JUDGMENT : 1. Whether a private Landlord's profiteering greed and lust for money by exploitation of tenant can be equated with the socialist State's objective of doing justice, social and economic to all which includes its tenants also ? 2. If not, whether a private estate owner Landlord and the State "Devasthan" department acting as Landlord are similarly situated for Article 14 ? 3. If the answer to the first question is in negative, whether State Landlord and private citizen Landlords are equals under Article 14 of the Constitution ? 4. If not, whether Rajasthan Premises Act, carves out unconditional exception for Devasthan Premises ? 5. Section 2(2) Proviso (c) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1950") has come into "fumes" and "Fire" under Article 14 of the Constitution, in this bunch of writ petitions, which are 67 in numbers. 6. The fire generator is an extremely eminent Senior Advocate, Shri Chittley, Mr. N.L. Jain, Advocate-General, with State fire extinguisher has joined the interesting but enlightening and educating "Battles at the Bar". 7. And now the traditional facts with untraditional preamble. 8. 6. The fire generator is an extremely eminent Senior Advocate, Shri Chittley, Mr. N.L. Jain, Advocate-General, with State fire extinguisher has joined the interesting but enlightening and educating "Battles at the Bar". 7. And now the traditional facts with untraditional preamble. 8. The object of fire, Section 2 of the Act of 1950 reads as under : "Commencement and Application : (1) This Act extends to the whole of the State of Rajasthan ; (2) Sections 1 to 4 and 27 to 31 of this Act shall come into force at once, and the remaining provision thereof shall extend to such areas in the State of Rajasthan and shall come into force therein with effect from such date as may be from time to time be notified by that State Government or a local authority ; (Provided that nothing in this Act shall apply:- (a) to any premises belonging to the Central Government or State Government or a local authority ; (b) to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Central Government or the State Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by the Government ; (c) to Devasthan premises managed and controlled by the State Government ; Explanation : The Expression "Local authority" used in clause (a) and in Explanation II to Section 12 shall mean : (i) a Municipal Board or Municipal Council established or deemed to have been established under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 38 of 1959) ; (ii) any other body corporate, established or constituted by a Central Act or a Rajasthan Act ; and (iii) A Government Company as defined by Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956) (3) The State Government if it is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in public interest may, by notification in the official gazette, exempt from all or any of the provisions of this Act, any premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of the institution). 9. All the petitioners are tenants of the Charitable or religious institutions, either of temples or dharamshalals which are managed and controlled by Devasthan Department of the State of Rajasthan. They are, 'Devasthan premises' of sub-clause (c). 10. 9. All the petitioners are tenants of the Charitable or religious institutions, either of temples or dharamshalals which are managed and controlled by Devasthan Department of the State of Rajasthan. They are, 'Devasthan premises' of sub-clause (c). 10. In all those cases the Devasthan Department has increased the rent and since the tenants contested the authority of Devasthan Department to increase the rent, the Devasthan Department took proceedings against them under the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1964). 11. It would be useful to mention the facts of the first case making it as an illustrative test case. The petitioner is tenant of a shop located in Jaipur City at Manak Chowk belonging to Thakurji Shri Anand Behari Ji, a Hindu deity. Initially he was paying the rent of the shop at the rate of Rs. 45/- but the same has been increased to the extent of Rs. 316/- p.m. now by the Devasthan Department. Since the petitioner did not pay the increased rent proceedings are being taken against him under the above Act. 12. The petitioner submitted his reply but the Estate Officer has proceeded with the passing of the order of eviction and now efforts are afoot to evict him from these premises. 13. Since in all these cases, common questions of law are involved, I have accepted the joint request of the learned counsel for the parties to decide them by the common judgment. 14. Mr. Chittley has challenged the validity of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 2 of the above Act of 1950 on the ground that it suffers from the vice of hostile discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. It was pointed out that the object of the above Rent Control Legislation is to control eviction from letting of and rents for certain premises in the State of Rajasthan. The premises which were managed and controlled by the Devasthan Department cannot be exempted from its operation. The object is to control the abnormal increase in the rent and evictions of the tenants at the whim, caprice or arbitrary desire of the landlord and that being the object, it applies to all tenants irrespective of the fact who is the owner of the property or who is managing or controlling that property. 15. The object is to control the abnormal increase in the rent and evictions of the tenants at the whim, caprice or arbitrary desire of the landlord and that being the object, it applies to all tenants irrespective of the fact who is the owner of the property or who is managing or controlling that property. 15. It was argued that the above legislation is a beneficial legislation to provide protection to the tenants as on account of the pressure of population in urban areas, the problem of a 'roof over the head' has assumed serious dimensions and unless protected, those who have not got their own houses or shops are bound to be exploited by those who are the owners or managers or controllers of the premises. The object being to protect the tenants, if an exemption is made for the Devasthan Departments, tenants are exposed to the risk of paying abnormal, excessive rent and being evicted merely on the caprice of the departmental bosses and then the very object of providing protection to tenants would be negatived and destroyed. 16. Mr. Chittley submitted that this would be a classification, destructive of the very object for which this Social Welfare Legislation was enacted by the State Legislature. A classification which destroys, nullifies, negatives the very object of the legislation is a hostile classification and void being violative of the protection guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. 17. The illustrative example of one of the case would show that the tenant who was paying Rs. 45/- only of his shop where he earns his bread and butter is now required ; on account of this classification to pay Rs. 316/- which is about more than seven times and now he is sought to be thrown on the road on account of non-payment of this excessive and outrageous demand. 18. Mr. Chittley, therefore, submitted that the classification sought to be made by providing exemption from application of this Act of 1950 to a class of premises where the tenants are similarly situated having the same problem of scarcity but where the landlords instead of being private citizens happens to be Devasthan Department, would completely destroy the object of the Act. Great emphasis was laid on the object of the Act, as the classification should have a nexus with the object of the Act. 19. Great emphasis was laid on the object of the Act, as the classification should have a nexus with the object of the Act. 19. Reliance was placed on the decision of State of Rajasthan v. Mukan Chand and others, AIR 1964 SC 1633 in which an analogous provision for carving out an exception from the category of creditors by exempting the Central, Government of any State, Scheduled bank, Local Authority, Cooperative Society etc. was challenged. The State had to go in appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court because this Court struck down this exemption and that judgment was challenged. 