LAKSHMI HARDWARE STORES v. G. V. SRIKANTAYYA — 1983 DIGILAW 151 (KAR)

P. A. KULKARNI, J. ( 1 ) THE Civil Revision petition by the opponent No. 1 and by one Bansilal jessa Singh, son of Jessa Singh and by the Court Receiver, is directed against the order dt. 25. 7. 1979 passed by the vii Addl. Civil Judge, Bangalore City, in H. R. C. No. 1207 of 1975 allowing the petition under S. 21 (1) (h) and (j) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. ( 2 ) THE parties have been referred to in the course of this order with reference to their position in the trial court. ( 3 ) THE petitioner landlord filed the petition under S. 21-1 (a) (h) (j) and (o) of the Karnataka Rent Comtrol Act. ( 4 ) THE tenants denied all the petition allegations. ( 5 ) WHEN the matter was pending before the trial court, Jessa Singh died. His son Bansilal Jessa Singh who was his legal representative, is one of the revision petitioners. It is undisputed that after the matter was disposed of by the trial court, the tenant Vasudev B. Baglani died. The learned counsel Sri Shankar sumits that the tenant Baglani's wife, who was his legal representative, died subsequently. She was made respondent No. 3 in this revision showing her as 'since deceased' and the is also given up by the learned counsel sri Shankar. ( 6 ) ADMITTEDLY, the firm Lakshmi hardware Stores had two partners namely Jessa Singh and V. B. Balgani. It is undisputed that suit No 653/1970 was filed in tne High Court at Bombay for dissolution and for accounts. A court Receiver was appointed. That court Receiver was made a party in the Trial Court as opponent No. 4 and he is revision petitioner No. 3. Admittedly, the suit ended in a compromise and the entire assets and liabilities of the said firm have been now transferred to the revision petitioner No. 2 Bansilal jessa Singh. Thus, it follows that the Court Receiver has no place at all in the present proceedings. Therefore, the Court Receiver shown as revision petitioner No. 3 is an unnecessary party and is not even a formal party. ( 7 ) WHEN the suit was filed for dissolution, the firm gets automatically dissolved. It means its legal death in law. Therefore Lakshm Hardware stores, now shown as revision petitioner no. 1, has also no legal existence. Therefore, the Court Receiver shown as revision petitioner No. 3 is an unnecessary party and is not even a formal party. ( 7 ) WHEN the suit was filed for dissolution, the firm gets automatically dissolved. It means its legal death in law. Therefore Lakshm Hardware stores, now shown as revision petitioner no. 1, has also no legal existence. Therefore, the only person who can make attempts to proceed with the matter now is Bansilal Jessa Singh son of Jessa Singh, who was one of the two partners of the said firm. ( 8 ) IT is undisputed that the premises in question is not a residential preses. It is a business premises where the two partners were carrying on business. It is fairly stated before me that the premises in question are not a residential one. Therefore, now the question is as to whether the l. Rs. of the deceased tenants would be tenants within the meaning of S. 3 (r) of Karnataka Rent Control act and whether they can be said to have any interest so as to enable them to contest or continue the present proceedings. ( 9 ) THIS court for the first time in s. P. Hamidsha Chandshwala vs. Seshagiri Bhiku Pai (1 ). interpreted s. 3 (r) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and held that the legal representatives of the deceased statutory tenant had no right to contest the petition on merits, unless they set up an independent right to the non-residential premises. Thereafter, this court in Sundar Raj M. V. vs. Kamalamma (2) reiterated the, view laid down in Hamidsha, Chandshawala's (1) case Thereafter this court in Vishnu narayan vs. Paplal, Baldev (3) laid down the same principle Again this court in Raghavendra Prasanna Coffee club vs. Venkata Rao (4) stated that a contractual tenancy could be inherited by the legal heirs of the deceased tenant even in the case of non-residential premises and that S. 3 (r) of the Karnataka rent Control Act conies into force for transmission of tenancy in the case of statutory tenants. Therefore, this ruling does not depart from the previous views taken by this Court. Therefore, this ruling does not depart from the previous views taken by this Court. It only lays down that if there is contractual right vested in the tenant and if the contractual tenancy has not come to an end, the interest which the tenant had in the contractual tenancy, could be inherited by his legal heirs. The Supreme court in Ganapat Ladha vs. Shashikant Vishnu Shinde (5) had an occasion to deal with S. 5 (11) (c) of the bombay Rent Act. S. 5 (11) of the bombay Rent Act reads as: "s. 5 (11) : "tenant" means any person on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes- (a) such sub-tenants and other persons as have derived title under a tenant before (the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rents Control (Amendment) Ordinance, (1959), (aa) any person to whom interest in premises has been assigned or transferred as permitted, or deemed to be permitted, under section, 15 ; (b) any person