( 1 ) THIS appeal by the wife is directed against the judgment and decree dated 10-3-1982 passed by the Principal Judge, City Civil Court. Bangalore City, in M. C. No. 20 of 1980, on his file, decreeing the petition of the husband for judicial separation under S. 10 of the Hindu Marriage act, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). ( 2 ) PETITIONER/husband instituted a petition for divorce under S. 13 (i) (1a) (iii) of the Act. Petitioner/husband averred in the petition that he was married to respondent according to 'vedic' rites on 28-10-1973 in Bangalore City and the consummation of the marriage took place in December 1973 in the house of the respondent in rajajinagar. Petitioner/husband had already taken a house in 3rd Block, rajajinagar, and after consummation of marriage, he brought his wife to his house and stayed with her. The marital life went on well only for a couple of months, according to the petitioner/husband, and, thereafter, his wife started behaving rudely towards him. She was exhibiting erratic behaviour and rude temper towards the petitioner / husband. Petitioner/husband patiently endured all that with the fund hope that she would change her ways ard improve. But she did not. Petitioner/husband, thereafter, avers that his wife (respondent) was consuming different types of pills and tablets, including 'sequil' tablets. On enquiry he learnt that she was for some time in the Mental hospital. He wanted to get her treated. But she refused. Thereafter, in para 6 of the petition, petitioner/husband avers several incidents that took place to illustrate the rude and erratic behaviour of his wife. They are from para 6 (a) to (w ). On those allegations, on the ground of cruelty, the petitioner / husband sought for divorce. He also based his claim on the ground that his wife had been incurably of unsound mind and she suffered from mental disorder of such a kind and such an extent that the petitioner/husband could not be expected to live with the respondent. ( 3 ) THE petition was resisted by the wife by filing her statement of objections. She denied all the averments made in the petition. According to her, it is her husband and the mother-in-law who teased her and tortured her. ( 3 ) THE petition was resisted by the wife by filing her statement of objections. She denied all the averments made in the petition. According to her, it is her husband and the mother-in-law who teased her and tortured her. ( 4 ) THE learned City Civil Court judge raised the following points for his consideration as arising from the pleadings : (1) Whether the petitioner has established the allegation that he was treated with cruelty by the respondent ? (2) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief ? (3) What order ? ( 5 ) IT is obvious that since there was no specific pleading as such on the ground of insanity, the learned city Civil Court Judge did not raise a specific point on that ground and it was obviously not pressed before him also. ( 6 ) DURING hearing, petitioner / husband examined himself as PW 1 and he examined two other witnesses, viz. , PW 2 Shivaswamy and PW 3 rajashekhar. He got marked exhibits p-1 to P-7. As against that, the wife examined herself as RW 1 and closed her case and no exhibits were marked on her behalf. ( 7 ) THE learned City Civil Court judge, appreciating the evidence on record, held under Point No. 1, thus: 'partly in the affirmative and partly in the negative. ' under Point No. 2, he held in the negative. But the further held that the petitioner was entitled to the relief of judicial separation and in that view, he gave a decree for judicial separation in favour of the husband. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the wife has instituted the above appeal before this Court. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/wife strenuously urged before us that the learned city Civil Court Judge was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the evidence on record was sufficient to hold that the wife treated the petitioner / husband with cruelty. He further pointed out that if there could be no finding of cruelty for the purpose of divorce, there could not be a finding of cruelty with regard to judicial separation also. He further pointed out that if there could be no finding of cruelty for the purpose of divorce, there could not be a finding of cruelty with regard to judicial separation also. He further submitted that even assuming that there was some conduct on the 'part of the wife, which could be described as cruel, the husband condoned the same by entertaining the wife to live with him forgiving her and restoring her to the proper status of wife from 15-10-1975 and, thereafter, he submitted that there was no such conduct on the part of the wife which could be said to revive cruelty on the part of the wife. Hence, he submitted that the petition of the husband ought to have been dismissed by the learned city Civil Court Judge. ( 9 ) AS against that, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent husband nrgued supporting the judgment and decree of the learned City civil Court Judge, ( 10 ) THE points, therefore, that arise for our consideration in this, appeal are: (1) Whether the learned City civil Court Judge was justified in holding that the conduct on the part of the wife, thought it did not amount to cruelty for the purpose of divorce, amounts to cruelty for the purpose of judicial separation ? (2) Whether the judgment and decree of the learned City Civil Court judge require interference in the interest of Justice ? ( 11 ) THE husband has averred in the petition as well as in this evidence that his wife, ever since the day she came to stay with him, i. e. , from december 1973, behaved in an erratic manner and exhibited rude temper towards him for absolutely no reason at all and that she was treating him with cruelty both in her words and by her deeds. He further averred that she was consuming all sorts of tablets including 'sequil'. Then he proceeds to give in