raise their objections in answer to the order directing cause to be shown, if they would not comply with the direction contained in the order. It is submitted that the respondents could raise their objections in answer to the order directing cause to be shown, if they would not comply with the direction contained in the order. It is submitted that the order enabling the party to show cause cannot be treated as a final order for the only reason that if the objection which they propose to take were to be upheld, there would have been a finality in the proceedings. 4. Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decisions reported in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (AIR. 1977 SC. 2185), Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1978 SC. 47 and V. C. Shukla v. State (AIR. 1980 SC. 962). It is decided in all these cases that revision petition would lie against certain types of interlocutory orders. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (AIR. 1978 SC. 47) it is observed: "It appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being converse of the words "final Order". There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case (AIR. 1949 FC 1 (Supra)), but yet it may not be an interlocutory order-pure or simple. Some kinds of orders may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-sec.(2) of S.397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders and for the purposes of Art.134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of S.397(2). It is neither advisable nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of Orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-sec.(2) of S.397. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-sec.(2) of S.397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course." It was further held: "Yet for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration, that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of S.397(2)." In F. C. Shukla v. State (AIR. 1980 SC. 962) also it was held that: "We might reiterate here even at the risk of repetition that the term 'interlocutory order' used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial because the bar contained in S.397(3) of the Code would apply to a variety of cases coming up before the courts not only being offences under the Penal Code but under numerous Acts: If therefore, the right of revision was to be barred, the provision containing the bar must be confined within the four corners of the spirit and the letter of the law. In other words, the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final." In his separate, but concurrent opinion Desai, J. held that "Till this situation is reached, a number of orders may have to be made, during the progress of adjudication of main dispute, such order can appropriately and legally be styled as "interlocutory orders". In the decision reported in Raj Kapoor v. State (1980(1) SCC. 43) Krishna Iyer, J. while considering the same question with reference to the decision reported in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (AIR. 1978 SC. 47), observed: "The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. 43) Krishna Iyer, J. while considering the same question with reference to the decision reported in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (AIR. 1978 SC. 47), observed: "The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the face. In between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal." It was assumed that revision may lie against such an order and the inherent power of the Court under S.482 would be available to safeguard the interests of justice at the instance of the person complaining of harassment by abuse of the process of court. 5. The decisions referred to above indicate that from interlocutory orders, pure and simple, no revision could be entertained. They also seem to suggest that from intermediate orders which is a category of orders in between interlocutory orders on the one hand and final orders on the other, revisions could be entertained. An order "rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, if accepted will conclude the proceeding", has been held to be an intermediate order which "will surely not be an interlocutory order within the meaning of S.397(2) of the Code. The counsel for the respondent submits that an order under S.133 in the instant case was such an intermediate order and hence the Sessions Court was correct in entertaining the revision. To accept this submission I should hold that all orders against which any preliminary objection could be taken are intermediate orders. This will render nugatory the provisions of S.133 of the Code whereunder a party is enabled to show cause against a preliminary order. In showing cause, an opposite party can as well say that the proceedings are devoid of jurisdiction in the sense that the matter relates to a private dispute and not a public right. If such an objection is taken as part of the cause shown by an opposite party the Magistrate before whom that objection is taken cannot but decide that question. If such an objection is taken as part of the cause shown by an opposite party the Magistrate before whom that objection is taken cannot but decide that question. If the decision goes against the opposite party, he may seek to revise it by invoking the revisional jurisdiction under S.397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. None of the decisions have laid down the proposition that mere possibility of a preliminary objection to an order would transform that order from an interlocutory to an intermediate order amenable to correction under S.397 of the Code, notwithstanding the bar under sub-sec. (2) thereof. I still understand the observations in the above decisions only to mean that an order on a preliminary objection which if considered favourably would terminate the proceedings, would be amenable to revision notwithstanding the fact that that order does not in fact qualify as a final order. Any other understanding of the decisions of the Supreme Court would have the effect of practically nullifying S.397(2) of the Code. The purport of the Supreme Court decisions, according to me, is that even orders on preliminary objections during interim stages of the proceedings would be revisable, if the objections are such as would terminate the proceedings, if accepted. This according to me, obliges and does not obviate, the preliminary objection being taken before the Magistrate himself, acceptance of which would terminate the proceedings by an order, which being a final order, will be revisable at the instance of one party and rejection of which by an order which is neither interlocutory nor final, will also be revisable at the instance of the other party, notwithstanding the bar contained in S.397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This seems to me to be the reasonable approach which should commend itself for acceptance, rather than the approach made by the Sessions Court that whether objections were taken or not, the mere possibility of such objection should render the preliminary order itself amenable to revision under S.397 of the Code. The only order liable to be revised in this case would therefore be either an order upholding the objection raised by the opposite party or an order rejecting the objections. The only order liable to be revised in this case would therefore be either an order upholding the objection raised by the opposite party or an order rejecting the objections. The preliminary conditional order does not cease to be one such, and therefore revisable only because the respondents had filed objections including those to the jurisdiction or competence of the Sub Divisional Magistrate to act under S.133 of the Code. The revision, if at all, would be not against the preliminary order, but only against a subsequent order either accepting or rejecting the objections. That order may be an intermediate and not interlocutory order. But the order under S.133 is only an interlocutory order, pure and simple. In this view of the matter, the order of the Sessions Court has to be set aside. 6. This course has the merit of expediting the proceedings, without in the least causing any prejudice to the parties or affecting the interests of justice. The preliminary order against which cause has already been shown cannot be effective until after the inquiry is over. The revision petition is therefore allowed and the order of the Court of Session, Trichur in Crl. R. P. 19/80 is set aside. The proceedings before the Sub Divisional Magistrate will continue. The respondents can, if so advised, move for orders on their preliminary objections, so that the proceedings may be terminated expeditiously.