remaining, after the determination of the lease, in possession, with or without the assent of the landlord, of the premises leased to such person or his predecessor who has derived title before (the commencement of the Bombay Remits, hotel and Lodging House Rents Conrol (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959) (c) any member of the tenant's family residing with him at the time, of his death as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court. " sec. 3 (r) of the Karnataka Rent control Act defines the word 'tenant'. S. 3 (r) reads as:"tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a premises and includes the surviving spouse, any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant who had been living with the, tenant in the premises as a member of the tenant's family up to the death, of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a premises by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a local authority. The wording S. 5 (11) (c) of Bombay Act are practically the same as the one used in S. 3 (r) of the Karnataka rent Control Act. The only difference is that the word 'residing' has been used in S. 5 (1. 1) (c) of the Bombay Rent act while the word 'living' has been used in S. 3 (r) of the Karnataka Rent control Act. The word 'residing' and the word 'living' carry the same meaning. Shri J. H. Dalai in, Bombay rent Act at page 150 has said that: residing with in this expression must be given its ordinary and popular significance. A person claiming to succeed to the tenancy under this clause must fairly and truly be said to have been 'residing with' the predecessor in the premises in the sense that the successor lived in and shared for living purposes the whole of the premises to which he or she claims to have succeeded. "the word! 'residing' denotes that that person resided as one of the family of the predecessor qua ad the particular premises. The word 'residing' or 'living' connotes that tenant (deceased) must be living, must be, taking his food, must be sleeping in the premises and must be using the premises for the purpose of residence. Otherwise the word 'residing' or 'living' would have no meaning at all. It is however, not necessary that the claimant used in common with the tenant every room in the premises. In a family, while using the premises for a residence, arrangement may be made for occupying separate bedrooms by individual members and such an arrangement would not mean that they are not residing together. The word 'residing with' or 'living with' cannot possibly apply to premises used by a tenant as business premises, as in respect thereof it cannot be said that the tenant was residing or living in the premises at the time of his death and may not extend to the premises which were not used by the tenant for residence (vide Parubai Manilal v. Baldevas (6 ). Again the specific use of of the wordis, 'the surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant", used in S. 3 (r) of the karnataka Rent Control Act clearly denotes that the premises must be used for the purpose of residing or living or occupation as a place of habitation. If the premises is a non-residental one, i. e. , business premises, it cannot be said that the father, mother or the surviving spouse or any daughter or son of a deceased tenant was living with him in the premises till his death. The stress is not on the word 'premises' where the tenant dies. It may be that the deceased; while carrying on the business might die in the shop itself. It further requires that the surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant must be living or had been living with the tenant in the premises till his death. The Supreme Court in the said Ganpat Ladhas (4) case has dealt with this aspect of the matter in a very elaborate manner and leaves no scope for any further argument at all. The supreme Court has said :"7. In these circumstances, the question arose for decision whether the present, respondent whose residence is given in the special leave petition as 'agakhan building, Haines Road, Bombay could possibly claim to be a tenant in respect of the shop which admittedly constitutes business premises by reason of S. 5 (11) (c) of the Act. The high Court took the view that S. 5 (11) (c) applies not only to residential premises but also to business premises and therefore, on the death of a tenant of business premises any member oi tenant's family residing with him at the time of his death would become a tenant. We do not think this view taken by the High court is correct. It is difficult to see how in case of business premises, the need for showing residence with the original tenant at the time of his death would be relevant. We do not think this view taken by the High court is correct. It is difficult to see how in case of business premises, the need for showing residence with the original tenant at the time of his death would be relevant. It is obvious from the language of S. 5 (11) (c) that the intention off the legislature in giving protection to a member of the family of the tenant residing with him at the time of his death was to secure that on the death of the tenant, the member of his family residing with him at the time