para 6 of the petition the following instances : (1) (a) She would pick up unnecessary quarrels with the petitioner on the public roads, unmindful of the presence of general public, calling the petitioner's name and loudly declaring that she was ready and willing to have divorce of her husband. Then he proceeds to give in para 6 of the petition the following instances : (1) (a) She would pick up unnecessary quarrels with the petitioner on the public roads, unmindful of the presence of general public, calling the petitioner's name and loudly declaring that she was ready and willing to have divorce of her husband. (2) (b) She also confessed that her father forced her marriage with the petitioner against her wish and the advice of the doctor, She further desired to know what the petitioner would be if she became insane. When the petitioner told her that he would inform her father about all that she had said, the respondent slapped him on cheeks and requested the petitioner not to do so. (3) (c) On Sunday the 28-4-74, the respondent quarrelled with the petitioner over the question of giving a present during the 'gruha Pravesham' of the house of a family friend Sri. Narayana shetty and rashly left the petitioner's house and want away to her father's house immediately after some time the respondent returned to the petitioner's house weeping and cryingly saying that her younger brother Sri Prasad slapped her and since she had no place of asylym either in her father's house or in her husband's house and therefore she had decided to put an end to her life. So saying, she went into the Pooja room and prayed for few minutes and thereafter came to the bedroom with a cup and emptied the contents of TIK 20 bottle into it and threatened to drink the same. At this, the petitioner and his brother Sri Jayaprabhu rushed and snatched away the said cup and threw it away. They also snatched the two bottles of TIK 20 one empty and another full kept with the respondent, They pacified her and hid the said bottles from her reach. Later, it has been learnt that she had brought the said two bottles from her house to which place she had gone. On account of these, the respondent loudly proclaimed that she would take vengence against the petitioner and his brother. (4) (d) Again from 2-5-1974 to 11-5-1974 the respondent created a lot of commotion and havoc in the house by loudly shouting and causing disturbance wantonly for the study of the petitioner's brother Sri Jayaprabhu, who had appeared for C. A. examination. (4) (d) Again from 2-5-1974 to 11-5-1974 the respondent created a lot of commotion and havoc in the house by loudly shouting and causing disturbance wantonly for the study of the petitioner's brother Sri Jayaprabhu, who had appeared for C. A. examination. Immediately after the said examination was over, she became calm and quiet. The respondent designedly gave milk to the petitioner and his brother for drinking and the said milk was found to be foul smelling and undrinkable. Further, on 27-5-1974, the respondent prepared 'chitranna' deliberately adding excess chilly powder and served the same to the petitioner and his brother taking advantage of the absence of their mother from the house. When it was found out, by eating a small quantity, they could not eat an more and to get rid of the bad effects of eating excess chillies, they were obliged to eat plantains. At this turn of events, the respondent exhibited her anger at both the brothers. If was only with a view to create an atmosphere of affection and cordiality that the petitioner got his mother from Arasikere to reside in the house with the peitioner and the respondent from 22-5-74. (5) (e) on 28-5-1974 when the petitioner asked the respondent in his house to give him illustrated weekly she threw the said magazine at his face and it actually hit him in his face. The mother of the petitioner intervened and pacified both advised the respondent to behave better. (6) (f) Again on 1-6-1974, while the petitioner's mother was grinding rice, the respondent without any reason whatsoever purposely pushed the unensils and wooden mane from the loft and the same fell immediately above beyond her. Fortunately no untoward thing happened to her in this incident. (7) (g) On 6-6-1974, respondent was taken by her father to his house on the pretext that her sister Smt. Gayathri would be coming from United States. As the respondent did not return to the petitioner's house for more than three months, the petitioner was obliged to go to the" respondent's father's house on 21-9-1974 for bringing her back tohis house. On that occasion the respondent's father refused to send the respondent and the respondent also stoutly refused to return to the petitioner's house saying that whatever he may do, she would not return to him. On that occasion the respondent's father refused to send the respondent and the respondent also stoutly refused to return to the petitioner's house saying that whatever he may do, she would not return to him. (8) (h) Again on 13-10-1974 sri Murugendrappa brother-in- law of Sri Basappa (father of the respondent) with a view to bring about reapproachment between the respondent and the petitioner arranged for a meeting in his house at Basavanagudi where the petitioner, respondent and her father were present. When the said Murugendrappa advised the respondent to go back to the petitioner's house, the respondent started hihurling abuses not only at the said gentleman but also at the petitioner and called the petitioner's name and loudly declared that she would not return to the petitioner and even dishonoured him. (9) (i) On 12-11-1974 night prior to Deepavali, the father of the respondent Basappa, accompanied by the respondent, her uncle Sri Varada and his wife and Murugendrappa, her mother gowramma, her younger brother prasad, came to the house of the petitioner ostensibly for bringing about a reconciliation between the respondent and the petitioner. Even then at that place the respondent abused the petitioner stoutly