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1983 DIGILAW 155 (ALL)

Prakash Chandra v. District Judge, Fatehpur

1983-02-22

B.N.SAPRU

body1983
JUDGMENT B. N. Sapru, J. 1. THIS is a writ petition filed by the tenants. 2. THE landlord, Ram Kumar, filed an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for release of a portion of House No. 327, Bajaja Bazar, Bindki, Fatehpur, in which the petitioners are tenants. The landlord's case was that he wanted to set up his son Jagdish Kumar in business and hence the shop in dispute should be released for that purpose, 3. ONE Ram Pal was admittedly a tenant of this shop and he was carrying on wholesale business in sugar in the shop. On his death, the petitioners, other than Prakash Chandra, who was in service, claimed that they kept on running the family business and this was the only source of their livelihood. The need of the landlord was denied. 4. THE Prescribed Authority, on a consideration of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the need of the landlord was genuine and a greater hardship would be caused to the landlord by the rejection of the application than would be caused by the grant of the application. THE application was accordingly allowed by the Prescribed Authority. The tenants preferred an appeal. The appellate authority upheld the order of the Prescribed Authority. It considered the need of the parties and came to the conclusion that the landlord's need for the accommodation in question was genuine. It further went on to hold that the tenants are not entitled to the benefits of sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 of the Rules framed under the Act because while Ram Pal carried on the business of wholesale of sugar, at present the tenant appellants were carrying on a business of sale of sugar in retail and vegetable ghee. It also noted the fact that the business of the tenants was small and petty. It accordingly held that the denial of relief to the landlord would cause greater hardship than would be caused to the tenant by allowing the application for release. 5. AGGRIEVED, the tenants have come in writ petition. 6. It also noted the fact that the business of the tenants was small and petty. It accordingly held that the denial of relief to the landlord would cause greater hardship than would be caused to the tenant by allowing the application for release. 5. AGGRIEVED, the tenants have come in writ petition. 6. THE finding as to the bona fide need of the landlord was sought to be challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that there was other accommodation available with Ram Kumar for setting up his son in business. THE learned counsel urges that Jagdish Kumar was previously accommodated in another shop belonging to Ram Pal and he subsequently vacated that shop voluntarily and started running his betel shop in the passage of the house in question. THE fact that Jagdish Kumar had been asked by the father to vacate the shop belonging to the father in which another son was set up is by itself no indication that the need of the father to set up Jagdish Kumar in business was not genuine. THE finding that the need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide, is based on evidence and cannot be interfered with in the writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioners has then argued that Rule 16 (2) (a) of the Rules framed under the Act applies to the facts of this case and the District Judge was in error in excluding its operation. The District Judge states in so many words in his judgment that Rule 16 (2) (a) of the Act would not apply because the nature of the business had been changed from the time of Ram Pal. Ram Pal, as mentioned earlier, was doing the business of wholesale of sugar whereas his sons are doing the business of sugar in retail and vegetable ghee. Rule 16 (2) (a) of the Rules runs as follows : " the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less the justification for allowing the application. " 7. THE rule 16 (2) (a) does not speak of a goodwill. It only speaks of the period of tenancy during which a business is caraied on in a particular premises. " 7. THE rule 16 (2) (a) does not speak of a goodwill. It only speaks of the period of tenancy during which a business is caraied on in a particular premises. THE District Judge was, therefore, in error in taking into account the fact that the goodwill of the wholesale business in sugar will not extend to the business of sugar in retail and vegetable ghee. That consideration is not to be found in the rule. THE nature of the business can change while the tenancy continues and nevertheless the benefit of Rule 16 (2) (a) will be available to a tenant. 8. THE District Judge while weighing the relative needs of the landlord and the tenants had been asked on behalf of the tenants in the appeal to extend the benefit of Rule 16 (2) (a) to them. THE District Judge refused to do so on the ground that while Ram Pal was carrying on the business of wholesale in sugar, his successors were carrying on the business of sugar in retail and vegetable ghee. THE reason given by the District Judge for holding that the rule was not applicable, was that the goodwill of the old business did not extend to the new business. THE District Judge fell into error here. For the application of Rule 16 (2) (a) the length of business and the period of tenancy is the decisive criteria. THE nature of the business carried on in a particular premises is not the criteria. THEre may be a goodwill of a business or there may not be a goodwill in a particular business but the duration for which the business was carried on in a particular shop by a particular tenant will decide whether Rule 16 (2) (a) will apply or not. In the assessment of relative hardship, the District Judge has also taken into account the fact that the business of the tenants was petty. The eviction of a tenant necessarily causes hardship to the tenant but the denial of release also causes hardship to the landlord. Therefore, the test has been laid down that the relative need of the two has to be assessed before deciding the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. 9. The eviction of a tenant necessarily causes hardship to the tenant but the denial of release also causes hardship to the landlord. Therefore, the test has been laid down that the relative need of the two has to be assessed before deciding the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. 9. THE difficulty in sustaining the judgment of the District Judge is that while weighing the needs of the parties, the District Judge has excluded the statutory rule 16 (2) (a) of the Act from being considered in favour of the tenants. 10. IN the result, the writ petition is allowed, the order of the District Judge is quashed but it is made clear that the finding of the District Judge that the need of the landlord is genuine, is not being disturbed. The District Judge will now decide the appeal in accordance with law. The parties will obtain a certified copy of this judgment and appear before the District Judge on 18th of January, 1984, so that he can fix a date for hearing in appeal. The appeal should be heard and disposed of at a very early date as it is very old. The parties will bear their own costs. Petition allowed.