BEHERA, J. ( 1 ) AN illiterate and unsophisticated lady from an interior and undeveloped area in the district of Sundargarh, the petitioner stands indicated of an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder coming under section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the Code), convicted there under and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of eight years by- the Court of Session ;. which has accepted the case of the prosecution that during the night of the l7th/l8th April, 1979, the appellant killed her husband Gangu Munda (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) by means of ax: axe (M. O. 1) in their house of which occupants were the deceased, the appellant and child aged about three years. The appellant, it was alleged, had made an extra judicial confession first before her neighbor Dimbu Munda (P. W. 2) who had come to the scene after hearing a bulla in the house when he saw the appellant at the door of the house holding M. O. I with the dead body of her deceased husband lying in the house near the door with the child nearby and then before Rama Munda (P. W. 3) and Birsingh Munda (P. W. 4) who had been called to the scence by P. W. 2. On the day following, P. Ws. 2 to 4 went to the police station at Bonaigarh where P. W. 2 lodged the first information report (Ext. 9) on the basis of which investigation was taken up by the Officer-in-charge of the police station (P. W. 7) and on the basis of a charge sheet placed on the completion of investigation, the appellant stood charged under section 302 of the Code. ( 2 ) TO bring home the charge to her, seven witnesses had been examined for the prosecution of whom P. Ws. 2 to 4 had testified about the extrajudicial confession said to have been made by the appellant before them during the night of occurrence. ( 2 ) TO bring home the charge to her, seven witnesses had been examined for the prosecution of whom P. Ws. 2 to 4 had testified about the extrajudicial confession said to have been made by the appellant before them during the night of occurrence. P. W. 1 was the doctor who had conducted the autopsy over the dead body of the deceased after its identification by the police Constable (P. W. 5), P. W. 6 was the doctor who had examined the appellant and had noticed a haematoma on the right parietal region of the head and a swelling around the right ear which, according to him, could be caused by M. O. 1 within twenty-four hours prior to his examination on the 18th April, 1979 and P. W. 7 had investigated into the case. ( 3 ) THE appellant had pleaded not guilty to the charge and had, in her statement recorded by the trial court, denied to have killed her husband and to have made an extrajudicial confession before P. W. 2 to 4 and had asserted that those witnesses had falsely testified against her and they bad killed her husband. With no means to engage an advocate of her own, a defence counsel had been engaged at the cost of the State. As would appear from the statement made by the appellant before the trial court referred to above and the suggestions made to some of the prosecution witnesses during their cross-examination in order to show that the appellant had a right of private defence of her person, the defence of the appellant was not quite consistent from time to time. The suggestion made to P. W. 2 was that the deceased, by means of Budia (axe), was attempting ,to deal blows on her and at that time, this weapon struck the deceased when she was snatching it away. It was suggested to P. W. 3 that the deceased had attempted to murder her and her child. The suggestion made to P. W. 4 was that the deceased, on returning home, raised the axe to deal blows on the appellant when she snatched away the axe and dealt the blow on the deceased. She had not examined any witness on her behalf. ( 4 ) ON a consideration of the evidence, the learned trial Judge accepted the evidence of P. Ws. She had not examined any witness on her behalf. ( 4 ) ON a consideration of the evidence, the learned trial Judge accepted the evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 4 and found that the appellant had killed her husband, but a finding was recorded that the appellant, having the right of private defence of her person, had exercised it by killing the deceased which, in the circumstances of the case, was not justified under the law. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted under section 304 Part I as indicated above. ( 5 ) WHILE the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted before me that the evidence of P. Ws 2 to 4 was not worthy of credence and the order of conviction cannot be said to have been founded on facts and cannot be sustained in law, the learned Additional Standing Counsel bas supported the order of conviction as well-founded on the basis of the evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 4 coupled with the recovery of M. O. 1. from the house of the appellant and deceased. ( 6 ) IT admits of no doubt from the. evidence of the doctor (P. W. 1) who had conducted the autopsy and had noticed four incised antemortem wounds on the head and forehead of the deceased causing fractures of the frontal and parietal bones sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death which could be caused by a sharp cutting weapon like M. O. 1, that the deceased died a homicidal death. The fading of the learned trial Judge in this regard has not been assailed. ( 7 ) EXCEPT for some vague evidence given by P. Ws. 3 and 4, whose doubtful evidentiary credentials will be discussed by me hereinafter, to the effect that the deceased and the appellant had been quarreling on occasions without specifying the reason or the basis for it, there was no evidence suggesting any motive on the part of the appellant to have gone to the extent of killing her husband. As has been held in Atley v. State of Uttar Pradesh. As has been held in Atley v. State