Judgment :- 1. This original petition is filed by the President of the Alleppey Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd. No. A-94. The prayer in the O.P. is to quash Ext. P4 order of the Labour Court, Quilon dated 26th May, 1982, the 2nd respondent herein. It is common ground that the 1st respondent was employed as a Clerk in the Bank on a salary of Rs. 150/- Pending enquiry, the Bank placed the 1st respondent under suspension on 14-2-1976. It is further agreed that no enquiry was conducted nor was any order passed terminating the services of the 1st respondent. In Claim Petition No. 75 of 1971 filed under S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, by order dated 30-6-1976 (Ext. P1) the Labour Court, Quilon awarded Rs. 10,000/- as benefit due to the 1st respondent. The said claim was for the period, 1966 to 1971. Though the 1st respondent claimed more, he limited the claim to Rs. 10,000/- and that was awarded by Ext. P1. The 1st respondent filed another Claim Petition, C.P. 35 of 1980 before the 2nd respondent claiming a total sum of Rs. 69,845/- at varying rates from the year 1966 to October, 1980. After deducting Rs. 10000/- awarded as per Ext. P1, he confined the claim to Rs. 59,849. This is seen from Ext. P2, copy of the claim petition. The petitioner's objections are evidenced by Ext. P3. The 2nd respondent by Ext. P4 order dated 26-5-1982 allowed the claim for the years 1972,1973 and for the period ending 11-8-1974 (on which date the 1st respondent attained superannuation) to the extent of Rs. 9,418.37. It is this order of the Labour Court (Ext. P4) that is impugned in this O.P. 2. The only contention urged by Mr. P. F. Thomas, learned counsel for the petitioner, at the time of the hearing of the O.P. was that the 2nd respondent Labour Court erred in awarding the benefit at a rate more than Rs. 150/-per mensem, since at the time when the 1st respondent was suspended he was drawing a salary of Rs. 150/- per mensem only. In other words, according to counsel, when the 1st respondent was placed under suspension on 14-2-1976 till 11-8-1974, (when he attained superannuation), be will be entitled to the benefit under S.33C(2) of the Act only at the rate, he was drawing as salary before the order of suspension. 150/- per mensem only. In other words, according to counsel, when the 1st respondent was placed under suspension on 14-2-1976 till 11-8-1974, (when he attained superannuation), be will be entitled to the benefit under S.33C(2) of the Act only at the rate, he was drawing as salary before the order of suspension. The yearly increments which the 1st respondent would have been entitled to had he continued in service, cannot be granted by the Labour Court in exercising its jurisdiction under S.33C(2) of the Act. According to counsel, by suspension the status was arrested and the employee was entitled to only" to that quantum of amount that he was drawing before his suspension. The impairment of the status will arrest or put an end to, any further increment or addition or accretion to the emoluments which the Ist respondent, as a workman, was drawing before. On the other hand, Mr. Franklin, learned counsel for the Ist respondent, argued that the order of suspension does not put an end to the status of the workman, and that the usual increments or perquisites or mechanical accretions or additions the workman will be entitled to can be awarded by the Labour Court in exercise of the powers under S.33C(2) of the Act. Counsel contended that by the order of suspension there was only cessation of the employees and not an employer's obligations and that in this case the 2nd respondent calculated the benefit due to him on the basis of the materials available before it and so no interference is called for by this court at this stage in exercise of the powers under Art.226 of the Constitution. 3. Before the Labour Court, as against a detailed calculation of the basic pay plus allowances due to the Ist respondent (evidenced by Annexure to Ext. P2) the petitioner filed objections stating that the amount calculated in the annexure is incorrect and the basis of calculating the salary for each and every year is not made out by the petitioner. No material or other evidence was adduced by the petitioner to show what would be due to him had he continued in service or otherwise. In such circumstances the Labour Court held in Ext. P4 as follows: "the claim inclusive of 1971 has been adjusted under Ext. M1. No material or other evidence was adduced by the petitioner to show what would be due to him had he continued in service or otherwise. In such circumstances the Labour Court held in Ext. P4 as follows: "the claim inclusive of 1971 has been adjusted under Ext. M1. The applicant is therefore entitled to get his wages for the years 1972 and 1973 and for the period ending 11-8-1974. The applicant has claimed Rs. 2520/-for the year 1972 and Rs. 2640/-for the year 1973, for the year 1974 the claim is made on the basis that he would get a salary of Rs. 579/-per month. The opposite party has only stated that the amount claimed is not correct. There is no pleading as to what would be the amount due to the applicant had he continued in service. Therefore, the court has no alternative but to adopt the figures shown in the application. Therefore the amount due for the years 1972 and 1973 and for the period, ending 11-8-1974 would be calculated on the basis of the figures shown in the annexure The amount claimed for the year 1972 is Rs. 2520/-and for the year 1973 is Rs. 2640/-, the amount due for the period ending 11-8-1974 would be Rs. 4258.37. Thus in all, the amount due to the petitioner upto the date of superannuation would be Rs. 9419.37 Ps." (Emphasis supplied) It is evident from the above that the petitioner cannot raise any valid objection against the quantum of benefit arrived at by the Labour Court at this stage especially in these proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. But petitioner's counsel contended that in fixing the quantum, the increments due to the workman, from year to year should not have been taken into account. Counsel argued, in doing so, the 2nd respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in exercise of its power under