refusing to reside with him, come what may, and bolted away from the house of the petitioner proclaiming once again that she would not return even if her 'thali' is lost. Even the presence of the elders did not have any desired effect and the respondent did not care for their advice also. (10) (j) On 13-1-1975 when the petitioner's brother-in-law m/s. Sadasivaiah and Kamesh visited the respondent's father's house to advise the respondent return to her husband's house, the respondent flouted them and her father appears to have said that the petitioner is not his son-in-law and his daughter will not be sent to the petitioner. (11) (k) Once again on 1-9-1975, the friends of the petitioner's father namely Shriyutha Sivaswamy, Ramaiah, Chikkarangaiah and Vengaiah Setty visited the respondent's father's house to advice the respondent and her father and mother to send the respondent to live with the petitioner. The father of the respondent even before these persons said that he would not send his daughter to the petitioner's house as he is not his son-in-law. On further persuation he said he would reconsider his views after 'gowri' festival and asked them to see his later. The father of the respondent even before these persons said that he would not send his daughter to the petitioner's house as he is not his son-in-law. On further persuation he said he would reconsider his views after 'gowri' festival and asked them to see his later. Accordingly, the above mentioned panehayatdars visited, the house of the respondent's father on 10-9-1975 and reiterated their previous request the respondent's father at the time told them that he would be meeting the petitioner and send the respondent to his house in three days time. (12) (1) As the father of the petitioner did not keep up his word as assured till 18-9-1975 a lawyer's notice dated 18-9-1975 was issued to the respondent as per the copy filed. In the said notice, the petitioner refrained from making mention of all the incidents that happened solely with a view that a reunion between the petitioner and the respondent be achieved. But as the desired effect has not been achieved despite the petitioner's patient and sincere efforts in that direction, the petitioner has no other alternative than to approach this Hon'ble Court with this petition enumerating all the earlier incidents, (13) (m) On 2-10-1975. the respondent's mother's brother sri Murugendraswamy came to the petitioner's house and informed him that she would be returning to the house of the petitioner in a short time. On 13-10-75, the parents of the respondent called on the petitioner in his house and invited them for a dinner at their house OB the next day. The petitioner and his parents thinking that their visits to the house of the respondent for dinner would cement the relationship visited the house on 14-10-75 and dined there. The respondent was brought by her parents to the petitioner on 15-10-75, after having deserted him for about one year and four months. (14) (n) The stay of the respondent with the petitioner in his house during this second visit although was very short was a very unhappy and miserable episode, so far as the petitioner is concerned. Her naughty and erratic behaviour was more violent during this time. (15) (o) On 24-1-1975, the respondent, without any provocation, threw away pooja articles in the small garden in front of the house and these had to be picked up later. Her naughty and erratic behaviour was more violent during this time. (15) (o) On 24-1-1975, the respondent, without any provocation, threw away pooja articles in the small garden in front of the house and these had to be picked up later. On 25-11-1975, all the members of the family took curry expressing that the same had been prepared very nicely. By that evening the respondent had put plenty of chilly powder into the said curry with a view to spoil the same so that no one could even eat it. The mischief of the respondent was known in the evening. When she was questioned why she had done such an act, she did not answer. Further many small articles like soaps, tooth-brushes etc. , which were found missing, were later found thrown in the gutter. The respondent when questioned owned having thrown them away. (16) (p) On 13-2-1975, the petitioner took the respondent to tanigebyle, his brother-in-law's house, along with his parents. At this time, the respondent surreptitiously added plenty of baking powder and 'arisina' to the 'iddlis' purposely. After eating the same, all of them suffered severe abdominal trouble. On 15/16-12-75, when the respondent was taken to Kammangudi and they visited the house of the petitioner's brother-in-law (Sri kamesh) at Tanigebyle, the respondent picked up an unnecessary quarrel and created an ugly scene in the presence of the officers there and thereby the prestige of the petitioner on that account was made to suffer untold humiliations. (18) (q) The respondent had gone on proclaiming with the neighbours, while she was staying with the petitioners, that she was not at all willing to live with him but unfortunately she had conceived and in spite of it she was very much prepared to give a divorce to the petitioner. The respondent, during this period, had cut with a blade a woollen rug and a silk saree of the mother of the petitioner. (18) (r) The petitioner sent the respondent on 2-5-1976 with her mother for confinement to the respondent's father's house. Even during her stay in her parent's house, the respondent was visiting the petitioner now and then and during all these visits she would pick up quarrels with the petitioner, abusing him with vulgur words. Finally, the respondent quarrelled and abused the petitioner immensely and he discontinued visiting her after July 1976. Even during her stay in her parent's house, the respondent was visiting the petitioner now and then and during all these visits she would pick up quarrels with the petitioner, abusing him with vulgur words. Finally, the respondent quarrelled and abused the petitioner