of Uttar Pradesh. , Nachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab State of Haryana v. Sher Singh and others, The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Digvijay Singh, Nanak v. State of Utter Pradesh, prosecution is not bound to prove the motive for the commission of the crime which, in the circumstances of a given case, may be difficult to know, but the failure on the part of the prosecution to ascribe the motive caste a duty on the court to examine and scrutinize the evidence very carefully before its acceptance. ( 8 ) THE prosecution has to prove its case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. In the instant case, the defence taken by the appellant from, time to time was not consistent. But falsity of the defence version, by itself, would not establish the prosecution case. The prosecution is to establish its case and any stand taken by the accused cannot hardly be used as evidence unless its truth is otherwise established. If other circumstances point unfailingly to the guilt of the accused, falsity of defence can be considered as an additional link. Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, Tika and others v. The State of U. P. The State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh and others, Kishan Chand v. Delhi Administration and another, Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. The State of Maharashtra. This Court must, therefore, see as to whether the prosecution has been able to establish the case against the appellant and if a finding is recorded in the affirmative, falsity of the defence may be considered as an additional link. It must be kept in mind that alternative defenses by an accused person at the trial are not impermissible and not un know in the criminal justice system. Another important aspect is that even if an accused person has not taken a specific plea of the right of private defence of person or property or has not led evidence in support of it, such a plea can be accepted by the court if it spelt out of the prosecution evidence itself. Another important aspect is that even if an accused person has not taken a specific plea of the right of private defence of person or property or has not led evidence in support of it, such a plea can be accepted by the court if it spelt out of the prosecution evidence itself. ( 9 ) AS the evidence would indicate, the appellant, the deceased and their small child were the only occupants of the house during the fateful night when the most unfortunate incident took place and leaving the small and simple child who must be lightly drawing its breath and feeling its life in every limb without knowing the meaning of death, the only two persons who could know as to what had happened would be the appellant and the deceased. As testified by P. Ws: 2 to 4, the door of the house was open with the appellant standing near the dead body of the deceased lying near the door. The possibility of some one entering the house and committing the crime could not be ruled out and it could not be assumed, in the absence of other evidence, that the appellant must have killed her husband. ( 10 ) THE only evidence to connect the appellant with the crime was that of P. Ws. 2 to 4. On their own showing. two of these witnesses, namely, P. Ws. 2 and 3, were close relations of the deceased and P. W. 4 had come to the scene later in point of time, as deposed to by P. W. 2. The evidence of relations of the deceased who, in the circumstances of this case, would also be related to the appellant, is not to be discarded on the ground of such relationship alone, but as would appear from their evidence, being agnatic brothers of the deceased, they would normally and naturally be more interested in the deceased than the appellant. One highly suspicious feature which cannot be lost sight of is that although P. Ws. 2 and 3 were no other persons than the relations of the deceased, the investigating agency had taken steps for binding them and P. W. 4 down by having their statements recorded by a Magistrate under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Relying on the principles laid down in Ram Charan v. State of U. P. . 2 and 3 were no other persons than the relations of the deceased, the investigating agency had taken steps for binding them and P. W. 4 down by having their statements recorded by a Magistrate under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Relying on the principles laid down in Ram Charan v. State of U. P. . The Supreme Court has observed in Balak Ram and another v. State of U. P. It cannot be overlooked that the statements of ] hilmili, Ram Prakash and Aryendra were recorded under Section 164, Criminal P. C. , in June 1971, soon after the incident. The Investigating Officer says that he got the statements recorded by way of prosecution. That could be true and it would be wrong to find fault with the Investigating Officer merely because he got the statements of these witnesses recorded under Section 164. Nor can the evidence of a witness be discarded for the mere reasons that his statement was recorded under Section 164. But the High Court overlooked that the evidence of witnesses whose statements are recorded under section 164 must be approached with caution. Ram Charan v. State of U. P. (supra ). Such witnesses feel tired to their previous statements given on oath and have but a theoretical freedom to, depart from the earlier version. A prosecution for perjury could be the price of that freedom. It is, of course, open to the court to accept the evidence of a witness whose statement was recorded under Section 164, but the salient rule of caution must always become in mind. That is all the more necessary when almost all the eye-witnesses are subjected to this tying-up process. Even Aryendra, the sisters son of Dharam Pal, was not thought to be above suspicion. ( 11 ) FOR all these reasons, the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 