JUDGMENT By Court. At the admission stage itself counter-affidavits and replies thereto have been filed. The learned Additional Advocate General has appeared on behalf of the State and its officers as also on behalf of respondent no. 5. Thus the Housing Board is, represented before us. The other two respondents, namely, the Chairman of the Housing Board and the Executive Engineer thereof would be bound by any order that is passed in relation to the Housing Board whole officers they are. It is, therefore, possible to dispose of this matter at the admission stale. 2. In this writ application the Petitioner pray for quashing of the eviction proceedings, being Eviction Case No. 1 of 1981, filed before, and disposed of by the Competent Authority by its order dated 11.2.1982 under the Bihar State Housing Board Act, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). In the said proceedings the Competent Authority has, in exercise of powers conferred under section 59(5) of the Act, directed the vacation of the Board premises in question by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof. It has also awarded a compensation of Rs, 4,09,516. 80 p. and directed that a further compensation (at the rate of Rs 382.48 p. per day) be paid till vacation of the premises in question. Other consequential relief dependent on the aforesaid main relief have also been prayed for. 3. This writ application was initially filed by Baba Bhoot Nath Charitable Trust and Kamakhya Dham Charitable Trust through its Secretary, who is petitioner No. 1. and petitioners 2 and 3 who are Trustee and Secretary. Respectively, of the Trust. During the Course of hearing Baba Bhoot Nath appeared and he has been permitted to be impleaded as a petitioner. 4. From what shall be stated hereinafter, it is clear that constructions have been made on lands which were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, by the Housing Board and there has thus been unauthorised occupation of the Board premises by or on behalf of the petitioners. The acquisition in question not having been challenged, the construction of building and encroachment on the acquired land would be unauthorised occupation of the Board premises, as the expression "Premises", defined in section 2(17) of the Act, mean~ any land or building or part of a building. The acquisition in question not having been challenged, the construction of building and encroachment on the acquired land would be unauthorised occupation of the Board premises, as the expression "Premises", defined in section 2(17) of the Act, mean~ any land or building or part of a building. In view of this situation the challenge to the action is partly procedural and partly on the ground of violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 25, 19 and 14 of the Constitution. It is also challenged on the ground that the rule of promissory estoppel prevented the Board from treating the construction as unautl1orised. 5. I may now state the case of the Petitioner in some details. It is stated in the writ application that Baba Bhoot Nath (who is now petitioner no, 4) has created a Trust known as Baba Bhoot Nath Charitable Trust having its head office at Luckaow. The object of the Trust is “to spread religion among the people and to provide education by establishing schools and Colleges to the helpless children and also to provide free medicines to the needy people”. 28 decimals of land was acquired under a registered document (gift) dated 16.5.1978 (after it had already been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act) from Srimati Bhagwati Devi Khetan. This purchase was after obtaining what has been termed as permission under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. It is stated that the authorities of Baba Bhoot Nath Ashram having come to know that the Bihar State Housing Board was acquiring lands for solving the housing problem in Patna, Baba Bhoot Nath approached the Board in order to ascertail1 whether plot No. 563 of Khata No. 254 was also the subject matter of acquisition. A copy of the letter addressed to the Board bas not been annexed but a copy of the reply dated 7.4.1978 has been annexed to the writ application and marked as Annexure 1'. The said letter is written by the Secretary to the Cl1ief Engineer (Technical) and is addressed to petitioner no. 4 It states that plot no. 563 of village Bahadurpur thana Patna City, thana no. 10, having an area of 28 decimals, on which there is a temple of Baba Bhoot Nath, has not been acquired by the Housing Board. The said letter is written by the Secretary to the Cl1ief Engineer (Technical) and is addressed to petitioner no. 4 It states that plot no. 563 of village Bahadurpur thana Patna City, thana no. 10, having an area of 28 decimals, on which there is a temple of Baba Bhoot Nath, has not been acquired by the Housing Board. The case of the petitioners is that from the aforesaid' Annexure it is clear that the Ashram was already established and constructed since the Housing Board did not take any action with regard to the construction of the Ashram on the aforesaid plot. It is also stated in the petition that after the aforesaid registered document dated 16.5.1978, Baba Bhoot Nath started construction of an Ashram in the year 1978 named as Baba Bhoot Nath Ashram and installed the deity on the said piece of land. 6. The Executive Engineer of the Housing Board, according to the petitioners case, filed an application before the competent Authority under the Act, stating that the Housing Board had acquired plot No. 563 along with other lands on which illegal construction has been made and, therefore, prayed for eviction of Baba Bhoot Nath from the said premises. The Petitioner did not know about the filing of the case, but when it came to the knowledge of the Ashram about the said eviction proceeding, an employee of the Ashram, namely, Amar Nath Mishra, appeared before the Competent Authority and filed a petition before it praying for the adjournment of the case in order to enable the Ashram to file a show cause after the arrival