immensely and he discontinued visiting her after July 1976. (19) (a) The petitioner visited the house of the respondent's parents on the morning of 24-10-76 to see the male child born on 18-9-76. At that time, the parents of the respondent and her sister and younger brother Prasad were present. The respondent demanded to pay her Rs. 1,500/- forthwith and not to question her how she spent the said amount. The petitioner, who had not the said sum at that time, offered to pay rs. 500/- then and said that he would pay the rest later if it is needed. The respondent at this flared up at the petitioner using all sorts of unworthy epithets against him, stating that she was ready for a divorce. The respondent's brother Prasad also joined her in abusing the petitioner in very vulgur words and both the respondent and her brother shouted that the petitioner should be thrown out of the house. The respondent's brother Prasad warned the petitioner never to visit the respondent's father's house again, threatening him that if he again came there, his legs would be broken. At this unfortunate incident, the petitioner felt sad, particularly as the respondent's parents did not utter a word. The petitioner returned to his house with a sad heart after this incident and he was afraid to visit the respondent again. (20) (t) However, on 14-1-1977, the petitioner sent mr. Rajashekhar to the respondent to ask her to return to her husband with the child. The father of the respondent at the instance of the respondent told the said person that the petitioner should forget his wife and child as the respondent was not willing to return to her husband and that she was ready for a divorce. The mother of the respondent also went to the extent of telling them that they would be responsible if the respondent, if sent to petitioner, ) takes poison and dies and also take vengence against the members of the petitioner. Even the naming function ('namakarana') of the kid is not done till to-day, though it is more than six months old. Even the naming function ('namakarana') of the kid is not done till to-day, though it is more than six months old. (21) (u) Once again on 19-1-77, the petitioner used the services of sri Murugendrappa, uncle of the respondent for requesting the respondent to join the petitioner. But the respondent flouted his advice also and told him in clear terms that she would not rejoin him and that she was ready for a divorce. (22) (v) On 23-1-1977, the petitioner, along with Rajashekhar, went to respondent in her father's house to ascertain the respondent's clear views. The parents of the respondent, who were present then, told them that as he and the respondent cannot live and pull on together, he might apply for a divorce. The respondent however, in a reticent manner said that she would send word about her final decision in the matter with Sri Rajashekar in a short time. The respondent behaved towards the petitioner at his meeting in a very cruel manner inasmuch as she made him stay in the varandah of the house till he left and did not allow him to his own child. (23) (w) Again 1-2-1977, Sri rajashekhar visited the respondent's father's house. The father of the respondent behaved very rudely with him flaring up and making gestures at him saying that it was the last warning for him not to come to his house in connection with this matter again and emphatically stating that he would not send the respondent to the petitioner. At this sudden flaring up, Sri rajashekar said he had gone there only on the desire of the respondent and her father expressed during his previous visit and that there was no justification in talking to him in such a threatening manner. So saying, he left the house of the respondent's father. ( 12 ) IT may be noted that instances from 1 to 13 are prior to the resumption of co-habitation from 16-10-1975. They form the first period and instances from 14 to 23 fall within the later period. Since the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the earlier behaviour, even if cruel, was condoned by the husband calling his wife and resuming co-habitation with har treating her as his wife and forgiving her and by resuming her the status of wife, there was condonation. Since the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the earlier behaviour, even if cruel, was condoned by the husband calling his wife and resuming co-habitation with har treating her as his wife and forgiving her and by resuming her the status of wife, there was condonation. ( 13 ) WE would first consider the earlier incidents to find out if they really prove the alleged cruel conduct on the part of the wife. The learned city Civil Court Judge has dealt with these aspects in the course of his lengthy judgment. He has dealt with the allegation made in para 6 (a), which is numbered as (a) above, in para 40 of his judgment. He, on discussing the evidence, has come to the conclusion thus :". . . . I do not feel persuaded to accept the bare and interested words of the petitioner without corroboration. " (vide : para-45)HE has further observed :". . . . For the foregoing reasons, i hold that the petitioner has failed to establish this behaviour alleged against the respondent. The probabilities are also against the case of the petitioner. Thus, he has disbelieved both the averments made in para 6 (a) and (b ). He has adverted to the averments made in para 6 (c), quoted as No. 3 above, in para 46 of his judgment. That is over the incident that took place on 28-4-74. Discussing the evidence on the aspect, the learned City civil Court Judge has observed that the incident as a whole is improbable, looking to the alleged mood of the wife and the facts of the case. In para 49, this is what he has observed : "the improbabilities discussed earlier high-light the conclusion that what the petitioner has stated in this regard is not true. "then in para SO, he has discussed the allegations contained in part 6 (d), quoted above under (4 ). It is with regard to the allegation that between 2-5-1974 