JUDGMENT : A.M. Ahmedi, J. In the town of Nadiad, in ward No. 9 bearing House No. 1445, is a shop belonging to Gokulnathji Temple Trust whereof Mahalaxmi Vahuji Maharaj is the trustee and Rameshbhai Patel is her Karbhari. The said shop was let to one Parshottamdas Gordhandas Kachhia by the said trust. There was litigation between -the trust and the said Parshottamdas for possession of the shop but the trust had failed to secure a decree in ejectment against the tenant. The first respondent, the original plaintiff, was desirous of obtaining the said shop on rent from the trust. Parshottamdas was prepared to vacate the shop on payment of Rs. 5,000/-. The plaintiff, therefore, agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to Parshottamdas whereupon the respondent Karbhari agreed to put the plaintiff in possession of the shop as a tenant. Purusuant to this arrangement the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- in two installments of Rs. 2,500/- each on 17th February 1976 and 18th February 1976 to Parshottamdas whereupon the latter handed over the demised shop to the Karbhari who in turn put the plaintiff in possession thereof under the writing, Exhibit 24, dated 18th February 1976. It is the case of the plaintiff that after he was put in possession of the shop on 18th February 1976 at about 12-30 P.M. he applied his lock. It is further his case in the plaint that the present appellants, original defendants Nos. 4 and 5, broke open the lock on the same day at about 11.00 P.M. in collusion with the Karbhari and thus forcibly dispossessed him. He, therefore, filed Suit No. 178 of 1976 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Nadiad, for being put back in possession of the shop of which he was forcibly dispossessed. 2. In the said suit, besides making the present appellants, alleged trespassers, parties to the suit, he also impleaded the trust, its trustee Mahalaxmi Vahuji Maharaj and the Karbhari Rameshbhai M. Patel as co-defendant, However, no relief was claimed against them. 3. The defendants filed a joint written statement, Exhibit 11, resisting the plaintiff’s prayer for possession. Certain technical objections were raised regarding the maintainability of the suit but so far as facts are concerned, it was denied that the plaintiff had paid Rs. 3. The defendants filed a joint written statement, Exhibit 11, resisting the plaintiff’s prayer for possession. Certain technical objections were raised regarding the maintainability of the suit but so far as facts are concerned, it was denied that the plaintiff had paid Rs. 5,000/- to Parshottamdas and thereafter he had been inducted in the shop as a tenant by the Karbhari of the trust. It was also denied that he had applied his lock to the shop after being put in possession thereof on 18th February 1976 at about 12.30 P.M. On the contrary, it was contended by the defendants that after Parshottamdas vacated the suit shop, the appellants were put in possession thereof under a lease deed executed by the Karbhari on behalf of the trust and the trustee Mahalaxmi Vahuji Maharaj. The appellants, therefore, contended that they were in lawful use and occupation of the suit shop and the plaintiff was not entitled to obtain possession thereof from them. 4. The learned trial Judge framed issues at Exhibit 12. Issue No. 1 related to the creation of the tenancy in favour of the plaintiff on 18th February 1976 and issues Nos. 2 and 3 related to the plaintiff having been put in possession of the shop on that afternoon and having been forcibly dispossessed by the appellants that night. The other issues concerned the technical objections raised in the written statements, Exhibit 11. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was put in possession of the suit shop on the afternoon of 18th February 1976 on the operation of a lease in his favour and that he was forcibly dispossessed by the appellants subsequently on that very day. In the view that he took, he passed an eviction decree against the appellants, original defendants Nos. 4 and 5. 5. All the defendants jointly preferred an appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1979, against the eviction decree passed by the trial Court against the present appellants. In the said appeal two contentions were urged on behalf of the appellants, namely : (i) the tripartite contract entered into between Parshottamdas, the Karbhari and the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. In the said appeal two contentions were urged on behalf of the appellants, namely : (i) the tripartite contract entered into between Parshottamdas, the Karbhari and the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to Parshottamdas to secure his eviction was in contravention of the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) and against public policy and could not be enforced in a Court of law; and (ii) the trial Court lacked inherent jurisdiction as the decree in question could be passed only by a Court which was conferred jurisdiction by Section 28 of the Act. So far as the factual aspect is concerned, the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court has been confirmed by the lower appellate Court. It was on the