JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - The interminable disputes between landlords and tenants, which constitute the bulk civil litigation in the urban areas of Uttar Pradesh, often give rise to interesting questions of law. One such point has cropped up in the instant case. It relates to the interpretation of Section 21 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Before reproducing the relevant provisions it would be necessary to mention the salient facts of the case. 2. The Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 are the landlords of premises No. 199 Badshahi Mandi, Allahabad. They filed an application u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act for release of the accommodation situate on the ground-floor thereof, which was in possession of the Petitioner-tenants, Sharda Prasad. In short, the case of the landlords was that the family of the late Sri. Tipu Lal, since dead, (the applicants being his descendants), had considerably increased and the accommodation in their possession was not sufficient to cope with their needs. Consequently, it was prayed that the portion situated on the ground-floor in occupation of the tenant (present Petitioner) be released in favour of the landlords for their own use and occupation. The application was resisted on the ground that the alleged need of the landlords was not bonafide, that they had other accommodation also at their disposal and in the event of any release order being passed in their favour the tenant would suffer much greater hardship. The release application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority against which an appeal was preferred by the landlords which was also dismissed. Aggrieved by that order the landlords filed a writ petition in this Court, being writ petition No. 1028 of 1977, which was allowed by the order dated 28-2-1979. The main point which had been canvassed on behalf of the landlord in that writ petition was that during the pendency of the writ petition the tenant had purchased house No. 354 Mohatishmganj, Allahabad and was residing in that house and the accommodation in dispute was actually lying vacant; hence the landlords were entitled to release of the accommodation in dispute. On these allegations this Court allowed the writ petition filed by the landlords and the order passed by the Appellate Authority was quashed with a direction to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the judgment. It was expressly observed by this Court that the Appellate Authority would permit the parties to adduce evidence on the new point urged in this Court, namely, the alleged purchase of house by the tenant during the pendency of the writ petition. Yet another direction contained in the High Court order was that the Authority concerned would decide first whether the needs of the landlords was bonafide. In pursuance of the High Court judgment the parties were directed by the Appellate Authority to adduce evidence and a copy of the sale deed dated 17-1-1978 relating to House No. 354 Mohatshimganj, Allahabad executed in favour of Shri Nath, minor son of Sharda Prasad (Tenant) was also filed. The Appellate Authority by its order dated 6-5-1980 allowed the landlords appeal and it is this order which is impugned in the present writ petition. 3. Two main points were urged on behalf of the Petitioner. Firstly, it was submitted that the order does not contain any finding that the accommodation in question was bonafide required by the landlords and in the absence of any such finding the order must be quashed as being not in accordance with , law. Secondly, it was contended that the Appellate Authority actually applied explanation (i) to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act to the present case, although it is not expressly mentioned in the order that the said provision was applicable to the facts of the case and the Appellate Authority acted illegally in applying the same and this has vitiated its order. 4. I am unable to accede to the submission made at the Bar that the order under challenge does not contain any finding that the accommodation was bonafide required by the landlords. It is an elaborate judgment dealing with all the relevant, factual aspects of the case and takes into consideration in great detail the strength of the families of the landlords and the tenant and the accommodations occupied by them respectively. It is an elaborate judgment dealing with all the relevant, factual aspects of the case and takes into consideration in great detail the strength of the families of the landlords and the tenant and the accommodations occupied by them respectively. It also examines in all its niceties the gradual increase in the number of the members constituting the family of the landlords with the passage of time, pointedly referring to the present position when their inflated family had obliged them to apply for release. A map of the accommodation occupied by the landlords has been commented upon in detail and it has been observed that excluding the two rooms which were being used by them as shops, the rest of the accommodation consisted of merely three rooms and Verandah, Kitchen, common courtyard and common passage etc. It has also been noticed that the family of the landlords is now comprised of 22 members. In these circumstances even though there may not be a categorical finding that the need or the landlords was bonafide, in substance such finding can be easily read between the lines. The tenor of the judgment leaves no room for doubting the accent placed by the learned Judge on the paucity of accommodation suffered by the landlords and their dire need for more accommodation. There is no formula prescribed in which a finding of this nature must be recorded. The point is concluded by the inference drawn by the Appellate Authority in these words: The case of the landlords is therefore covered by Section 21(1) of Act 13 of 1972. 