and 11-5-74 respondent created lot of commotion and havoc in the house by shouting and causing disturbances want only for the study of his brother Jayaprabhu. The learned City civil Court Judge, discussing this aspect in detail, has come to the conclusion in para 53 of his judgment thus :". . . . The learned City civil Court Judge, discussing this aspect in detail, has come to the conclusion in para 53 of his judgment thus :". . . . THE evidence of the petitioner on this aspect having regard to the probabilities involved in the case does not inspire confidence. "then, he proceeds to the averments made in para 6 (e), which is reproduced at No. 5 (above ). That is the incident of 28-5-1974 in the matter of throwing the Illustrated Weekly at the face of the husband. At para 55 of the judgment, the learned City civil Court Judge has observed that the version given by the husband in his evidence is entirely different from the version that he has made out in the petition and this is what he has stated :". . . . IT is clear that the routine quarrelsome nature imputed to the respondent in paragraph 6 (e) of the petition was given-up by the petitioner when he entered the witness-box and gave evidence so as to impute intolerance to the respondent of the petitioner talking with his mother. "he has further observed in para 56 thus ;"the deviation is alone sufficient to discredit the evidence of the petitioner with regard to the incident alleged to have happened on 28-5-1974. Even taking a charitable view, in the absence of the evidence of the mother of the petitioner, in view of the infirmity in the evidence with regard to the events that happened on 28-5-74 noticed just now, I feel it unsage to act on the testimony of the petitioner. It is not of such a character as to overcome suspicion. "then, he proceeds to consider the allegations made in para 6 (f), reproduced above at (6 ). That is with regard to the incident that is alleged to have taken place on 1-6-1974. The learned city Civil Court Judge, discussing the evidence in the matter, has observed thus :". . . Be that as it may. The fact remains that the mother is not examined by the petitioner to buttress his story. . . "hence, he has disbelieved it. He has further pointed out that all these incidents which happened according to the petitioner/husband prior to the issuance of the notice dated 18-9-'75 (Exhibit-P,1), were not mentioned in the notice, It was normal to expect to mention all these if they had really taken place. . . "hence, he has disbelieved it. He has further pointed out that all these incidents which happened according to the petitioner/husband prior to the issuance of the notice dated 18-9-'75 (Exhibit-P,1), were not mentioned in the notice, It was normal to expect to mention all these if they had really taken place. That is also one of the reasons why he has disbelieved these incidents. It is alleged in para 6 (g), quoted at (7), that the wife was taken by her father to his house on the pretext that her sister Smt. Gayatri would be coming from United States. The learned City Civil Court Judge, discussing this aspect, has observed in para 64 of the judgment thus,". . . . IT appears that what the petitioner has stated is true. "he has referred to the evidence of pws. 2 and 3 and relied on their evidence and in para 68 of the judgment he has observed :"i have examined the evidence of PW 2 and found nothing in it to disbelieve his evidence. He appears to be an entirely independent and disinterested witness. "further, he has observed that the averments made find corroboration in exhibit P-1, in para 71 of the judgment, and, in para 73 of the judgment, the learned City Civil Judge has observed that the wife returned to the house of the husband on 15-10-1975. ( 14 ) WE will presently proceed to consider whether the conduct of the wife till 15-10-1975 could be considered as cruel as contemplated in the different provisions of the Act. ( 15 ) THE Supreme Court of India had occasion to consider the term 'cruelty' and to explain the same as applicable in our country for purposes of S. 10 of the Act, in the case, Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, ( AIR 1975 SC 1534 ). His Lordship Justice chandrachud, speaking for the Bench, in para 30 of the judgment, has observed ;"an awareness of foreign decisions could be a useful asset in interpreting our own laws. But it has to be remembered that we have to interpret in this case a specific provision of a specific enactment, namely, s. 10 (1) (b) of the Act, What constitutes cruelty must depend upon the terms of this statute which provides : 10 (1 ). But it has to be remembered that we have to interpret in this case a specific provision of a specific enactment, namely, s. 10 (1) (b) of the Act, What constitutes cruelty must depend upon the terms of this statute which provides : 10 (1 ). Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may present a petition to the district court praying for a decree for judicial separation of the ground that the other party - (b) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party ; the inquiry therefore has to be whether the conduct charged as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. It is not necessary, as under the English Law, that the cruelty must be of such a character as to cause 'danger' to life, limb or health or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. Clearly, danger to life, limb or health or a reasonable apprehension of it is a higher requirement than a reasonable apprehension that it is harmful or injurious tor one spouse to live with the other," ( 16 ) THUS the Supreme Court of india has pointed out that the standard required under the Indian Law to prove cruelty is not of such a degree as is contemplated under the english Law. The Supreme Court has hastened to add that while considering the conduct of the spouse and his or her apprehension, it is not required of the Court to assume the standard of a reasonable man as known to the law of negligence. In para 32 