basis of the facts found proved that the aforesaid two contentions were urged on behalf of the appellants. The learned District Judge, Nadiad, repelled the first contention in the following words : "I do not find any merits in the contention raised by the learned advocates. As a matter of fact, plaintiff’s arrangement with the original tenant Parshottamdas Kachhia was independent of the act on the part of the defendant in inducting the plaintiff in the suit shop. In claiming a decree for possession of the suit shop from the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 he claimed to protect his possession only." So far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, the learned District Judge after referring to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 observed as under : "It is only when a landlord or a tenant files a suit for possession as a landlord or a tenant and in his capacity as landlord or a tenant and relying on his title the landlord of a tenant that it becomes a suit of the description mentioned in Section 50 and Section 28. It is true, in the present case the plaintiff has set out his title in the plaint, but those averments are entirely unnecessary and irrelevant. Essentially the plaintiff’s suit is against the trespassers, namely, the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 and precisely a decree of ejectment is sought against the defendants Nos. 4 and 5. It is only with abundant caution he has joined the defendants Nos. Essentially the plaintiff’s suit is against the trespassers, namely, the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 and precisely a decree of ejectment is sought against the defendants Nos. 4 and 5. It is only with abundant caution he has joined the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as it is his case that the action of the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 in dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit shop was in collusion with the defendant No. 3. The issue, therefore, as to landlord and tenant in this suit was out of question." In this view that the learned Dis-strict Judge took, he dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree passed by the learned trial Judge. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the learned District Judge, the original defendants Nos. 4 and 5 against whom the decree of eviction is passed, have preferred the present Second Appeal. 6. This Second Appeal came up for admission on 23rd December 1982 before my learned brother N.H. Bhatt, J. In his opinion, the following substantial question of law was involved in the appeal : "Whether the plaintiff’s suit is based upon the alleged tenancy rights acquired by payment of illegal consideration of Rs. 5,000/- to the previous tenant Parshottamdas Kachhia for extinguishment of his tenancy rights and, therefore, the alleged tenancy rights are unlawful and not enforceable at law?" At the hearing of this appeal, Mr. Vakil, the learned Advocate for the appellant, also sought to raise the question of jurisdiction which was raised before the lower appellate Court. The proviso to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that if the Court is satisfied that any other substantial question of law not formulated by the Court at the time of admission is involved in the appeal, it may for reasons to be recorded hear the additional question and decide the same. As the question of jurisdiction was directly raised in the First Appeal before the lower appellate Court and as it is a substantial question of law bearing on the validity of the decree passed by the trial Court and confirmed in appeal by the District Court, I was inclined to permit Mr. Vakil to urge that question though not formulated by my learned brother N.H. Bhatt, J. at the time of admission of the appeal. Vakil to urge that question though not formulated by my learned brother N.H. Bhatt, J. at the time of admission of the appeal. In substance, therefore, both the questions set out earlier, which were urged before the lower appellate Court, arise for determination in this Second Appeal. 7. The cause title of the plaint does not state in so many words that it is a suit instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The averments made in paragraph 3 of the plaint are to the effect that the tenant Parshottamdas desired to wind up his business carried on in the demised shop but he refused to deliver possession of the shop to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to whom the property belonged. Defendant No. 3, therefore met the plaintiff on instructions from defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and informed him that he could secure possession of the shop from the tenant Parshottamdas and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 would be prepared to let out the shop to him. Thereupon, the plaintiff met Parshottamdas and persuaded him to deliver possession of the shop on payment of Rs. 5,000/-. The plaintiff informed defendants, No. 1, 2 and 3 about the said arrangement whereupon the said three defendants asked the plaintiff to pay the said amount of Rs. 5,000/- to Parshottamdas and agreed to reimburse the same from the rent. On