has to be examined with great care before it is accepted. ( 12 ) SPEAKING about what he had seen and heard, P. W. 2 had deposed thus: The occurrence took place in the night in the month of Chaitra last year. That night while I was sleeping in my house, hearing some hulla I proceeded towards the house of the deceased holding a Dibri. ( 12 ) SPEAKING about what he had seen and heard, P. W. 2 had deposed thus: The occurrence took place in the night in the month of Chaitra last year. That night while I was sleeping in my house, hearing some hulla I proceeded towards the house of the deceased holding a Dibri. Inside the house in front of the door, I found Ganga Munda was lying dead with bleeding injuries and the accused Sukarmani was standing near that dead body holding a Budia and when I asked her, the accused replied that in that Budia she had killed him. By then the accused was holding M. O. I. Then I went to the house of Birsa Munda and Ramu Munda and told them the incident. They came with me to the house of the deceased. To their query, also the accused confessed before them that she had killed her husband. The evidence of P. W. 3 was: In the night of the occurrence, P. W. 2 went to my house and told me to accompany him to the house of the deceased who was already dead. With P. W. 2, I went to the house of the deceased and found his dead body was lying. At a short distance from the dead body, the accused was standing and close to her M. O. I. was kept and when I asked the accused how Gangu died, she replied that she had killed him in the Budia. Previously at times the accused and the deceased were picking up quarrel. P. W. 4 had deposed: In the night of the occurrence P. Ws. 2 and 3 came to my house and told that Gangu is dead and with them I came to the house of the deceased and found his dead body was lying and at a short distance from his dead body the accused was sitting and near her the M. O. I was kept. 2 and 3 came to my house and told that Gangu is dead and with them I came to the house of the deceased and found his dead body was lying and at a short distance from his dead body the accused was sitting and near her the M. O. I was kept. When I asked the accused how Gangu died, she replied that there was shortage of rice (cooked rice) in their house and the deceased was not satisfied with such food and so he gave a blow in that Budia to the accused and went away threatening that on return he would murder her (the accused) and so when the deceased returned the accused confessed that out of fear in that Budia she gave blows to the deceased and caused his death. The deceased picked up quarrel with his parents and so his parents left their house and were staying at Birtola. Next day I along with P. Ws. 2 and 3 went to the P. S. and orally reported the incident and I have given my L. T. L on the report prepared by the S. 1. ( 13 ) WHAT had been deposed to by P. W. 4 was at great variance with the extrajudicial confession said to have been made by the appellant as testified by P. Ws. 2 and 3. If the exculpatory portion of the alleged extrajudicial confession said to have been made by the appellant as deposed to by P. W. 4 is accepted and it is found that the appellant had a reasonable apprehension that the deceased would kill her or cause grievous hurt to her, the statement of the appellant as testified by P. W. 4, read as a whole, would not amount in law to be a confession in view of the pronouncement of the Privy Council in the well-known case of Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor that no statement that contains self exculpatory matter can. amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. The Supreme Court has referred to and relied on the aforesaid principle in Polvindra Kaur v. The State of Punjab, Om Prakash v. State of U. P. , and Veera Ibrahim v. The State of M aharashtra. amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. The Supreme Court has referred to and relied on the aforesaid principle in Polvindra Kaur v. The State of Punjab, Om Prakash v. State of U. P. , and Veera Ibrahim v. The State of M aharashtra. ( 14 ) THE evidence of extrajudicial confession in the very nature of things is a. weak piece of evidence. Jagta v. State of Haryana and State of Punjab v. Blzajan Singh and others. Evidence with regard to an extrajudicial confession is not considered to be of much value unless the witness deposing about it can be depended upon and the acknowledgment of guilt is clear and unequivocal. An extrajudicial confession must be proved by evidence of a reliable character. If such a confession is oral, the evidence must be assessed carefully and the voluntary nature of the confession must also be considered before it can be acted upon. Doubtless, the order that a protracted extrajudicial confession is acted upon, it must be shown not only to be voluntary, but also to be true. As has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Mulak Raj v. State of U. P. an extrajudicial confession, if voluntary, can be relied upon ,along with other evidence. An extrajudicial confession clearly proved by unimpeachable testimony and without the slightest doubt as to its voluntary nature is evidence which can be relied upon as a human being is not likely to face the consequences of making the confession by a false statement affecting his life and liberty. An extrajudicial confession clearly proved by unimpeachable testimony and without the slightest doubt as to its voluntary nature is evidence which can be relied upon as a human being is not likely to face the consequences of making the confession by a false statement affecting his life and liberty. ( 15 ) FOLLOWING the principles laid down in Rahim Beg v. State of U. P. the Supreme Court, in the case of Haramba Brahma and another v. State of Assam, has laid down the principles with regard to appreciation of such evidence and has observed and held: We are at a loss to