5. The pithy sentence in my opinion, is very pregnant and contains a clear finding about the bonafide requirement of the landlords. Therefore, a recital of the essential ingredients of an order of release u/s 21(1)(a) is not absent in the order of the Appellate Authority. 6. I, however, agree with the Petitioner's second contention viz. that the Appellate Authority has wittingly or unwittingly applied explanation (1) of Section 21(1)(a) to the facts of the instant case. But I am unable to accept the argument that the explanation has been erroneously applied. In my opinion the facts of the instant case fully attracted the provisions of the Explanation and they were rightly applied. that the Appellate Authority has wittingly or unwittingly applied explanation (1) of Section 21(1)(a) to the facts of the instant case. But I am unable to accept the argument that the explanation has been erroneously applied. In my opinion the facts of the instant case fully attracted the provisions of the Explanation and they were rightly applied. It has been found as a fact that Sharda Prasad Petitioner has purchased house No. 354 Mohatshimganj Allahabad during the pendency of the case, in the name of his minor, unmarried son, Sri Nath although he denied it and had pleaded that his son Shri Nath was living separately from him. Explanation (1) to Section 21(1)(a) reads; In the case of a residential building-Where the tenant or any member of his family (who has normally residing with him or is wholly dependent on him) has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this Sub-section shall be entertained. 7. A controversy has arisen on the construction of this explanation. It was argued on behalf of the Respondent-landlords that the effect of the explanation was that the defence or the objections raised by the tenant against the landlords application for release would not be taken into consideration where the explanation was attracted and consequently the Prescribed Authority was not called upon either to weigh the respective needs of the landlords and tenant or even to probe the question as to whether the accommodation was bonafide required by the landlords. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner vehemently urged that notwithstanding the fact that Explanation (1) applied to the facts of a case, it was incumbent upon the Prescribed Authority first to record the preliminary finding that the building was bonafide required by the landlords and in the absence of such finding the order could not be legally sustained. I am inclined to agree with the interpretation suggested by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner with respect to Explanation (1). I am inclined to agree with the interpretation suggested by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner with respect to Explanation (1). The Explanation is immediately preceded by the following proviso: Provided also that the Prescribed Authority shall, except in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed. 8. In order to arrive at a correct interpretation it is necessary that the explanation must be read in juxtaposition with the preceding proviso. It was suggested that the explanation really provides an exception and, therefore, there was no necessity of any finding about the bonafide claim of the landlords being recorded. This argument is untenable. The explanation only dispenses with the requirement which is embodied in the proviso, namely, 'taking into account likely hardship of the tenant' as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. Only this part of the procedure which enjoins a comparison of the respective needs of the landlord and tenant is dispensed with by the explanation but its effect must be circumscribed within this limit. It cannot be projected farther so as to suspend the existence of the preliminary condition enshrined in the substantive part of Section 21(l)(a) which makes a consideration of the bonafide requirement of the landlord imperative. The fallacy in placing a different construction on the explanation arises from an omission to appreciate the distinction between substantive law and a mere rule of evidence. In plain language if a provision of law contains something which is intrinsically germane to the determination of the point at issue between the parties, it must be construed as a rule of evidence. On the other hand, if it is not in itself relevant for the purpose of determining the point of controversy between the parties but by itself it leads to a positive conclusion or makes a particular kind of inference irresistible, it acquires the shape of substantive law. Pointing out this cardinal distinction between substantive law and rule of evidence it was observed by the Supreme Court in Izhar Ahmad Khan Vs. Pointing out this cardinal distinction between substantive law and rule of evidence it was observed by the Supreme Court in Izhar Ahmad Khan Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1962 SC 1052 : In deciding the question as to whether a rule about irrebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence or not, it seems to us that the proper approach to adopt would be to consider whether fact A from the proof of which a presumption is required to be drawn about the existence of fact B, is inherently relevant in the matter of proving fact B and has inherently any probative or persuasive value in that behalf or not. If fact A is inherently relevant in proving the existence of fact B and to any rational mind it would bear a probative or persuasive value in the matter of proving the existence of fact B, then a rule perscribing either a rebuttable presumption or an irrebuttable presumption in that behalf would be a rule of evidence. On the other hand, if fact A is inherently not relevant in proving the existence of fact B or has no probative value in that behalf and yet a rule is made prescribing for a rebuttable or an irrebuttable presumption in that connection that rule would be a rule of substantive law and not a rule of evidence. Therefore, in dealing with the question as to whether a given rule prescribing a conclusive presumption is a rule of evidence or not, we cannot adopt the view that all rules prescribing irrebuttable presumptions are rules of substantive law. We can answer the question only after examining the rule and its impact on the proof of facts A and B. If this is the proper test, it would become necessary to enquire whether obtaining a passport from a foreign Government is or is not inherently relevant in proving the voluntary acquisition of the citizenship of that foreign State." 