20. Mr. Kapoor learned counsel for the State in that case contended that the debts mentioned in sub-clause (1) to (6) of Section 2(e) have been placed on a different footing, from debts due to other creditors, because the bodies and the authorities mentioned therein serve a public purpose or a public cause and this provides a reasonable basis for differentiation between private creditors and creditors mentioned in clause (1) to (6) above. Their Lordships first examined the scheme of the Act. It was noticed that the object of the Act is to scale down debts of jagirdars whose jagir lands have been resumed. The Act then provides for reduction of secured debts. Their Lordships then referred to the two well-known conditions for the validity of the classification under Article 14 of the Constitution. The first being that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are to be kept separate from others left out of the group and secondly the differentia must have a rational relationship and a nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. 21. The fulfilment of both conditions is necessary for permitting classification. Their lordships then stated that the object was to reduce the debts secured on jagir lands which had been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. The Jagirdar's capacity to pay debts had been reduced by the resumption of his lands and the object of the Act was to ameliorate his condition. Their lordships then stated that the object was to reduce the debts secured on jagir lands which had been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. The Jagirdar's capacity to pay debts had been reduced by the resumption of his lands and the object of the Act was to ameliorate his condition. Keeping in view the above object, their lordships observed that the fact that the debts are owed to a Government or local authority or other bodies mentioned in the impugned part of Section 2(e) has no rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. 22. Making the above dictum of law as the bedrock of his contention, Mr. Chittley argued that the object of the Act of 1950 is to control and regulate the rent and evictions of the tenants who require protection from exploitation of the landlord on account of the scarcity of land and premises. If that is so argued by Mr. Chittley, how can a landlord who is a private citizen and a landlord where the Devasthan Department controls, the management, can be different ? The tenants in all cases require protection from the increase of rent and a ceiling for increase of rent, and eviction on limited grounds. The Act of 1950 has been enacted to ameliorate and emancipate the tenants who form an important segment or class of the society. How can then you distinguish between the tenant whose landlord is a private citizen and a tenant whose landlord happens to be the Devasthan Department by virtue of control and management of the temple ? 23. The object was to save tenants from landlords who would like to exploit the scarcity of premises by increasing rent to unlimited extent and to evict the tenants at their sweet will. In this above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, their lordships have not approved the judgment of the High Court in the decision of Ram Chhotey Lal v. Kishori Raman Singh, AIR 1962 All. 521 , wherein the exemption or exception provided for Government or Semi Government authorities and scheduled banks was held valid in the zamindars Debt Reduction Act. In this above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, their lordships have not approved the judgment of the High Court in the decision of Ram Chhotey Lal v. Kishori Raman Singh, AIR 1962 All. 521 , wherein the exemption or exception provided for Government or Semi Government authorities and scheduled banks was held valid in the zamindars Debt Reduction Act. Another judgment of Jamnalal Ram Lal Kintee v. Kishandas and State of Hyderabad (S), AIR 1955 Hyderabad 194, wherein the High Court supported the exclusion on the ground that exclusion of certain class of debts under Section 3 of the impugned Act is also not without substantial justification for public demands do not stand in the same position as ordinary demands, was not approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above judgment. 24. Mr. Chittley has submitted that all that is required to be done is that Zamindar's debts are to be substituted by tenant and for all intents and purposes the principles laid down in the above judgment would apply warranting the striking down of the explanation carved out by Section 2(2) proviso (c) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act of 1950 whereby the premises managed and controlled by the Devasthan Department have been exempted. 25. The second limb of the submissions of Mr. Chittley was that in no cases the rent can be increased unilaterally. The tenancy is a matter of contract and the contract is bilateral one. Since the respondents cannot increase the rent merely by giving the notice. He placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Hari Kishan etc. v. State of Rajasthan and another, 1982 RLR 921 , in which similar notices issued by the Devasthan Department were quashed. 26. The third limb of submission of Mr. Chittley was according to the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 and more particularly Section 53, the management of the public trusts is to be done by a Committee of Management to be constituted by the Govt. and since that is the legislative mandate, it cannot be said that Devasthan Department has got any control or management of the trust property in which the petitioners are tenants in the eye of law, though de facto it may be exercised, by non-observance of the mandate contained in Section 53. 27. In support of his first contention Mr. and since that is the legislative mandate, it cannot be said that Devasthan Department has got any control or management of the trust property in which the petitioners are tenants in the eye of law, though de facto it may be exercised, by non-observance of the mandate contained in Section 53. 27. In support of his first contention Mr. Chittley relied upon the Improvement and Clearance Act (1956) referred in Jyoti Pershad and others v. Administration for the Union Terriotory of Delhi and others, AIR 1961 SC 1602 , in which the following principles have been enunciated:- (c) Constitution of India, Article 14 - Scope - Interpretation of Rules of guidance indicated. (1) If the statute itself or the rule made under it applies unequally to persons or things similarly situated, it would be an instance of a direct violation of the constitutional guarantee and the provision of the statute or the rule in question would have to be struck down. (2) The enactment or the rule might not in terms enact a discriminatory rule of law but might enable an unequal or discriminatory treatment to be accorded to persons or things similarly situated. This would happen when the legislature vests a discretion in an authority, be it the Government or an administrative official acting either or an executive officer or even in a quasi judicial capacity by a legislation which does not lay down any policy or disclose and tangible or intelligible purpose, thus clothing the authority with unguided and arbitrary powers enabling it to discriminate. 28. In such circumstances the very provision o the law which enables or permits the authority to discriminate, offends the guarantee of equal protection afforded by Article 14. (3) The above rule would not apply to cases where the legislature lays down the policy and indicates the rule or the line of action which should serve as a guidance to the authority. Where such guidance is expressed in the statutory provision conferring the power, no question of violation of Article 14 could arise, unless it be that the rules themselves or the policy indicated lay down different rules to be applied to persons or things similarly situated. Where such guidance is expressed in the statutory provision conferring the power, no question of violation of Article 14 could arise, unless it be that the rules themselves or the policy indicated lay down different rules to be applied to persons or things similarly situated. Even where such is not the case, there might be a transgression by the authority of the limits laid down or an abuse of power, but the actual order would be set aside in appropriate proceedings not so much on the ground of a violation of Article 14, but as really being beyond its power. (4) It is not, however, essential for the legislation to comply with the rule as to equal protection, that the rules for the guidance of the designated authority, which is to exercise the power or which is vested with the discretion, should be laid down in express terms in the statutory provision itself. (5) Such guidance may thus be obtained from or afforded by (a) the preamble read in the light of the surrounding circumstances which necessitated the legislation taken in conjunction with well-known facts of which the Court might take judicial notice or of which it is appraised by evidence before it in the form of affidavits. 