of his death is not thrown out and this protection would be necessary only in case of residential premises. When a tenant is in occupation of business premises, there would be no question of protecting against dispossession a member of the tenant's family residing with him at the time of his death. The tenant may be carrying on a business in which the member of his family residing with him may not have any interest at all and yet on the construction adopted by the High Court, such member of the family would become a tenant in respect of the business premises. Such a result could not have been intended to be brought about by the legislature. It is difficult to discern any public policy which might seem to require it. The principle behind S. 5 (11) (c) seems to be that when a tenant is in occupation of premises, the tenancy is taken by him not only for his own benefit, but also for the benefit of the members of the family residing with him, and, therefore, when the tenant dies, protection should be extended to the members of the famly who were participants in the benefit of the tenancy and for whose needs inter alia the tenancy was originally taken by the tenant. This principle underlying the enactment of S. 5 (11) (c) also goes to indicate that it is in respect of residential premises that the protection under that section is intended to be given. This principle underlying the enactment of S. 5 (11) (c) also goes to indicate that it is in respect of residential premises that the protection under that section is intended to be given. We can appreciate a provision being made in respect of business premsies that on the death of a tenant in respect of such premises, any member of the tenant's family carrying on business with the tenant in such premises at the time of his death shall be a tenant and the protection of the Rent Act shall be available to him. But, we fail to see what purpose the legislature could have had in view in according protection in respect of business premises to a member of the tenant's family residing with him at the time of his death. The basic postulate of the protection under the Rent Act is that the person who is sought to be protected must be in possession of the premises and his possession is protected by the legislation. But in case of business premises, a member of the family of the tenant residing with him at the time of his death may not be in possession of the business premises; he may be in service or he may be carrying on any other business. And yet on the view taken by the High Court, he would become tenant in respect of the business premises with which he has no connection. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view taken by one of us (Bhagwati, J) in the Gujrat High court about the correct meaning of s. 5 (11) (c) in Parubai Manilal brahmin v. Baldevdas Zeverbhai tapodhan (1964) 5 Guj. L. R. 563, in preference to the view adopted in the subsequent decision of the Gujarat high Court in heirs of deceased darji Mohanlal Lavji v. Muktabai shamji (1971) 12 Guj. L. R. 272, which decision was followed by the bombay High Court in the judgment impugned in the present appeal before us. The Supreme Court further said in para 8 as : "8. It is significant to note that after the decision of Gujrat High court in Parubai Manilal Brahmin v. Baldevdas Zaverbhai, Tapodhan (1964) 5 Guj. L. R. 272, which decision was followed by the bombay High Court in the judgment impugned in the present appeal before us. The Supreme Court further said in para 8 as : "8. It is significant to note that after the decision of Gujrat High court in Parubai Manilal Brahmin v. Baldevdas Zaverbhai, Tapodhan (1964) 5 Guj. L. R. 563) (supra) the gujarat legislature amended the Rent act by substituting the following provision for S. 5 (11) (c) :- "5 (11) (c) (i) in relation to premises let for residence, any member of the tenant's family residing with the tenant at the time of, or within 3 months immediately preceding, the death of the tenant as may be decided in default of agreement by the court, and (ii) in relation to premises let for business, trade or storage, any member of the tenant's family carrying on business, trade or storage, with the tenant in the said premises at the time of the death of the tenant as may continue after his death to carry on the business, trade or storage, as the case may be, in the said premises and as may be decided in in default of agreement by the court. In para 9, the Supreme Court further said as : "this amendment was of course necessitated by the decision in Parubai' manilal Brahmin v. Baldevdas Zaverbhai Tapodhan (1964, 5 Guj. LR. 563) and it cannot, therefore, be relied upon for the purpose of supporting the view taken in that decision. But what is of significance is that when the legislature enacted a provision in regard to business premises in cl. (ii) of S. 5 (11) (c), the legislature made it clear that the potection in respect of business premises was intended to be given, not to any member of the tenant's family residing with him at the time of his death, but a member of the tenant's family carrying on business with him in such premises at the time of his death. The legislative intent, therefore, never was to