of Baba Bhoot Nath, who was away from Patna, and after obtaining material informations from him. The petition aforesaid, it is asserted, was illegally rejected. Thereafter the competent Authority behind the back of the petitioners and without any not ice to the Ashram passed an order of eviction which was forwarded to respondents 4 and 5, the chair man and the Managing Director, respectively, of the Housing Board. On the basis of the said order of eviction, respondent no. 2, the District Magistrate, has taken steps with the help of police, to get the order of eviction implemented and a portion of the building has also been demolished. It is also alleged that certain articles belonging to the Ashram have also been seized. On the basis of the said order of eviction, respondent no. 2, the District Magistrate, has taken steps with the help of police, to get the order of eviction implemented and a portion of the building has also been demolished. It is also alleged that certain articles belonging to the Ashram have also been seized. It was in those circumstances that the petitioners filed this writ petition on 22.5.83 and on 23 5.83 further demolition of the construction in plot No. 563 was prohibited. This interim order has continued thereafter. 7. A counter-affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit have been filed in this case. Shortly stated, the case as made out in the affidavits supported by the original record which was produced before us during the course of hearing and which was perused by us as also the learned counsel for the petitioner indicates the facts which are being mentioned hereafter. On the basis of the requisition made by the Housing Board, steps for acquisition of lands were taken. A notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, was published in the Official. Gazette dated 7.11.73. This was followed by notification under section 6 on 1.5.75. Final award with regard to the lands covered under the aforesaid Notification was made on 29.6.77 under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. Possession was thereafter taken in respect of the acquired lands which vested in the State of Bihar free from all encumbrances. Possession of the lands measuring 227.6925 acres was delivered to the Housing Board on 22nd July, 1977. Among, the land acquired were plot DO. 556, 561, 562, 563, 564 and 565 (these being, the plots with which we are concerned in this case). Illegal encroachments & construction was made on plot no. 563 and Boundary walls constructed on the other plots above mentioned. Thus total area of encroachment was 1974.4459. sq. metre.. In this situation the Bihar State Housing Board filed Eviction case No, 1 of 1981 before the Competent Authority on 5.6.81. It may be stated that Baba Bhoot Nath was made opposite party in the case. On 23.7.81 notice was directed to be issued fixing 7.8.81 for filing of show cause. On 18.9.81 a vakalatnama was filed in the eviction proceeding by Sri Amar Naih Mishra describing himself as Manager of Baba Bhoot Nath Ashram. It may be stated that Baba Bhoot Nath was made opposite party in the case. On 23.7.81 notice was directed to be issued fixing 7.8.81 for filing of show cause. On 18.9.81 a vakalatnama was filed in the eviction proceeding by Sri Amar Naih Mishra describing himself as Manager of Baba Bhoot Nath Ashram. An application was also filed by him in which it is stated that the petitioners have come to know about the case having been instituted but since Baba Bhoot Nath was out of station no information could be communicated to him. It was further stated that steps were being taken to inform him about the case the applicant (Amar Nath Mishra) was not aware of the actual state of affairs. It was therefore, prayed that six weeks’ adjournment may be given in order to file show cause. The case was adjourned to 24.10.81 when the case was further adjourned to 21.11.81. On that date the case was adjourned to 10.12.81. On the said date attendance was filed on behalf of the opposite party through Amar Nath Mishra aforesaid. The case was again adjourned to 19.12.81 and then to 26.12.81. On 26.12.81 an application was filed on behalf of the opposite party through the aforesaid Amar Nathe Mishra stating therein that the petitioners opposite party (meaning Baba Bhoot Nath) had filed a petition dated 30.11.81 before the Chairman, Housing Board, requesting stay of further proceedings in the eviction case since the allotment matter with respect to the lands in question was in progress before the Board. It was further stated that the allotment order for the lands in question was expected to be passed shortly (Annexure ‘C’). After three more adjournments 15.1.82, 20.1.82 and 22.1.82 the case was fixed for 6.2.82. On that date appearance was again filed on behalf of the opposite party through the said Amar Nath Mishra. On the said date the case was adjourned to 11.2.82. On that date a petition for time was filed on behalf of the opposite party which was rejected and an ex-parte order of eviction was passed. A copy of the said order is Annexure 'D' to the' counter-affidavit. On the said date the case was adjourned to 11.2.82. On that date a petition for time was filed on behalf of the opposite party which was rejected and an ex-parte order of eviction was passed. A copy of the said order is Annexure 'D' to the' counter-affidavit. From what has been stated, it is clear that although the proceeding was started on 23.7.11 and Amar Nath Mishra appeared on 18.9.81, the impugned order in question was passed on 11.2.82, that is, almost five months after the appearance of the said Amar Nath Mishra. In the meantime, the case was adjourned on eight dates. There was thus ample opportunity for filing show cause by the opposite party provided the appearance of Amar Nath Mishra is in the circumstances found to be sufficient notice to the opposite party in the eviction Case. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that proper opportunity was not given is in our view, therefore, completely, without any merit. As to whether in the circumstances the appearance of Amar Nath Mishra complied with the provisions of section 59 of the Act, shall be considered later. 