the basis of this agreement the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to Parshottamdas by two instalments of Rs. 2,500/- each on 17/18th February 1976. On receipt of the amount of Rs. 5,000/-, Parshottamdas delivered actual vacant possession of the shop to defendant No. 3 who accepted the same on behalf of defendants Nos. 1 and 2. After the possession of the shop was thus obtained by the Karbhari, defendant No. 3, the plaintiff was put in possession thereof by defendant No. 3 on the instructions of defendants No. 2 on the same day, that is, 18th February 1976 at about 12.30 P.M. The plaintiff applied his lock to the shop in token of having received possession thereof under the writing Exhibit 24 dated 18th February 1976. On the same day the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 who are father and son, in collusion with defendant No. 3 broke open the lock at about 11.00 P.M. and assumed possession of the shop. Since defendants Nos. On the same day the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 who are father and son, in collusion with defendant No. 3 broke open the lock at about 11.00 P.M. and assumed possession of the shop. Since defendants Nos. 4 and 5 had thus trespassed into the shop, the plaintiff was constrained to sue them for possession. These in brief are the averments in the plaint. No relief is claimed against defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 but a decree of eviction is claimed against defendants Nos. 4 and 5 only. The suit was instituted on 1st May 1976, that is, within a period of six months from the date of actual dispossession. At the hearing of this Second Appeal Mr. Pandya, the learned advocate for the first respondent, original plaintiff, raised a preliminary objection in that no appeal, not even the First Appeal lay against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court as the suit was one covered by Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 provides that if any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him, may, by suit, recover possession thereof notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. Sub-section (2) next provides that no suit under this Section shall be brought after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession. Sub-section (3) which has a direct bearing on the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Pandya reads as under : "No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this Section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed." Sub-section (4), however, clarifies that nothing in the said Section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. It is, therefore, obvious, on a plain reading of sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, that if this suit falls within the purview of Section 6, the appeal in the lower appellate Court was not competent and hence this Second Appeal would also be incompetent. The first question which, therefore, arises for determination is whether the suit which has given rise to the present Second Appeal was one filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The first question which, therefore, arises for determination is whether the suit which has given rise to the present Second Appeal was one filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. 8. In the cause title of the plaint there is no mention that the suit is under the aforesaid provision. Court-fee has, however, been paid on the market value of the shop which was estimated to be Rs. 4,000/-. In other words, court-fee was not paid on the basis of the annual rent of the shop. The second feature to be noticed is that no relief is claimed against defendants Nos. 1. 2 and 3 who were the landlords of the suit shop. There is no prayer for mesne profits. The only relief claimed is a decree of eviction against defendants Nos. 4 and 5 on the ground that they had forcibly and illegally dispossessed the plaintiff. As stated earlier, the suit has been brought within a period of six months from the date of actual dispossession. Prima facie, therefore, the suit appears to be one brought under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. 9. Mr. Vakil, the learned Advocate for the appellants, original defendants Nos. 4 and 5, submitted that the averments in the plaint clearly bear on the question of title and, therefore, it is not correct to say that the relief for possession is based solely on the fact that the plaintiff was forcibly dispossessed. He submitted that if the suit was intended to be one under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, there was no need to mention the alleged events leading to the creation of tenancy in favour of the plaintiff. He further submitted that if the suit was meant to be under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff would certainly have raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal before the learned District Judge. According to Mr. Vakil, the averments regarding the manner in which possession was obtained from Parshottamdas on payment of Rs. 5,000/- and the subsequent induction of the plaintiff in the shop as a tenant under the writing, Exhibit 24, clearly betray the plaintiff’s