JUDGMENT T. R. Handa, J.—This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order dated 31-7-1978 recorded by a learned single Judge of this Court dismissing the writ petition of the appellant-petitioner on the short ground that it suffered from the vice of delay and laches. 2. The appellant Shri B. N. Ghildyal was selected to the H. P. Forest Service Class II (for short HPFS Class II) by the Union Public Service Commission (for short UPSC) in the year 1956. Later after completion of Three Years training Course (1956-59) in the Indian Forest College Dehra Dun, he was appointed to officiate in the HPFS Class II with effect from 1-10-1958, Two other batch-mates of Shri Ghildyal, namely, Sarvshri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerjee were also similarly appointed to officiate in the HPFS Class II with effect from 1-10-1958. Both these officers, however, by virtue of their better performance in the training course were ranked senior to the appellant. 3. In the year 1962 there arose some vacancies in the cadre of HPFS Class I which was obviously a service superior to HPFS Class II. Mode of appointment to this Class I Service in these days was 75% by direct recruitment and 25% by promotion. All the vacancies existing in this Class I Service in the year 1962 pertained to direct quota. This is apparent from letter No. Ft. 12-339/58-11 dated 22-5-1962 existing in file No. Ft. 45-33/56-III (E) produced for our inspection by the Forest Department. A copy of this letter has been put on this record as annexure X-l’. 4. Interviews for the selection of candidates for appointment to the aforesaid Class I posts were held by the UPSC on 16-8-1962. The appellant and some other officers of HPFS Class II as also several other outsiders appeared for such interview. Later on the recommendations of the UPSC, the Lt. Governor of the then Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh vide his order dated 20-9-1962 found at Annexure E appointed the following officers to HPFS Class I : 1. Shri R. S. Gujral 2. Shri Anupam Kumar Mukerji 3. Shri Ved Parkash Mohan .... respondent No. 6 4. Shri Parkash Chand Sharma .... respondent No 7 The first two of these officers as already observed, were batch-mates of the appellant though they ranked senior to him in HPFS Class It Service. Shri R. S. Gujral 2. Shri Anupam Kumar Mukerji 3. Shri Ved Parkash Mohan .... respondent No. 6 4. Shri Parkash Chand Sharma .... respondent No 7 The first two of these officers as already observed, were batch-mates of the appellant though they ranked senior to him in HPFS Class It Service. The other two officers, namely, Sarvshri V. P. Mohan and P. C. Sharma were of 1957-60 batch of the Indian Forest College Dehradun. They were also the members of the HPFS Class II Service. They were, however, junior to the appellant in that Service. Respondent No. 9 who was an outsider and respondent No. 10 who was also then a member of HPFS Class II Service were also approved for appointment by the UPSC as a result of the aforesaid interview. These two persons were later inducted in HPFS Class I Service The result of the selection of the aforesaid persons in HPFS Class I Service was that respondents Nos. 6, 7, 9 and 10 were all ranked senior to the appellant in the State Service although prior to this selection respondents Nos. 6, 7 and 10 were all junior to him, 5. A new All India Service known as Indian Forest Service (for short IFS) was constituted under the provisions of the All India Services Act with effect from 1-7-1966. Initial recruitment to this Service was, however, made with effect from 1-10-1966 The appellant was appointed to the junior scale of this new Service with effect from 1-10-1966, the date of the initial recruitment. He was confirmed in that cadre with effect from 1-10 1967 vide Annexure ‘P’ He was later promoted to the senior scale of IFS with effect from 1-1-1969 vide Annexure ‘O’ 6. Vide Office Memo dated 16-11-1972 found at Annexure ‘Q respondent No. 1 issued a joint seniority list of the officers appointed to the Indian Forest Service cadre of the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh at the time of its initial constitution. In this list the appellant was allotted the year 1965 as the year of his appointment to the IFS. His batch-mates Servshri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerji were on the other hand allotted 1962 as the year of their appointments in the Service. Asa result thereof the names of Servshri R. S. Gujral and A K. Mukerji were shown at S, Nos. His batch-mates Servshri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerji were on the other hand allotted 1962 as the year of their appointments in the Service. Asa result thereof the names of Servshri R. S. Gujral and A K. Mukerji were shown at S, Nos. 37 and 38 of the seniority list while the name of the appellant was shown at S. No. 62. Respondents Nos. 6 to 26 were shown at S. Nos. 27 to 47 respectively. The appellant who was ranked junior to all these respondents was not satisfied with the seniority and the year of appointment allotted to him in the IFS. He, therefore, on 26-5-1975 filed his writ petition giving rise to this appeal, praying : "(a) that an appropriate writ, direction or order be issued and the gradation list prepared by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 be set aside and respondents Nos. 1 to 3 be directed to prepare the gradation list restoring the seniority of the petitioner in Class I with effect from 28-8-1962 vis-a-vis the IFS year of allotment at its initial constitution and placing him below Sarvshri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerji, the petitioners batch-mates of 1956-59 Indian Forest College Course, serving in Himachal Pradesh, (b) that respondents Nos. 1 to 3 be directed to allot 1962 ½ as the year of allotment to the petitioner in the Indian Forest Service as that of his class fellows