JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner no. 1 was the holder of five mining leases mentioned in the writ petition. The petitioners have, inter -alia, prayed for quashing the demands for the revised dead rent payable under the aforesaid leases to the Government of Orissa for the period from 30th June, 1968 upto 30th September, 1972. At the outset I may note that although the impugned revised calculations for dead rent also set out the alleged dues for the period subsequent to 30th September, 1972 such demands for dead rent for the period subsequent to 30th September, 1972 are not the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. The respondents have contested the case by filing an affidavit and thereafter a further affidavit. 2. IT is undisputed that all the five mining leases held by the petitioners specified the rate of yearly dead rent payable by the lessee. At the hearing of the application the petitioners have assailed the revised calculation of the dead rent demanded by the respondents on grounds somewhat different from those averred in their writ petition). Mr. Gupta, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has submitted that by demanding from the petitioner No. 1 dead rent and thereafter by accepting payment the State Government must be considered to have specified the rate of dead rent payable by the petitioner in terms of Rule 27 (1) (c) of the Mineral concession Rules, 1960 read with Schedule 4 to the said Rules. Therefore, the state Government had no power to again demand at further enhanced rates the said dead rents payable without specifying the same in the manner laid down in Rule 27 (1) (c) of the Mineral concession Rules, 1960. Mr. Gupta has submitted that in any case after the schedule 4 was deleted from the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 the respondents had no further power or authority to demand ground rent at the rate specified in the deleted Schedule 4. I may first consider the last submission made on behalf of the petitioners. With effect from 15th September, 1973, schedule 4 was deleted from the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. In the instant case, as already mentioned, the petitioners have impugned the calculations made of the revised dead ground rent payable upto 30th September, 1972. I may first consider the last submission made on behalf of the petitioners. With effect from 15th September, 1973, schedule 4 was deleted from the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. In the instant case, as already mentioned, the petitioners have impugned the calculations made of the revised dead ground rent payable upto 30th September, 1972. Therefore, in deciding the rights and obligations of the parties in relation to the period in question, court ought to enforce the agreements between the parties and the provisions of the law as they stood at the said point of time when the liability to pay dead rent had accrued. Undisputedly the State Government was vested with such power to specify the dead rent payable for the said periods. Therefore, I reject this submission of the petitioners that after the deletion of the said Schedule of the Mineral concession Rules, 1960 the State Government had lost the power to specify the dead rent payable even in respect of the period upto 15th September, 1973. 3. FOR the reasons presently indicated, I am of the view that in the absence of any fresh specification of the yearly rent payable, the petitioners continued to remain liable to pay yearly dead rent at the rate specified in the respective lease deeds upto the 30th September, 1972. By specifying in the deeds the rate of yearly dead rent payable under respective leases, the State Government must be deemed to have made such fixation in the exercise of its powers under Rule 27 (1) (c) of the Mineral concession Rules, 1960. Originally Schedule 4 under Rule 27 (1) (c) of the said rules specified both the minimum and the maximum limits within which the state Government under Rule 27 (1) (c)of the Rule could fix the yearly dead rent payable by a lessee. The Government of India by a notification dated 30th March, 1980, in exercise of its powers under section 13 of the Mines and minerals (Regulations and Development) Act, 1957 had amended the Minerals Concession Rules, 1960, inter alia, by substituting the said Schedule 4 of the Rules of 1960 I set out below the said amended Schedule 4: Period of the mining lease Rate of dead rent per Hectare. 1. 1st year Nil 2. 2na year to 5th year Rs. 12. 50 3. 6th year to 10 th year Rs. 25. 00 4. 11th year onwards Rs. 37. 1. 1st year Nil 2. 2na year to 5th year Rs. 12. 50 3. 6th year to 10 th year Rs. 25. 00 4. 11th year onwards Rs. 37. 