JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - This appeal has been directed against the judgment and order of acquittal recorded by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patnagarh holding the respondents to be not guilty in respect of commission of offences punishable under sections 323 and 354 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant, who was the complainant in the court below, had alleged that there had been previous dispute between her on the one hand and the respondents on the other and on November 11, 1978, the respondents came in a body to the land which was in her cultivating possession while she and her brother (p. w. 3) were reaping til crops and at the instance of the other respondents, the respondent no. 1 Baru Meher pulled out the Sari oi the complaint-appellant (p. w. 1) as a result of which she became naked and at the instance of the other respondents, the respondent no. 1 went on mercilessly assaulting her with a piece of wooden staff (Merha). The appellant, as stated by her, received medical treatment first at the Ghasian Primary Health Centre and then at the Sub-divisional Hospital at Patnagarh whereafter she had also received treatment from p. w. 4 at the S.C.B. Medical College Hospital at Cuttack. After she was discharged, she made a complaint in the court and the respondents were prosecuted. Their case was one of denial and false implication. 2. To establish her case, the appellant had examined, besides herself, her brother (p. w. 3) and Niranjan Das (p. w. 2) as witnesses to the occurrence. Reliance had also been placed on the evidence of Dr. N.K. Agarwalla (p w. 4). On a consideration of the evidence, the trial court held that the case had not been established and accordingly an order of acquittal was recorded. 3. Mr. S.P. Mohapatra, appearing for the appellant, has placed the judgment and the evidence before me and has straneously urged that the findings arrived at by the trial court in favour of the respondents are unreasonable and unfounded calling for interference by this Court. 4. The principles to be kept in mind while deciding an appeal against acquittal have been laid down by the Supreme Court in Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat AIR 1983 S.C. 484 . 4. The principles to be kept in mind while deciding an appeal against acquittal have been laid down by the Supreme Court in Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat AIR 1983 S.C. 484 . Their Lore ships have observed and held:- "The appellate court while dealing with an appeal against the order of acquittal has full power to review at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach a conclusion that upon such evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. However, in exercising that power the appellate court should give proper weight and consideration to the following matters (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of the appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge, who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses, which finding would not certainly be disturbed if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record....." If two views are reasonably possible and the evaluation of evidence does not suffer from any manifest error or perversity or from illegality and the view taken by the trial court could be taken on the evidence on record, there should be no interference by this Court in an appeal against acquittal. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner have to be examined keeping the aforesaid principles in mind. 5. I notice that the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate has carefully considered the evidence adduced from the side of the appellant. Undoubtedly, the appellant, being the victim herself and her brother (p. w 3) were highly interested witnesses and they would normally look for a successful termination of the trial against the respondents who were said to be on inimical terms with them. The only other witness examined to speak about what had happened was p.w 2. As has rightly been noticed by the trial court, he was a person against whom the members of the Bar Association at Patnagarh had alleged that he had been doing the job of a tout and for this, there had been an enquiry. The only other witness examined to speak about what had happened was p.w 2. As has rightly been noticed by the trial court, he was a person against whom the members of the Bar Association at Patnagarh had alleged that he had been doing the job of a tout and for this, there had been an enquiry. This had been admitted by p. w 2. On his own showing, p. w. 2 had appeared as a surety in two cases. The suggestion of the defence was that p.w 2 was a professional witness and had been coming to the court premises every day for earning his livelihood. No doubt, p. w. 2 had denied this suggestion. But notice had been taken taken by the trial court regarding some suspicious features in his evidence. He had informed none about the occurrence of assault on the person of p w. 1 and according to him, he had seen the dealing of one below after which he left the place. He had not informed the appellant that he had witnessed the occurrence. There was nothing to show as to how the appellant could come to know that p w. 2 had witnessed the occurrence. Regard being had to these features, it could not be said that the learned Magistrate unjustifiably held that the evidence of p w. 2 could not be acted upon. P. w. 2 had, no doubt been cited as a witness in the petition of complaint which been made after an inordinate delay to which reference will made by me hereinafter. But the trial court rightly took not of the fact that the appellant chose to examine a person of the nature of p. w. 2, leaving out the other persons named as witnesses in the petition of complaint. In my view, the comment made by the learned Magistrate was perfectly justified although, as has rightly been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is not necessary in every case for the prosecution to examine each and every witness to the occurrence. In the instant case, however, it could legitimately be assumed that with an ulterior motive, the appellant did not examine the other persons and only examined p. w. 2. 6. In the instant case, however, it could legitimately be assumed that with an ulterior motive, the appellant did not examine the other persons and only examined p. w. 2. 6. I am not at one with the learned Magistrate that the evidence of p. w 2 was to be disbelieved because he was a chance witness or that he had not intervened at the time of the occurrence. A person while going on the way may have occasion to see an occurrence which takes place. Different persons react different y when they witness an occurrence and merely because a person does not intervene when he sees an assault, his evidence is not to be discarded. (See Rana Pratap and Others v. State of Haryana AIR 1983 S.C. 680 ). But for the other reasons recorded by the learned Magistrate and referred to by me in this judgment, the evidence of p, w. 2 was not worthy of acceptance and had rightly been rejected. 7. The occurrence had allegedly taken place on November 11, 1978, The petition of complaint was made as late as on December 20, 1978 This undue delay had not satisfactorily been explained. The appellant had testified that she had sustained injuries and had received medical treatment at two places before she came to Cuttack for further treatment. It, in fact, the appellant had received medical treatment first at the Primary Health Centre at Ghasian and then in the Sub-divisional Hospital at Patnagarh, it is really strange as to how not a piece of paper had been produced at the trial in support of this assertion made by her and neither the doctor at Ghasian nor any of the doctors of the Sub-divisional Hospital at Patnagarh had been examined as a witness. As has rightly been noticed by the trial court, the evidence of p w. 4 would not further the case of the appellant that she had sustained injuries as a result of assault by one of the respondents. As the evidence of p. w. 4 would show, the appellant was an in-door patient in the Female Orthopaedic Ward having been admitted because of some bodily pain on her body, particularly on her spine and she was discharged from the Medical College Hospital on December 14, 1978 Ext. 1 was the discharge certificate and Ext. 2 was the requisition issued for her X-ray examination. 1 was the discharge certificate and Ext. 2 was the requisition issued for her X-ray examination. Thus the evidence of p. w. 4 would not in any manner, corroborate the evidence of the appellant that she had sustained injuries on her person as a result of the assault. Even after she was discharged from the Medical College Hospital on December 14, 1978, she did not make a petition of complaint until December 20, 1978 and this delay also had rightly been taken note of. Unexplained delay in making a petition of complaint or in lodging the first information report is certainly a suspicious feature to be taken into consideration while judging the bona fides of the prosecution as delay in making a complaint or in lodging the first information report may bring in coloured version, embellishment and concoction. 8. In view of the aforesaid features in the evidence, it was not a case in which fault could be found with the trial court for having rejected the evidence of p. ws. 1 and 3 as, in ray view, their evidence without any corroboration, especially as the evidence could be but had not been corroborated, should not be made the foundation of an order of conviction. 9. I thus find that the findings recorded by the trial court are reasonable and do not call for interference in an appeal against acquittal. 10. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed