ORDER K. Kader, J. 1. The first respondent in I.A. No. 4117 of 1980 in A.S. No. 121 of 1979 on the file of the Principal Sub Judge, Trivandrum is the revision petitioner, and the revision is directed against the order passed on I.A. No. 4117 of 1980 filed by the respondent herein who is the appellant in A.S. No. 121 of 1979, allowing his prayer to get himself examined by the Assistant Family Planning Medical Officer, Trivandrum. The parties will be hereinafter referred to as the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner claimed that she is the legally wedded wife of the respondent and minor Sindhu was born to them during their wedlock. Alleging neglect by the respondent, the petitioner filed an application for maintenance for herself and the minor girl under S.125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Although this petition was contested by the respondent, the learned Magistrate after taking evidence and due consideration of the same awarded maintenance to the petitioner and the minor girl. The respondent instituted O.S. No. 382 of 1978 before the Munsiff's Court, Trivandrum praying for a declaration that Sindhu (2nd defendant in the suit) was not his child and the defendants were not entitled to maintenance. The suit was contested and both sides adduced evidence both oral and documentary, and, on the conclusion of the trial the suit was dismissed. 2. The respondent, being aggrieved by this dismissal, filed A.S. No. 121 of 1979 before the District Court, Trivandrum and the same was made over to the Principal Subordinate Judge for disposal according to law. While the appeal was pending before the Sub Court, the respondent filed I.A. No. 4117 of 1980 under O.41 R.27, 28 and 29 praying that Assistant Planning Medical Officer, Trivandrum, be directed to subject the petitioner "to a thorough medical check up including his semen test and to state whether vasectomy operation conducted on the petitioner (the appellant) on 21st December 1968 was a 100 percent success and whether he has any power to procreate after the said operation". This application was strongly opposed by the petitioner on several grounds. But the learned Subordinate Judge allowed the prayer on condition that the respondent pays Rs. 100 towards costs to the petitioner herein. 3. Shri. Harun Ul Rashid, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner attacked this order on various grounds. This application was strongly opposed by the petitioner on several grounds. But the learned Subordinate Judge allowed the prayer on condition that the respondent pays Rs. 100 towards costs to the petitioner herein. 3. Shri. Harun Ul Rashid, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner attacked this order on various grounds. The main ground of attack by the counsel was that the discretion vested in the Court under O.41 R.27 has been arbitrarily and improperly exercised, that the Order under attack is in flagrant violation of the essential requirements in O.41 R.27, that the order in effect is one which has enabled the respondent to fill up the gap in the evidence adduced by him and that the court below seriously erred in passing the order without examining the evidence already on record. 4. O.41, R.27 reads: "27. Production of Additional evidence in appellate Court. - (1) The Parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if - (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or [(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligencee such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of the diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or] (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission." Clause (aa) was added in this rule by Amendment Act, 1976. Sub-r.(1) of rule 27 is a general rule which prohibits production of additional evidence by parties, whether oral or documentary in the Appellate Court. But clauses (a), (aa) and (b) provide exceptions to this general rule in certain cases falling within the four corners of those clauses. Under sub-r.(2), whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission. But clauses (a), (aa) and (b) provide exceptions to this general rule in certain cases falling within the four corners of those clauses. Under sub-r.(2), whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission. It can thus be seen on a careful reading of R.27 that a discretion has been given to the Appellate Court on the three contingencies laid down in clauses (a), (aa) and (b) of R.27, to allow parties to an appeal to let in or adduce, additional evidence. But this discretion no doubt is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations in clauses (a), (aa) and (b) and this discretion should not be exercised arbitrarily or improperly or in violation of the limitations. 5. Under clause (a) the appellate court can admit additional evidence if the Trial Court or the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit that evidence which ought to have been admitted. Under new clause (aa) inserted by the Amending Act, 1976 if a party to the appeal seeking to produce additional evidence establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, additional evidence sought to be produced was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, the Appellate Court can allow such evidence to be produced. Under clause (b) the Appellate Court has been given full discretion, if it requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause to allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. It is therefore clear that under this clause the requirements must be that of the appellate court. The Appellate Court must be satisfied that in order to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, additional evidence is necessary. It is therefore clear that under this clause the requirements must be that of the appellate court. The Appellate Court must be satisfied that in order to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, additional evidence is necessary. There can also be cases where even if the appellate court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the available materials on records, still the appellate court considers that something which remains obscure should be cleared up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner, then it will be allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause and not strictly in order to enable it to pronounce the judgment. 6. The attack of the counsel for the revision petitioner is that the application filed by the respondent herein does not fall under any of the exceptions under clauses (a) to (b). He contended that the appellate court has failed to examine the evidence already on record and properly apply its mind to the requirements under R.27 of O.41 of C.P.C. The respondent has no case that the application filed by him fell under clause (a) or (aa) of R.27. The application filed by him also does not state any reason or ground to bring it under any of those clauses. 7. In Ramanatha Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar 1980 (1) MLJ 178 it was held that the provisions of O.41 R.27 of Civil Procedure Code are not meant to enable either party to the suit to fill up the gaps in the evidence or to better their case, in the appellate court when once they find that the evidence which they had chosen to let in the Trial Court is found by the appellate court to be insufficient to justify their case. 8. A five member Bench of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal ( AIR 1957 SC 912 ) held that it is well settled that additional evidence should not be permitted at the appellate stage in order to enable one of the parties to remove certain lacunae in presenting its case at the proper state and to fill in gaps. Of course, the position is different where the appellate court itself requires certain evidence to do justice between the parties. Of course, the position is different where the appellate court itself requires certain evidence to do justice between the parties. Arjan Singh v. Cartar Singh ( AIR 1951 SC 1 93 ) has been referred to in this case. In that case, it was held that the discretion given to the appellate court by O.41 R.27 to receive and admit additional evidence is not an arbitrary one, but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations specified in that rule. If the additional evidence is allowed to be adduced contrary to the principles governing the reception of such evidence, it will be a case of improper exercise of discretion and the additional evidence so brought on the record will have to be ignored and the case decided as if it is non existent. It was also held that the legitimate occasion for the application of O.41 R.27 is when on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent, not where a discovery is made outside the court, of fresh evidence and the application is made to import it. The true test, therefore, is whether the appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. 9. In Kamala Ranjan v. Baijnath ( AIR 1951 SC 1 ) the Supreme Court construed the provisions in O.41 R.27 C.P.C. and observed that: "Where the appeal court allows the additional evidence to be given in order to clear up certain matter and for the purpose of enabling it to come to a proper decision on the point, the matter is fully covered by O.41 R.27 C.P.C. and no objection can be taken to the course adopted by the appellate court in second appeal as there is no reason to interfere in the exercise of the court's discretion." 10. Now the question for consideration is whether the court below has applied its mind and complied with the due requirements under R.27 of O.41 C.P.C. I have been taken through the order sought to be revised and I have duly considered the same in the light of the requirements under O.41 R.27 and the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above decisions. There is nothing on record to show that the appellate court has examined the evidence already on record before passing the order under attack. There is also no finding that the appellate court requires the additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. It is not at all clear from the order under attack whether it was passed under clause (aa) or clause (b) of R.27. The application, by respondent, is filed under O.41 R.27, 28 and 29 and not under a particular clause of R.27. The order also does not show that the additional evidence was allowed to be let in order to clear up something which remains obscure or to clear up certain matters for the purpose of enabling the court to come to a proper decision on the point. There is nothing in the order to show that the court was satisfied that this is a case coming under clause (b) of R.27 or that the court below applied its mind to the limitations and requirements under this clause. The affidavit in support of the application shows that the applicant had undergone a vasectomy operation and it was cent per cent success as per the version of P. W. 2. What is stated in paragraph 8 of the affidavit is: "So by way of abundant caution, I would like to point out that I am even now prepared to undergo semen test or medical check up to prove that I have no capacity to procreate after the operation conducted on me on 21st December, 1968." For the aforesaid reasons, the order cannot be sustained. This revision is, therefore, allowed and the order under attack is set aside and the petition is sent back to the court below for disposal afresh, according to law, and in the light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the decisions cited above, as expeditiously as possible.