understand how the High Court accepted the evidence on this extra- judicial confession without examining the credentials of P. W: 2 Bistriram; without ascertaining the words used; without referring to the decision of this Court to be presently mentioned wherein it is succinctly stated that extrajudicial confession to afford a piece of reliable evidence must pass the test of reproduction of exact words, the reason or motive for confession and person selected in whom confidence h reposed. In Rahim Beg v. State of U. P. (supra), this Court while examining the evidence as to extrajudicial confession made by two accused to Mohmed Nasim Khan (P. W. 4) observed that; There was no history of previous association between the witness and the two accused as may justify the inference that the accused could repose confidence in him. In the circumstances, it seems highly improbable that the two accused would go to Mohmed Nasim Khan and blurt out a confession. So saying, the Court rejected the evidence as to extra-judicial confession. Position in this case is more deplorable. If the High Court had examined the decision of this court, there would have been no difficulty in rejecting the evidence of extra-judicial confession. It fails to pass all the tests. We rejected this evidence of extra-judicial confession as unworthy of belief ( 16 ) JUDGED in the light of the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in this reported case, it would be noticed, for the reasons to follow, that the evidence with regard to extra judicial confession in the instant case, has failed to pass the tests laid down therein and is too short of the mark. ( 17 ) AT the time the appellant had allegedly made a confessional statement before P. W. 2 and then before P. W. 3 no finger of accusation had been raised against her and there was no incriminating material against her except for the fact that the dead body of her murdered husband was lying in the house. There was no reason as to how and why the appellant, unsophisticated though she might be, would blurt out a confessional statement before P. W. 2 or 4, two of whom were close relations of the deceased, involving her in such a grave crime, in the absence of any evidence to indicate that she had previous association with them. The words uttered by the appellant before P. Ws. 2 to 4, as deposed to by them, did not tally as would clearly be seen from the evidence of these witnesses quoted above. No reason or motive had been shown or indicated in the prosecution evidence as to why the appellant should make a confessional statement before these witnesses. As earlier indicated, there was no evidence that P. Ws. 2 to 4 or any of them had challenged her by saying that she must have committed the crime. There was no material to show that the situation in which the appellant was placed was such tart out of remorse or repentance, she made an extra-judicial confession before these witnesses. ( 18 ) THERE were other highly suspicious features with regard to tile evidence of P. W. 2 to 4 in this regard. While in the first information report (Ext. 9), P. W. 2 had stated that the appellant had been shouting that she would kill which attracted his attention and for which he went to the house of the appellant with a burning lamp, he had not given evidence about heating such words uttered by the appellant and had on the other hand, stated that hearing some hulla, he proceeded towards the house of the appellant and as stated by him in his cross-examination, hearing the hulla, his wife called him and therefore, he got up. The wife of P. W. 2 had not been examined to support this version of P. W. 2. If as testified by P. W. 2, the appellant had made a confessional statement before him before he went and called P. Ws. The wife of P. W. 2 had not been examined to support this version of P. W. 2. If as testified by P. W. 2, the appellant had made a confessional statement before him before he went and called P. Ws. 3 and 4, in the normal and natural course of human conduct, he would have informed P. Ws. 3 and 4 that the appellant had made such a confessional statement. As would appear from the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4, all that P. W. 2 told them was that the deceased was dead. They had not stated a word that P. W. 2 had told them that a confessional statement had been made by the appellant or that the appellant was standing with M. O. I near the door. According to them, M. O. l had been kept near her in the first information report. P. W. 2 had Dot stated that he went himself and called P. Ws. 3 and 4, as deposed to in the court and he had stated therein that he sent for P. Ws. 3 and 4. The person who might have been sent by him to bring P. Ws. 3 and 4 to the spot had not been examined in support of the story given by P. W. 2 in Ext. 9. While P. W. 2 had testified that after hearing the confessiojlal statement from the appellant, he went to the houses of P. Ws. 3 and 4, told them about the incident and came with them to the house of the appellant and to their query, the appellant confessed before them that she bad killed her husband, the evidence of P. W. 3 was that when he was called by P. W. 2, be came and on being asked by him, the appellant made the confessional statement and thereafter he (P. W. 3) with P. W. 2 went to tile house of P. W. 4 and told him about the incident and with him, came back to the he use of the appellant where again the appellant had allegedly made the confessional statement before P. W. 4. The evidence as to how and under what circumstances P. Ws. 3 and 4 bad come to the scene was, therefore, highly discrepant. The evidence as to how and under what circumstances P. Ws. 3 and 4 bad come to the scene was, therefore, highly discrepant. The evidence of these witnesses that one after the other, each of them came and the appellant made a confessional statement before each of them on three occasions would appear to