29. In the circumstances indicated under the fourth head, just as in the third, the law enacted would be valid being neither a case of excessive delegation or abdication of legislative authority viewed from one aspect, nor open to objection on the ground of violation of Article 14 as authorising or permitting discriminatory treatment of persons similarly situated. The particular executive or quasi-judicial act would, however, be open to challenge on the ground not so much that it is in violation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 14 because ex-concessis that was not permitted by the statute but on the ground of the same being ultra vires as not being sanctioned or authorised by the enactment itself. The situation in such cases would be parallel to the tests to be applied for determining the validity of rules made under statutes which enable the rule-making authority to enact subsidiary legislation "to carry out the purposes of the Act". The situation in such cases would be parallel to the tests to be applied for determining the validity of rules made under statutes which enable the rule-making authority to enact subsidiary legislation "to carry out the purposes of the Act". The criteria to be applied to determine the validity of such rules could be appropriately applied to determine the validity of the action under the provisions like the one dealt with under the last two heads. 30. Mr. N.S. Jain, Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the respondent has vehemently opposed the above contentions of Mr. Chittley. 31. In the first instance Mr. Jain submitted that in all these cases the validity of the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964, has not been challenged and since the impugned order of eviction has been passed under the Act of 1964, no relief can be granted in these cases to the petitioners. It was then pointed out that under the Act of 1964 there is right of appeal from the order of the Estate Officer and the appeal lies to the District Judge. The Petitioner should have availed of this remedy which is very efficacious. It was argued that since the District Judge hears the appeal, there is judicial forum, provided for raising all contentions, but since the petitioners have not filed appeals, the writ petition should be dismissed. 32. Mr. Jain contended that it would be wrong to treat the present cases as cases of increase of rent because what has been done is that when the petitioners failed to pay the arrears of rent, the Estate Officer was moved for evicting them and therefore, amount of use and occupation was mentioned. Mr. Jain then submitted that the decision of State of Rajasthan v. Mukan Chand and others (supra) cannot apply in the instant cases because in these cases in the very preamble the legislation has mentioned that control of rent and eviction is to be done for certain premises. He emphasised "certain premises" and said that the legislature was very conscious from the very beginning that certain classes of premises only are to be brought under subject-matter of this legislation. In this view of the matter Mr. Jain submitted that all premises are not similarly situated and the object of the Act was never to control rent and eviction of all the premises. 33. In this view of the matter Mr. Jain submitted that all premises are not similarly situated and the object of the Act was never to control rent and eviction of all the premises. 33. He then pointed out that in the present case the tenants are shop keepers, an affluent segment of the society and are having their shops in the heart of Jaipur city. They are neither poor nor belong to weaker section of society. They are earning huge profits and don't want to increase the rent in spite of great increase in their income. The Rent Control Legislation was never intended to provide an umbrella to such persons to earn huge profits and not to share the part of it with the Devasthan Department who is looking after the management of the temples. Shri Jain then pointed out the decisions of Chandimal Ratichand Jhabua v. State of M.P. and others, AIR 1967 MP 52 and Pursotoma Ramanata Quenim and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1970 Goa 35 . The above decisions have been decided depending upon the peculiar facts and factors of these cases that have been held to be not applicable. 34. Mr. Jain then referred to the then important decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Re : The Special Courts Bill, 1978(8) and invited my attention to the following observations : (7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in the others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that differentia must have a relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. (8) The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. (8) The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while Article 14 forbids class discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense above mentioned. 35. Reliance was also placed on the observations in V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Administration), 1980 Supplementary SCC 249. 36. Mr. Jain pointed out that this Court recently in Balwant Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1982 RLW 575, has held that classification per se is not discriminatory. In this case the State of Rajasthan prescribed conversion charges of agricultural land for being converted into urban land at different rates in different cities and towns of Rajasthan. Challenge was made by the residents of Sriganganagar, Udaipur and Bikaner and one of the important ground of the challenge was that the classification of Sriganganagar in category A or (1) is bad in law and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This objection was repelled by this Court. 37. Mr. Jain further placed reliance upon the judgment of Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and another, 1983 URJ (SC) 81 and Smt. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs. & others and M.R. Mini v. State of Kerala and another, 1980 (2) SCC 216 and Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti, 1980 (1) SCC 990. 38. The decision of this Court in Hari Kishan etc. v. State of Rajasthan and another, 1982 RLR 921, wherein the single Bench quashed the notice for increase of rent, all the properties of Devasthan Department at Jodhpur, were sought to be distinguished of Devasthan Department at Jodhpur, were sought to be distinguished by Mr. Jain on the ground that their notices were for increase of rent and not proceeding under the Act of 1964. Jain on the ground that their notices were for increase of rent and not proceeding under the Act of 1964. It was also argued in that once on account of the exception carved out by Section 2(2) Proviso (c), the Rent Control Act is held to be non-applicable, then the respondents could increase the rent unilaterally also, more so because the period of tenancy has expired. Since the Rent Control Act was not applicable, the petitioners were not statutory tenants. Mr. Jain submitted that this aspect of the case was not examined in the above noted decision and therefore, that decision has not got any application in the facts and circumstances of the present cases. 39. With reference to submission of Mr. Chittley about the application of Section 53 of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act. Mr. Jain submitted that the per-requisite condition is that the Public Trusts must be notified under Section 52(2) and since no such notification has been shown to have been made in the present case, Section 53 will not be applicable. In these circumstances the submission is that pre-requisite condition for Section 53 is issue of notification under Section 52(2) mentioning the name of particular public trust to which the properties of the petitioner related. It was also argued that even otherwise provisions of Section 53 are directory and not mandatory. 