JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, Vijay Raj Singh Rajawat, was working as Supervisor with the Kekri Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank (hereinafter called the Society) in the grade of Rs. 130-409 with an additional allowance of Rs. 35/- per mensem with effect from December 22, 1982. On a representation by the employees of the Society, the management committee of the Society passed a resolution, dated, February 18, 1983 purporting to sanction the application of pay-scales admissible to the employees of corresponding ranking in the Central Cooperative Banks in accordance with the settlement arrived at between the workmen concerned through their trade unions and the administrators of those banks on August 25, 1980. According to the said resolution, the employees of the Society would be entitled to the enhanced pay-scales with effect from February 1, 1983, involving an additional financial burden of Rs. 1,300/- per mensem on the Society. The said enhanced pay-scales were in force in the Central Cooperative Banks with effect from July 1, 1983. The management committee of the Society deferred decision on the question of payment of arrears on the basis of the enhanced pay-scales for the period from July, 1, 1980 to January 31, 1983. 2. Acting on the aforesaid resolution of the management committee of the Society the Secretary of the Society informed the petitioner that his pay had been fixed at Rs. 647/- per month in the revised pay-scale of Rs. 375-1264 with effect from February 1, 1983. 3. It is alleged that the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies Beawar (respondent 3) who was a nominated member of the management committee of the Society at the time of the puring of the a for mentioned resolution opposed it. but it had been passed by a majority vote, notwithstanding the dissent of respondent 3. It so happened that respondent 3 was appointed as Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies Beawar and had thus acquired power under section 32, Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965, to rescind the said resolution. He served a notice, dated, July 8, 1983, on the Society under section 32 requiring it to show cause why the said resolution be not rescinded. On October 31, 1963, respondent 3 rescinded the resolution on the ground that it affected pre-judicially the financial interest of the Society. He served a notice, dated, July 8, 1983, on the Society under section 32 requiring it to show cause why the said resolution be not rescinded. On October 31, 1963, respondent 3 rescinded the resolution on the ground that it affected pre-judicially the financial interest of the Society. This led the petitioner to file this petition for a writ quashing the order, dated, October 31, 1983, made by the Assistant Registrar (respondent 3) and for mandamus enjoining the Society (respondent 4) to pay arrears for the period from July 1980 to January 31, 1983, and further salary to the petitioner in accordance with the revised and enhanced pay-scale as per resolution of the Society, dated, February 18, 1983 mentioned above. The petitioner also sought a declaration to the effect that section 32 Rajasthan Co- operative Societies Act, 1965, is ultra vires the Constitution of India, being arbitrary in nature, and that it be struck down as such. 4. After hearing learned counsel on both sides, perusing the record and studying the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter called the Act) and the rules made thereunder, I am of opinion that even if the resolution dated, February 18, 1983, purporting to have been passed by the management-committee of the Society had not been rescinded by the Assistant Registrar (respondent 3), it would have none-the--less remained document, illegal and void ab innitio, for the management of the Society has no power under the Act to revise the pay-scales of the employees of the Society. It will be seen that the Society (respondent 4) is not an "apex society" as defined in rule 2(c) of the Rajasthan Co-operative Society Rules, 1966 for its area of operation is confided to a particular village called Kekri and not to the whole State of Rajasthan. It is also not a 'central society" as define to rule 2(c) because it has no other society affiliated to it and it is not rewired to make provision of facilities for the operations of the affiliated societies. It is admittedly a --primary society" as defined in rule 2(o). A reference to the provision of chapter XI (section 84 to (section 116) of the Act would show that the said chapter deals exclusively with the Land Development Bank in Rajasthan. It is admittedly a --primary society" as defined in rule 2(o). A reference to the provision of chapter XI (section 84 to (section 116) of the Act would show that the said chapter deals exclusively with the Land Development Bank in Rajasthan. Section 85), lays down that there shall be a State Land Development Bank for the State of Rajasthan and as many land Development Banks as may be deemed necessary. Now the Society is admittedly not State Land Development Bank for Rajasthan. It is merely a Land Development Bank at the Primary level. The management committee of such a bank at the primary level has no power to regulate the terms and conditions of service of its employees. On the contrary, a perusal of section 116 (i.e. last section in chapter XI which deals with Land Development Banks) would show that such power vests to a limited extent in the State Land Development