8. We would now consider the various contentions that have been raised on behalf of the parties. 9. But before we do so, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant portion of section 59 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act. The said section deals with summary procedure for eviction and recovery of rents. Sub-section (1) states that if the competent Authority, as defined under section 2 (10) of the Act, is of the opinion that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any Board premises it may issue a notice to any person who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises to show cause why an order of eviction and recovery of arrears of rent and damages, if any, should not be made. Sub-section (3) states that the Competent Authority shall cause the notice under sub-section (1) to be served by having it affixed on outer door or some other conspicuous part of the Board premises and in such other manner as may be prescribed. If this is complied with the notice shall be deemed to be duly given to shall persons concerned. Sub-section (3) states that the Competent Authority shall cause the notice under sub-section (1) to be served by having it affixed on outer door or some other conspicuous part of the Board premises and in such other manner as may be prescribed. If this is complied with the notice shall be deemed to be duly given to shall persons concerned. Sub-section (4) requires that where the Competent Authority knows or has reason to believe that any person is in occupation of the Board premises, it shall cause copy of the notice to be served on such person by registered post or delivery or tender to him the same. Sub section (5) authorises after consideration of show cause, if any, the passing of the order of eviction and is in the following words: “If, after considering the cause, it any, shown by any person in pursuance of the notice under sub-section (1) and any evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the competent authority is satisfied that any of the circumstances mentioned in sub section (1) exists, or existed on the date of the issue of the notice, it may on a date to be fixed for the purpose, make an order stating reasons therein, directing that the Board premises shall be vacated by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof and may further order that any person shall pay such amount 01 arrears of rent or damages as may be specified in the order". Sub-section (8) deals with the situation arising on the failure to comply with the order of eviction under sub-section (5), This sub-section may also be quoted : “If any person refused or fails to comply with an order of eviction under sub-section (5) within thirty days from the date of the order or such longer time as the competent authority may allow the competent authority or any other officer duly authorised by it in this behalf, may evict him from, and take possession of, the Board premises, and may for that purpose use such force 81 may be necessary”. Section 60 may be mentioned here as it deals with appeal from an order passed under Section 59. Section 60 may be mentioned here as it deals with appeal from an order passed under Section 59. Sub-section (1) authorises the filing of appeal within one month from the date of service of notice of the order under section 59 of the Act, to the Government. The Proviso to this sub section authorises the Government to entertain he appeal even after the expiry of the period aforesaid. Sub-Section (3) empowers the Government to stay the order of the Competent Authority for such period and on such conditions as the Government may think fit. 10. The first contention that has been raised in this case is that no notice having been served on the Trust no order could be passed under section 59 (5) of the Act, and no action could be taken under section 59 (5) of the Act. It is clear from what has been stated the case of the petitioners is that on plot no. 563 there exists an Ashram. From what has been stated earlier it is also clear that in the proceeding Amar Nath Mishra was representing both the Trust as also Bhoot Nath, who has been impleaded as the fourth petitioner. In the vakalatnama that he filed, Sri Mishra described himself as the Manager of Baba Bhoot Nath Ashram. In the petition that be filed he wanted time to file show cause on behalf of the interested party. We have referred to several hazris which would show that he was representing the opposite party in the eviction case, namely, Baba Bhoot Nath. In the circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that the authorities of the Ashram and the Trust were fully aware of the eviction proceedings and were acting through their Manager Amar Nath Mishra. We are also satisfied that Amar Nath Misbra, was acting for Baba Bhoot Nath in the proceeding, was given ample opportunity to take adequate steps to defend the case and file show cause. Later discussions would show that the show cause was not filed as the case for eviction was unanswerable. We are also satisfied that Amar Nath Misbra, was acting for Baba Bhoot Nath in the proceeding, was given ample opportunity to take adequate steps to defend the case and file show cause. Later discussions would show that the show cause was not filed as the case for eviction was unanswerable. The land on which the construction was made having been acquired as early as 1977, any transfer of the said land after acquisition or any construction made on the said land would not clothe the transferee with any right in respect of the land which had already vested free from all enumbrances in the state and which was handed over to the Housing Board for its development/projects. It would, therefore not be possible to accept the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that because of failure of the authorities to serve notice on the Ashram no order for eviction could be passed or that consequential steps could not be taken. 