ORDER U.N. BHACHAWAT, J. 1. This order shall also govern the disposal of Miscellaneous Petition No. 166 of 1983 (Narayanas Dubey v. The State of M.P. and others.) 2. This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order (Annexure P-4) dated 24-5-1983 of the State Government, respondent No. 1 herein. 3. The petitioner is the Vice President nominated by the State Government of the Municipal Council, Seondha, which has come into being in the manner stated hereinafter. 3.01. Seondha was a Notified Area till before 20th November 1981. On 20-11-1981, the State Government in exercise of its powers under section 5 read with S. 344 of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') declared it to be a municipality and for that purpose, in further exercise of the powers under section 16(1) of the Act, it constituted a committee as under vide notification No. 1284-XVIII-MI-81, Bhopal, dated the 20th November 1981, published in the M.P. Government (Extra-ordinary) Gazette Part 2) of that date (Annexure P-1) :- No. 1284-XVIII-II-81.-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Madhaya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961) the State Government hereby constitutes a committee of Seondha Muncipality in Seondha Tehsil of Datia District consisting of the following members, namely :- S. No. Dr. Ramprasad Sharma s/o Shri Baijnath Prasad. President. 1. Shri Narayandas Dudey s/o Shri Mool chandra Senior Vice President. 2. Shri Janggiram Jatav s/o ShriKashiprasad. Junior Vice President. 3. Shri Madhuri Sharan Sharma s/o ShriRamcharan. Member. 4. Shri Mahesh Chandra Sharma s/o ShriRamswaroop. Member. 5. Shri Vishwanth Goswami s/o Shri Gangaprasad. Member. 6. Dr. Omprakash Agrawal s/o Shri Kantiprasad. Member. 7. Shri Daulat singh Yadav s/o Shri Nahar singh. Member. 8. Smt. Dastoori devi Pathak w/o Shri Kailash chandra Pathak. Member 9. Shri Babukhan Retd. Teacher. Member. 10. Shri Pooratlal Nagariya s/o Shri Kalkaprasad. Member. 11. Shri Barelal Jatav s/o Shri Jangi. Member. By the order and in the name of Governor of Madhya Pradesh Sd/- B.B. Sharma, Dy. Secy. 3.02 After the Committee was so constituted, Dr. Ramprasad Sharma the President appointed died on 22nd April 1983 and thus a vacancy occurred in the office of the President. Member. 11. Shri Barelal Jatav s/o Shri Jangi. Member. By the order and in the name of Governor of Madhya Pradesh Sd/- B.B. Sharma, Dy. Secy. 3.02 After the Committee was so constituted, Dr. Ramprasad Sharma the President appointed died on 22nd April 1983 and thus a vacancy occurred in the office of the President. Consequently, the petitioner-appointed Senior Vice President, started exercising the powers and performing the duties of the president by virtue of section 52 of the Act. 3.03. On May 4, 1983. the Chief Executive Officer Seondha Muncipality intimated the petitioner that a telegram was received from the Collector, Data that since an action is being taken against the petitioner under section 38 of the Act, he be not handed over the charge of president. Thereupon, the petitioner filed Miscellaneous Petition No. 166 of 1983 on 7th May 1983 seeking a writ of prohibition against respondents No 1,2 and 3 commanding them to refrain from restraining and or interfering with the working of the petitioner as President of the Municipal Council, Seondha. After the filing of this petition, on May 24, 1983, the State Government vide its order dated 24-5-1983 (Annexure P-4) appointed respondent No. 4 Madhuri Sharan Sharma as the President of the Municipal Council, Seondha, stating that it was being done in exercise of the powers vested in the State Government under section 16(1) of the Act. The petitioner has, thus, filed the present petition (M.P. No. 179/83) to challenge this order. 4. At the outset it may be stated that the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted-and in our view rightly, that the fate of Miscellaneous Petition No. 166 of 1983 is linked with the fate of this petition and has, thus, advanced arguments in this petition. 5. The validity of the order (Annexure P- 4) is challenged on the ground that the State Government was not competent to appoint a person in the purported exercise of its power under Section 16(1) of the Act to fill in the vacancy in the office of the president, caused by the death of Dr. Ramprasad Sharma The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this contention are capsulized as under: 5. 01. Ramprasad Sharma The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this contention are capsulized as under: 5. 01. After the constitution of the committee under section 16(1) of the Act, at the time of the declaring the Notified Area to be a municipality, except in the eventuality contemplated under section 16(3) of the Act, i.e., on the removal of the president by the State Government, the State Government has no jurisdiction or power to fill in the vacancy in the office of the President. The only manner to fill in the vacancy is by election under section 43 of the Act. The learned counsel submitted that the committee constituted under Section 16(1)is "deemed to be a council for the purposes of this Act.' which goes to show that the provisions contained in section 43 of the Act are attracted for the purpose of filling in the vacancy in the office of the preside net caused by death. He also drew support for this argument of his from sub-sec. (4) of section 16 submitting that since this sub-section (4) excludes the applicability only of the provisions of sections 41,47 and 48 of the Act to the committee so constituted, is can well be inferred that the legislature intended the applications of all other provisions of the Act including section 43 with the only exception that section 43 shall not apply for filling in the vacancy when it is caused on account of the removal by the State Government of the President, the Vice-president or a Member of the committee in which event the State Government would be competent to appoint a person to fill in the vacancy. 