JUDGMENT : R.C. Mankad, J. Petitioner who is mother of one Vijay Kinariwala (hereinafter referred to as the "detenu") has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for release of the detenu who has been detained by an order Annexure ‘A’ dated June 3, 1983, passed by the Government of Gujarat, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the "COFEPOSAA"). 2. The grounds on which the impugned detention order was passed were as follows. The Customs Officers of Ahmedabad received an intelligence report that contra-band gold was to be delivered to the detenu between 16-00 and 17-00 hours on April 19, 1983 opposite Kwality Restaurant near Kan-karia, Ahmedabad by a person who was to come in a sky blue coloured ambassador car bearing registration No. GJB 5281. In pursuance of this intelligence report, the Customs Officers kept vigil near the said Kwality Restaurant. At about 16-00 hours, the Officers noticed one sky blue coloured car bearing No. GJB 5281 occupied by two persons coming towards the Kwality Restaurant. No sooner the car was parked opposite the Kwality Restaurant, the detenu accompanied by one person on a scooter approached the said car. The detenu got into the car and was engaged in conversation with two occupants thereof, while the person accompanying him on the scooter remained seated on the scooter at some distance. The Customs Officers surrounded the car. On seeing the Customs Officers, the detenu attempted to escape, and while doing so, assaulted the Customs Officers with a pipe which he had taken out from the car. The officers, however, caught hold of the detenu and the situation was brought under control with the help of the police in the mobile van which was near that place. Two occupants of the car disclosed their names to be Fakir Mohmad of Jam Khambhalia and Mohmad Adil of Bombay. The Customs Officers did not think it advisable to search the car at that place as it was an open place and crowd had collected. Therefore, the car along with its occupants was brought to the Customs Office under police escort. The Customs Officers did not think it advisable to search the car at that place as it was an open place and crowd had collected. Therefore, the car along with its occupants was brought to the Customs Office under police escort. The detenu was brought to the Customs Office in the police van, whereas Fakir Mohmad and Mohmad Adil were brought in their own car duly escorted. The car was thoroughly rummaged in presence of the Panchas. 232 slabs of foreign marked gold each weighing 10 totals, valued at Rs. 48,72,000/- and Indian currency of Rs. 4,600/- were recovered from the car as a result of the search. The Customs Officers seized gold and the Indian currency under the reasonable belief that they were liable to confiscation under the Customs Act, 1962. The aforesaid car was also seized under the provisions of the Customs Act. Statements of the detenu, Fakir Mohmad and Mohmad Adil were recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act. In the view' which we are taking, we do not consider it necessary to refer to these statements in detail. It may, however, be mentioned here that reference to these statements has been made in the grounds on which the detention order is made. (Annexure ‘C’). 3. It is the case of the respondents that the gold seized from the car was to be delivered to the detenu. After taking into consideration the above facts and the statements of Fakir Mohmad, and Mohmad Adil and the detenu, the detaining authority was satisfied that contraband gold recovered from the aforesaid ambassador car was to be delivered to the detenu. The detenu was attributed with the knowledge about the contents of the car, namely, contraband gold and Indian currency. Therefore, considering all the facts and circumstances, including the fact that the detenu who was arrested under the Customs Act was released on bail, came to the conclusion that if the detenu was not detained under COFEPOSAA, he was likely to continue his activities of dealing in smuggled goods. The detaining authority was satisfied that there was sufficient cause to pass detention order against the detenu under COFEPOSAA with a view to preventing the detenu from dealing in smuggled goods. It was on the above grounds that the impugned order of detention was passed. 4. The detention order has been challenged on several grounds. The detaining authority was satisfied that there was sufficient cause to pass detention order against the detenu under COFEPOSAA with a view to preventing the detenu from dealing in smuggled goods. It was on the above grounds that the impugned order of detention was passed. 4. The detention order has been challenged on several grounds. We, however, do not consider it necessary to set out or deal with all the grounds of challenge, since in our opinion, for the reasons which we shall presently state, the petition must succeed on one ground, namely, that a copy of the intelligence report on which reliance is placed by the detaining authority in passing the detention order is not supplied to the detenu. It is contended that intelligence report was an important and relevant document which was considered by the detaining authority in passing the impugned order and, therefore, unless a copy thereof was given to the detenu, he was not in a position to exercise his right of making representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India effectively. On the other hand, the stand which is taken up on behalf of the respondents is that copy of the intelligence report was not supplied to the detenu in public interest in exercise of the powers conferred on the detaining authority under the provisions of Article 22 (6) of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that disclosure of the intelligence report to the detenu would have resulted into reprisal and the source of information thereafter would not have been available to the authority. It is further urged that reference to the intelligence report in the grounds of detention was only a casual reference. In other words, according to the respondents the order of detention was not based or founded on such report. Therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujarat and Another, AIR 1981 SC 1191 , failure to supply copy of such report to the detenu will not render the detention order invalid. 