intention to have his possessory title established in the suit. It is for this reason, argued Mr. According to Mr. Vakil, the averments regarding the manner in which possession was obtained from Parshottamdas on payment of Rs. 5,000/- and the subsequent induction of the plaintiff in the shop as a tenant under the writing, Exhibit 24, clearly betray the plaintiff’s intention to have his possessory title established in the suit. It is for this reason, argued Mr. Vakil, that the plaintiff raised no objection when the trial Court framed issue No. 1 bearing on the question of the alleged tenancy right created under the said writing of 18th February 1976. It is indeed true that the plaintiff has set out the events leading to the creation of a tenancy in respect of the suit shop in his favour in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the plaint. These averments have, however, been made in the plaint for the limited purpose of showing the nature of his possession. On a reading of the plaint it does not appear that the plaintiff desired the question of tenancy created in his favour to be settled in the suit. His purpose was to set out the events which had preceded his induction in the suit shop. The idea was to point out to the Court that he was in actual possession of the shop when he came to be dispossessed. The defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were joined as proforma defendants because it was his allegation that defendants Nos. 4 and 5 had broken open the lock in collusion with defendant No. 3, the agent or servant of the managing trustee, Mahalaxmi Vahuji Maharaj. Lest a bar of non-joinder of parties may be pleaded, the plaintiff by way of abundant caution joined defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as co-defendants to the suit. It is, however, pertinent to note that no relief is claimed against the said three defendants. The relief which is claimed is against defendants Nos. 4 and 5 only on the plea that they had trespassed into the suit shop in collusion with defendant No. 3. Besides, there was no occasion for the plaintiff to raise the question regarding the existence of his tenancy rights in the suit shop because the same had not been doubted by defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 at that stage. If his tenancy right had been doubted by the said defendants, he would certainly have sought a relief against them also. 1, 2 and 3 at that stage. If his tenancy right had been doubted by the said defendants, he would certainly have sought a relief against them also. I am, therefore, inclined to think that the learned District Judge was right in holding that the suit was governed by Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. 10. The object of Section 6 plainly is to provide a summary remedy to a person who has been dispossessed without his consent and otherwise than in due course of law so that the person in possession does not drag on the litigation by challenging his title, thereby reeping the fruits of his high handed action. The law seeks to discourage the taking of law into one’s own hand, no matter how valid his claim to possession may be. In a suit brought under this Section the plaintiff must prove (i) that he was in actual possession; (ii) that he was dispossessed by the opposite party; (iii) that the dispossession was not in accordance with law or with his consent; and (iv) that the action is not stale i.e., it is filed within six months from the date of dispossession. If all the four requirements are satisfied, the Court will decree ejectment. 11. It is well-settled that in a suit brought under this provision it is not permissible to take up questions of title. If the suit is based on title, it is outside the scope of this provision. But when can a suit be said to be based on title? A suit can be said to be based on title when the restoration of possession is claimed on the basis of his superior title and not on the mere fact that his juridical possession has been disturbed without his consent. If averments are made in the plaint merely to show that his possession was juridical before he came to be dispossessed, the suit will not fall outside the scope of this Section. It must also be realised that in cases where the factum of plaintiff’s possession is disputed, the plaintiff would be required to prove his possession by relying on all those documents which establish that he was put in possession of the property. It must also be realised that in cases where the factum of plaintiff’s possession is disputed, the plaintiff would be required to prove his possession by relying on all those documents which establish that he was put in possession of the property. In the present case also the plaintiff in order to succeed had to prove that he was in actual physical possession of the suit shop immediately before he was dispossessed by the defendants Nos. 4 and 5, as that fact was specifically denied by all the defendants in their written statement Exhibit 11. To prove the same he had to prove all the events leading to his induction in the suit shop. Merely because the learned trial Judge framed issue No. 1 relating to the creation of tenancy it cannot be said that the suit