6. The arguments in counter of the learned counsel for the respondents may by sub-sumuned as under: 6 01. During the term of the committee constituted under section 16(1) of the Act. if any vacancy is caused in the office of the President, or Vice President or a Member of the Committee by whatever reason, the State Government is empowered to fill in that vacancy under section 16(1) of the Act, and as such section 43 of the Act cannot be brought into play for filling in the vacancy caused in the office of the president on account of the death of Dr. Ramprasad Sharma. Ramprasad Sharma. In other words, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents was to the affect that during the term of the committee constituted under sub sec. (1) of section 16 of the Act, its elective nature is not contemplated by the provisions of section 16, and section 43 is attracted only when it is a question of filling in a vacancy in the office of the President or Vice President of a council constituted by an election under the Act and, thus, the appointment of respondent No. 4 by the State Government vide annexure P-4 is valid. 7. In the light of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties the point for decision is whether a vacancy caused in the office of a President of the Committee, nominated under sec. 16(1) of the Act, on account of the death of the President, during the term of that Committee provided under S. 16, can be filled in by the State Government appointing a person in his place. 8. To appreciate the problem and to give an adequate answer, it is necessary to have a glance over the scheme of the Act. as reflected in its relevent sections, i.e.. section 5,16,18,19,36,37,43 and 44. The scheme of the Act may be stated thus: 8-01. The State Government is to create or alter limits or abolish municipalities; there are general elections and elections to casual vacancies; the general elections may be in regard to the first election after the Act came in to force or to the subsequent elections under the Act; the committee to be constituted by the State Government for an area declared to be a municipality for the first time under the Act is to function as a council for the purposes of this Act till a council is constituted by election. 9. Section 16 of the Act enjoins upon the State Government to constitute and notify a committee, which shall be deemed to be a council for the purposes of the Act, while declaring an area to be a municipality for the first time. In the present case, the answer to the question at hand depends mainly upon the interpretation of section 16 of the Act. We would, therefore, like to set out hereinbelow S. 16 of the Act:- "16. In the present case, the answer to the question at hand depends mainly upon the interpretation of section 16 of the Act. We would, therefore, like to set out hereinbelow S. 16 of the Act:- "16. Exercise of powers of Council pending its constitution.-(1) When an area is declared to be a Municipality for the first time under this Act, the Stats Government shall, by notification, constitute a Committee consisting of a President, two Vice-Presidents and such number of members as it may deem fit and such a Committee shall be deemed to be a Council for the purposes of this Act: Provided that no person shall be appointed as President or Vice-President or member of such a Committee who is ineligible to hold such office in the Council under this Act. (2) A Committee constituted under sub-section (1) shall continue to function until a Council is constituted under this Act or until the expiration of two years from the date on which the notification under sub-section (1) is published in the Gazette, whichever is earlier: Provided that if a Council is not constituted, within the said period, the Committee shall, if the State Government so direct, continue to function for such further period not exceeding one year as may be specified, by notification, in this behalf. (3) The State Government may, by notification, at any time remove the President, Vice-president or a member of the Committee and appoint any other person eligible to be so appointed in his place. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the provisions of sections 47 and 48 shall not apply to the Committee. (Emphnsis supplied) 10. The edifice of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been built upon the expression "shall be deemed to be a Council for the purposes of this Act" in section 16. To iterate, the central core of his argument has been that by virtue of this expression, for all purposes, with the exception of the specific provision contained in this Act, the committee constituted under this section is equated to be an elected council, and all the previsions of the Act, applicable to a council constituted by election, apply to it. The rest of the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is penumbral to this central point. 11. The rest of the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is penumbral to this central point. 