confer protection in respect of business premises on a member of a tenant's family residing with him at the time of his death. The legislative intent, therefore, never was to confer protection in respect of business premises on a member of a tenant's family residing with him at the time of his death. This is also a circumstance which supports the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in the earlier decision in Parubai Manual Brahmin v. Baldevas Zaverbhai Tapodhan and shows that the view taken in the subsequent decision in heirs of deceased darji Mohanlal Lavji v. Muktabai Shamji (1971,12, Guj. LR. 272) is not correct. Of course, the amendment made in Rent Act in the state of Gujrat cannot assist us in interpreting S. 5 (11) (c) of the rent Act in the State of Maharashtra, but it is not wholly irrelevant, since the judgment of the Bombay high Court in appeal before us heavily relied on the decision of the gujarat High Court in heirs of deceased Darji Mohanalal Lavji v. Muktabai shamji (supra) and if that decision is incorrect, the judgment in appeal before us must also likewise be held to suffer from the same infirmity. We must, therefore, hold that S. 5 (11) (c) applies only in respect of residential premises and since the premises in question before us were admittedly business premises, the respondent, who was son of the original tenant, could not claim to be a tenant under S. 5 (11) (c)". Though this Court as long back as 1973 ruled that S. 3 (r) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act would not be available in the case of business premises, the Legislature has not amend. ed S. 3 (r) for so many years. An amendment has been effected by Gujarat legislature extending the definition of the word 'tenant' even to the premises used for business purposes. So long as the Legislature does not effect any amendment, as has been done by the Gujarat Legislature, the principle laid down by this Court will continue to apply. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel Shri Shankar, heavily relied! on S. 51 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act in support of his contention that legal representatives of the deceased tenant occupying the business premises also come within the definition of the word 'tenant'. S. 51 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act reads as:"51. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel Shri Shankar, heavily relied! on S. 51 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act in support of his contention that legal representatives of the deceased tenant occupying the business premises also come within the definition of the word 'tenant'. S. 51 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act reads as:"51. Proceedings by or against legal Representatives : (1) Any application made, appeal preferred or proceeding taken under this Act by or against any person, may, in the event of his death be continued by or against his legal representative. (2) Where any application, appeal or other proceeding would have bean made, preferredl or taken under this Act by or against any person such application, appeal or other proceedings may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representatives". The learned counsel Sri Shankar submitted that if the legal representatives of the deceased tenant occupying the business premises were not the tenants and were not entitled to the protection under the act, there was no necessity to make a provision for bringing the legal representatives on record. If the tenant occupying the business premises dies, the landlord cannot straightaway run to the premises and enter into possession of the property. In order to enable him to obtain possession of the property through Court, the provision has been made to bring the legal representatives on record. Then the next argument of the learned counsel Sri Shankar is that if the legal representatives had no subsisting interest in the property so as to become entitled to the protection of the Act, they had no locus standi at law to institute a proceeding on behalf of the deceased tenant. In a rent control proceeding, it is not only the possession that would be involved, but also the question of costs might be involved. The legal representatives might contend that they are not in law bound to pay the costs. The goods and articles and other properties of the deceased tenant might be lying in the premises. The l. Rs will have to take them away. Therefore, to meet such situations, a provision has been made in S. 51 of the karnataka Rent Control Act. The section provides for continuation of the eviction proceedings against the legal representatives of the deceased tenant. The l. Rs will have to take them away. Therefore, to meet such situations, a provision has been made in S. 51 of the karnataka Rent Control Act. The section provides for continuation of the eviction proceedings against the legal representatives of the deceased tenant. It does not confer any right on the legal representative of the deceased tenant to contest on merits unless the legal representative sets up an independent right to the tenancy in respect of non-residential premises (Vishnu Narayan vs. Baldev (7 ). A useful