S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is common ground that the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act 1972 (Act 27 of 1973) provides for the payment of subsistence allowance equivalent to the wages which the employee was drawing immediately before suspension if the period of suspension exceeds 180 days. It is agreed that S.3(1)(b) of Act 27 of 1973 will apply to the instant case. It is common ground that the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act 1972 (Act 27 of 1973) provides for the payment of subsistence allowance equivalent to the wages which the employee was drawing immediately before suspension if the period of suspension exceeds 180 days. It is agreed that S.3(1)(b) of Act 27 of 1973 will apply to the instant case. S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before its amendment stood thus: "(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided Tor in Sub-sec. (1)." In Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan (1963 (2) LLJ. 89 at pages 94 and 95), the Supreme Court held: "Similarly, having regard to the fact that the policy of the legislature in enacting S.33C is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workmen In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-s. (2), it is clear that if a workman's right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be determined by the labour court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the labour court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the labour court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed, the labour court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the labour court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. It seems to us that the opening clause of sub-s. (2) does not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause. The clause "where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit" does not mean "where such workman is admittedly, or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit." The appellant's construction would necessarily introduce the addition of the words "admittedly, or admitted to be" in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant's construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-s. (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the labour court to entertain the workman's application. The claim under S.33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of that right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the labour court by sub-s. (2). As Maxwell has observed: "Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution," (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 350). As Maxwell has observed: "Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution," (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 350). We must accordingly hold that S.33C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefit to which they are entitled would be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers." (Emphasis supplied) The Section after its amendment is as follows: "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government." (Emphasis supplied) In Bihar State Transport Corporation v. Bhawsagar Mishra (1919 (1) LLJ 237) two employees of the Corporation were not allowed to cross the efficiency bar for a number of years and they preferred petitions under S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The question arose whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to decide the question. Justice B.P. Sinha delivering the judgment of the Bench, after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan (AIR 1964 SC. 7431 and other decisions on the subject, held: "The question for consideration in the present case is as to whether the increments in the pay of respondents had been reasonably withheld in accordance with the service rules and instructions. Such an investigation is surely within the ambit and power of the Labour Court. It would be merely incidental to the main question, viz., the amounts to which the respondents are entitled had they been allowed to cross the efficiency bar at the proper time." (Emphasis supplied) 4. It appears to me that under S.33C(2) of the Act, the individual workman can seek to enforce or execute his existing rights. It is common ground, that the 1st respondent has got a right to receive his salary. It appears to me that under S.33C(2) of the Act, the individual workman can seek to enforce or execute his existing rights. It is common ground, that the 1st respondent has got a right to receive his salary. The only question, is whether he was entitled to the salary along with the usual increments that will accrue to him from year to year had he continued in (effective) service, or only the amount received by him before his suspension. The answer seems to be in the affirmative. The increments or other perquisites which are due to the workman from year to year and which he is entitled to mechanically, is only an addition or accretion which he will be entitled to, notwithstanding the order of suspension since there is no cessation of the obligations of the employer by the unilateral act of suspension. S.33C(2) of the Act envisages that the Labour Court can decide whether the workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. The increments or additions which will mechanically accrue to the workman during the period of suspension will definitely fall within the language of S.33C(2) of the Act and the Labour Court is competent to award the salary he was drawing as increased by the usual increments or additions. In other words, the amount drawn previously plus the increments/or/additions is the substituted figure of salary or amount due to him. There is no error of jurisdiction or error of law in the 2nd respondent taking into account such increments or additions due to the workman in awarding the relief to the 1st respondent. Nor can I find any manifest injustice in the 2nd respondent awarding the amount as claimed by the 1st respondent, especially in a case where the petitioner had not placed any material before the Labour Court. The original petition is without force. It is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.