be too unreal and artificial. ( 19 ) THE conduct of P. Ws. 2 to 4 after the alleged confessional statement made by the appellant would also render their evidence doubtful. If such a ghastly crime had been committed during the night and the appellant bad made a confessional statement, P. Ws. 2 to 4 two of whom were the close relations of the deceased, would have watched her and taken steps to inform the Ward Member or any member of the Panchayat at the locality and would take immediate steps to lodge a report at the police station. No such steps had been taken. The first information report was lodged on the day following at 10 a. m. ( 20 ) IF the appellant had been standing with M. O. I as deposed to by P. W. 2-a fact which he had not stated to P. Ws. 3 and 4 when he called them-and this weapon had been seized by the Investigating Officer as a weapon of attack, human blood would be found in it. On chemical and serological test, blood was found in it, but its origin could not be ascertained. There is no other evidence that M. O. I was the weapon of attack. Thus the recovery of M. O. I, by itself, would be of no consequence, ( 21 ) EVEN assuming that the evidence with regard to the extrajudicial confession is accepted, in spite of the infirmities and suspicious features indicated above, the appellant had retracted the extra judicial confession said to have been made and there is no corroboration of such a statement. ( 22 ) LAW does not require that the evidence of an extra judicial confession must, in all cases, be corroborated. Piara Singh and others v. State of Punjab. The true role appears to be that it is a question of fact to be decided in the circumstances of each case. ( 22 ) LAW does not require that the evidence of an extra judicial confession must, in all cases, be corroborated. Piara Singh and others v. State of Punjab. The true role appears to be that it is a question of fact to be decided in the circumstances of each case. It is not an in flexible rule that in no case can a conviction be based solely on an extra judicial confession, but in cases of homicide and other grave offences, it may not be safe to convict only on such evidence without corroboration. As a rule of caution, courts generally require some material corroboration to an extrajudicial confession. Ratan Gond v. State of Bihar, and Ram Singh v. State of Utter Pradesh. Corroboration of extrajudicial confession is required for abundant caution. If the Court. is satisfied that a confession is voluntary and true, conviction can be founded on it. Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. State of Vindhya Pradesh and Magha Singh v. State of punjab. It is well settled that a confession, if voluntarily and truthfully made, is an efficiacious proof of the guilt of an accused person. Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan. There is no legal bar to a conviction being based on a voluntary confession, if believed to be true, but. the rule of prudence requires that whenever possible, it should be corroborated by independent evidence. The rule of prudence does not require that each and every circumstance mentioned in the confession with regard to the participation of the accused with the crime must be separately and independently corroborated nor is it correct that confession can only be corroborated by facts and circumstances discovered after the confession was made. Hem Raj Devilal v. Stats of Ajmer and Balvir Singh v. State of Punjab. A general corroboration of a retracted confession is sufficient. Subramania Goundan v. State of Madras, Ram Prakash v. State of Punjab. It is now settled that it lies upon the prosecution to establish and not for the accused to negative the voluntary nature of a confession, it being the duty of the prosecution to satisfy itself thereon before putting the statement in. ( 23 ) A wife is alleged to have committed the murder of her husband. There was no evidence worth the name regarding any motive for the commission of the offence. The evidence of P. Ws. ( 23 ) A wife is alleged to have committed the murder of her husband. There was no evidence worth the name regarding any motive for the commission of the offence. The evidence of P. Ws. 2 to 4 with regard to the extrajudicial confession not only bristled with discrepancies, but also was highly suspicious and could not be acted upon. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, even if the evidence with regard to the retracted extrajudicial confession is accepted, it would not be safe, reasonable and proper to set upon it without corroboration. ( 24 ) IT is not necessary, in view of the aforesaid findings, to go into the question of the right of private defence of the person of the appellant. Suffice it to say that the right of self-defense is a valuable right provided in the Code for a social purpose and this right is not to be construed narrowly. Vidya Singh v. State of Maharashtra. The burden which rests on the accused to prove this exception is not as one-rous as it is on the prosecution to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for an accused person to show that the preponderance of probabilities are in favour of such a plea. State of U. P. v. Ram Swarup and anothet. The doctor had noticed two injuries on the person of the appellant which could be caused by M. O. I. The appellants alternative case seemed to be that she had entertained grave danger in her life when her husband returned home as he had threatened to kill her. There was, however, no material to indicate that on returning home, the deceased attacked the appellant or even threatened to assault her. It is, however, unnecessary to go further into this matter in view of the finding already recorded by me. ( 25 ) IN the result, the appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. The order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is set aside and she be set at liberty forthwith. Appeal allowed