40. Mr. Chittley in his rejoinder submitted that Mr. Jain has not pointed out any decision of Supreme Court in which any adverse comment has been made about the dictum of law, laid down in the State of Rajasthan v. Mukan Chand's case . Since it holds the field and has not been watered down by the apex Court, it applies squarely in the present cases. 41. Mr. Chittley submitted that merely because word 'certain' has been used in the preamble, it would not mean that the State Government or Legislature can allow some of the landlords because they are the Government Departments, to evict the tenants or increase the rent against the provisions of the Rent Control Act. He emphasised that the tenants are tenants, whether they are of private landlords or of Devasthan Department or of the Government. He emphasised that the tenants are tenants, whether they are of private landlords or of Devasthan Department or of the Government. According to him the objection of the Act was to regulate, control and provide protection against the increase of rent and indiscriminate evictions at the mercy of the landlords, taking advantage of scarcity of space or premises, and that being the object, no nexus has been established by making the classification of Government landlord and private landlord. 42. Mr. Chittley submitted that in Social Welfare State, it was the duty of the Government to provide protection from evictions and increase of rent by legislation to all and the Government cannot be allowed to pick and choose or make out any exception in its own favour. 43. Mr. Chittley then submitted that when the Rent Control Act was enacted in 1950 there was no exception in favour of the Devasthan Department, as would be obvious and clear from the fact that Clause (c) of the proviso has been added in 1975 by an amendment. Mr. Chittley pointed out that the learned Advocate-General has not pointed out what were the new circumstances which warranted the amendment in 1975, after the legislation has worked well for about 25 years. Mr. Chittley submitted that unless reasons are shown by the respondents to justify the carving out of an exception in favour of the temples or properties managed by the Devesthan Department, as against the temples and properties managed privately, this amendment is outrageous and hostile discrimination which cannot be permitted under Article 14 of the Constitution. 44. Mr. Chittley then referred to the reply filed by the State in Radha Vallabh's case and submitted that justification for carving out this exception shown in the return has no justification in the eyes of law. According to the return filed by the State it has been submitted that tenants were taking undue advantage of the provisions of the Rent Control Act as the rent of the adjoining premises was very high but these tenants were paying only nominal rent. In the reply it has been mentioned that due to the rising prices of various things used in the maintenance of these temples and Devasthan premises it becomes necessary to introduce the amendment so that the rent can be increased by the department. Such an amendment was therefore, in the public interest. Mr. In the reply it has been mentioned that due to the rising prices of various things used in the maintenance of these temples and Devasthan premises it becomes necessary to introduce the amendment so that the rent can be increased by the department. Such an amendment was therefore, in the public interest. Mr. Chittley submitted that this justification for the classification of private temples, properties managed by private person qua the temples, property managed by Devasthan department is not intelligible. If the prices have increased for seva-puja articles, it applies to all temples whether they are managed by State or private persons and therefore, the State cannot claim any exemption to increase the rent while debarring and prohibiting those persons who are managing the temples privately. 45. Mr. Chittley then submitted that the object of the Act is positively to protect the tenants from exploitation by the landlords on account of scarcity of land and premises and primarily it is beneficial legislation for providing arbitrary funds. Mr. Chittley then submitted that the object of the Act is to be inferred from the entire scheme of the Act and not from the preamble only. 46. The use of the word "certain" in the preamble cannot show that the object of the Act, was to create different classes of tenants and landlords. All that was intended was to give powers to the Act under Section 2(2) for applying the provisions of this Act, time to time by notification to different areas. The phrase 'certain' has been used in this context as it was not possible to apply the Act to rural areas where there was no scarcity of premises. In this context Mr. Chittley submitted that the word 'certain' should be interpreted to mean 'urban areas' but once the Act is applied by notification it was not permissible to create further classification in that area by giving advantage to some tenants and taking away the advantage from other tenants and by giving benefit to their landlords. 47. In respect of the application of Section 52 and 53, Mr. Chittley said that once it is held that the property is a Public Trust, Sections 52 and 53 would apply and if the Government has failed in its duty to notify it, would not mean that the legislation as a whole would remain inoperative. Mr. 47. In respect of the application of Section 52 and 53, Mr. Chittley said that once it is held that the property is a Public Trust, Sections 52 and 53 would apply and if the Government has failed in its duty to notify it, would not mean that the legislation as a whole would remain inoperative. Mr. Chittley submitted that Section 53 was mandatory and not directory and it is the duty of the State Government to appoint committees for the management of the Public Trust Properties. Mr. Chittley then submitted that decision of this Court in Hari Kishan v. State of Rajasthan and another (supra) , lays down the correct law. The increase of rent can be bilateral only and it can never be unilateral. 48. Regarding non-filing of the appeal under Act, 1964, Mr. Chittley submitted that since the basis of the proceedings in the above Act was non-payment of increased rent, no useful purpose has been served by filing the appeal because the Appellate Authority could not have declared any provisions to be ultra vires. 49. Mr. Chittley submitted that it was not necessary for him to challenge the validity of Act of 1964, as once it is held that the tenants are statutory tenants then all proceedings taken under the Act of 1964 treating them as un-authorised tenants, become invalid. 50. Mr. Jain, learned Advocate-General pointed out that it is wrong to say that this Rent Control Legislation is only meant for providing protection to tenants. Contrary to it, it was a legislation to strike a balance between the landlord and tenant. The preamble nowhere mentions that benefit of production is only to be given to the tenants. 