M. D. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is the revision of the accused Narayana Prasad, who has been sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment and to pay the fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of fine to Two months rigorous imprisonment under section 16 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. ( 2 ) BOTH the Courts below, relying on the oral testimonies of the Food Inspector P. W. 1 R. D. Dohre and P. W. 3 R. C. Jam, who had accompanied the said food Inspector to the Kirana shop of the applicant-accused on 26. 9. 1977, have held that the applicant accused, on the demand of the Food Inspector to sell him the sample of ground-nut oil, whose tins were found kept in the shop, had refused to sell him the sample and had refused to sign the notice, which was intended to be give to the applicant-accused in this regard. It was equally held by both these Courts that the appellant accused had told the Food Inspector at the relevant time that the oil was not a item, which was manufactured at his house and that, whatever, he purchased from the Seths of Diodori, he had been selling the same. On being further asked to produce the bills for purchase of the tins of oil, the applicant accused had further told him that he had no time to show him any bills, whatsoever; and that, he would not sell the sample of oil to him nor would he sign any papers. Both the Courts have also held that the applicant-accused had told the Food Inspector finally, to go away from his place and to take, whatever action against him as the Food Inspector may like to take. According to both the Courts, all these overt acts and conduct as stated above of the applicant-accused and his demeanour amounted to preventing the Food Inspector from taking the sample, as authorized by the provisions of the Act and as such, was punishable under Section 16 (1) (c) of the Act. The trial Court convicted and sentenced the applicant-accused to the extent, as stated at the outset. The lower appellate Court equally maintained the same. He now the present revision. The trial Court convicted and sentenced the applicant-accused to the extent, as stated at the outset. The lower appellate Court equally maintained the same. He now the present revision. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant accused has urged the solitary point that the facts as held proved, by both the Courts below, did not tantamount to preventing the Food Inspector from taking the sample. According to the applicants counsel, the terms refusal and prevention are not synonymous, and at worst, the case against the applicant focused would be that of refusal and not of prevention, and such refusal is no offence under Section 16 (1) (c) of the Act. In support of his contention the applicants learned counsel has cited Chhedilal and another v. Medical Health Officer1, Faizabad Municipality and Municipal Council Jaipur v. Mangilal. 2 The learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the non-applicant-State has, however, contended that the case in question is of prevention, fully covered under Section 16 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In support of his argument he has cited Municipal Board v. Jhammanlal3 and Habib Khan v. State of M. P. 4 ( 4 ) ARGUMENTS advanced, are apparently without any merit. It is, no doubt, true that the word refusal and the word prevention are not altogether synonymous, and have different shades of meaning. As has been explained in the full bench decision of Rajasthan High Court, reported in Narayan Prasad v. Rajasthan, an act of refusal sometimes may amount to prevention when accompanied by the requisite conduct or demeanour of the accused person. Whether a refusal in any particular case amounts to prevention will have to be decided on the facts and circumstance of each case. Chhedilal and another v. Medical Health Officer, Faizabad, (supra) cited by the applicants learned counsel has no application to the present case, since the facts there are quite different from those, present in the instant case. The case cited, is one, where the accused person, on being asked to sell the sample of milk, had simply run away leaving behind the containers with milk and cycle. Notgiog else was done by the accused persons and hence, in these circumstances it was held that the accused persons, at worst, had refused to cooperate with the Food Inspector in selling the sample of milk to him, and it was open to the Foot. Notgiog else was done by the accused persons and hence, in these circumstances it was held that the accused persons, at worst, had refused to cooperate with the Food Inspector in selling the sample of milk to him, and it was open to the Foot. Inspector even in the absence of the accused persons, to take the sample in the presence of the witness. Such a case was, hence, held to be one as not of prevention. Another cited case viz. Municipal Council Jaipur v. Mangilal (supra) wherein distinction is sought to be drawn between the two terms preventst and, refuses, on the strength of certain dictionary meanings, has also no application to the present case. The cited case was one, where there was no overt act of obstruction but there was a negative approach of the accused is not co-operating with the Food Inspector to accompany him wherever he desired to take him. ( 5 ) THE present case has more than sufficient overt-acts to envelope the accused within the against of the offence punishable under Section 16 (1) (c) of the Act. It may well, be remembered that the prevention, as used in Section 16 (l) (c) ibid does not necessarily involves an obstruction by physical force or by threats, though it may include them, but there must-be some deliberate act or acts of the accused, which may hinder the Food Inspector from exercising his powers of taking the sample under Section 10 (1) of the Act. The word preventing necessarily implies doing of some act by the accused which may actually make it impossible for the Food Inspector to obtain the sample in exercise of his power Municipal Board v. Mulukdos Gupta6 and State of Rajasthan v. Asharaph. ( 6 ) THE facts of the present case are somewhat similar to and even stronger than these at present in the full bench case of the Rajasthan High Court, reported in Narain Prasad v. Rajasthan (supra), This full bench case was one where the accused had refused to take notice and to give the sample to the Food Inspector and had created a row in this regard, and it was held in these circumstances that the conduct of the accused did full within the mischief of Section 16 (1) (c) of the Act. The present case is one which is not a case of mere refusal, but comprises of very many overt acts, and such obstructive and obdurate conduct of the applicant-accused which brought him within the mischief of Section 16 (1) (c) of the Act. The applicant-accused not only refused to sell the sample of ground nut oil to the Food Inspector but refused to accept the notice and further refused to sigh any papers that the Food Inspector intended to present to him for his signatures. Not only that, his mis demeanour is found to travel much far. The applicant accused is found to have told the Food Inspector that he would not show any bills of purchase to him and he had no time to show to him any bills nor would he sell the sample to him orsignatures. Not only that, his mis demeanour is found to travel much far. The applicant accused is found to have told the Food Inspector that he would not show any bills of purchase to him and he had no time to show to him any bills nor would he sell the sample to him or any account. The applicant accuseds obstruction and resistance went so far that he finally told the Food Inspector to go away from his place, with a threat that he might take any action against him, as he might choose to take. In such circumstances, when the Food Inspector was so threatened and was asked to get out from the shop, the Food Inspector obviously had no other choice and had no means to take the sample, by exercising any force, which he could not, under the violent and threatening attitude of the appellant-accused. In these circumstances, findings myself in agreement with the findings of the lower appellate Court, I am clearly of the view that the applicant-accused had prevented the Food Inspector from taking the sample from him. His conviction therefore, is well merited; and equally so, the sentence of imprisonment and fine as awarded against him. ( 7 ) IN the result, thus, the revision being without any merit is dismissed; and the order, of conviction and sentence as passed by the lower appellate Court is maintained in toto. .