11. By virtue of the expression 'shall be deemed to be a Council for the purposes of this Act," the deemed committee, though it is not really a council constituted under the Act, has been fictionally treated to be a council constituted for the purposes of the Act. Legal fictions are created only for some definite purpose; therefore, a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it was created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. The principles "regarding the interpretation of a provision creating a legal fiction have been laid down in a series of decisions of the Supreme Court that are collected in the Book "Principles of Statutory Interpretation'' by Guru Prasanna Singh J., now Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court, 2nd edition, under the heading 'Legal Fiction' at pp.206 to 214. At pp.206 and 207 the learned author says:- "In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the Court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created: and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. But in so construing the fiction it is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created or beyond the language of the section by which it is created. It cannot also be extended by importing another fiction. As was observed by James L.J.: "When a statute enacts that so-meting shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to. "When a legal fiction is created," stated S.R. Das J. "for what purpose, one is led to ask at once, it is so created." After ascertaining the purpose, "full effect must to given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion"...... 12. Bearing is mind the aforesaid principle, we proceed to ascertain the purpose and the extent of the fiction created vide section 16(1) of the Act, so that it can be carried to its logical conclusion on giving full effect to it. 13. 12. Bearing is mind the aforesaid principle, we proceed to ascertain the purpose and the extent of the fiction created vide section 16(1) of the Act, so that it can be carried to its logical conclusion on giving full effect to it. 13. The object of the Act, as it appears from its scheme, is to democratise the local institutions and have a uniform administration. It is with that object of democratisation that section 19 of the Act has been enacted; which provides that a Municipal council should consist of elected and selected councillors. It is not possible to have an elected council immediately for an area which is declared to be a Municipality for the first time. Sometime is bound to be consumed in holding the election in the manner provided in the Act after the Municipality has come into being. Thus to prevent an haitus in between the period from the coming into being of the Muncipality upto the constitution of an elected council therefore, provision for constituting a committee under section 16(1) of the Act is made. Such a committee is a caretaker committee to do the work of the Municipality till a council is constituted by election under the Act. 14. By creating a fiction 'such a committee shall be deemed to be a Council for the purposes of this Act' in sub-section (1) of section 16, the legislature intended to assign to it the working functions of an elected council. The legislature did not intend to extend the fiction so as to give the committee an elective nature in the matter of its composition or constitution during its term. This intention of the legislature is discernible from the non obstante clause provided in the shape of section 16(4) of the Act. 14.01. It cannot be gainsaid that the phrase 'Not with standing anything contained in sub-section (1)' is used in contra-distinction to the phrase 'subject to', the latter conveying the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or provisions to which it is made subject. The non obstante clause throws light as to the scope and ambit of the enacting part. (See Dominion of India v. Shrinbai ( AIR 1954 SC 596 ); A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1957 SC 657 );Warren Shriniwas v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. The non obstante clause throws light as to the scope and ambit of the enacting part. (See Dominion of India v. Shrinbai ( AIR 1954 SC 596 ); A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1957 SC 657 );Warren Shriniwas v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. ( AIR 1959 SC 689 ) and South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secretary. Board of Revenue Trivandrum ( AIR 1964 SC 207 ). 14.02. The non obstante clause contained in section 16(4) of the Act chary says that "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1)," the provisions of sections 41,47 and 48 shall not apply to the Committee. Section 41 of the Act relates to removal of Councilor; section 47 relates to removal of President and Vice-President by passing a resolution of no confidence in the meeting of a council; and section 48 relates to grant of leave of absence to President or Vice President. All these provisions indicate the elective nature of the council. Thus, the object of section 16(4) is to clearly unlock the intention of the legislature to maintain the Nan elective character of the committee constituted under section 16(1) of the Act. 14.03 Section 3(8) of the Act defines 'Council' as 'Municipal Council constituted by or under this Act.' At this stage it would be pertinent for an intelligent, clear and comparative study, with a view at determine the extent of the fiction created by section 16(1) of the Act, to extract herein below the deeming provision contained in section 2[(2)(i) and