JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is plaintiff's second appeal in a suit for declaration that the order reducing his pay to the lowest point in the time scale of pay, that is, to Rs. 150 per month for one year, was bad in law and thus "the plaintiff is entitled to retribution of losses sustained by him." By an amendment of the plaint the sum of Rs. 986.93 P. was estimated to be due to the plaintiff. 2. The plaintiff is a Sub-Inspector of Police. His case in brief was that he is entitled to free Government quarter wherever available. Tic was posted in July, 1964 as Sub-Inspector at police station Anwarganj, Kanpur, and provided a Government quarter there. On 24th August, 1964 lie was transferred to the Control Room at police station Kotwali. He continued to occupy the quarter at police station Anwarganj, Kanpur. The plaintiff was not provided any quarter at police station Kotw-ali. The plaintiff gave list of Police Officers who are occupying quarters at police station Anwarganj and at police station Kotwali, though they were posted at other police station's. However, on account of the grudge which Sri Ran jit Singh, Station Officer of police station Anwarganj bore against the plaintiff he was ordered to vacate the quarter occupied by him at the police station Anwarganj. This was followed by an order dated 3rd May, 1965 of the Deputy Superintendent of Police (City) II, requiring the plaintiff to vacate the quarter. The plaintiff gave a reply. This time he was required by Superintendent of Police (City) to vacate the quarter and was threatened with "dire consequences" if he failed to do so. The plaintiff submitted replies and prayed for extension of time enabling him to get a house to live in by private arrangement, but could not succeed. Due to the plaintiff's act of not vacating the quarter although no action was taken against other persons who are similarly occupying quarters at places other than the place of their posting, the plaintiff was put under suspension on 2.7th August, 1965 by Superintendent of Police (City) Kanpur. The plaintiff challenged that suspension order as invalid and without jurisdiction. Proceedings were started against him under Section 7 of the Police Act, under the orders of Superintendent of Police (City) Kanpur. The plaintiff was charge-sheeted for disobedient of orders to vacate the quarter. The plaintiff challenged that suspension order as invalid and without jurisdiction. Proceedings were started against him under Section 7 of the Police Act, under the orders of Superintendent of Police (City) Kanpur. The plaintiff was charge-sheeted for disobedient of orders to vacate the quarter. The charge-sheet was given by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (City) who held an enquiry. According to the plaintiff the enquiry was not properly conducted; and on 26th November he was served with a show-cause notice with a copy of the findings of the Enquiry Officer dated 5th November, 1965 and after considering his reply the Enquiry Officer proposed the punishment of reduction of his salary to Rs. 150 per month for one year by the order dated 27th December, 1965. This order was passed without the prior concurrence of Superintendent of Police (City) Kanpur. 3. The State of Uttar Pradesh contested the suit and supported the proceedings taken against the plaintiff as valid and proper. It was pleaded that the plaintiff gave arrogant replies and did not comply with the departmental orders. The plaintiff was accordingly placed under suspension and departmental proceedings were started against him. The proceedings were valid and within jurisdiction. Other technical pleas such as want of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure etc. were also pleaded. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit but the lower appellate Court has dismissed it. 5. The grounds on which the validity of the departmental proceedings taken and the punishment imposed on the plaintiff were challenged have been summarised by the lower appellate Court in its judgment. In the first place the suspension order passed against the plaintiff was challenged as without jurisdiction. The suspension in this case was pending enquiry and the enquiry having terminated, and the punishment imposed being reduction in pay, the suspension does not subsist and the challenge against it does not survive any longer. The grounds on which the punishment was challenged before me by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant were; firstly, that the preliminary enquiry which is a condition precedent for a departmental trial was not held secondly that the evidence was not recorded by the Superintendent of Police himself and lastly that some of the witnesses were not permitted to be examined by the Enquiry Officer. There is no merit in either of those grounds. 6. There is no merit in either of those grounds. 6. Under the Police Regulations paragraph 479 defines the powers of punishment of the police officers. Clause (b) provides that the Superintendent of Police may punish all inspectors and sub-inspectors temporarily or permanently subordinate to him except with dismissal or removal, and clause (f) provides that subject to the provisions of paragraph 491 (i) all permanent Assistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy Superintendents of Police who have crossed the first efficiency bar in the time-scale of pay applicable to them, and (ii) other Assistant Superintendents of Police and Deputy Superintendents of Police specially authorised in this behalf by the Deputy Inspector General of Police so far as his Range is concerned may exercise all the powers of a Superintendent of Police as detailed in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) of this paragraph other than powers relating to the punishment of inspectors of police and powers under Fundamental Rules 24 and 25. The plaintiff was a Sub-Inspector of Police. Therefore, an Assistant Superintendent of Police or a Deputy Superintendent of Police who had crossed the first efficiency bar who had been specially authorised could exercise all the powers punishment in respect of the plaintiff which the Superintendent of Police may have exercised except the power of dismissal or removal. Paragraph 491 referred to above provides that the officers holding the posts enumerated in paragraph 479 (1) shall follow the procedure prescribed in Paragraph 490 when conducting departmental trials, and their orders shall, with the concurrence of the Superintendent of Police, have the same executive force in all cases as the orders of the