Sarvhri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerji selected under the same set of rules and conditions of service " The case which the appellant endeavoured to set out in his petition in support of the reliefs claimed by him was that some adverse remarks were incorporated in his character roll for the years 1960-61 and 1961-62. These adverse remarks, however, were never conveyed to the appellant. His character roll containing such adverse remarks was made available to the UPSC at the time of his interview for selection to Class I Post in August 1962. Such adverse remarks against the appellant then existing in his character roll influenced the UPSC in excluding his name from selection to Class I post. His character roll containing such adverse remarks was made available to the UPSC at the time of his interview for selection to Class I Post in August 1962. Such adverse remarks against the appellant then existing in his character roll influenced the UPSC in excluding his name from selection to Class I post. Totally unjustified as these remarks were, the same were suo moto expunged by the competent authority partly in the year 1964 and partly in the year 1971, In all fairness after these remarks had been expunged by the competent authority, the case of the appellant for selection to HPFS Class I should have been considered afresh. This, however, was not done, 7. The further case of the appellant is that ever since his non-selection by the UPSC to Class I post, he had been continuously representing to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to consider his claim for promotion to Class I post with retrospective effect, that is, with effect from 20-9-1962, the date when Sarvshri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerji the batch-mates of the appellant were appointed to that Service. The appellant was informed on 15-1-1975 that the matter was very much alive and was under active consideration of the State Government. This was done vide annexure found at K. No action was, however, taken by the State Government on such representations of the appellant in spite of the communication found at Annexure ‘K’. 8. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner was guilty of delay and laches as he had called in question the selection made in the year 1962 and was, therefore, not entitled to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This preliminary objection, as earlier stated, prevailed with the learned single judge who dismissed the writ petition on this short ground, 9. The short question which, therefore, this L. P. A. raises for our consideration is whether the writ petition filed by the appellant suffered from the vice of delay and laches and has been rightly dismissed by the learned single judge. 10. The short question which, therefore, this L. P. A. raises for our consideration is whether the writ petition filed by the appellant suffered from the vice of delay and laches and has been rightly dismissed by the learned single judge. 10. Now the facts of this case and which are not in controversy reveal that the petitioner after completion of his course in the Indian Forest College Dehradun was appointed to officiate in HPFS Class II with effect from 1-10-1958 along with his batch-mates Sarvshri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerji. Sarvshri Gujral and Mukerji were later in the year 1962 appointed to Class I Service through the UPSC against the quota of direct recruits fixed for that Service. Respondents No. 6 Shri V. P. Mohan, No, 7 Shri P. C. Sharma, No. 9 Shri M S.L Yaidya and No. 10 Shri P. N. Tiku were also simultaneously appointed to Class I Service against the direct quota. Three of these respondents, namely, Shri V. P. Mohan respondent No. 6, Shri P. C. Sharma respondent No. 7 and Shri P. N. Tiku respondent No. 10 were, however, junior to the petitioner in HPFS Class II before their appointment to Class I Service. By virtue of their appointment to Class I they, however, became senior to the petitioner in 1962, 11. Indian Forest Service was constituted with effect from 1-7-1966, Initial recruitment to this Service was made with effect from 1-10-1966 in terms of the Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966. The petitioner, respondents Nos. 6 to 26 as also Sarvshri R, S, Gujral and A, K, Mukerji were appointed to this newly constituted Indian Forest Service at its initial constitution. Their interse seniority was fixed under the Indian Forest Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules 1968, Rule 3 of these Rules deals with "Assignment of year of allotment" for the purposes of seniority. The relevant provisions of this rule may be extracted : “3. Assignment of year of allotment — (1) Every officer shall be assigned a year of allotment in accordance with provisions hereinafter contained in this rule. The relevant provisions of this rule may be extracted : “3. Assignment of year of allotment — (1) Every officer shall be assigned a year of allotment in accordance with provisions hereinafter contained in this rule. (2) The year of allotment of an officer appointed to the Service shall be— (a) (b) Where an officer is appointed to the Service at its initial constitution in accordance with sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules, such year will be determined in accordance with the following formula ;— Year of allotment=1966 minus (N1 plus half of N2) wherein — N1 represent completed years of continuous service up to 1st July, 1966 in a post equivalent to or above a senior scale post included in the State Cadre, provided that any such Service rendered during the first eight years of gazetted service of the officer shall be excluded for this purpose. N2 represents completed years of continuous Gazetted service up to 1st July, 1966 excluding that included in N1. In computing the period of continuous service for purposes of NT or N2 any period during which an officer has undertaken training in a diploma course in the Forest Research Institute and College, Dehra Dun or an equivalent course in any other institution which training is approved by the Central Government for this purpose, shall not be taken into account : Provided that........ Provided further that the year of allotment of an officer so arrived at shall be limited to the year which his immediate senior in the State Forest Service who is appointed to the Indian Forest Service at its initial constitution obtains, “4. Seniority of Officers.—The seniority of officers inter-se shall be determined in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained in this rule. (3) Officers belonging to a State Forest Service who are appointed to the Service in accordance with sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 if the Recruitment Rules and allotted the same year shall be graded without disturbing their existing inter-se seniority in the State Forest Service” 12. Members of the Indian Forest Service like the petitioner and the respondents Nos. 6 to 26 who had been recruited into the Service at the time of its initial constitution were all assigned the years of allotment in terms of the above quoted Rule 3. Members of the Indian Forest Service like the petitioner and the respondents Nos. 6 to 26 who had been recruited into the Service at the time of its initial constitution were all assigned the years of allotment in terms of the above quoted Rule 3. Sarvshri R. S. Gujral and A, K. Mukerji who were the batch-mates of the petitioner in the Indian Forest College at Dehra Dun(1956-59 course) and who had been appointed to HPFS Class II along with the petitioner on 1-10-1958 were both assigned 1962 ½ as the year of their allotment. This was done on the basis of their continuous Gazetted service in the State. Ordinarily, the petitioner should also have been assigned the same year of allotment. This, however, was not done. The reason is obvious. Shri V. P. Mohan respondent No 6 who was from 1957-60 Indian Forest College batch and was initially junior to the petitioner in HPFS Class II was later selected and appointed to Class I post as a direct recruit in the year 1962, He, therefore, became senior to the petitioner in the State Service, Shri V. P. Mohan in terms of the aforesaid Rule 3 was assigned 1965 as the year of allotment and the petitioner, therefore, could not be assigned an earlier year. It was for this reason that the petitioner too was assigned the year I965 as the inter-se seniority between Shri V. P. Mohan and the petitioner had to be maintained, 13. It is thus obvious that as per situation obtaining as on 1-10-1966, the date of recruitment at the time of initial constitution of Indian Forest Service, the seniority of the petitioner had been correctly fixed in accordance with the relevant rules. Though the petitioner in his writ petition has challenged the seniority allotted to him in the Indian Forest Service at the time of its initial constitution, his grievance in fact is against his non-selection by the UPSC in the year 1962. As earlier observed in case the non-selection of the petitioner in Class I Service along with his batch-mates Servshri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerji is not open to challenge, the petitioner would have no locus standi to challenge the seniority assigned to him in the Indian Forest Service. In fact the petitioner has claimed in the writ petition that respondents Nos. In fact the petitioner has claimed in the writ petition that respondents Nos. 1 to 3 be directed to set aside the gradation list already prepared and to prepare the gradation list restoring the seniority of the petitioner in Class I with effect from 28-8-1962 vis-a-vis Indian Forest Service year of allotment at its initial constitution and placing him below Sarvshri R, S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerji, his batch-mates of 1956-59 Indian Forest College course 14. It is thus obvious that in his writ petition the appellant had made a grievance against his non-selection to Class I post in 1962. The writ petition which was filed in 1975 had thus been filed after a lapse of 13 years. The case for the petitioner is that ever since his non-selection by the UPSC to Class I he had been continuously making representations to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to consider his claim for promotion to Class I post with retrospective effect, that is, 28-8-1962, the date when his batch-mates Sarvshri R. S. Gujral and A. K, Mukerji were appointed to that Service. According to the petitioner this matter was still alive as informed to him on 15-1-1975 vide Annexure ‘K’. 15. A reference to Annexure ‘X-1’ clearly shows that the recruitment made through the Public Service Commission to Class I posts in the year 1962 was against the direct quota fixed for that cadre as distinguished from the promotion quota. The petitioner as also respondents Nos. 6, 7, 9 and 10 and Sarvshri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerji had all appeared before the UPSC for their selection for appointment to the Class I posts reserved for direct quota. No representation could lie under any rule against the non-selection of a candidate by the UPSC. The petitioner did make an averment in his petition that he had made various representations to the Government of Himachal Pradesh against his non-selection to Class I post by the UPSC. He, however, had not filed a copy of any such representation along with his writ petition. We were certainly unable to appreciate as to how such representation could lie. We, therefore, summoned the relevant departmental record to see whether any such representation had been made by the petitioner and if so on what grounds. He, however, had not filed a copy of any such representation along with his writ petition. We were certainly unable to appreciate as to how such representation could lie. We, therefore, summoned the relevant