was not intended to be a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. That was a mistake on the part of the trial Court which cannot alter the character of the plaintiff’s suit. The learned trial judge has at the same time conceded in para 12 of his judgment that the real contest is between the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 4 and 5 on the question whether the latters broke open the shop at night on 18th February, 1976. Before the learned District Judge it was in terms argued that the suit was one under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and reliance was placed on Bai Dahi v. Amulakhbhai, (1973) 14 GLR 801. Dealing with this contention the learned District Judge observed that the averments in the plaint touching on the question of plaintiff’s title were ‘unnecessary and irrelevant’, meaning thereby only incidental .It was on the basis of this approach that he also negatived the contention regarding lack of inherent jurisdiction based on Section 28 of the Act. On this finding the learned District Judge would certainly have dismissed the appeal as not maintainable if his attention was drawn to Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act which bars an appeal. If the appeal from which the present appeal arises was incompetent, the present appeal must also be held to be incompetent. 12. Assuming for the sake of argument that the present appeal is competent, I will now proceed to deal with the two submissions urged before me by Mr. Vakil. According to Mr. If the appeal from which the present appeal arises was incompetent, the present appeal must also be held to be incompetent. 12. Assuming for the sake of argument that the present appeal is competent, I will now proceed to deal with the two submissions urged before me by Mr. Vakil. According to Mr. Vakil, the creation of tenancy in favour of the plaintiff on payment of the premium amount of Rs. 5,000/- to Parshottamdas was clearly in contravention of the provisions of Sections 18 and 19 of the Act and the public policy underlying the scheme of the said two provisions. Section 18(1) provides that if any landlord either himself or through any person acting or purporting to act on his behalf receives any premium or other like sum in respect of the grant of a lease of any premises, or for giving his consent to the transfer of a lease by sublease or otherwise, such landlord or person shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and shall also be punished with fine which shall not be less than the amount of the premium or sum received by him. It further provides that where the offence is committed by a landlord in respect of the premises which were of his ownership on the date of the offence, such premises shall be liable to confiscation. Be it noted that the Section does not expressly provide that the entire transaction will be void and no tenancy rights whatsoever will be conferred on the person paying the premium or other like sum. Sub-section (2) of Section 18 next provides that where any premium or other like sum referred to in sub-section (1) is paid by any person, the amount or value thereof shall be recoverable by him from the landlord to whom it was paid or on whose behalf it was received or from his legal representative at any time within a period of six months from the date of payment. It next provides that if the person making the payment is a tenant, he shall be entitled to deduct the same from the rent payable to the landlord without prejudice to any other remedy available to him for the recovery of the said amount. It next provides that if the person making the payment is a tenant, he shall be entitled to deduct the same from the rent payable to the landlord without prejudice to any other remedy available to him for the recovery of the said amount. It must be realised that the intention of the legislature is that the tenant should not suffer merely because he was a victim of circumstances in that he was virtually forced to pay premium or other like sum to secure possession of the property on lease. Obviously, the legislature had in mind situations arising out of the paucity of accommodation which compel intending tenants to pay premium or other like sum to secure the lease in their favour. The legislature has, therefore, treated such tenants as innocent victims and has, therefore, provided the two-fold-remedy, namely, the right to recover the entire amount by filing a suit or to deduct the same from the rent payable to the landlord. On the other hand the legislature in order to deter landlords from demanding premium or other like sum has made it penal as well as provided for the confiscation of the property in question. 13. Section 19(1) lays down that it shall not be lawful for the tenant or any person acting or purporting to act on his behalf to claim or receive any sum, or any consideration as a condition of the relinquishment, transfer or assignment of his tenancy save in cases provided for under the proviso to Section 15. That proviso empowers the State Government to permit in any area the transfer of interest in premises held under such leases or class of leases referred to in sub-section (1) and to such extent as may be specified in the notification to be issued in the Official Gazette. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 lays down that any tenant or person who in contravention of the provisions of subsection (1) receives any sum or consideration shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and also be punished with fine which shall not be less than the sum or the value of the consideration received by him. Section 19, therefore, makes it penal for a tenant or any person purporting to act on his behalf to claim or receive any sum or any consideration as a condition of the relinquishment, transfer or assignment of his tenancy of any premises. It is significant to note that the law does not provide that a tenant who has relinquished his tenancy rights on receipt of any sum or any consideration shall be entitled to re-entry in the property. The law does not seek to protect his possession but seeks to penalise him for receiving any sum or consideration as a condition of the relinquishment, transfer or assignment of his tenancy in respect of the demised premises. 14. Mr. Vakil, the learned Advocate for the appellants, contended that the tripartite contract entered into between the Karbhari, defendant No. 3, the plaintiff and the ex-tenant Parshottamdas was that on the plaintiff securing possession of the suit shop from Parshottamdas on payment of Rs. 5,000/-, the plaintiff will be accepted as a tenant of the suit shop on the rent to be fixed by the managing trustee, defendant No. 2. This contract or agreement clearly envisages the payment of Rs. 5,000/- to the tenant. Parshottamdas for the relinquishment of his tenancy rights in the suit shop. Now that part of the contract under which the plaintiff was to pay Rs. 5,000/- to the tenant Parashottamdas for relinquishment of his tenancy rights was clearly in contravention of Section 19(1) of the Act, Mr. Vakil, therefore, submitted that the tripartite contract was clearly against public policy in as much as it envisaged contravention of Section- 19(1) of the Act and could not, therefore, be enforced in a court of law. In support of his submission he placed strong reliance on a decision in Saleh Abraham v. Manekji Cowasji, A.I.R. 1924 Calcutta 57 wherein it was held that where the object of the lease was to defeat the provisions of the Rent Act, the object being unlawful, the contract of lease must be held to be void in view of Section 23 of the Contract Act. Reliance was also placed on a decision rendered in Mohan Chand v. Manindra Nath, A.I.R. 1955 Calcutta 442. Reliance was also placed on a decision rendered in Mohan Chand v. Manindra Nath, A.I.R. 1955 Calcutta 442. Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act prohibited the claiming or receiving of any premium or salami in addition to the rent for the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy. Dealing with this provision, Mitter, J., observed in paragraph 24 of the judgment as under : "If the receipt of a Salami forms a part of the consideration for the transfer and if such payment is forbidden by law, or if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law, Section 23, Contract Act would be attracted and it seems to me, that the Court would give no assistance to the parties to such transfer." In that case, no transfer of property had taken place and hence the learned Judge refused to grant specific performance of the agreement which ran counter to the provision of law. 15. Mr. Pandya, the learned Advocate for the original plaintiff, submitted that the contract to lease the suit shop to the plaintiff on Parashottam-das relinquishing his tenancy rights therein was dehors Section 19(1) of the Act and could not, therefore, be said to be hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act. He submitted that having regard to the events which preceded the induction of the plaintiff in the suit shop the agreement cannot be said to be one single agreement. According to him the agreement between the plaintiff and the ex-tenant Parashottamdas where under the latter delivered possession of the suit shop to the Karbhari of the trust was independent of the subsequent agreement between the Karbhari and the plaintiff where under the latter was put in possession of the shop as a tenant. He submitted that only the first agreement could be said to be hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act while the subsequent agreement in which the ex-tenant Parshottamdas did not figure could never be said to be one forbidden by law or contrary to the spirit of Section 19(1) of the Act and, therefore, it did not attract Section 23 of the Contract Act. The second limb of his argument was that Section 19(1) being penal, must be strictly construed and since it does not seek to hold the person who offers premium to the tenant for relinquishment of his tenancy rights liable to punishment, the provision of Section 23 of the Contract Act cannot be invoked against him. In my opinion, in order to decide the question at issue before me, it is not necessary to decide in the present proceedings whether the transaction in question was hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act. I will assume as urged by Mr. Vakil that both the limbs of the transaction were inextricably interwoven and, therefore, the entire transaction was contrary to public policy as well as in breach of Section 19(1) of the Act and was, therefore, hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act. Even on this assumption I am of the view that the eviction decree passed against defendants Nos. 4 and 5 must be sustained. 