9. Applying the above test to the interpretation of the proviso and Clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act it becomes clear that while the latter embodies a rule of substantive law, the former prescribes only a rule of evidence. Applying the above test to the interpretation of the proviso and Clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act it becomes clear that while the latter embodies a rule of substantive law, the former prescribes only a rule of evidence. It would be pedantic and unrealistic to dispute that the proviso referred to above directly relates to an aspect which is of great relevancy and probative value in assessing the truth and authenticity of the landlord's claim that he bona fide requires a certain accommodation. Accordingly the proviso postulates only a rule of evidence with respect to the bona fide need of a landlord. It is of persuasive value in deciding as to whether the landlord has made out a case Under Clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act. The effect of the explanation is only to dispense with the rule of evidence contained in the proviso; it does not infiltrate into Section 21(1)(a) and so the substantive law remains intact. A rule of evidence manifestly does not displace the substantive law. This seems to be in conformity with the object of the enactment as stated in the Preamble, namely, the regulation of "the eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas and matters connected therewith." The ultimate effect of the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is that the eviction of tenants has been rendered an exception rather than a rule and the Courts of law cannot endorse an interpretation which would be repugnant to this central purpose. Dislodging a tenant would be permissible only when the fundamental condition is fulfilled, namely, that a landlord is obliged by sheer necessity to ask for the accommodation in dispute either because he has no other accommodation with him or the one already occupied by him fails to satisfy his need. That preliminary condition being fulfilled, the law permits another factor to be pressed to the advantage of the landlord, namely, that the tenant has another accommodation at his disposal. That preliminary condition being fulfilled, the law permits another factor to be pressed to the advantage of the landlord, namely, that the tenant has another accommodation at his disposal. To take an illustration, if it is found in a case that the landlord with a very small family has a large accommodation already at his disposal and he applies for release of another adjoining room occupied by an old tenant paying very low rent, obviously with the object of finding another tenant prepared to pay exorbitant rent, the application would not be considered bona fide. In such circumstances, the fact that the tenant has been able to acquire another accommodation would not entitle the landlord to obtain release in his favour. This circumstance of the tenant having another accommodation at his disposal would tilt the balance in the landlord's favour only if other things are equal i. e. his need is bonafide. Explanation I, therefore, does not exonerate the landlord from discharging the initial burden which rests on him of establishing that the accommodation is bonafide required by him. In the absence of such condition the benefit contemplated by the Explanation cannot be availed of. A contrary interpretation would enable a rapacious landlord to indulge in the sheer luxury of ejecting a sitting tenant. This would surely give rise to an alarming situation in a welfare State haunted by the spectre of paucity of habitable accommodation. I am fortified in my interpretation of the Explanation (1) by the observations made by Division Bench of this Court in Gopinath Goel Vs. 1st Addl. Dist. Judge, Meerut and Another, AIR 1977 All 408 which, however, deal with explanations (ii) and (iv) of the Act which have since been deleted but the same principles would be applicable. Thus, the contention of the Respondent that in view of the present case coming within the ambit of Explanation (1) any finding with regard to the bona fide requirement of the landlord was not necessary in law must be rejected. 10. Hence, even this statement of law as made above does not enable me to decide this case in the Petitioner's favour. I have already observed that there is no prescribed language or formula in which a finding with regard to the landlord's bonafide need must be recorded. 10. Hence, even this statement of law as made above does not enable me to decide this case in the Petitioner's favour. I have already observed that there is no prescribed language or formula in which a finding with regard to the landlord's bonafide need must be recorded. If the order read as a whole does substantially contain the inference that the authority was convinced that the need of the landlord was bona fide, that would satisfy the requirement of the substantive law contained in Clause (1) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. That crucial condition being fulfilled in the instant case, I am unable to hold that the order of the Appellate Authority was vitiated by any legal infirmity. 11. For these reasons this writ petition is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case no order is made as to costs.