Dev Raj Khanna ( 1 ) THIS is plaintiff s suit for specific performance of agreement to sell S 231, Greater Kailash It. New Delhi, for Rs. 1,30,000. 00. That agreement was stated to have been arrived at between the plaintiff s late further Shri Rattan Lal Surana and Balram Krishan, deft. 1 on 5. 12. 82 (. . . . . . . . .) Rs. 25,000. 00 were said to have been paid thereunder to deft. 1. Deft. 2 is the son of deft. 1, and it is stated that the said agreement was arrived at by No. 1 for himself as well as on behalf of No. 2. A joint family is said to exist between them of which No. 1 is the Karta. ( 2 ) THE suit was brought on 4. 12. 1982, and court-fee of Rs. 13. 00 only was aflixed on the plaint. An application u/s 149 Civil Procedure Code was, however, attached to the effect that since the Delhi Treasury was closed on 3rd and 4th Dec. , 1982, the court-fee of the value of Rs. 3,600. 00 could not be purchased and filed. Time was, therefore, sought for paying the court-fee by 6. 12. 1982. ( 3 ) THIS suit was laid before the Court on 7. 12. 1982 when none appeared from the side of the plaintiff, and it was adjourned to the next day. There was again default in the appearance, and it was also noticed that the plaint did not bear the necessary court-fee, and the plaintiff had not made up the deficiency upto 6. 12. 1982, as had been mentioned in application u/s 149 Civil Procedure Code The suit was, therefore, dismissed. ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY the plaintiff moved an application u/s 151 Civil Procedure Code (I. A. No. 4697 of 1982) for restoration of the suit on the ground that the court-fee could be procured on 9. 12. 1982 only because of the plaintiff s intervening sickness, and the plaintiff s counsel carried a bona fide impression, that till the time the deficiency in court-fee was made up on the plaint, the suit had to be put up before the Deputy Registrar only for removal of objections. He had not expected that the suit would be laid before the Court. He had not expected that the suit would be laid before the Court. ( 5 ) THIS applition of the plaintiff for restoration, of the suit was allowed, and summons were directed to be issued. Since the plaintiff had also moved an application under Order 39, Rules S and 2 and S. 151, Civil Procedure Code (I. A. No. 4696 of 1982), seeking an interim injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing him from any portion of the property, and also for a direction that he need not pay/deposit rent, an interim order was made requiring maintenance of status quo at the spot with regard to possession. ( 6 ) THE defendants have now appeared and filed Written statement and reply to I. A. 4696 of 1982. They have stoutly opposed the extension of the interim order issued earlier, and have contended that the present suit is mala fide and an abuse, as it is based upon a forged writing. No such agreement to sell was said to have been at any time arrived at, and rather it is stated that defendant No. 1 had never met the plaintiff s father. Certain other circumstances have been brought out which in a nut-shell are : A portion of the property bearing No. S-231, Greater Kailash- II, was let out by deft. 1 to the plaintiff and his brother on a monthly rent of Rs. 500. 00 in June, 1979. At that time, deft. No. 2 was out of India. He returned from there in Jan. , 1980, and, therefore, the deft. 1 required more accommodation for residence. A petition for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act was, therefore, moved before the Rent Controller by deft, No. 1 against the plaintiff and his brother on 25. 8. 1980 u/s 25-B on the ground of bona fide necessity. During the course of the same, the plaintiff applied for grant of leave to defend, but the same was rejected on 28. 11. 1980. The eviction order was, however, held executable on the expiry of six months from the date of the order. Against this, the plaintiff moved a revision before this Court which was dismissed on 26. 5. 1981. ( 7 ) THE plaintiff s brother then moved a petition before Rent Controller for setting aside of eviction order on the ground that he had not been served. This was dismissed on 10. 9. Against this, the plaintiff moved a revision before this Court which was dismissed on 26. 5. 1981. ( 7 ) THE plaintiff s brother then moved a petition before Rent Controller for setting aside of eviction order on the ground that he had not been served. This was dismissed on 10. 9. 1982, and the appeal against the same was also rejected by the Tribunal on 8. 10. 82. Revision moved against that also bore the same fate. ( 8 ) ANOTHER ejectment petition was filed by. deft. 1 against the plaintiff and his brother on the ground of non-payment of rent in 1980. During the course of the same, the plaintiff and his brother were required to deposit rent inspite of their placing reliance on a rent receipt allegedly issued by defendants for payment of rent, which receipt had been denied by them. The plaintiff and his brother had, in the meanwhile, also moved a petition for fixation of standard rent and urged that rate of rent should be Rs. 125. 00 p. m. The Additional Controller, however, by an order dt. 28. 4. 1981, required the plaintiff and his brother to deposit rent at the agreed rate of Rs. 500. 00 p. m. This was upheld in revision by this Court on 8. 12. 1982 with a modification on the basis of a joint statement by the parties counsel that the rent would be deposited in the account of the deft. 1 in the Corporation Bank. The plaintiff and his brother have been depositing the rent accordingly. ( 9 ) IN none of this chain, of legal proceedings, the plaintiff and his brother put forth the case of the agreement to sell, or thatthey were in possession not as tenants but as prospective purchasers in part performance of the agreement. They also did not disown their liability to pay rent as was purported to be agreed on 5. 12. 1979 under the said writing evidencing the agreement to sell. ( 10 ) THE case of the plaintiff is that he was not aware of the said writing reflecting agreement to sell, and he came across it in August, 1982 when he was looking into the papers left behind by his father who had died in May, 1981. Amongst them was a will as well left behind by his father bequeathing the rights under the agreement to him. Amongst them was a will as well left behind by his father bequeathing the rights under the agreement to him. He then sent a registered notice dt. 8. 