Bank. Section 116 vests the management committee of the State Land Development Bank with supervisory powers over Land Development Bank at the primary level. It also vests the said committee at the State level with power to make regulations for various matters including conditions of service of employees of Land Development Bank. However, such power may not be exercised without the previous sanction of the Government and should not be inconsistent with the Act or the rules made thereunder. A reference to rule 41 of the Rules framed under the Act would show that the power to specify the conditions of service of the employees of the societies is a close preserve of the Registrar. The Registrar does not appear to have framed any rules regulating the conditions of service of the employee of Land Development Banks. Therefore, it is open to the State Land Development Bank to frame regulations for this purpose. But under no circumstances would it be permissible to the committee of a Land Development Bank at the primary level, such as respondent 4, to make any regulations in respect of the conditions of service of its employees. Therefore, the committee of the Society in the instant case clearly acted without power and jurisdiction in passing the resolution, dated, February 18, 1983. The said resolution must be treated as null and void ab initio. 5. Therefore, the committee of the Society in the instant case clearly acted without power and jurisdiction in passing the resolution, dated, February 18, 1983. The said resolution must be treated as null and void ab initio. 5. Turning now to the powers of the Assistant Registrar, it is common ground that an Assistant Registrar has been conferred with all powers of the Registrar within his local jurisdiction, and therefore, the Assistant Registrar Beawar (respondent 3) had power and jurisdiction to rescind the resolution dated February 18, 1983 passed by the Society which is a primary society having its area of operation confined to village Kekri. Section 32 of the Act empowers the Registrar to rescind such a resolution after giving the society concerned an opportunity of being heard, if in his opinion the resolution is prejudicial to the interest of the society. As already stated the Assistant Registrar gave the Society (respondent 4) an opportunity of being heard and as a result formed the opinion, that the resolution, if allowed to stand would be prejudicial to the financial interest of the Society. It is obvious on the face of the resolution that it would subject a small village land development Bank to an additional financial burden of Rs. 1,300/- per mensem. No other Land Development Bank in the State is shown to have granted such a largess's to its employees. In any case, the Assistant Registrar had given the Society an opportunity of being heard and it had failed to satisfy him that the resolution would not impinge upon the financial interest of the Society. He was thus clearly within his power to rescind this resolution. 6. The mere fact that the Assistant Registrar initiated the proceedings for rescission of this resolution at the instance of the joint Registrar is no ground for quashing the action of the As instant Registrar in rescinding the resolution. If he had the power to rescind it, which he certainly had, and if the resolution was prejudicial to the interest of the Society which the Assistant Registrar has found it is so prejudicial, the advice tendered to the Assistant Registrar by his superior in this behalf would not detract from the extent of validity of the power exercised. 7. If he had the power to rescind it, which he certainly had, and if the resolution was prejudicial to the interest of the Society which the Assistant Registrar has found it is so prejudicial, the advice tendered to the Assistant Registrar by his superior in this behalf would not detract from the extent of validity of the power exercised. 7. Similarly, the fact that the Assistant Registrar had opposed this resolution at the time of its passing by the committee would not render its subsequent rescission by him mala fide on that ground alone. On the other hand, it only goes to show that even after giving the Society an opportunity of being heard, the Assistant Registrar found it as a fact that the resolution, if not rescinded, would burden the Society with a financial liability which it could ill-afford. If the Society genuinely felt that the rescission was not justified, it was always open to it to challan be it by way of appeal under the Act. No such appeal was ever filed. 8. Mr. Bandhu, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the settlement, Annexure 2, is a settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that as such it is brinding on the parties including respondents 3 and 4 in this writ petition. A perusal of Annexure 2 would show that it was a settlement between the trade union of workmen of Central Co-operative Banks on one side and the management of such banks on the other. It is significant to note neither the workmen nor management of Land Development Banks were parties to the execution of Annexure 2. It is therefore obvious that the management of the Development Banks and the trade union, if any, representing the workmen of Land Development Banks are not bound by the settlement alleged to have been arrived at between the workmen of Central Co-operative Banks and their management, as contained in Annexure 2. 9. For all these reasons, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. *******