reference in this connection may be made to the commentary on the Karnataka Rent Control Act by mrs. Kiran Suri, on page 22, the learned author has said:"but under S. 51 of the Act, the landlord is entitled to continue the proceedings against Lrs of deceased tenant. The legal effect of these principles is that whereas landlord is entitled to continue the proceedings under the statute, the) LRs of the deceased tenant are deprived of the protection which their predecessor had as a statutory tenant". This view is supported by the principles laid down in AIR 1965 SC 414 . This Court in Sundar Raj M. V. vs. Kamalamma (8) said that S. 51 of the Act provides for continuation of the eviction proceedings against the legal representatives of the deceased r-tatutory tenant, which they do not otherwise have. Unless the legal representatives set up an independent right of tenancy to the non-residential premises they cannot be heard to contend that they should be recognised as tenants. Therefore, this ruling sufficiently answers the contention urged by the learned counsel Sri Shankar. ( 11 ) THE learned counsel Sri Shankar, further submitted that similar question had been referred to the Division Bench of this Court and that the Division Bench was seized of the matter andi that this case also be referred to the Division Bench. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court above referred to, i do not think it necessary to refer this matter to the Division Bench, as requested by Sri Shankar. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel Sri Shankar submitted that Civil Appeals involving the same point had been pending before the Supreme Court also. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court above referred to, i do not think it necessary to refer this matter to the Division Bench, as requested by Sri Shankar. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel Sri Shankar submitted that Civil Appeals involving the same point had been pending before the Supreme Court also. So long as the ruling of the Supreme court in Ganpat Ladha's case (4) holds the ground, I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by keeping the matter pending. ( 13 ) ADMITTEDLY, two partners Jessa sing and Baglani who constituted the firm, are dead. Admittedly the premises is a bisiness premises. The firm. ,as already noted, has no legal existence in view the suit in O. S. No:653/1970 which was filed for dissolution. It is also undisputed that the second partner Baglani is dead and his sole heir i. e. , his wife is also dead. The only other partner was Mr. Jessa Singh who also died during the pendency of the case before the Trial Court therefore, his son Bansilal, though he is a legal representative of Jessa Singh will not come within the definition or the word 'tenant as mentioned in S. 3 (r) of the Karnataka Rent Control act. As already staled above, the court Receiver has no legal existence now. Therefore, the present revision, petition by the legal representative of the tenant would be rather incompetent and he cannot resist the petition at all. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel Sri Shankar then urged that it was a contractual tenancy and that when the tenant died the LRs of the deceased tenant would inherit the same. There is no material to show that the tenancy existing on the date of the death of the tenants, was a contractual tenancy. Admittedly, a notice terminating the tenancy of the firm and the two tenants, was given in the year 1971, i. e. , long before the institution of the proceedings. Once the tenancy is terminated, the contractual tenancy would come to an end and the tenants would be only statutory tenants. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the said contention. ( 15 ) THUS in view of the fact that bansilal, the only legal representative of the statutory tenant has no right to contest the proceeding at all. Once the tenancy is terminated, the contractual tenancy would come to an end and the tenants would be only statutory tenants. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the said contention. ( 15 ) THUS in view of the fact that bansilal, the only legal representative of the statutory tenant has no right to contest the proceeding at all. the landlord is entitled to get possession of the property from the legal representative of the deceased tenant. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel Sri Shankar, urged that the Karnataka Rent control Act lapsed at the end of 31. 12. 