51. Mr. Jain then pointed out that no Government officer would ever make any attempt or effort to exploit the tenants or to evict them arbitrarily, because actions of the Government are always bonafide and Government exists for the People and for their benefit and not for their exploitation. Mr. Jain further pointed out that there is always a presumption of constitutionality and it is for the petitioners to rebut the presumption by cogent, valid reasons, which has not been done in this case. 52. Lastly Mr. Mr. Jain further pointed out that there is always a presumption of constitutionality and it is for the petitioners to rebut the presumption by cogent, valid reasons, which has not been done in this case. 52. Lastly Mr. Jain submitted that even if some actions of the Government officers are wrong or illegal or held to be motivated by objects which are not permissible in law then that would not make the law bad. The law cannot be declared ultra vires or unconstitutional on account of any mistake, lapse in its implementation by the Government. The individual actions or orders may be successfully challenged in those cases but not the law. 53. I have given a thoughtful consideration to the above submission of the learned counsel for the parties.First and the foremost point to be considered is whether the exception created by amendment introduced by way of Ordinance of 1975 on 25th September, 1975 and subsequently by the amendment Act in Section 2, sub-clause (2) by addition of clause (c) to the proviso in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, is ultra vires and liable to be struck down being in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 54. I have summarised the above respective submission of the learned counsel for the parties in this respect and, therefore, it is not necessary to repeat them now while considering this point. Undoubtedly, the object of the Rajasthan Premises Act is to control rent and eviction. In Milap Chand v. Dwarka Das, 1954 RLW 587, a challenge was made to the validity of this Act under Article 14 of the Constitution. A division bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble Wanchoo, C.J. and Hon'ble Ranawat, J., as he then was, repelled the challenge and observed as under : "Constitution of India, Article 14 Applicability - Basis of classification- Mere absence of basis in Act itself will not invalidate Act - Reasonability of Act may be taken judicial note in exceptional circumstances - Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950." 55. The question raised was that the Act is being applied to some of the towns only and therefore, the classification is violative of article 14 of the Constitution. Their Lordship held that the selective application of the law is based on the housing difficulty in various towns of Rajasthan due to various reasons. The question raised was that the Act is being applied to some of the towns only and therefore, the classification is violative of article 14 of the Constitution. Their Lordship held that the selective application of the law is based on the housing difficulty in various towns of Rajasthan due to various reasons. Therefore, in the peculiar circumstances of the case Article 14 is not violated. In this regard, their Lordships have also mentioned the object of the act in para Nos. 17, 18, 23 and 24, which reads as under:- "In Ishwari Prasad v. N.R. Sen (supra) , the validity of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act (XVII of 1950) came up for consideration. In that case, the validity was attacked on account of breach of Article 19(1)(f), and not under Article 14. The learned Judges practically took judicial notice of the circumstances prevailing at the time when the Act was passed in Judging whether the restrictions placed by it were reasonable. Harries, C.J., observed as follows at page 275:- Whether a restriction on a fundamental right by a piece of legislation is reasonable or not must depend upon the circumstances existing when that piece of legislation was enacted. Drastic remedies may be necessary to meet conditions giving rise to serious and urgent problems and a piece of legislation which may well impose unreasonable restrictions in one set of circumstances may eminently be reasonable in a different set of circumstances. The Rent Acts in this State were enacted to meet the grave housing shortage caused by the last Great War and the congestion particularly in the cities and towns of West Bengal caused by the war and the partition of the province in the year 1947. There can be no doubt that the war and the partition created very serious problems in this State. During the War building was to a very large extent at a standstill and after partition lakhs of people flocked into this State, particularly into Calcutta and the large towns of the State. There can be no doubt that the war and the partition created very serious problems in this State. During the War building was to a very large extent at a standstill and after partition lakhs of people flocked into this State, particularly into Calcutta and the large towns of the State. The Government of the West Bengal was faced with a serious problem is, I think, clear and it was to meet that were from time to time enacted."Later the learned Chief Justice observed again at the same page as follows:- "It appears to be that in the interest of law that order and good Government restrictions on the landlord's right were absolutely necessary, for otherwise thousands of tenants would have been ejected and persons would have been compelled to pay for more than they could afford for most inferior accommodation. In considering whether the restrictions imposed on the landlords are reasonable regard must be held to be position of the tenant would it be in the interest of good of Government and in the public interest generally for thousands of people to be rendered homeless and for thousands of others to be compelled to pay exorbitant rents and to be literally at this mercy of their landlords ? It appears to be that in the circumstances existing in this country and particularly in this State the Control of rents during the War and particularly after partition was essential and had any Government failed to take action in this matter serious consequences might well have arisen which might have taken the very foundation of this State and indeed of the whole of India." "What the learned Advocate-General asks is that we should also take notice of the circumstances which were prevailing at that time when the impugned Act was passed, and if we do so, it will be found that two restrictions placed were not only reasonable restrictions, but that the State was justified in passing the law which, on the face of it, applies to the whole of those conditions existed, which led to the passing of the law. Whether conditions existed in a particular town to which the impugned Act was applied is a question of fact while can most properly be judged by the Government and unless it is proved that there were mala fides in a particular town must be held to be based on the existence of those conditions. We feel that the conditions existing in Rajasthan at the end of 1950 when this Act came to be passed were not dissimilar from those described by Harries, C.J., in Ishwari Prasad's case (supra), and there was, therefore, justification for passing the impugned Act in order to control rents. The same circumstances, in our opinion, justify the selective application of the law to such towns as required, in the opinion of the Government, the enforcement of the impugned Act. "Learned counsel also urges that the Act was being arbitrarily applied. Relying on "A Statistical Outline of Rajasthan" issued by the Government of Rajasthan "in January, 1953 and the various notifications extending the impugned Act to various towns, he points out that out of 6 towns over 50,000 in population, the impugned Act is application in all, out to 19 towns over 20,000 the impugned Act is applicable in fourteen but in five ; out of 35 over 10,000 the Act is applicable in 21 but not in 14, out of 61 towns over 5000 it is only applicable in 18 and not in the remaining 43; and it is also the number of such towns must be very large. He asks us to infer from this that the impugned Act is being arbitrarily extended, and therefore, its application is hit by Article 14. There is, in our opinion, no force in this argument. Once the basis of classification is assumed to exist, as we feel we should assume in this case, we must further assume that the state of facts, which is necessary for the selective application of the law, is also in existence in the towns where it has been applied, and is not in existence where it has not been applied. Once the basis of classification is assumed to exist, as we feel we should assume in this case, we must further assume that the state of facts, which is necessary for the selective application of the law, is also in existence in the towns where it has been applied, and is not in existence where it has not been applied. The basis for classification, which we can reasonably conceive of in this case, obviously in the housing difficulty in various towns of Rajasthan due to non-creation of buildings during the period of the last world war, and increase in population in most cities in the last ten years, the conditions created by the partition of 1947, and the influx of persons from what is not Pakistan. These assumptions which are reasonable, provide a basis for classification of towns where these conditions prevail and therefore, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, we must hold that the law is not discriminatory and is not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution." "We cannot leave this aspect of the case without sounding note of warning that it may not be in many cases that we shall be able to conceive of such circumstances as may be a basis of classification also in the Act or in the preamble." 