00 The learned Advocate General for Orissa who had appeared for the respondents has submitted that after the said amended Schedule was inserted the lessee was bound to pay the dead rent per hectare at the rate specified in the said schedule and it was no longer necessary for the State Government to fix the yearly dead rent in terms of Rule 27 (1) (c) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. According to the learned Advocate General, three significant changes were brought about by the said substituted Schedule 4 of the Rules. Unlike the old Schedule 4 the maximum and the minimum rates of dead rent were no longer specified, The substituted schedule 4 specified one uniform dead rent graduated year wise for all kinds of Mining leases. Since one single rate of ground rent has been specified, according to the respondents, the State Government was not require to fix such dead rent in case of individual lessees and the lessee was bound to pay at the rate specified in the schedule 4 to the Mineral Concession rules. The learned Advocate General next submitted that since the minimum and the maximum rates were not mentioned there was no scope for fixing the rates. Lastly, he submitted that the substituted Schedule 4 reflected a basic change in the law applicable in the matter of payment of yearly dead rent by mining lessees. Gradual increase in the rate of dead rent specified in the Schedule 4, according to the Advocate General, indicated that a lessee who did not promptly develop and efficiently work his mine because liable to pay gradually enhanced rate of dead rent and thereby suffer for his incompetence or inaction. In this connection Mr. Advocate General also submitted that the said Schedule 4 of the mineral Concession Rules 1960 was a ments partly to give effect to the pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in The hingir -Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. The State of Orissa and ors. AIR 1961 SC 459 and in state of Orissa and Anr. v. M/s. M. S. Tulloch andco. AIR 1964 SC 1284 . 4. Ltd. v. The State of Orissa and ors. AIR 1961 SC 459 and in state of Orissa and Anr. v. M/s. M. S. Tulloch andco. AIR 1964 SC 1284 . 4. IN my view, the above considerations are not very relevant for deciding the scope and effect of the amended Schedule 4 of the Mineral Concession Rules. It is significant that simultaneously with the substitution of Schedule 4 of the Rules, Rule 27 (1) (c) which empowered the State Government to fix the yearly dead rent within the limits specified in Schedule 4 was not amended so as to deprive the State Government of its powers to fix the rate of yearly dead rent. The respondents have not also questioned the validity of the provisions of rule 27 (1) (c) of the Mineral Concession rules. Therefore, I proceed to consider the case upon the assumption that the State government's power to specify under the said Rule 27 (1) (c) of the said Rules has not been affected by the aforesaid two supreme Court decisions about the denudation of the legislative powers of the State legislatures after the passing of the Central act 87 of 1957. Until it was repealed Schedule 4 specified the limits within which the state Government had power under Rule 27 (1) (c) to fix the yearly dead rent. In other words, the power of the State Government under Rule 27 (1) (c) of the Rules was to be exercised within the bounds of the said Schedule 4. It is true that after the aforesaid amendment, Schedule 4 no longer mentioned the minimum rate which could be fixed, as yearly dead rent payable. But the rate prescribed by the Schedule 4 continued to be the maximum limits within which the State Government was still entitled to fix the yearly dead rent. In the absence of any alteration in the language used in Rule 27 (1) (c) of the Mineral Concession Rules, Schedule 4 until its deletion, was merely a table specifying the limits within which the power of the State Government to fix the dead rent was to be exercised. In this connection, I may refer to the observations made by Craies on statute Law (7th Edn ) at page 224, about the reasons for attaching Schedules to Acts of Parliament. According to the learned author, "to some Acts of Parliament schedules are attached. In this connection, I may refer to the observations made by Craies on statute Law (7th Edn ) at page 224, about the reasons for attaching Schedules to Acts of Parliament. According to the learned author, "to some Acts of Parliament schedules are attached. These may be merely forms or examples of the way in which an enactment is intended to be carried out or may contain provisions important in themselves". The Schedule 4 of the Mineral concession Rules merely indicated how the power under Rule 27 (1) (c) of the Rules was to be exercised. The Schedule 4 did not contradict such power of the State government to specify. Therefore, there was no question of the Schedule 4 prevailing over Rule 27 (1) (c) of the Rules. While the power of the Government of india under section 13 of the Mines and minerals (Regulation and