5. In other words, according to the respondents the order of detention was not based or founded on such report. Therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujarat and Another, AIR 1981 SC 1191 , failure to supply copy of such report to the detenu will not render the detention order invalid. 5. Article 22 (5) provides that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Clause (6) provides that nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in clause (5) "to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose." 6. Its settled law that Article 22, clause (5) of the Constitution has two facets: (1) communication of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) an opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. It is also settled law that "grounds" in clause (5) of Article 22 do not mean mere factual inferences but mean factual inferences plus factual material which led to such factual inferences. "Grounds" must be self-sufficient and self-explanatory. Therefore, the grounds communicated to the detenu should reveal the whole of the factual material considered by the detaining authority and they should comprise all the constituent facts and materials, that went into' making up of the mind of the statutory functionary. An opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention necessarily implies that the detenu is informed of all that has been taken into account against him in arriving at the decision to detain him. [See Shalini Soni v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 431 ). It is therefore, clear that the detenu is to be informed not merely of the factual inferences and factual material which led to such inferences but also the sources from which the factual material is gathered. [See Shalini Soni v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 431 ). It is therefore, clear that the detenu is to be informed not merely of the factual inferences and factual material which led to such inferences but also the sources from which the factual material is gathered. The disclosure of sources would enable the detenu to draw the attention of the detaining authority in the course of his representation to the fact whether the factual material collected from such sources could be relied upon and used against the detenu on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. (See Bai Amina v. State of Gujarat, 22 Guj.L.R. 1186). However, as observed by this Court in Bai Amina's Case, the right of the detenu to be furnished with material facts and particulars is subject to the limitation mentioned in Article 22, Clause (6). The detaining authority is thereunder empowered to withhold such facts and particulars, the disclosure of which such authority considers to be against the "public interest". Both the obligations to furnish material facts and particulars and the duty to consider whether the disclosure of any facts involved therein is against public interest, are vested in the detaining authority and not in any other. When the privilege of withholding facts and particulars is exercised, the detenu cannot be heard to say that the grounds did not disclose the necessary facts and particulars or that in the absence of such facts and particulars, he is not in a position to make an effective representation, save and except when the exercise of privilege is challenged as mala fide (See Lawrence D’Souza v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 531 and Pran Lal Lakhanpal v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 163 ). 7. The grounds of detention furnished to the detenu clearly reveal that the intelligence report has gone into consideration in passing the impugned detention order by the detaining authority. It is the respondent’s case that the detenu came on a scooter when the car in question was parked near Kwality Restaurant. The detenu went into the car and when he was having conversation with two occupants thereof, it was surrounded by the Customs Officials. It is alleged that the detenu made an attempt to escape and while making such attempt, he assaulted the Customs Officers. The detenu went into the car and when he was having conversation with two occupants thereof, it was surrounded by the Customs Officials. It is alleged that the detenu made an attempt to escape and while making such attempt, he assaulted the Customs Officers. However, there was nothing to directly connect the detenu with the contraband gold except the intelligence report. It was the intelligence report which disclosed that contraband gold was to be delivered to the detenu. Following extracts from the grounds supplied to the detenu make it clear that the detaining authority had mainly relied upon the intelligence report in reaching subjective satisfaction about involvement of the detenu in the smuggling of contraband gold: "The detaining authority is therefore satisfied that both Fakir Mohmad and Mohmad Adil do not state the truth. The fact that prior intelligence was available with the customs contraband gold which was to be delivered to you, the fact that the said vehicle GJB 5281 came near Kwality Restaurant at the appointed time and you came and approached the occupants of the said car and got into the said car GJB 5281 and started talking with the occupants of the said car and the fact that you had suggested that all of you know each other and what you had talked was in connection with contraband gold and that each of you knew each other and the contents of the car The statement of Fakir Mohmad Haji Hussein shows that he was told by J; Mohmad Adil over telephone at Khambhalia to bring his vehicle to Ahmedabad for the purpose of dealing with live-stock. However, the intelligence shows that the purpose of bringing the said car to Ahmedabad was not to meet Adil for the purpose of business in livestock but for the transport of contraband gold." It is therefore, obvious that intelligence