departmental record to see whether any such representation had been made by the petitioner and if so on what grounds. On a search of the relevant record we could trace the first representation of the petitioner on the subject in file No. Ft, 45-33/56-III (E), This representation is dated 23-2-1966 and is found at pages 30-31 of the aforesaid file. The last para of this representation is relevant and may be extracted : "At the end, I request your good self that under such extenuating circumstances as submitted above and in light of my previous representations, orders for giving me promotion to Class I from the date of my class fellows were promoted, be kindly passed so that I have fair chance of entering into I. F. S. and at the same time maintain my seniority in Service, keeping me next to Shri A. K. Mukerji, my colleague of 1956-59 I.F. S. batch." We could not come across any earlier representation of the petitioner. The petitioner had thereafter sent some reminder to his representation dated 23-2-1966, Now this representation was rejected by the then Lt. Governor Himachal Pradesh and the rejection was conveyed to the petitioner on 11-12-1967. The letter conveying this rejection reads like this : "No. Ft-45-33/56-III (E. I). Himachal Pradesh Government (Forest Department) Dated Simla-4, the 11/12/67 From The Secretary (Forests) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh. To Shri B. N. Ghildyal, Senior Forestry Instructor, Nepal Forestry Institute, P. O, Hathauda, Nepal Subject : Request for retrospective promotion to H, P. Forest Service Class I. Memorandum : Reference correspondence resting with your letter dated 16th June, 1967. 2. I am directed to say that the Administrator (Lieut. Governor) Himachal Pradesh has carefully considered your request for promotion to H. P. Forest Service Class I from 29th August, 1962 as detailed in your representation dated 23rd February, 1966 and 15th April, 1967 and has rejected the same. Sd/- Secretary (Forests) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh1 16. Thereafter it was only on 25-6-1969 that the appellant made a fresh representation claiming his promotion to class I Service with retrospective effect. Sd/- Secretary (Forests) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh1 16. Thereafter it was only on 25-6-1969 that the appellant made a fresh representation claiming his promotion to class I Service with retrospective effect. This representation is found at page 231 of the Office File No. Ft, 45-33/56-111 (E) and may be extracted ;— "No. 368 dated 25-6-69. To The Chief Conservator of Forests, Himachal Pradesh, Simla— 4. Dated Rohru, the June, 1969 Subject : Request for retrospective promotion to H, P. Forest Service Class I. Sir, In drawing your kind attention to CCF.H.P. No, Ft. 45-33/56-111 (E. 1) at Simla-4 the 12th November, 1968 on the subject cited as above, may I request you to kindly send the information requested vide my letter No, 756 dated 6-7-1968. 2. Perusing the file No, Ft. III-2/61 (A) MS No. 143/65(3) made available to me by the S P E. at Ambala during the inspection of document, but disallowed to exhibit by the enquiry, officer at Delhi during enquiry, it is evident and crystal clear that there were remarks regarding illicit fillings in my C, R. before my interview in the U.P.S C. Delhi. The concluding para of the report from the aforesaid file reads as under ;— "Shri Raina has alleged that I requested him to improve the C. R. of Shri Ghildyal. The allegation is false and fantastic The C. R. of Shri Ghildyal is placed below. I have myself mentioned the fact of illicit fillings in the C. R, and said that the case is under enquiry and it is not possible to express an opinion about it to day. The C.R. was perused by the L.G, on 6-8-62." Sd/- C.C. F.H. P. 3. Shri Raina in his statement to S. P. E. on 13-2-63 at Mandi has said that the C.C.F.H.P. asked him to improve my CR., which he recorded during February 1962 i.e. after three months of handling over charge of Chamba Circle, 4. The aforesaid notings by C. C. F EL P. was perused by L.G.H P. on 6-8-62, and I was interviewed by the U. P. S. C. on 16-8-82 i e. after 10 days of L.G/s perusal. The U.P.S.C. selected my colleagues S/Shri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerjee alongwith juniors, while the U.P.S.C. took serious view and I was rejected by the Commission, The aforementioned remarks were never communicated to me. 5. The U.P.S.C. selected my colleagues S/Shri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerjee alongwith juniors, while the U.P.S.C. took serious view and I was rejected by the Commission, The aforementioned remarks were never communicated to me. 5. The enquiry Officer and Commission and the President of India report are out and I have not been charged and made responsible for Tissa illicit fellings. Hence the adverse remarks by the C.C.F. and Shri Raina have no bearing on the case. In light of above and more than 50 representations submitted since 1962, it is requested that the case may please be reviewed and orders for promotion to Class I with retrospective effect may kindly be passed at the earliest. Yours faithfully, Sd/- 24-6-69 (B. N. Ghildyal) Divisional Forest Officer, Working Plan Division, Rohru." 