Development)Act, 1957, to deprive the State Government of its powers under Rule 27 (1) (c) to fix the yearly dead rent cannot be disputed, I am not prepared to hold that such intention on the part of the Government of India was manifested by merely deleting the previous schedule 4 and by inserting the aforesaid substituted Schedule. In my view, in the absence of any modification or alteration of rule 27 (1) (c) of the Rules even after the substituted Schedule 4 was inserted the said Schedule continued merely to specify the limits within which the State Government could fix the yearly ground rent payable by the mining lessees. I am unable to concur with the view that in view of the altered Schedule 4, Rule 27 (1 ) (c) no longer left any option with the State Government in the matter of fixation of the yearly dead rent. It is well settled that attempts should be made to make harmonious reading of different provisions of a statute or rules and to reconcile them. Secondly in the absence of any express provision, the rule of implied repeal ought not to be resorted to because there was no repugnancy or inconsistency between Rule 27 (1) (c) and the substituted Schedule 4 of the Mineral Concession Rules. Secondly in the absence of any express provision, the rule of implied repeal ought not to be resorted to because there was no repugnancy or inconsistency between Rule 27 (1) (c) and the substituted Schedule 4 of the Mineral Concession Rules. The point stressed by the learned-Advocate General for Orissa does not establish that the Union of India by merely substituting the Schedule 4 had intended to impliedly alter or modify the provisions of Rule 27 (1) (c) of the Mineral concession Rules. 5. BEFORE I conclude consideration of the point, I may refer to another submission of Mr. Gupta, learned advocate for the petitioner, which has some bearing on the above points. Mr. Gupta has pointed out that section 9a was inserted in the mines and Miner ales (Regulation and development) Act 1957 with effect from the 30th September, 1972. By the said amendment Schedule 3 was inserted in the act specifying the rate of dead rent payable, thereby dispensing with the necessity of specifying in each individual lease the rate of dead rent payable. The differences in the language used in the new provisions are significant and is a pointer to the change in law regarding fixation of the dead rent payable. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that upto 30th September, 1972 it was still necessary for the State government to specify the rate of dead rent payable and in the absence of any alteration made the lessee was liable to pay at the rate specified in the lease deeds. In the instant case the respondents have not alleged that the State Government had altered the specified rate of dead rent in the lease deeds. Therefore, the petitioners continued to be liable to pay such dead rent at the rate specified in the lease deeds upto 30th September, 1972. 6. THE petitioner cannot claim any advantage by reason of having paid at a rate lower than the rate of, ground rents specified in their lease deeds. The petitioners have neither alleged nor established that the Mining Officer concerned who had demanded and received payments which were presumably lower than the rate of ground rent specified in their lease deeds, had any authority to alter the specified rates. The respondents have claimed that by mistake the Mining Officer concerned had made the said demands. The petitioners have neither alleged nor established that the Mining Officer concerned who had demanded and received payments which were presumably lower than the rate of ground rent specified in their lease deeds, had any authority to alter the specified rates. The respondents have claimed that by mistake the Mining Officer concerned had made the said demands. The petitioners who were bound by the terms of the lease deeds cannot take any advantage of such apparent mistakes and deny their liability to pay at the rate specified in their lease deeds. Therefore, I conclude, that, in the absence of fresh specification upto 30th September, 1972 the petitioners continued to be liable to pay dead ground rent at the rate specified in their respective lease deeds. Before I conclude, I make it clear that although the petitioners have failed to successfully challenge the authority of the respondents to demand dead rent, it is open to the petitioners to make any representation, if they desire, regarding the correctness of arithmetical calculations of the total sums demanded. In case the petitioners wish to dispute such correctness of the calculation, they may do so within two months from this day. If such representation is made the respondents will dispose of the same in accordance with law within two months from the date of receipt thereof. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged with observations.