section 16](1) of the Act Section 2 so far relevant redas thus:- "2. Repeal and Savings. -- (1) The Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (II of 1922), the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, 1954 (I of 1954), the Vindhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1956 and the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, 1955 (III of 1956), are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal:-- (i) all Municipal Committees. Municipal Councils, Municipal Boards and Notified Area Committees, constituted committees or sub-committees constituted x x x x x under the said Acts, or any enactment thereby repealed shall in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been respectively constituted x x x under this Act." (Emphasis supplied). Municipal Councils, Municipal Boards and Notified Area Committees, constituted committees or sub-committees constituted x x x x x under the said Acts, or any enactment thereby repealed shall in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been respectively constituted x x x under this Act." (Emphasis supplied). The deeming provision in section 16(1) of the Act reads "such a Committee shall be deemed to be a Council for the purposes this Act." 14.04. On the comparison of the two deeming provisions, referred to hereinabove, one would find a statutory distinction between the fictional garment provided to the Council that was constituted under a repealed Act and to the committee constituted under section 16(1) of the Act. In section 2(2)(i) the expression used is "constituted under this Act", whereas in section 16(1) the word 'constituted' is absent and the expression used is "shall be deemed to be a Council for the purposes of this Act." 14.05. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, at page 311 says :- "It has been justly remarked that, when precision is required, no safer rule can be followed than always to call the same thing by the same name. It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act." It is true, as Maxwell says, that this is not a rule of thumb and there may be cases where "the same word may be used in different senses in the same statute and even in the same section, x x." (p. 312). It would also be useful to point out that the Supreme Court has, while dealing with the question of interpretation of statutes also observed in S.V. Parulekar v. Destrict Magistrate, Thana ( AIR 1957 SC 23 ) and Raghubans Narain v. Govt, of U.P. ( AIR 1967 SC 465 ) to the effect that it is at all events reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the some expression in every part of an Act unless the context requires otherwise. In short, what is deducible from these decisions is that the Courts would ordinarily presume that a word used in different parts of a statute carries the same meaning From this holding of the Supreme Court, what we intend to deduce is that the converse of it is also true, i.e., though the us of tautologous expression in statutes is not uncommon, ordinarily, unless there is sufficient reason or the context requires otherwise, the legislature would not use different expressions to convey the same meaning. In this view of the matter about the interpretation of statutes, we are of the opinion that the use of two different expressions is indicative of the intention of the legislature that the scope of the legal Actions created by these two different expressions are different. The use of the word 'constituted' in section 2(2)(i) unlocks the legislature to provide the council constituted under the repealed Act with all the trappings of an elected body under the Act--of course, with the limitations provided in section 2(2)(i), whereas the absence of the word 'constituted' in section 16(1) goes to show that the legislature intended to fictionally (reat it a council for the purposes of the Act, bereft of the elective nature of the council constituted under the Act. To put it differently, is deemed to be a council clothed with the powers and functions of a council under the Act for working purposes. 14.06. The extent and scope of the fiction created by section 16(1) is obtainable from the very language of section 16(1 ).The governing expression "such a committee" appealing before the deeming provision holds the key to unlock the intention of the legislature. As stated by Crates on Statute Law, Seventh Edition at page 90,' The word 'such' in an enactment must be taken to refer to some previous provision or matter, whatever the result of so doing may be.' In this light, if we examine the deeming clause, it becomes transparently clear that the deeming clause applies only to a Committee constituted by the State Government, which must consist of : (i) a President; (ii) two Vice-Presidents, and (iii) such number of members as the State Government deems fit. The section makes a distinction between "such a Committee" and the 'Council' elected under the Act. The section makes a distinction between "such a Committee" and the 'Council' elected under the Act. Even assuming that the definition of 'Council' contained in section 3(8) of the Act makes the net so wide as to include a deemed Council, yet this definition must' give way if there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, which is provided by the qualifying expression employed in section 3 of the Act. "Definitions.