56. A perusal of Section 2 would show that first of all the legislature delegated the powers of extension of the Act to the various areas and also the dates from which they are to be applied. Thereafter, the proviso to sub-sections (1) and (2) provides exception and the following two categories were earlier exempted from the application of the Act:-a) to any premises belonging to the Central Government or State Government or a local authority.b) to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Central Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by the Government.Clause (c) was added by the Ordinance of 1975 as mentioned above on 29th September, 1975 and by this another category of exemption was granted or exception from the application of this Act was granted to the Devasthan premises managed and controlled by the State Government. 57. 57. On the basis of well established tests to be considered for deciding the validity of classification made, the first question to be considered whether there is any intelligible or reasonableness of classification and secondly it has got any nexus to the object to be achieved by the Act. 58. Undoubtedly, the premises controlled by the Government and managed by the Devasthan Department are a class in themselves. They are temples or Dharamshalas or such religious places and properties. It is not in dispute that the Devasthan premises form a class by themselves, because the State in its various functions, duties and obligations also looks after the various religious properties, temples and dharamshalas and make arrangements for their worship and maintenance. These are premises which primarily vests in the religious de-nomination or deity or such other religious trusts, but according to the provisions of Rajasthan Public Trust Act, they are to be managed by the Devasthan Department. The Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, was enacted for regulating and making better provision for the administration of public, religious and charitable trusts in the State of Rajasthan. Section 2 of this Act defines charitable endowment, other religious endowment religious association, temples etc. Chapter III enjoins upon the State to appoint Devasthan Commissioner and then Assistant Devasthan Commissioner and subordinate officers and servants. Chapter V provides for registration of public Trusts and Chapter VI provides for management of Trust property. It is not necessary to deal with the entire scheme of this Act and it would be sufficient to mention that this Act has been enacted for providing better management and administration of the religious and charitable trusts in the State of Rajasthan and the Devasthan Commissioner is the Chief Functionary under whom the entire department functions ; 59. In the Rajasthan Premises Act as already mentioned above, there were exceptions for the State Government and Central Government and other local authorities for the premises which were given or taken on rent or requisitioned by the Government. It appears that it was felt that the premises which are known as Devasthan Premises, cannot come in the above two categories and therefore, amendment was made to include this category also in the exception to be created in the application of the above Act of 1950. What was implicit was made explicit. 60. It appears that it was felt that the premises which are known as Devasthan Premises, cannot come in the above two categories and therefore, amendment was made to include this category also in the exception to be created in the application of the above Act of 1950. What was implicit was made explicit. 60. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the Devasthan premises managed and controlled by the State from the basis of reasonable valid classification amongst the various premises in the State. In other words the premises, in which the private owners are landlords is one class and the premises in which the Devasthan Department manages them as manager and exercises all powers of landlord and the tenants, is a different class. Similarly those premises whether the State owns the premises as landlord or tenant is again different class. There are various classes and categories and the difference between them is intelligible and not obscure. 61. The next question is more important than the first whether this classification has reasonable nexus with the object to be achieved. I was prima facie impressed by the submission of Mr. Chittley that this is an Act to provide protection to the tenants who are facing difficulties on account of scarcity of the housing and shops and premises in Rajasthan due to various reasons including growth of population, rapid industrialization, rapid growth of commerce and industry and developing economy due to which there is great rush of the public to settle down in the Urban areas. The submission of Mr. Chittley that to deprive those tenants, who happen to be tenants of the Devasthan Department will not serve the object, appears to be plausible at the first site. However, the submission of Mr. Jain that the very preamble of the Act makes it clear that the premises Act was intended to control eviction from letting of and rents for 'certain Premises' in the State of Rajasthan gave different dimensions to the controversy. It appears that from the very inception of the Act, that the legislature were of the opinion that only certain premises are to be made subject-matter of the regularisation under this Act. As mentioned above from the very inception of the Act two categories which form Class (A) and (B) of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act were exempted from the application of the Act. 62. Mr. As mentioned above from the very inception of the Act two categories which form Class (A) and (B) of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act were exempted from the application of the Act. 62. Mr. Chhitley has not been able to show that any of these provisions, which forms exception to the application of the Act have been challenged and struck down by this Court or any analogous provision under any rent restriction laws of the State which have got exception, have been struck down. All that he said was that large number of writ petitions have been filed in the Supreme Court under Article 14 of the Constitution of India challenging the classification in favour of Devasthan Department or the State and they are pending consideration before the Supreme Court.The Rent Control Legislations are in existence right from the very inception of the rule of law and the framing of the Constitution of India in 1949. In some of States of India after the second world war the Rent Control Act was introduced. They have without any exception in all the States, stood as valid piece of the legislation so far, because Mr. Chittley has not been able to show any decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court or High Court whether quota provision has created any exception in favour of the State, Central or otherwise, have been struck down being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 63. True it is that simply because there is no judgment of striking down analogous provision, it would not form as precedent for treating the above exceptional provision, as valid. I have mentioned it only as bare facts as they stand. 