1982. According to him, the ordinance issued in December 1982, had also ceased to operate and even Ordinance no. 4 of 1983 which was promulgated by the Governor in January 1983, had also ceased to operate. The said argument of the learned counsel Sri shankar that both the Ordinances had ceased to operate, cannot be disputed, because after promulgation of the first Ordinance, the Legislature had met and the period of six weeks from the reassembly of the legislature had expired. Vide Article 213 (2) of the constitution of India. The second ordinance also has ceased to operate for the same said reasons. The legislature in order to overcome such situations, has made a provision. S. 1 (4) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act reads :"it shall remain in force up to and inclusive of (thirty-first December 1982) and upon the expiry of this act, section 6 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899, shall apply as if this Act were a permanent Karnataka Act and had been repealed by a Karnataka Act immediately before its expiry". S. 6 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899, speaks about the effect of repeal and covers automatic lapse also. It reads : 6. S. 6 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899, speaks about the effect of repeal and covers automatic lapse also. It reads : 6. Effect of repeal : Where this act or (any Karnataka Act) made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not, (A) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect ; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder ; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed ; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed ; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid ; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing act had not been passed". Therefore, S. 6 of the Karnataka general Clauses Act makes it clear that all legal proceedings already instituted or pending may be continued and disposed of as if the Act hadi not lapsed at all. Therefore, the present proceeding which was admittedly instituted during the currency of the kent Act will have to be continued and disposed of as if the said Act is in force and it will have to reach its natural end at the hands of this Court. ( 17 ) THE learned counsel Sri Shankar urged that the decision rendered by the Court below was an exparte decision and that his client had no opportunity of being heard at all. If the matter required consideration on merits, I would not have hesistated to set aside the order and send it back to the Court below for fresh disposal on merits. But, however it is a case where the original tenants, who were statutory tenants, are dead. Their legal representatives will not be the tenants within the meaning of S. 3 (r) of the karnataka Rent Control Act and they are not entitled to the protection of the act at all as the premises in question are a business premises. But, however it is a case where the original tenants, who were statutory tenants, are dead. Their legal representatives will not be the tenants within the meaning of S. 3 (r) of the karnataka Rent Control Act and they are not entitled to the protection of the act at all as the premises in question are a business premises. Therefore, i do not think that it is necessary to send back the matter to the Trial court. ( 18 ) THUS in the result, the landlord do recover possession of the petition premises from the LRs of the tenants i. e. , the revision petitioners. The revision is dismissed. ( 19 ) THE learned counsel Sri Shankar at this stage submitted that many things relating to the business hadi been kept in the premises and his client will have to find out an alternative accommodation for storing the same or for carrying on the trade. According to him, it has become extremely difficult to find out alternative accommodation in Bangalore. Bangalore is a fast developing city, wherein large number qf business houses are coming up like mushrooms. It may be that one may be required to pay a fairly heavy rent and heavy advances for the alternative accommodation. Therefore, one would naturally require some time to find out an alternative accommodation. One also requires some time to muster up resources to meet the fat rents and the fat advances demanded by the landlords. Sri Shankar sought for five years time to vacate the premises. Sri puttaswamy stated that the litigation was going on since 1971 and that the premises had been practically kept vacant. According to him no time should be given. It cannot be forgotten that both the partners themselves fought out the litigation in o. S. No. 653/1970 instituted in the High court Bombay. It was stated before me that it resulted in a compromise during Oct. 1982. The very fact that the said suit was fought out for 12 years would go to show the bitter feelings between the two partners. On account of the long pendency of the suit, no business could be carried on in the premises. It may be that it was kept under lock on account of the litigation in the High Court. But the fact remains that the business goods must be lying there. On account of the long pendency of the suit, no business could be carried on in the premises. It may be that it was kept under lock on account of the litigation in the High Court. But the fact remains that the business goods must be lying there. The legal representatives will have to make arrangements for shifting those goods to some other alternative accommodation and for carrying on the business also. Therefore, under these circumstanctes, the legal representative is entitled to be given some time to vacate the premises. But the request for five years time is rather too long. ( 20 ) IN the circumstances of the case, I think that the ends of justice would be met if time up to the end of december 1985 is given to the legal representative to vacate the premises in question. No costs throughout. --- *** --- .