- In this Act unless the context otherwise requires,--" We may derive assistance for this view of ours from a decision of the Supreme Court in M. Penitah v. Veeramallappa ( AIR 1961 S.C. 1107 ), wherein the question that had come up for intepretation, was whether a committee though not constituted under The Hyderabad Municipal and Town Committees Act, 1951 (XXVII of 1951) was deemed to have been constituted under that Act, and could be put at par with the elected Committee under the Act and then while interpreting the provision creating the fiction it held that in the context the deemed Committee cannot be equated to the Committee constituted under the Act. The relevant excerpt is set out below: "(4). Let us first test the validity of the construction of S. 320of the Act suggested by the learned counsel. The material part of S.320 reads : (1) The Hyderabad Municipal an 1 Town Committees Act, 1951 (XXVII of 1951).........(is) hereby repealed; provided that :-- (a) any Committee constituted under the enactment so repealed (hereinafter referred to in this section as the said Committee) shall be deemed to have been constituted under this Act, and Members of the said Committee shall continue to hold office till the first meeting of the Committee is called under section 35;". The terms of the section are clear and do not lend any scope for argument. The section makes a distinction between the 'said' Committee and the Committee elected under the Act and says, "Members of the said Committee shall continue to hold office till the first meeting of the Committee is called under S. 35." Though the word "Committee" is defined in S. 2(5) to mean a Municipal or Town Committee established or deemed to be established under the Act, that definition must give way if there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. An the Section makes a clear distinction between the "said' Committee and the Committee elected under the Act, in the context, the Committee in S. 320 cannot mean the Committee elected under the Act. The term fixed, for the member of the Committee constituted under the Act cannot apply to the members of the Committee deemed to have been constituted under the Act. Section 32 which provides for the culminating state of the process of election under the Act says that the names of all members finally elected to any Committee shall be forthwith published in the official Gazette. Section 34 prescribes the term of office of the members so elected. Under it, 'except as is otherwise provided in this Acts shall hold office for a term of three years.' Section 320(1)(a) provides a different term for the members of the Committee deemed to have been constituted under the Act. Thereunder, the term is fixed not by any member of years but by the happening of an event. The Committee constituted under S. 320 clearly falls under the exception. But it is suggested that the exception refers only to S. 28 where under a member of a Committee ceases to be one by a supervening disqualification. Firstly, this section does not fix a term but only imposes a disqualification on the basis of a term fixed under S. 34; secondly, assuming that the said section also fixes a term, the exception may as well cover both the deviations from the normal rule. That apart, sub-sec. (2) of S. 34 dispels any doubt that may arise on the construction of sub-section (l) of the section. Under sub-section(2), the term of office of such members shall be deemed to commence on the date of the first meeting called by the Collector under S. 35."Section 35 directs the Collector to call a meeting after giving at least five clear days notice within thirty days from the date of the publication of the names of members under S. 32. This provision clearly indicates that the members on the Committee mentioned in S. 34 are only the member elected under the Act and not members of the Committee deemed to have been elected under the Act, for. in the case of the latter Committee, no publication under S. 32 is provided for and therefore the provisions of S. 35 cannot apply to them. in the case of the latter Committee, no publication under S. 32 is provided for and therefore the provisions of S. 35 cannot apply to them. It is, therefore, manifest that the term prescribed in S.34 cannot apply to a member of the "deemed" Committee." 15. In the backdrop of the discussion contained in paragraph 14, we proceed to Judge the competency of the State Government to till in the vacancy caused on account of the death of Dr. Ramprasad Sharma. 16. The question to be considered is whether the power in the State Government to appoint a President, Vice-President or a Member gets exhausted when once the State Government exercises that power by constituting a Committee under section 16(1). At this state a reference to S. 14 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1967 is very necessary. This section says "Where by any enactment, any power is conferred or a duty is imposed, then unless a different intention appears, that power may be exercised and that duty shall be performed from time to time, as. occasion requires." (This section corresponds to section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897). When [a power is conferred by a statute, that power may be exercised from time to time, when occasion arises, unless a contrary intention appears. This section codifies this principle; which may be said to be a rule of convenience and which would, generally speaking, be in conformity with legislative intent. Thus, it flows from this section that unless there is anything to indicate a contrary intention, the power to fill in the vacancy flows naturally and as a necessary sequence from the power to appoint. In other words, it is a necessary