of the judgment, their Lordships have made it clear thus :"one other matter which needs to be clarified is that though under S. 10 (1) (b), the apprehension of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other party has to be reasonable, it is wrong, except in the context of such apprehension, to import the concept of a reasonable man as known to the law of negligence for judging of matrimonial relations. Spouses are undoubtedly supposed and expected to conduct their joint venture as best as they might but it is no function of a court inquiring into a charge of cruelty to philosophise on the modalities of married life. Someone may want to keep late hours to finish the day's work and someone may want to get up early for a morning round of golf. The court cannot apply to the habits or hobbies of these the test whether a reasonable man situated similarly will behave in a similar fashion. The question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty and the like for divorce purposes is determined primarily by its effect upon the particular person complaining of the acts. The question is not whether the conduct would be cruel to a reasonable person or a person of average or normal sensibilities, but whether it would have that effect upon the aggrieved spouse. That which may be cruel to one person may be laughed off by another, and what may not be cruel to on individual under one set of circumstances may be extreme cruelty under another set of circumstances. (vide: American Jurisprudence, 2nd Ed. , Vol. 24 ). The court has to deal, not with an ideal, husband and an ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a near-ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to drown their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures. As said by Lord reid in his speech in Gollina v. Collins, (1963) 2 All. ER 966, 970, in matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man, as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a prior assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruetly case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people. "their Lordships have further stated cautioning that trifles should not be made much of in dally life. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruetly case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people. "their Lordships have further stated cautioning that trifles should not be made much of in dally life. They have observed in para 34 of the judgment thus :"we do not propose to spend time on the trifles of their married life. Numerous incidents have been cited by the appellant as constituting cruelty but the simple trivialities which can truly be described as the reasonable wear and tear of married life have to be ignored. It is in the context of such trivialities that one says that spouses take each other for better or worse. In many marriages each party can, if it so wills, discover many a cause for complaint but such grievances arise mostly from temperamental disharmony. Such disharmony or incompatibility is not cruelty and will not furnish a cause for the dissolution of marriage. We will therefore have regard only to grave and weightly incidents and consider these to find what place they occupy on the marriage canvas. " ( 17 ) THUS, it is clear that we have to consider on the facts of the case not merely trivialities representing the wear and tear of married life but have regard only to grave and weighty incidents and consider them to find what place they occupy on the marriage canvas. ( 18 ) THE learned City Civil Court judge has rightly disbelieved the several incidents contained in para 6 (a) to (f ). We have no hesitation to agree with him. He has rightly pointed out that the husband has tried to imagine and exaggerate. There is no corroboration to his evidence. His statement is interested. It is not reflected in Exhibit P-1 (Notice.) We have no hesitation therefore, to agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned City civil Court Judge. ( 19 ) THEREAFTER, from para 6 (g) to (m), there are instances relating to the wife going to the house of her parents on 6-6-1974 because her sister gayatri had arrived from America and not returning to the house of the husband till 15-10-1975. ( 19 ) THEREAFTER, from para 6 (g) to (m), there are instances relating to the wife going to the house of her parents on 6-6-1974 because her sister gayatri had arrived from America and not returning to the house of the husband till 15-10-1975. The learned city Civil Court Judge appears to believe the version of the husband in this behalf because he thinks the witnesses, viz. , PW 2 Shivaswamy and PW 3 Rajashekhar have supported the version and it is reflected in Exhibit P-1, the notice issued. The learned City Civil Court Judge has no doubt observed that these witnesses are independent and they have no reason to be interested in the petitioner/husband. But the evidence on record shows that PW 2 shivaswamy has a shop in front of the house of the petitioner/husband. The petitioner / husband purchases from his shop. It is further on records that he sells milk to the house of the petitioner. Thus, it can hardly be stated that Shivaswamy is a disinterested witness. His testimony cannot be called of an independent witness. The learned city Civil Court Judge has not properly appreciated his evidence. ( 20 ) SIMILARLY, Rajashekar (PW3) was one of his subordinates. He has worked under him. He cannot be considered as an independent witness. He is practically under the obligation and thumb of the petitioner-husband. Therefore, the learned city Civil Court Judge was not justified in believing the version of these two witnesses and in upholding the averments made by the petitioner/ husband. ( 21 ) IT is quite probable that the wife went to her parents' house when her sister Gayatri returned from America and that she stayed on for some time there. ( 22 ) ANOTHER circumstance that gives a clue for the appreciation of evidence is that the husband himself admits