64. As mentioned above, it is now to be seen whether on account of the dictum of law laid down in State of Rajasthan v. Mukan Chand's case (supra) the present clause (c) is to be struck down being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In Mukan Chand's case the debt of the State for which exception was made and which were not to be scaled down for which those Jagirdars whose lands were resumed, were held to be ultra vires being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 65. In Mukan Chand's case the debt of the State for which exception was made and which were not to be scaled down for which those Jagirdars whose lands were resumed, were held to be ultra vires being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 65. Prima facie, I was impressed and it appeared that the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Mukan Chand would govern the fate of this case also. However, on a thorough deep probe and concentrated study to the provisions of Section 2 of the Act, I find that the analogy of the Rajasthan Jagirdar's Debt Reduction Act cannot apply. The principle laid down in Mukan Chand's case (supra) was that the fact that debts are owed to a Government or local authority or other bodies mentioned in the impugned part of Section 2(e) has no rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act, namely to reduce the debts secured on Jagir lands which had been resumed under the provisions of Jagirs Act. It was held that there was no intelligible principle underlies the exempted categories of debts. 66. It may be mentioned here that the scheme of that Act was that those Jagirdars being indebted and whose lands were resumed by the State should be granted relief because in future they would not be able to earn huge profits from jagirs. The relief was in the form of scaling down interest etc. 67. Under the Rajasthan Premises Act the situation is entirely different. The object of the Act is to regulate rent and eviction of certain premises. The word 'certain' is very significant. The object of the Act is to provide regulation and control. It was intended that a tenant should not become a tool in the hands of unscrupulous landlords, who at his whim and caprice, taking advantage of rising prices, scarcity of premises, better bargaining on account of financial status would throw the tenants on the road at his caprice and will or may increase the rent out of all proportions, which would defeat the very object of socialist society under the Constitution, as per its preamble and also the objects mentioned in the directive principle of the Constitution. 68. There is a vast difference between the State and unscrupulous individual citizen's functioning as landlord motivated with the object of earning profit by hook or crook. 68. There is a vast difference between the State and unscrupulous individual citizen's functioning as landlord motivated with the object of earning profit by hook or crook. The State's declared object is to do justice social, political, economic and to ensure the various rights of citizens enshrined in the Constitution Part (3) and (4). The two cannot be equated in one category or classification. The two are not similar. The two : one and individual citizen acting as landlord contemplates different situations are inspired by different objects, act on the basis of different situation and principles and it would be treating two unequals as equals, if I categorise them as one or similar situated under Articles 14 of the Constitution. 69. It is unthinkable with the State functionaries of the socialist State as it is supposed to be under the Constitution, would exploit the helplessness of the tenant or the needs of the tenants to the letters detriment or throw him out on the road or increase the rents disproportionately on account of sole reason to earn more money. I am of the considered opinion that the State or the Devasthan Department cannot be treated as similarly situated with an individual citizen of the State for the purposes of this Act of 1950.If that is so the distinction is patent and not patent. Again if that is so then the classification by exemption or exception in favour of the Devasthan Department has certainly got a nexus with the object of the Act, which is to control and regulate certain premises. The control and phrase regulate is too comprehensive and therefore, I am clearly of the opinion that the principle laid down in State v. Mukan Chand (supra) cannot have any application in the present case. 70. The submission of Mr. Chittley, which at the first impressed me, have not been able to ultimately persuade me of constitutional discrimination in order to strike down this social welfare legislation. 71. I must here refer to one of the decision of this Court in Balwant Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra) wherein, the classification between the various cities of Rajasthan for the purpose of commercial rate in Rajasthan for allotment, conversion and regularisation of Agricultural land for Residential and Commercial purpose in Urban Areas) Rules was under challenge. 71. I must here refer to one of the decision of this Court in Balwant Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra) wherein, the classification between the various cities of Rajasthan for the purpose of commercial rate in Rajasthan for allotment, conversion and regularisation of Agricultural land for Residential and Commercial purpose in Urban Areas) Rules was under challenge. I had an occasion to deal with the classification in that case and I have held that the legislature is competent to create intelligible classification. In para No. 57 referring to the decision of Prabhu Das v. Union of India , I observed as under:-On the bedrock of the above factual aspect which knocks down the case of the petitioners, the important decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court may now be examined in Prabhudas v. Union of India (supra) doctrine of constitutionality of an enactment has been upheld and it has been laid down that the petitioner must assume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people and the laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and the categorisation is based on adequate grounds. It was further observed as under:- "To make out a case of denial of the protection of the laws under Article 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. An application pleading that Article 14 has been violated must make out that not only he had been treated differently from others but he has been so treated from persons similarly situated - circumstanced without any reasonable basis and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made." (Head Note A). 72. In my considered opinion, firstly, the Devasthan premises managed and controlled by the Devasthan Department of the State are not similarly circumstanced to the premises of the individuals and private citizens. Secondly, there is reasonable basis in making this distinction and resting them differently by providing exception for the State or Devasthan Department and regulating and controlling of individual citizens. 73. It should not be forgotten that by 44th amendment even the property rights of individual have been abolished and they are no longer fundamental rights although constitutional rights have been provided.The whole object of this enactment is that as a socialist State and the legislature functioning under the Constitution, socialist State wants to control and regulate the property rights of individual citizens. The exploitation of a tenant by a property holder also come into the category and therefore, the rent control legislation regulate and control that property rights of private persons. The same cannot be said for the State or the Devasthan Department because there is neither any intention or motive of profiteering by harassment of the tenants, as it will have to presume that the State should act in the best interest of the citizens as social welfare State. 74. The fact that some of the functionaries would not act fairly, would not make the legislation bad in law because these infirmities or vices lies with not the State. I am, therefore, convinced that so far as the challenge to them and validity of clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Rajasthan Premises Act is concerned in spite of the issue being highly debatable as mentioned above, there is no discrimination or it suffers from vices of hostile classification and consequently it is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. I, therefore, hold it to be intra vires. 75. The second limb of submission of Mr. Chittley relates to the increase of rent unilaterally. Undoubtedly, it is not in dispute that the respondents have increased the rent in all cases unilaterally without the consent of the tenants. In this respect the decision of this in Hari Kishan etc. v. State of Rajasthan and others (RLR 1982-921) was placed for assistance by Mr. Chittley. It appears that in Hari Kishan's case the only point considered was whether in a case where the relationship is of landlord or tenant, there can be any increase in rent unilaterally. This Court observed that the tenancy is a matter of contract and the amount of rent, which is agreed between the parties is only realisable under the contract. It was further observed that the contract is always bilateral in character. Unless both the parties agree to effect increase in the amount of rent, no liability for the increased amount of rent arises. 