adjunct of the power of appointment and is exercised as an insident to, or consequence of the power as and when the occasion arises. In this respect, we may quote with advantage the following excerpt of the Supreme Court judgment in Express Newspaper Ltd v. Union of India (AIR 1958 S.C. 579 at pp. 634 and 635): "230. Re: 1. In this respect, we may quote with advantage the following excerpt of the Supreme Court judgment in Express Newspaper Ltd v. Union of India (AIR 1958 S.C. 579 at pp. 634 and 635): "230. Re: 1. The first ground of attack is based on the circumstance that Shri K.P. Kesava Menon who was originally appointed a member of the Wage Board resigned on or about 21st June 1956, which resignation was accepted by the Central Government by a notification dated 14th July 1956, and by the same notification the Central Government appointed in his place Shri K.M. Cherjan and thus reconstituted the Wage Board. There was no provision in the Act for the resignation of any member from his membership or for the filling in of the vacancy which thus arose in the membership of the Board. A provision in this behalf was incorporated only in the working Journalists Wage Board Rules. 1956 which were published by a notification in the Gazette of India Part II-section 3 on cate 31st July 1956. It was, therefore, contended that such re-constitution of the Board by the appointment of Shri K.M. Charian in place of Shri K.P. Keashava Menon was unauthoised by the Act as it then stood and the Board which actually published the decision in question was therefore not properly constituted. 231. It is necessary to remember in this connection that S. 8 of the Act empowered the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette to constitute a Wage Board. This power of constituting the Wage Board must be construed having regard to S. 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which says that where by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the Act, any power is conferred then, unless a different intention appears that Power may be exercised from time to time as occasion arises. If this is the true position there was nothing objectionable in the Central Government re-constituting the Board on the resignation of Shri K.P. Keshava Menon being accepted by it." There is nothing in section 16 of the Act to indicate or suggest even remotely that the power vested in the State Government regarding the constitution of a Committee under section 16(1) gets exhausted when once the State Government exercises that power. Hence there appears to be nothing objectionable in the State Government passing the impugned order (Annexure P-4) appointing respondent No. 4 on the death of Dr. Ramprasad Sharmi, In our view, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner which is being dealt hereafter in greater detail, that Section 14 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957 is not attracted, is not well-founded. 16.01. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 16(1) indicates a different intention so as to exclude the operation of Sec. 14 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957. His submission was mat since S. 16(3) of the Act--extracted in paragraph 9 of this Order--specifically gives power to the State Government remove the President of a Member and to appoint any other person eligible to be so appointed in his place, it has to be read to mean that the State Government's power of appointment under S. 16(1) exhausted when once it constitutes a Committee under it except when a vacancy is caused on account of removal of the President or a Member by the State Government and, therefore, a vacancy caused in the Committee constituted under S 16(1) during its tenure can be filled in only in the manner provided in Section 37 or 43 of the Act, as the case may be. It was also submitted that Section 37 and 43 of the Act, which provide for the filling in of vacancies in an elected Council, equally apply, as the case may be, to the Committee constituted under S. 16(1), this is spelt out as a necessary implication of Sec. 16(4) which excludes the operation of Sections 41, 47 and 48 only in respect of such Committee. 16.02, There is a fallacy in the fore-referred (in sub-paragraph 16. 01) arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The construction canvassed by the learned counsel would lead to manifest absurdity also. 16.03. Section 16(3) which specifically pro ides the manner of removal of a person from the office of President, Vice-President and Member of the Committee, constituted under section 16(1) of the Act and then to fill in the vacancy caused by such removal by appointing any other person eligible to be so appointed, does not detract from the general power of the appointing authority under S. 16(1) to fill in the vacancy caused by death or resignation. This section, on the contrary, reiterates the general power of the appointing authority to fill in the vacancy. It is true that an express provision for appointment or removal in a specific Act renders section 14 and 16 of the General Clauses Act (which codifies the general power of termination as a necessary adjunct of the power of appointment) inapplicable, then, in that event, the termination and appointment has to be made strictly in accordance with the express provision. It cannot be gainsaid that the legislature must have been alive to the possibility of a vacancy occurring due to death or resignation, and with that aliveness no express provision having been made for the filling in of that vacancy, it