in his petition as well as in his evidence that he and his father went to take food in the house of the father-in-law on 14-10-1975. If there was no love lost between the parties, it is highly improbable that the husband with his father should have gone and taken meals in the house of his father-in-law on 14-10-1975 and the wife would return on 15-10-1975. If there was no love lost between the parties, it is highly improbable that the husband with his father should have gone and taken meals in the house of his father-in-law on 14-10-1975 and the wife would return on 15-10-1975. That also believes the version of the husband with regard to the quarrels and disputes and the assertion of the father-in-law that he would not send his daughter to the house of the petitioner. ( 23 ) IN the circumstances, we are unable to bring ourselves to agree with the conclusion of the learned City Civil Court Judge that that part of the story represented in para 6 (g) to (m) is probably true. We hold that that aspect of the matter also is imagined and concocted by the husband for the purpose of this case. ( 24 ) IF that be so, we are constrained to hold that there is practically no act of cruelty proved on the part of the wife towards her husband. As stated by the Supreme Court, mere wear and tear of married life or mere outburst of temper once in a way cannot constitute cruelty as contemplated under the law- ( 25 ) THAT being so, we are persuaded to hold that the husband has failed to establish any act of cruelty on the part of the wife till he admittedly resumed co-habitation with the respondent/wife from 15-10-1975. ( 26 ) IN the circumstances, there was no occasion for condonation of cruelty by the husband when he assumed co-habitation from 15-10-1975. What we have to consider is whether the instances mentioned thereafter by the husband and spoken to by him in his-evidence, would be sufficient to grant a decree for divorce. As already observed relying on the ruling of the Supreme Court, the allegations must be grave and weighty. In the petition, as quoted above, the husband has mentioned the instances after 15-10-1975. What is mentioned in para 6 (25) is that on 24-1-1975, the wife without any provacation, threw away pooja articles in front of the house and that they had to be picked up later. In the same para another instance is mentioned by the husband who says that on 25-11-1975, the wife added chilly powder to the curry with a view to spoil its taste. In the same para another instance is mentioned by the husband who says that on 25-11-1975, the wife added chilly powder to the curry with a view to spoil its taste. As observed by the supreme Court, every little act which is a mere trivial, cannot be made a ground to say that the wife treated the husband cruelly. They are all the wear and tear of married life. There is nothing on record to show that the wife purposely threw away pooja articles, It may be that due to over sight she did not bring them back after washing. There is no animus established. Hence it cannot be said that it is an act purported to do intentionally. It cannot be considered so - grave as to constitute cruelty on the part of the wife towards her husband. Similar observation is to be made with regard to the adding of chilly powder to the curry. ( 27 ) THE learned City Civil Court judge has held that there is no proof with regard to the incident at kammangundi. There is no specific pleading. After discussing the evidence he has observed -". . . . . . . . IF really the respondent had behaved in the manner alleged by the petitioner at Tanige- bylu and at Kammangundi, nothing prevented the petitioner from adducing the evidence of persons who according to him and witnessed the events. "the learned City Civil Court judge has disbelieved it. We have no reason to differ. Similar is the observation with regard to the taring of woollen rug and silk saree. They appear to be pigments of imagination of the petitioner. Thereafter the husband makes much of the fact that the wife had demanded Rs. 1500 from him when he - ffered Rs. 500 on 24-10-1975 in - connection with the expenses for confinement. That cannot be made much of as it is a homely incident. The wife had gone to her parents house for confinement. It may be that she demanded a little more amount. That cannot be considered as an act of cruelty. Therea ter the allegations made are that the wife did not return in spite of the husband inviting her to the matrimonial home. The learned City civil Court Judge, in this behalf has disbelieved Exhibit P-3, a note book, alleged to have been maintained by the husband. That cannot be considered as an act of cruelty. Therea ter the allegations made are that the wife did not return in spite of the husband inviting her to the matrimonial home. The learned City civil Court Judge, in this behalf has disbelieved Exhibit P-3, a note book, alleged to have been maintained by the husband. The husband was preparing obviously for a false case from the beginning. Such being the case, the mere ipse dixit of the petitioner cannot be relied on. The learned city Civil Court Judge speaking about exhibit P-3, has observed :-". . . . . . . . IT appears that Ex. P-3 was brought into existence for being pressed into service only to corroborate the say of the petitioner, Ex. P-3, having regard to its nature, the nature of the en- trie made therein cannot be invested with any authentisity. The entries in Ex, P-3 cannot corroborate the evidence of petitioner. " if that be so, the version of the husband cannot be made much of. In these state of affairs, it can hardly be said that the petitioner has established any circumstances or set of circumstances which justify this court to hold that the wife treated him cruelly. It is true that the antire conduct of the spouses should be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion that the treatment given by the wife or the husband, as the case may be, is cruel or not. Having done so, we are satisfied that the petitioner husband has