17. It is obvious that in this representation there is not reference to any earlier representation made by the appellant on the subject nor to the rejection thereof as conveyed to the appellant vide letter dated 11-12-1967 (reproduced above). The appellants letter No, 756 dated 7-6-1968 referred to in para No. 1 of the above reproduced representation dated 25-6-1969 is on a different subject. This letter is found at page 227 of the aforesaid file and is in the following language :— "No, 756 Dated Rohru the 6th July, 1968. To The Secretary Forests, to the Government of Himachal Pradesh Simla—4. Through The Conservator of Forests, Working Plan Circle, Simla-1 Subject: Request for retrospective promotion to H. P. Forest Service Class I. Sir, In drawing your kind attention to your Memo, No, Ft. 45-33/56-III (E. I) dated 11-12-67 in reply to more than 40 representations from 28-8-62 from me on the subject cited as above, addressed to me at Nepal address, it is requested that I may please be informed if adverse remarks existed in my C, Roll before my interview for class I by U.P.S.C. on 15-8-62. These facts have already been mentioned by me at pages 5 and 6 of my representation dated 16-4-67, It may also kindly be intimated if the aforesaid remarks still exist in my C. Roll. Yours faithfully, Sd/- 3-7-1963 (B. N. Ghildyal) Divisional Forest Officer, Working Plan Division Rohru (H.P.)" 18. The appellant had of course sent some reminders to his representation dated 25-6-1969 and had also made fresh representations thereafter but all of them were practically on the same lines. Yours faithfully, Sd/- 3-7-1963 (B. N. Ghildyal) Divisional Forest Officer, Working Plan Division Rohru (H.P.)" 18. The appellant had of course sent some reminders to his representation dated 25-6-1969 and had also made fresh representations thereafter but all of them were practically on the same lines. He received no reply from the State Government except the communication dated 154-1975 found at Annexure ‘K’ 19. We have given above the narration of the relevant facts since it is in the light thereof that we can appreciate the rival contentions in support of and against the question raised in this appeal, namely, whether the writ petition filed by the appellant suffered from the vice of delay and laches and did not deserve consideration by the Court on that ground alone, 20. It was argued by Shri Hari Mohan Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that there was no un-explained delay on the part of the appellant in approaching the Court and hence there was no justification for the learned single Judge for throwing out his petition as barred by delay and laches The learned counsel agreed that the main grievance of the appellant was against his non-selection to Class I post by the Commission in August 62 whereas the writ petition was filed by the appellant in the year 1975. His contention, however, was that the appellant had successfully explained all this delay. According to the learned counsel, immediately after the selection was made by the Commission to Class I Service in August 1962, the appellant had made his representation to the State Government against his non-selection. That representation was followed by more than 40 reminders/representations. The matter remained under the active consideration of the State Government right till the day the appellant filed his writ petition in 1975. Reliance was placed on Annexure K in support of this contention. In these circumstances, argued the learned counsel, the appellant could not be held guilty of delay and laches as he was justified in waiting for the decision of the State Government on the representations made by him and in assuming that his grievance might be redressed at the level of the Government without his having recourse to a Court of law. In this connection we would like to point out that the only averment made by the appellant in his writ petition with respect to repeated representations made by him against his non-selection by the Commission in August 1962 is found in para No, 11 of the writ petition which reads ; 11. That ever since the rejection of petitioners claim to Class I, the petitioner has been continuously representing to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to consider his claim for promotion to class I post with retrospective effect i.e. with effect from 28-8-62 the date when S/Shri R. S. Gujral and A. K. Mukerji, the batchmates of petitioner were selected. The petitioner has been informed on 15-1-1975 that the matter is very much alive and is under active consideration of the Government. A true copy of the said communication is attached herewith and is marked as Annexure K to this writ petition." It may further be noticed that although the appellant now claims to have made more than 40 representations to the State Government, he did not care to furnish a copy of any one of such representations. One other point which needs mention at this stage is that whereas the representations made by the appellant in 1966 were rejected by the Lt. Governor of the then Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh who was the Administrator of the Union Territory in December 1966 and the rejection thereof was duly conveyed to the appellant, the latter suppressed this fact and in spite of this rejection maintained that his representations which started immediately after his non-selection in 1962 were still pending consideration before the Government. We are, however, at the moment taking no notice of such suppression of facts made by the appellant in his writ petition, 21. Reverting now to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant has successfully explained the delay in approaching the Court, we find absolutely no merit in this contention. There was admittedly a long delay of more than 12 years in the appellants approaching the Court to seek redress of the grievance caused to him in 1962. We are of the positive view that he has failed to explain as to why he kept on waiting for all this period. There was admittedly a long delay of more than 12 years in the appellants approaching the Court to seek redress of the grievance caused to him in 1962. We are of the positive view that he has failed to explain as to why he kept on waiting for all this period. Even if we assume, the appellant was prompt in making his representation to the Government against his non-selection by the Commission in 1962, for which we repeat there is no evidence before us, such like representations would not explain the delay. Before the making of a representation and the pendency thereof before the competent authority can be considered as a ground for explaining the delay in approaching the Court, it must be shown that such a representation could lie under the law or under the relevant rules. The making of a representation or for that matter repeated representations which are not envisaged under the law or the rules would not be a relevant factor for explaining the delay in approaching the Court more especially when it is not within the competence of the authority to whom the representation is made, to grant the relief claimed in the representation. In the instant case admittedly the grievance of the appellant was against his non -selection by the Commission for recruitment to Class I post against a vacancy reserved for direct quota. The learned counsel for the appellant could not show us any law or rule which entitles a candidate for selection to such post as of right or which provides for a representation to the State Government against the decision of the Commission to select or refuse to select a particular candidate for appointment. On the other hand the Commission being a high powered independent body constituted to select candidates for public appointments, it is only logical to say that no Executive authority, howsoever high it may be, can sit in appeal over the decision of the Commission. The Commission is certainly entitled to its own views in the matter of selection of candidates for public appointments and if at all, a decision taken by the Commission on such matters can be reviewed only by the Commission itself. The appellant made no representation before the Commission making grievance against his non-selection. The Commission is certainly entitled to its own views in the matter of selection of candidates for public appointments and if at all, a decision taken by the Commission on such matters can be reviewed only by the Commission itself. The appellant made no representation before the Commission making grievance against his non-selection. He only represented before the State Government which was not competent to annual the decision of the Commission, Looking from this aspect the making of representation by the appellant, if any, was a futile exercise and the pendency of such a representation was certainly not a relevant factor which could explain the delay on the part of the appellant in approaching the Court, 22. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the representation made by the appellant against his non-selection could lie under Rule 23 (iv) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, This rule reads : "23. Subject to the provisions of Rule 22, a Government servant may prefer an appeal against all or any of the following orders, namely, (iv) any order which— (a) denies or varies to his disadvantage his pay, allowances, pension or other conditions of service as regulated by rules or by agreement; or (b) interprets to his disadvantage the provisions of any such rule or agreement." The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the selection and appointment of his juniors to Class I Service in preference to the appellant amounted to variation of his conditions of service and hence an appeal against his non-selection did lie to the Government under the rule quoted above. According to the learned counsel the term conditions of service as used in the above rule is comprehensive enough to include the provisions of salary, increments, leave, gratuity, pension, age of superannuation, termination of employment and also promotion. He placed reliance on the case of The Manager, Government Branch Press and another v. D. B. Belli pa, [reported in 1979 (1) SLR 351] in support of this interpretation placed by him on the term conditions of service. He also drew our attention to Government of Indias instructions laying down that an appeal against supersession in the matter of promotion falls within the purview of Rule 23 (iv) extracted above. He also drew our attention to Government of Indias instructions laying down that an appeal against supersession in the matter of promotion falls within the purview of Rule 23 (iv) extracted above. We have no dispute with respect to the Government of Indias decision that Rule 23 (iv) provides for appeal against supersession in the matter of promotion. The case of the present appellant, however, was not of supersession in the matter of promotion. As already observed the appellant was interviewed by the Commission for his selection to Class I post as a direct recruit and not for his promotion from Class II to Class I. Such an appeal was maintainable only in case the appellant had been considered for promotion to Class I post against the promotion quota and had been superseded by his juniors. Inasmuch as the appellant was not superseded in the matter of promotion, the provisions of Rule 23(iv) are not attracted to his case, 23. Even if we assume for the sake of arguments that a representation against his non-selection to Class I post by the Commission could lie to the Government on the administrative side, such representation was rejected by the Government in 1967 and the rejection was conveyed to the appellant vide letter dated 11-12-1967 (supra). This rejection was at the level of the Lt, Governor, the Head of the State, There is no provision in law or rules providing for an appeal or review against the order of the Lt. Governor rejecting such like representations of the appellant. 