10. 1982 to the defendants, requiring them to complete the sale. This was replied by them on 15. 10. 1982, denying the existence of any such agreement or the receipt of Rs. 25,000. 00. All that was termed as forged and fabricated and motivated as a desperate attempt to avoid eviction from the premises. ( 11 ) IT may also be mentioned that the plaintiff s brother has similarly brought a suit on 8. 12. 1982 in the court of a Sub Judge, Delhi, on the basis of the agreement to sell dt. 5. 12. 1979, and has also challenged the eviction order passed against him on the ground that he had not been served. He has not mentioned in that suit any will left behind by his father in favour of the present plaintiff. No interim injunction was allowed by the learned Sub Judge against the defendants from evicting him. ( 12 ) THE payment of Rs. 25,000. 00 as mentioned in the receipt dt. 5. 12. 1979, was stated to be in cash and not by cheque. According to the defendants, they are the joint owners of the property having first purchased the plot jointly, and later effected construction thereon in similar manner. According to them, the property is worth several lacs. ( 13 ) WITH this background of the respective cases of the parties, the question to be considered is whether the interim injunction issued earlier should be made absolute till the decision of the suit. There is no gain-saying that the Court has at this stage, to primarily consider the prima facie nature of the case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury likely to be caused to any of the parties. While determining the prima facie case, the Court has not to closely examine the respective cases and scrutinise in detail where the truth lies. All that should be seen is whether the plaintiff has a case worth giving a trial, and not that he must ultimately succeed. The plaintiff in this regard has placed reliance upon 1973 Rajdhani LR 542 (Gopal Krishan Kapoory. All that should be seen is whether the plaintiff has a case worth giving a trial, and not that he must ultimately succeed. The plaintiff in this regard has placed reliance upon 1973 Rajdhani LR 542 (Gopal Krishan Kapoory. Rumesh Chancder) ; 1981 Rajdhani LR 601 (R. L. Sapra v. Om Prakash) ; AIR 1975 M. P. 85 [surendrasingh v. Lal Sheoraj ; 1975 (1) AER 504 (American Cymimid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. } ; 1865 LR 50 {thomas Walker v. Auber George Jones), and 1895 (1) Calcutta 459 (Chandidat Jha v. Padmuiund Singh ). ( 14 ) HOWEVER, at the same time, it cannot be ignored that what the plaintiff in the present suit is also seeking is that the deft. No. 1 should not be allowed to reap the fruit of the ejectment decree which he has obtained against him. A challenge to a decree lawfully passed after contest, should not be readily entertained in separate independent proceed- ings, and the Court should be extremely slow to stay its execution and deprive the benefit thereof to the person in whose favour it has been granted. This should be all the more so when the aggrieved party has exhausted his remedy in appeals and revision. There should be overwhelming compelling circumstances to justify the stay. 1973 Rajdhani LR 542 (Gopal Krishan Kapoor v. Ramesh Cliander), on which much reliance has been placed by the plaintiff, is not of much avail inasmuch as the challenge to thedecree and its execution was not by a person who was party to the same. Instead a third person (though happened to be the father of judgment-debtor) who had brought the suit basing his claim on a letter allegedly issued by the decree-holder. ( 15 ) IN case the agreement to sell had been arrived at on 5. 12. 1979, and a large sum of Rs. 25,000. 00 had been paid by the plaintiff s father who, according to the plaintiff, used to live with him, to deft. 1, it somewhat appears strange that the plaintiff would not have known about the same. That agreement further purported to convert the possession of the plaintiff and his brother from that of tenants to prospective purchasers. Liability for the payment of rent also ceased then. 1, it somewhat appears strange that the plaintiff would not have known about the same. That agreement further purported to convert the possession of the plaintiff and his brother from that of tenants to prospective purchasers. Liability for the payment of rent also ceased then. , Such an agreement would have been a complete answer to the petitions for ejectment which the defendant No. 1 filed against the plaintiff and his brother on the ground of bona fide requirement and non-payment of rent. The plaintiff and his brother would also not have sought fixation of standard rent. If the plaintiff s father was living with them, it was highly unusual that they did not come to know of the agreement. If he was not living with them, and was at Jaipur where he died, it is not understood how he developed interest to purchase the property in dispute if it was not at the instance of the plaintiff. The case of discovery of this document belatedly in August, 1981, does not prima facie appear much convincing. It is also noteworthy that the plaintiff s father did not issue any notice to the defendant No. 1 for almost 1 year till his death on the basis of this agreement requiring the defendant No. 1 to complete the sale. A person who had parted with Rs. 25,000. 00 would not have normally remained silent and indifferent for so long towards the completion of the sale-deed. ( 16 ) CONSIDERING all these circumstances, V am not inclined to extend the interim injunction issued earlier in the suit so as to prevent the defendant No. 1 from executing the ejectment order which he lias obtained against the plaintiff. He had come into possession of the premises as a tenant. That tenancy stands terminated and the eviction order holds good. If and when the plaintiff succeeds in the present suit, he will be entitled to possession on the execution of the sale-deed and the rule of lis pendence against any transfer or parting with possession, would naturally apply. The plaintiff s rights thereby would not be prejudiced. ( 17 ) THE result, therefore, is that the interim order issued earlier on 13. 12. 1982 is not extended any further.