has necessarily to be inferred that the legislature intended the general power under section 14 of the General Clauses Act to operate. The legislature cannot be attributed the intention of leaving a lacuna regarding the filling in of vacancies occurring in a manner other than provided in Sec. 15(3) of the Act. Here we would hasten to observe that in oar opinion, as discussed hereinafter, sections 3 and 43 of the Act are not applicable for filling in of the vacancies occurring in a manner different from the one provided in section 16(3) of the Act. 16.04. Sections 37 and 43 of the Act provide for filling in of vacancy in the office of a Councillor, and President; Vice-President, respectively. Before we proceed further, we consider it advisable to bring to bear on mind some significant facts. There cannot be a Municipality without a Council. The constitution of an elected Council under the Act is bound to take time. Therefore, the legislature, in order to prevent a hiatus, has made provisions like sections 16(1) and 328(6) of the Act. Section 16(1) provides for the constitution of the Committee to function as a Council in between the period from the declaration of an area to be a Municipality for the first time upto the date an elected Council is constituted under the Act, and section 328(6) provides for the appointment of a person or a Committee of persons to exersise all the powers and perform all the duties of a Council during the period from the dissolution or super session of the Council upto the date when the reconstitution of the Council comes into being. The lease of life provided for the Committee constituted under section 16(1) of the Act is till a Council is constituted under the Act, the upper limit in the event of non-constitution of a Council under the Act is two years with the provision for extention of one year more. From the provision contained in Sec. 16(2), it can well be spelt out that soon after the declaration of the area to be a Municipality and constitution of the Committee under section 16(1), preparation for holding election of councillors for the Municipality has to be strated and no sooner this is done, elections have to be held in the direction of constituting a council under the Act. With this view, we proceed to consider the applicability of sections 37 and 43 of the Act to the Committee constituted under section 16(1). Section 37 provides for the filling up of casual vacancies in the event of death, resignation, etc., of any councillor. It says "* * such vacancy shall be filled as soon as may be by the election or selection, as the case may be, of a person thereto as Councillor **." Apart from other reason, if this section is to be applied to filling the vacancy in the office of a member of the Committee constituted under S. 16(1), the first question that arises is whether that Member, on whose death or resignation, a vacancy has occurred, has to be treated as an elected Councillor or a selected Councillor, because the section provides that if that Member was an elected Councillor the procedure for filling in the vacancy by election shall apply, and if he was a selected Councillor, the procedure regarding the selection of Councillor would apply. In this regard, there is no provision contained in section 16 of the Act. In view of this anomalous position, it can well be said that S. 37 cannot be brought into play. Further, if that Member is to be treated as an elected one, then, as already said, it has to be filled in by an election. The Act and the Rules made thereunder lay down a particular procedure that has to be followed for the election. Further, if that Member is to be treated as an elected one, then, as already said, it has to be filled in by an election. The Act and the Rules made thereunder lay down a particular procedure that has to be followed for the election. According to the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules made thereunder, a Councillor has to be elected from a particular ward and for that the municipal area has to be divided into wards, as determined by the State Government in Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of S, 29 of the Act in accordance with the M.P. Municipalities (Ward) Rules 1963 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Ward Rules'), and thereafter, the election has to be held in the manner provided in the M.P. Municipalities (Preparation, Revision and Publication of Electoral Rolls Election and Selection of Councillors) Rules 1962 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Election Rules') Thus, unless the formalities required to be performed under the Ward Rules and the Election Rules are completed, the election is not possible. We cannot ignore the possibility of a situation that a vacancy or vacancies may occur immediately after the constitution of a Committee under S. 16(1) in the office of a Member/Members of that Committee on account of death/deaths, resignation/resignations, and the preparations contemplated under the Ward Rules and the Election Rules may not be made till the end of the tenure of the Committee. Then, in such an event, on accepting the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the result would be that the vacancy/vacancies should remain unfilled and an hiatus has to be there till during the prescribed tenure of the Committee resulting in the running of the Municipality without a duly constituted Council. Further, if the formalities under the aforesaid Rules are completed, then it is presumed that, as provided in section 16(2) of the