24. In any case, all that the appellant had claimed in his representations made to the Government was that he should be promoted from Class II to Class I Service with retrospective effect from 28-8-1962, the date when his batch- mates Sarvshri R. S, Gujral and A. K, Mukerji had been appointed to Class I Service through the Commission as direct recruits. There is neither any averment made in the writ petition nor any material was placed before us during the course of arguments which could show if there existed any vacancy in the promotion quota of Class I Service against which the appellant could be promoted. In case there was no such vacancy available against the promotion quota, the claim of the appellant made in his representation was just like asking for the moon. In case there was no such vacancy available against the promotion quota, the claim of the appellant made in his representation was just like asking for the moon. Neither he was entitled to this claim nor was it within the competence of the Government to accede to that claim. Thus looking from either angle the delay in filing the writ petition for the entire period between August 1962 and May 1975 and in any case from December 1967 to May 1975 remains unexplained. 25. The learned counsel for the appellant relying upon a Division Bench authority of this Court in the case of Shri Subhash Chander and others v. The State of H. P. and others [reported in 1978(1) SLR 681] contended that even though the representations made by the appellant in 1969 and thereafter were very much delayed, the authorities concerned had taken the same very seriously for their consideration as conveyed to the appellant vide Annexure K and in this view of the matter the delay, if any, supposed to have been condoned by the Government. That authority, in our view has no application to the facts of this case. That was a case relating to fixation of seniority which was within the competence of the authorities entertaining the representation. In the instant case the claim of the appellant is for his promotion from Class II to Class I with retrospective effect. This claim of the appellant could not be allowed since there was no post available in the promotion quota against which the appellant could be promoted. This fact was within the knowledge of the appellant and he, therefore, had no reason to assume if his claim for promotion could be entertained muchless accepted. 26. The alternative argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that even if there was unexplained delay on the part of the appellant in approaching the Court, the same by itself was not a sufficient or valid reason for the learned single Judge to refuse to entertain the writ petition. In support of this argument the learned counsel placed reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and others v. the State of Maharashtra and others, [reported in 1974 (1) SLR 470]. We have carefully perused the judgment delivered by their Lordships in the case of Ramchandra (supra). In support of this argument the learned counsel placed reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and others v. the State of Maharashtra and others, [reported in 1974 (1) SLR 470]. We have carefully perused the judgment delivered by their Lordships in the case of Ramchandra (supra). In our view this authority has nowhere laid down that the Courts cannot refuse to entertain the delayed and stale claims even though the delay is not satisfactorily explained. It is true that in the case of Ramchandra (supra) the petitioners had challenged the vires of the rules framed in 1959 by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in the year 1969 and the Supreme Court did entertain the same. The Supreme Court, however, entertain ed it on the peculiar facts of that case in as much as the petitioners who were governed by the rules framed in 1959 had been given to understand by the competent authorities of the State Government itself like the Divisional Commissioner and the Revenue Secretary that the rules of 1959 were not applicable to them. It was only in the year 1968 when in another case the State of Maharashtra took a stand and which was accepted by the High Court that the rules framed in 1959 were the unified rules which were applicable to these petitioners as well that the said petitioners acquired knowledge of the fact that the 1959 rules were applicable to them also. 1 he petitioners thereafter did not lose any time in challenging those rules by filing their petition in the Supreme Court. The entire factual and legal position of that case is contained in para No, 10 of the aforesaid report which may be extracted with advantage : "10. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents was that the petitioners were guilty of gross laches and delay in filing the petition. The entire factual and legal position of that case is contained in para No, 10 of the aforesaid report which may be extracted with advantage : "10. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents was that the petitioners were guilty of gross laches and delay in filing the petition. The divisional cadres of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars were created as far back as 1st November, 1956 by the Government Resolution of that date and the procedure for making promotion to the posts of Deputy Collector on the basis of divisional select lists which was a necessary consequence of the creation of the divisional cadre of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars, had been in operation for a long number of years, at any rate from 7th April, 1961 and the Rules of 30th July, were also given effect to since the date of their enactment and yet the petitioner did not file the petition until 14th July, 1969. There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidyatullah, C. J. in Tilockchand Motichand v. H. R. Munshi "is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Rights and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose". There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Rights and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose". Here the petitioner were informed by the Commissioner, Aurangabad Division, by his letter dated 18th October, 1960 and also by the then Secretary of the Revenue Department in January 1961 that the rules of recruitment to the post of Deputy Collector in the reorganised State of Bombay had not yet been unified, and that the