16. The established facts are that the landlord could not obtain the vacant possession of the suit shop from Parshottamdas. The landlord had lost the litigation which was contested upto the High Court stage against Parashottamdas. Having realised that it was not possible to legally evict Parshottamdas, the services of the plaintiff were secured. The plaintiff was told that if he could pursude Parshottamdas to deliver possession of the suit shop to the landlord, the latter will lease it out to him on revised terms. In pursuance of this offer the plaintiff succeeded in persuading Parshottamdas to vacate the suit shop and deliver possession thereof to the landlord on payment of Rs. 5,000/-. After discussion with the landlord about the demand made by Parshottamdas, the plaintiff paid an amount of Rs. 5,000/- by two instalments whereupon Parshottamdas handed over possession of the suit shop to the landlord. The landlord then inducted the plaintiff in the suit shop as per the agreement. The rent was to be fixed in consultation with the managing trustee. It was also agreed that from the enhanced rent, the plaintiff would be reimbursed to the extent of Rs. 5,000/- paid by him to Parshottamdas. These facts clearly show that the landlord was a party to the arrangement where under Rs. 5000/- were paid to Parshottamdas. The landlord, it must be presumed, was aware of the fact that the receipt of Rs. 5,000/- paid by him to Parshottamdas. These facts clearly show that the landlord was a party to the arrangement where under Rs. 5000/- were paid to Parshottamdas. The landlord, it must be presumed, was aware of the fact that the receipt of Rs. 5000/- by Parashottamdas was in contravention of Section 19(1) of the Act. The landlord must also be presumed to know that by accepting the said amount Parshottamdas would render himself liable to be punished under the said provision. If a person is aware that the arrangement worked out by him with the assistance of another is likely to render the person receiving the amount liable to punishment under Section 19(1) of the Act, he cannot be permitted to convert that crime committed by the recipient of the money into a source of profit or benefit for himself. In other words, person who is a party to a wrong cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. Having regard to the facts of this case it is quite clear that defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were particeps criminis and it is well-settled that those who are in pari delicito cannot take advantage of their own wrong. Now assuming for the sake of argument that the tripartite arrangement was a single contract which contravenes Section 23 of the Contract Act, it did not permit the landlord to forcibly evict the plaintiff except in due course of law with the assistance of defendants Nos. 4 and 5. Therefore, even if the suit is to be treated to be one based on title, the plaintiff has succeeded in proving the circumstances in which he was put in possession of the suit shop on the afternoon of 18th February 1976 as pleaded in the plaint. He was, therefore, not a trespasser in the suit shop. Even if he was inducted in the suit shop under an agreement which was in contravention of Section 23 of the Contract Act, it was not open to the landlord to dispossess him forcibly with the assistance of defendants Nos. 4 and 5. The defendants had, therefore, taken the law in their own hands in dispossessing the plaintiff. Even if he was inducted in the suit shop under an agreement which was in contravention of Section 23 of the Contract Act, it was not open to the landlord to dispossess him forcibly with the assistance of defendants Nos. 4 and 5. The defendants had, therefore, taken the law in their own hands in dispossessing the plaintiff. Therefore, even in a suit brought under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff can really on the factum of his possession and seek a decree against those who had dispossessed him forcibly and otherwise than in due course of law. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the decree passed by the learned trial Judge and confirmed in appeal can be sustained even if the suit is treated to be a suit under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. Mr. M.D. Pandya, the learned Advocate for the original plaintiff, invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Surasaibalini v. Phanindra Mohan A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1364 wherein Shah J., speaking for himself and Gajendragadkar C.J. observed as under : "It is true that if the plaintiff seeks the assistance of the Court to effectuate an unlawful transaction, the Courts will refuse to assist him. Where, however, the plaintiff is seeking to enforce his title to property and it is not an integral part of his pleading which he must prove