76. Though the matter has not been discussed at length but the basic principle laid down in the above decision appears to be correct and sound. 77. In all these cases before this Court, undoubtedly, the increase has been made unilaterally. In the test case of Radha Vallabh, the rent which was earlier in existence, was Rs. 76. Though the matter has not been discussed at length but the basic principle laid down in the above decision appears to be correct and sound. 77. In all these cases before this Court, undoubtedly, the increase has been made unilaterally. In the test case of Radha Vallabh, the rent which was earlier in existence, was Rs. 45/- and it has been increased to Rs. 316/- by a notice in 1976. It is not for this Court to consider whether this increase was justified or unjustified. Undoubtedly, the prices have gone very high and so also the costs of construction. Once it is held that the Rajasthan Premises Act would not apply then the permissible increase of rent and the principle laid down in it would not apply to the present cases. However, before a increase can be made, the parties should come to an agreement. Obviously, there is no agreement between the parties nor it is pleaded by the respondents, therefore, the increase would be unilateral and it cannot be allowed to stand. In view of the decision of this Court in Hari Kishan's case, I quash the notice of increase in all the cases.The next question is whether on account of quashing of the notice for increase, the proceedings for eviction taken against the petitioner under the provisions of Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964, also deserves to be quashed. I must consider the objection of Mr. Jain that the order in this Act is appealable and the appeal lies to the District Judge and, therefore, this Court should not invoke its extra-ordinary jurisdiction for quashing the order passed by the authorities under this Act. 78. There is no material before this Court because the petitioners have not filed in any case the order of the authorised officer of the Estate Officer, who has passed the order for the eviction. As a matter of fact it was the duty of the petitioners to file those orders and then make an amendment for quashing them in case they have been passed during the pendency of the writ petitions. In some of the cases the orders were passed earlier to the filing of the writ petition and in some cases after filing of writ petitioners. 79. In some of the cases the orders were passed earlier to the filing of the writ petition and in some cases after filing of writ petitioners. 79. However, in order to be very fair, just and equitable, I am of the opinion that this lapse of the petitioners should be condoned and eviction orders passed for on the basis of non-payment of enhanced rent, should not be allowed to be executed. It is true that appeal could have been or should have been filed by the petitioners. However, since in Hari Kishan's case the principle laid down by this Court is that there cannot be unilateral increase and obviously in the present case, the increase has been made unilaterally, the petitioners should not be ejected or evicted on the basis of that increase and the order of realisation of the increased rent also cannot be allowed to stand. 80. However, it must be made clear that in Hari Kishan's case, also this Court held as under:- "The respondents no doubt can resort to termination of tenancy in accordance with law and thereafter proceeding to initiate eviction proceedings in accordance with law." 81. If the respondents start eviction proceedings not on the basis of non-payment of increased rent but on any other ground it would be open to them to take such proceeding under any law including the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. I am granting this relief to the petitioners because of the fact that all these writ petitions were filed at an early stage and stay order was passed by this Court restraining the respondents from evicting the petitioners. Moreover, in an illustrative example of one of the case, mentioned above, the initial rent was Rs. 45/- only and now on account of increase the rent and was required to pay Rs. 316/-. Likewise, in the present cases, the rent was increased unilaterally and the eviction orders made, then as the bedrock of eviction and making a demand for the same. Therefore, these orders cannot be allowed to stand. 82. It is not possible under these provisions to determine how much rent is due and for what period because that involves a dispute regarding the facts. Whereas, Mr. Jain submits that the amount from 1975 is due from the petitioners, the petitioners submit that they have paid up to August, 1980. Therefore, these orders cannot be allowed to stand. 82. It is not possible under these provisions to determine how much rent is due and for what period because that involves a dispute regarding the facts. Whereas, Mr. Jain submits that the amount from 1975 is due from the petitioners, the petitioners submit that they have paid up to August, 1980. Be that as it may, this judgment should not be taken by any of the parties to either give a licence for non-payment of rent or to delay its payment. 83. Since I have held that the provisions of Premises Act are not applicable, the logical and legal conclusion is that the respondents are entitled to evict the petitioners according to the law without making out any ground under Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises Act. It would not like to decide in these cases another question whether the respondents are required to file a civil suit after terminating the tenancy or they can evict the petitioners by resort to the provisions of Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964. I have not quashed the order of eviction on the ground that Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964 is not applicable. 84. In case, the respondents want to proceed under the Act of 1964, they may do so after fulfilling the requirements of the various provisions of this Act. 85. In case the petitioners refuse to pay the enhanced rent or agree to it, it would be certainly open to respondents to take eviction proceedings under the proper law as mentioned above. It is further ordered that whatever amount is due in the petitioners, in respect of the rent, they should pay the same immediately within a period of two months from today but that payment would not absolve them from any liability of eviction and other consequences. If the arrears are not paid during this period, then the eviction orders already pass under the Act of 1964, would become executable. 86. So far as the submission of Mr. Chittley in respect of the application of Sections 52 and 53 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act is concerned, I am of the opinion that no mandamus can be granted for acting under them. 86. So far as the submission of Mr. Chittley in respect of the application of Sections 52 and 53 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act is concerned, I am of the opinion that no mandamus can be granted for acting under them. Sub-clause (2) of Section 52 mentions phrase 'as soon as' and it is for the respondents to publish the list of public trusts and to notify the same and then comply with the provisions of Section 53 as and when the same became applicable. 87. The result of the above discussion is that whereas the main challenge to the validity of sub-clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act is devoid of any force and consequently rejected. The Writ Petitions are accepted to the limited extent that the enhancement of the rent unilaterally against the petitioners and the order of eviction so far passed on the basis of non-payment of the enhanced rent, are conditionally quashed as mentioned above. The respondents would be at liberty to take appropriate proceedings for eviction or otherwise, according to law, against the petitioners. 88. The Writ Petitions are accepted partially without any order as to costs.Petitions accepted.