petitioners continued to be governed by the rules of Ex-Hyderabad State and the Rules of 30th July, 1959 had no application to them. The petitioners were, therefore, justified in proceeding on the assumption that there were no unified rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector and the promotions that were being made by the State Government were only provisional, to be regularised when unified rules of recruitment were made. It was only when the petition in Kapoors- case was decided by the Bombay High Court that the petitioners came to know that it was the case of the State Government in that petition—and that case was accepted by the Bombay High Court—that the Rules of 30th July, 1959 were the unified rules of recruitment to the Posts of Deputy Collector applicable throughout the reorganised State of Bombay. The petitioners thereafter did not lose any time in filing the present petition. Moreover, what is challenged in the petition is the validity of the procedure for making promotions to the posts of Deputy Collector— whether it is violative of the equal opportunity clause—and since this procedure is not a thing of the past, but is still being followed by the State Government, it is but desirable that its constitutionality should be adjudged when the question has come before the Court at the instance of parties properly aggrieved by it. It may also be noted that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. It may also be noted that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. This principle was stated in the following terms by Hidayatullah, C. J. in Tilokchand v. H. B. Munshi : The party claiming Fundamental Rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court." Sikri, J. (as he then was), also re-stated the same principle in equally felicitous language when he said in R. M Bose v. Union of India : "It would be unjust to derive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion affected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years," Here as admitted by the State Government in paragraph 55 of the affidavit in reply, all promotions that have been made by the State Government are provisional and the position has not been crystallised to the prejudice of the petitioners. No rights have, therefore, accrued in favour of others by reason of the delay in filing the petition. The promotions being provisional, they have not conferred any rights on those promoted and they are by their very nature liable to be set at naught, if the correct legal position, as finally determined, so requires. No rights have, therefore, accrued in favour of others by reason of the delay in filing the petition. The promotions being provisional, they have not conferred any rights on those promoted and they are by their very nature liable to be set at naught, if the correct legal position, as finally determined, so requires. We were also told by the learned counsel for the petitioners, and that was no controverted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State Government, that even if the petitions were allowed and the reliefs claimed by the petitioners granted to them, that would not result in the reversion of any Deputy Collector or officiating Deputy Collector to the post of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars; the only effect would be merely to disturb their interse seniority as officiating Deputy Collectors or as Deputy Collectors, Moreover, it may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the fundamental rights of equal opportunity under Art. 16 is itself a fundamental rights guaranteed under Art, 32 and this Court which has been assigned the role of a sentinal on the qui vive for protection of the fundamental rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like." It is thus obvious that it was in the peculiar circumstances of that case that the Supreme Court, repelled the objection of delay and laches. The Supreme Court, however, clearly observed that the rule which says that the Court may not enquire into the belated and stale claims though not a rule of law, was a rule of practice based on a proper and sound exercise of discretion and whether the Court should entertain or refuse to entertain a belated and stale claim would depend upon the facts of each case. Looking to the facts of the present case there appears to be absolutely no justification for entertaining the claim of the appellant after the expiry of such a long period. 27. Looking to the facts of the present case there appears to be absolutely no justification for entertaining the claim of the appellant after the expiry of such a long period. 27. To sum up, we find that the main grievance of the appellant was against his non-selection by the Commission in August 1962 for appointment to Class I Service as a direct recruit and the appellant never made any grievance of the same till he filed his writ petition in May, 1975 after a lapse of about 13 years In the various representations which the appellant had made to the Government from time to time, he had only asked for his promotion to Class I post which obviously meant promotion against the quota fixed for promotees as distinquished from appointment as direct recruit,. The appellant knew that there was no post available in Class I Service pertaining to promotion quota and hence he could not be so promoted. The making of his repeated representations was, therefore, a futile exercise which would not explain the delay more so when such representations were rejected in 1967 by the then Lt. Governor who was the head of the Administration. The rule that the Court should not entertain the stale and belated claims, though not a rule of law is a rule of practice based on sound exercise of discretion and applying this rule on the facts of this case, the writ petition of the appellant had been rightly dismissed by the learned single Judge. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.