Act, the general election itself would be held to constitute a Council under the Act and there would be no occasion for filling in of a casual vacancy. If the vacancy/vacancies is/are treated to be of a selected Councillor, then it is only the elected Councillors who can select a Councillor, and for that also, the formalities required under the Election Rules have to be observed and, as such, would result in the absurdities already discussed hereinabove. If the vacancy/vacancies is/are treated to be of a selected Councillor, then it is only the elected Councillors who can select a Councillor, and for that also, the formalities required under the Election Rules have to be observed and, as such, would result in the absurdities already discussed hereinabove. The above impracticalities and absurdities go to show the inapplicability of section 37. The legislature in its wisdom would have never intended that a vacancy/vacancies caused in the office of a Member/Members during the term of the Committee constituted under S. 16(1) of the Act on account of the death/deaths of, resignation/resignations by, a Member/Members should remain unfilled and an hiatus should be created. Here, we shall quote with advantage from the Book 'The Discipline of Law' by Lord Denning, 1979 edition, at p. 13, what Lord Denning said in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asber (1949) 2 KB 481; "We do not sit here to pull the language of Parliament and of Ministers to pieces and make nonsense of it. That is an easy thing to do, and it is a thing to which lawyers are too often prone. We sit. here to find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers and carry it cut, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis." 16.05. We now turn to the consideration of applicability of section 43, which reads as under:-- "43. Election and term of office of President and Vice-President :-- (1) A Council shall elect:-- (a) a President from its members or from other persons residing is the Municipality possessing the qualification of a candidate for election under section 34 and not disqualified under section 35 or any other provision of this Act; (b) two Vice-Presidents to be designated as Senior Vice-President and Junior Vice-President from amongst its members :-- Provided that no person shall be eligible for being elected as a President or Vice-President of a Council if he holds such or similar office in any other local authority. (2)(a) After every general election the Council shall elect the President and the Vice Presidents at its first meeting held under sub-section (2) of section 55 and the President and the Vice-Presidents so elected shall hold office for a period of two years from the date on which they enter upon their offices. (2)(a) After every general election the Council shall elect the President and the Vice Presidents at its first meeting held under sub-section (2) of section 55 and the President and the Vice-Presidents so elected shall hold office for a period of two years from the date on which they enter upon their offices. (b) On the expiry of the term of the office of the President and the Vice-President elected under clause (a), the Council shall an a meeting convened for the purpose witnin one month there of, election new President and Vice-Presidents who shall hold office for the unexpired term of the Council; (c) The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 55 shall so far as may be, apply to the meeting under clause (b), as they apply to the first meeting of a Council: Provided that the President and the Vice-Presidents shall continue in office until their successors enter upon their respective offices in accordance with the provisions this Act. (3) If the Council fails to elect a President or Vice-President in accordance with this section the State Government may, by order, direct the council to elect the President or Vice-Presidents within the period specified therein and on failure of the Council to do so appoint any person eligible under sub-section (1) to fill the vacancy. (4) The State Government may make rules for regulating the mode and time of election of the President and the Vice-Presidents. (5) The President who is not a Councillor shall unless otherwise expressly provided, be deemed to be a Councillor for all purposes of this Act." A bare reading of the section reveals its impracticability in its application to the Committee constituted under section 16(1). 16.06. Sections 37 and 43 are applicable to an elected Council constituted under the Act, and for the reasons stated hereinabove in paragraphs of this order, these sections cannot be brought into play to fill in the casual vacancy caused during the tenure of the Committee constituted under S. 16(1) of the Act. 17. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the firm opinion that the State Government has not acted without jurisdiction in passing the impugned order (Annexure P-4), appointing respondent No. 4 as the President in the vacancy of Dr. Ramprasad Sharma, caused on account of his death, and the order (Annexure P. 4) is not liable to be quashed. Ramprasad Sharma, caused on account of his death, and the order (Annexure P. 4) is not liable to be quashed. 18. The petition, therefore, fails and consequent to the failure, of this petition, the petition registered as M.P.No. 166 of 1983 also fails and, accordingly, both these petitions are dismissed. The costs shall be borne by the parties as incurred. The outstanding amount of lecurity deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.