report has gone into consideration while recording subjective satisfaction for passing the impugned detention order. We are, therefore, not inclined to accede to the submission made on behalf of the respondent that reference to the intelligence report in the grounds of detention was only a casual reference attracting the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in L.M.S. Ummu Saleema’s Case (supra). Copy of the intelligence report is admittedly not furnished to the detenu. We are, therefore, not inclined to accede to the submission made on behalf of the respondent that reference to the intelligence report in the grounds of detention was only a casual reference attracting the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in L.M.S. Ummu Saleema’s Case (supra). Copy of the intelligence report is admittedly not furnished to the detenu. It is true that according to the respondents, the grounds supplied to the detenu gives gist of the intelligence report, but the fact remains that copy of the intelligence report is not furnished or supplied to the detenu. The respondents have claimed privilege under clause (6) of Article 22 of the Constitution and contended that since it was not in public interest to make disclosure of the intelligence report, a copy thereof was not supplied to the detenu. As pointed out by this Court in Bai Amina's Case (supra), the foundation of the law behind clause (6) of Article 22 is injury to the public interest. The reason for the exclusion from disclosure is that if the facts and materials are disclosed, the public interest would be injured. While withholding the disclosure of materials, facts and particulars to the detenu on the ground that it would harm the public interest, another public interest, which requires the disclosure of all relevant particulars and materials on which the order of detention is based, with a view to affording an effective opportunity of representation to the detenu against the order of detention, must be borne in mind. The delicate balance between the two must be maintained by the detaining authority upon whom is cast the obligation to furnish material facts and particulars and who is under a duty to withhold the disclosure of such facts and particulars under certain circumstances. It is only when the public interest likely to be sub-served by nondisclosure outweighs or overrides the public interest intended to be served by disclosure that the relevant information must be withheld. It is the duty of the detaining authority to enquire of all the matters which are relevant in the context of intelligence report on which reliance is placed by it and carefully examine it with a view to satisfying itself that the alleged disclosure of information was likely to injure the public interest. In the instant case, we find that intelligence report was not placed at all before the detaining authority itself. In the instant case, we find that intelligence report was not placed at all before the detaining authority itself. We have perused the record of the detenu’s case produced before us and we find that though the detaining authority had specifically called for a copy of the intelligence report, it was not supplied to it by the Customs authorities. Unless the intelligence report was before it, we are unable to understand as to how the detaining authority could have come to the conclusion that it was against public interest to make its disclosure. As already pointed out above, according to the respondents, gist of intelligence report is given in the grounds supplied to the detenu. Under the circumstances, we fail to see how privilege can be claimed in respect of the intelligence report. But apart from that, as pointed out in Bai Amina's Case (supra), the Court has to be satisfied in a case like this by the affidavit of the detaining authority that the decision to withhold from the detenu material documents, statements, or particulars was bona fide and rationally reached by the detaining authority after proper application of mind to each matter and after considering all the relevant aspects. The Court must be satisfied that the authority has applied its mind and has come to the conclusion with regard to the public interest bona fide and not arbitrarily or capriciously. In absence of the intelligence report, the detaining authority could not have reached the decision that it was not to be in the public interest to disclose the intelligence report. In any case we do not think that the decision to withhold the intelligence report from the detenu was bona fide and rationally reached by the detaining authority after proper application of mind to each matter and after considering all the relevant aspects. We are, therefore, of the opinion that failure to supply copy of the intelligence report vitiates the order of detention. Intelligence report was one of the factors which had gone into consideration in passing the detention order. In fact, the detention order is mainly based on the intelligence reports. We are, therefore, of the opinion that failure to supply copy of the intelligence report vitiates the order of detention. Intelligence report was one of the factors which had gone into consideration in passing the detention order. In fact, the detention order is mainly based on the intelligence reports. In the view which we are taking, we do not consider it necessary to go into the question whether or not it was necessary for the detaining authority to disclose the source of intelligence report or in other words, to disclose the identity of the informant if any. There was absolutely no justification for withholding the intelligence report from the detenu and since this important material which had gone into consideration in passing the detention order was not supplied to the detenu the order of detention deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. In the result, we allow this petition and quash and set aside the order of detention Annexure ‘A’ dated June 3, 1983. Detenu Vijay Kinariwala is ordered to be released forthwith so far as the present case is concerned. 9. Rule made absolute. Petition allowed.