to entitle him to relief that there was between him and the defendant an unlawful transaction or arrangement which he seeks to enforce, the plaintiff will be entitled to the assistance of the Court, even if the initial title or the plaintiff is rooted in an illegal transaction." It is indeed true that the plaintiff was required to state in the plaint the events that had preceded his induction in the suit shop. He made a mention of those events for the limited purpose of showing that he was in actual physical possession of the suit shop. He was seeking possession from defendants Nos. 4 and 5 who had in collusion with defendant No. 3 dispossessed him by force, i.e., otherwise than in accordance with law. It was not necessary for him to aver and prove how he had succeeded in persuading the ex-tent Parshottamdas to deliver possession of the suit shop to the landlord. He was seeking possession from defendants Nos. 4 and 5 who had in collusion with defendant No. 3 dispossessed him by force, i.e., otherwise than in accordance with law. It was not necessary for him to aver and prove how he had succeeded in persuading the ex-tent Parshottamdas to deliver possession of the suit shop to the landlord. It was not necessary for him to aver and prove that he had paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to Parshottamdas whereupon the latter had relinquished his tenancy rights in the suit shop and delivered possession thereof to the plaintiff. It -was sufficient for him to establish that he was put in possession of the suit shop by the landlord and was in actual occupation thereof on the date of dispossession. To my mind, therefore, Surasaibalini's case applies to the facts of the present case. 18. The next contention urged by Mr. Vakil is based on Section 28 of the Rent Act. Mr. Vakil submitted that the averments in the plaint clearly disclosed that the suit was between the landlord and the tenant and related to the possession of the demised premises. He, therefore, submitted that under Section 28 of the Rent Act, only the Special Court conferred jurisdiction thereunder could try the suit and no other Court. It is pertinent to note that in the present suit no relief is claimed against the landlord. The gravemen of the charge in the plaint is that he was forcibly dispossessed by defendants Nos. 4 and 5. He, therefore, sought possession of the suit shop from defendants Nos. 4 and 5 who, according to him, were mere trespassers therein. The suit was essentially against defendants Nos. 4 and 5 who were in possession of the suit shop and defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were joined as proforma defendants since the plaintiff alleged that defendants Nos. 4 and 5 had dispossessed him in collusion with the Karbhari who was the servant of the managing trustee of the trust. This allegation has considerable substance because all the defendants had filed a joint written statement, Exhibit 11. However, the defendants had relied on a so-called rent-note. Exhibit 81, purported to have been executed by defendants Nos. 3 and 4 in favour of the trust. That fact would also show that there was collusion between the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and defendants Nos. However, the defendants had relied on a so-called rent-note. Exhibit 81, purported to have been executed by defendants Nos. 3 and 4 in favour of the trust. That fact would also show that there was collusion between the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and defendants Nos. 4 and 5. It was in view of this averment made in the plaint that the plaintiff thought it wise to implead defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as proforma defendants without seeking any relief whatsoever against them, Such a suit could hardly fall within the purview of Section 28 of the Act. 19. Reliance was placed on the decision in Bai Dahi v. Amulakkbkai, (supra), wherein Sheth, J. sitting singly, held that the operation of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is not excluded in cases between landlords and tenants where no question of title is involved. The provisions of Section 28 of the Act do not take away the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Therefore, since I am of the opinion that this was a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, the trial Court had jurisdiction to try and dispose of the suit. Even otherwise, I am of the view that the suit falls outside the purview of Section 28 of the Act since it is directed against trespassers who have illegally dispossessed the plaintiff. In any view of the matter, therefore, Section 28 of the Act is not attracted. 20. These were the only submissions made at the hearing of this Second Appeal. As I do not find any substance in the submission urged by Mr. Vakil, the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. However, the operation of the decree is stayed for a period of four weeks from the date the certified copy is ready for delivery provided it is applied within a week on the usual undertakings of not parting with the possession to any one else except the plaintiff. No order on the Civil Application. Security as to mesne profits to continue. Appeal dismissed.