Superintendent of Police except in cases in which the officer conducting the proceedings recommends the dismissal or removal of a constable or under officer. The enquiry in this case which was held under paragraph 490 was held by a Deputy Superintendent of Police Mr. M. C. Rawat. The lower appellate Court has found that the plaintiff has not established that he was not authorised to take the proceedings under the aforesaid provisions in place of the Superintendent of Police. It is reasonable to suppose that if the Deputy Superintendent of Police Mr. M. C. Rawat. The lower appellate Court has found that the plaintiff has not established that he was not authorised to take the proceedings under the aforesaid provisions in place of the Superintendent of Police. It is reasonable to suppose that if the Deputy Superintendent of Police Mr. Rawat was not authorised to take the proceedings, the plaintiff could have objected to his jurisdiction on the ground that he was not a Deputy Superintendent of Police who had crossed the first efficiency bar in the time scale of pay applicable to him or was not a Deputy Superintendent of Police specially authorised in this behalf by the Deputy Inspector General of Police of the range concerned. I think the lower appellate Court was justified in proceeding on the basis that the official acts are presumed to be regularly done unless proved otherwise. If the Superintendent of Police Mr. Rawat has authorised to punish the plaintiff with the concurrence of the Superintendent of Police, and was authorised to conduct the departmental trial under paragraph 490 of the Police Regulations, it is apparent that the evidence at the trial had also to be recorded by him as if he was the Superintendent of Police and the reference in paragraph 490 to the Superintendent of Police should be read as reference to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. There is thus no merit in the second point raised by the learned counsel. The authorities by him in support thereof, namely, that of a learned single Judge of this Court in Sri Darbari Ram Sharma v. The State of U. P. and others, 1969 ALJ 447 and that of Division Bench in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Hari Shankar Kaushik, 1964 ALJ 576 do not lay down anything to the contrary. The Division Bench laid it down that the procedure prescribed by paragraph 490 is mandatory. The question whether a Deputy Superintendent of Police authorised to punish a Sub-Inspector of Police under clause (f) of paragraph 479, may conduct a departmental did not arise in those cases and paragraph 491 of the Police Regulations is clear authority for the proposition that such a Superintendent of Police can hold the departmental trial under paragraph 490. 7. The first point raised was that a preliminary enquiry should have preceded the departmental trial. 7. The first point raised was that a preliminary enquiry should have preceded the departmental trial. Reliance was placed on sub-paragraph 486 which provides that "when a Superintendent of Police sees reason to take action on information given to him, or on his own knowledge or suspicion, that a Police Officer subordinate to him has committed an offence under Section 7 of the Police Act...-................."he will make or cause to be made by an officer senior in rank to the officer charged, a departmental enquiry sufficient to test the truth of the charge and on the conclusion of the inquiry he will decide whether further action is necessary, and if so, whether the officer charged should be departmentally tried or whether the District Magistrate should be moved to take cognizance of the case under the criminal Procedure Code........................", This inquiry is not a formal trial or a formal inquiry which must proceed a departmental trial. The fact that the departmental trial took place and the fact that the plaintiff did not vacate the quarter at police station Anwarganj and the further fact that he was charged for disobedience of orders to vacate that quarter are such that it is impossible to say in the present case that the departmental trial was in any way vitiated. Orders were served on the plaintiff to vacate the quarter, some time elapsed between the service of those orders and initiation of the departmental trial after placing him under suspension Sub-paragraph III of paragraph 486 shows that a Superintendent of Police can even act on his own knowledge or suspension. If he does act on his own knowledge the enquiry which has to proceed a departmental trial could be nothing more than the process of collection of evidence and making up of his mind to initiate the departmental trial. Moreover, the point does not seem to have been raised in this form. All that was suggested was that the suspension was bad in the absence of a preliminary enquiry. The suspension was not by way of punishment but was pending trial and since it no longer subsists the question does not arise. 8. The last point taken was that some of the witnesses were not permitted to be examined by the Enquiry Officer. The name of the particular witness given was Shri J. N. Awasthi, Superintendent of Police. The suspension was not by way of punishment but was pending trial and since it no longer subsists the question does not arise. 8. The last point taken was that some of the witnesses were not permitted to be examined by the Enquiry Officer. The name of the particular witness given was Shri J. N. Awasthi, Superintendent of Police. Now Shri J. N. Awasthi was not one of the witnesses for the plaintiff. According to the Enquiry Officer all that had to be proved was that the signatures under the orders were his which was amply proved by the statement of his reader. The lower appellate Court has referred to paragraph 490 (5) of the Police Regulations. Order that paragraph it is provided that if the Superintendent of Police considers that the evidence of any witness or any document which the officer charged wishes to produce in his defence, is unlikely to be material to the issue of the case, he may refuse to call such witness or allow such document to be produced in evidence, but in such case, lie must briefly record his reasons for so refusing. The lower appellate Court has observed that the Enquiry Officer has given his reasons at page 7 in paragraph 2 of his finding Ext. 18. I do not think that the plaintiff could be said to have been prejudiced at the trial by the refusal to compel the presence of Mr. J. N. Awasthi. 9. In the result I find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances I make no order as to costs in this Court.