failed to establish that the wife has treated him cruelly. ( 28 ) THE learned City Civil Court judge, however, having held that cruelty was not proved for the purpose of divorce under S. 13 (1) (i) (b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has given a decree for judicial separation on the same ground, and that is challenged before us. If the conduct of the wife is not cruel for the purpose of S. 13 (1) (i) (b) namely, for granting a decree for divorce, it cannot be considered as cruelty for the purpose of judicial separation as contemplated under S. 10 of the said act also. The commentator of Hindu law by Mulla, 15th Edn. If the conduct of the wife is not cruel for the purpose of S. 13 (1) (i) (b) namely, for granting a decree for divorce, it cannot be considered as cruelty for the purpose of judicial separation as contemplated under S. 10 of the said act also. The commentator of Hindu law by Mulla, 15th Edn. at page 781 has observed-''it may be noticed that cruelty persue was not a ground for relief by way of divorce prior to the amendment of this section by the Amending Act of 1976, but was only a ground for the relief of judicial separation under clause (b) of S. 10 (1) which laid down: "has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. " The rule laid down in the present clause (ia) although it does not incorporate those words would seem to accept the creterion which has always been applied by the Courts as flowing from the accepted legal conception of cruelty. In any case it does not seem that the legislature intended in this clause any different meaning to the expression cruelty or aimed at a more elastic or restricted conception. This is just as well since actions of men are so diverse and infinite that it is almost impossible to expect a definition exclusive or inclusive which will aptly meet every particular act or conduct and not fail in some circumstances. . . . . . . . " ( 29 ) IT is a settled principle in interpretation of Statutes that when identical words are used in different sections of the same Act, the same meaning should be gaven to them. In Maxwell on Interpretation of statutes, Twelfth Edition at page 278, this is what is observed in this behalf.-"it has been justly remarked that, when precision is required, no safer rule can be followed than always to call the same thing by the same name. It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an act. It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an act. Accordingly, in ascertaining the meaning to be attached to a particular word in a section of an Act, though the proper course would seem to be to ascertain that meaning from a consideration of the section itself if possible, yet, if the meaning cannot be so ascertained, other sections may be looked at to fix the sense in which the word is there used. Further-more, "where a word has been construed judicially in a certain legal area, it is, I think, right to give it the same meaning if it occurs in a statute dealing with the same general subject- matter, unless the context makes it clear that the word must have a different construction. " ( 30 ) AS pointed out above, the legislature has not given any definition of the term "cruel" with regard to the matrimonial offences, apart from what is mentioned in S. 10 of the Act quoted above and the Supreme Court of India had occasion to interpret that expression in N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane (A. I. R. S. C. 1534 ). That being so, we are constrained to hold that the same meaning shall be given to the term "cruelty" when it is repeated in S. 13 (1) (i) (b) of the Hindu Marriage act. The learned City Civil Court judge, therefore, was not justified in thinking that when the conduct was not cruel as contemplated under S. 13 (1) (i) (b) for the purpose of divorce, it was good enough for the purpose of cruelty as contemplated under S. 10 (1) of the same Act. His reasoning is inconsistent and self contradictory. ( 31 ) IT is true that the learned counsel appearing for the respondent in this appeal has filed cross-objections and he has urged the ground of insanity and cruelty for the purpose of granting divorce. We have already dealt with the aspect of cruelty and we have shown that the conduct of the wife can never be considered as cruel on the facts of the present case. Adverting to insanity, the learned city Civil Court Judge has rightly disallowed that ground. We have already dealt with the aspect of cruelty and we have shown that the conduct of the wife can never be considered as cruel on the facts of the present case. Adverting to insanity, the learned city Civil Court Judge has rightly disallowed that ground. It is true that in S. 13 (1) (iii) it is stated that divorce can be granted if it is proved that the spouse has been incurably of unsound mind or suffered continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably expected to live with the respondent. There is no evidence that the wife, in the instant case, has been incurably of unsound mind or even that she has suffered continuously or intermittently from mental disorder. There is no expert evidence adduced in this behalf. The learned City Civil Court judge has rightly disallowed the same. We have no reason to interfere. ( 32 ) THE learned City Civil Court judge who observed the demeanour of the respondent-wife in the box, has observed that she appeared to him quite same and intelligent in giving answers. Hence he has observed that she does not suffer any mental weakness and disorder. In the absence of any clinching evidence in this behalf, we agree with the observations made by the learned City civil Judge. The cross-objections are therefore liable to be dismissed. ( 33 ) IN the result, this appeal is allowed and the decree for judicial separation given by the learned City civil Court Judge is hereby set aside. The Cross-objections are dismissed. The petition of the husband for divorce is hereby dismissed. No costs of the appeal and the cross-objections. --- *** --- .