11. It was next contended that action under section 59 (8) could only be taken provided there was service of the order of eviction on the petitioners. It was contended that the order of eviction is subject to appeal. The appeal can be filed within one month from the date of service of notice. In the instant case there was no service of notice of the order of eviction and as such no action could be taken under section 59 (8) of the Act. The factual assumption that there was no service of the order of eviction on the Petitioner is, in our opinion, unjustified. It w been stated in the supplementary counter-affidavit that has been filed that after the final order was passed Arnar Nath Mishra had applied for certified copy of the order On 17.2.82. The certified copy was prepared and delivered to the said Amar Nath Mishra on 27.3.82. A photostat copy showing the receipt of the certified copy of the order under the signature of Amar Nath Mishra (who has signed as Amar Nath only) has been annexed as Annexure 'F' to tbe supplementary counter• affidavit. The deponent of the supplementary counter- affidavit clearly states that it was in his presence that Amat Nath Misbra received the copy and put his signature. The original or the said endorsement had also been produced during the course of hearing. The deponent of the supplementary counter- affidavit clearly states that it was in his presence that Amat Nath Misbra received the copy and put his signature. The original or the said endorsement had also been produced during the course of hearing. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement aforesaid. Moreover, in the reply to this affidavit it has not been stated that Amar Nath Mishra did not make the endorsement aforesaid. What is asserted is that the Ashram was not represented and thus the receipt by Amar Nath Mishra is of no consequence. A supplementary affidavit sworn on 13.6.83 on behalf of the petitioners has been filed in which a copy of the affidavit sworn by Amar Nath Mishra is enclosed. In this affidavit it is stilted that he was neither informed of the order of eviction nor was be supplied a certified copy of the order. The signature, however, is not denied. As to the signature he has explained as follows: “In fact the signature was obtained by misleading me purporting to be in anticipation of the delivery of a certified copy of the order which was never made.” Thus the explanation is that the endorsement was in anticipation of the receipt of the certified copy which was never supplied. This explanation cannot be accepted. There is also no reason why the endorsement should have been made without receiving the copy. There is also no reason why the endorsement should have been taken without supplying the copy. In our view, the affidavit fil ed on behalf of the Housing Board is preferable. That the affidavit of Amar Nath Mishra cannot be said to be reliable is also established by the fact that in paragraph 9 of his affidavit he has stated that he is not the manager of the Ashram of Baba Bhoot Nath, but, as already stated, in the. vakalatnama as also in the petition filed by him he has clearly described himself as the Manager of Baba Bhoot Nath Ashram. Thus, this part of the statement is contrary to his own assertion in the proceedings and as such it cannot be believed. This shows the unreliability of the affidavit of Amar Nath Mishra. Thus, it is clear that the certified copy of the order was obtained on 27.3.82. The appeal could, therefore, be filed within one month at least from that date. This shows the unreliability of the affidavit of Amar Nath Mishra. Thus, it is clear that the certified copy of the order was obtained on 27.3.82. The appeal could, therefore, be filed within one month at least from that date. No action, even according to the petitioners case, had been taken within one month from 21.3.82. The period of filing appeal having expired, the authorities cannot be laid to be acting illegally in taking steps in exercise of powers under, section 59 (8) of the Act. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that steps for c1emolition could only be taken under section 78 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of section 78 is as follows :- “No person shall in the area in which the Board undertakes a housing scheme or execution of any of the schemes under section 28, erect, re-erect, construct, add to or alter any building or wall or commence to do so either on land or building owned by him or allotted to him by the Board without prior sanction of the Chairman by submitting a plan showing the proposed construction and provided that the proposed construction is in conformity with rules, regulations and bye laws framed under the provision of this ordinance." The relevant portion of sub-section (4) states :- "If any building or construction work is done without obtaining sanction under sub section (1) of this section or in contravention of the terms and conditions of the sanction, or contravenes the provisions of this ordinance or rules, regulations and bye laws framed under the provision of the ordinance, the Chairman may in addition to the prosecution that may be instituted under this ordinance, make an order, directing that such building or construction work shall be removed by demolition". Thus it is clear that the power of demolition etc. is applicable in the circumstances as mentioned in sub-section (1) and sub-section (4) of section 78. This is not a case where the conditions of section 78 or the Act, arc Ipp1icabi;' Section 59 gives In independent power and if in pursuance of a valid order palled under section 59 an action as contemplated under section 59 (8) is taken we are or the view that section 78 (4) is not bar to the taking of the action as authorised under section S9 (8) of the Act. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners cannot, therefore, be accepted. 13. It was contended that the Board is prevented on the principles of equitable estoppel from treating the constructions made as being unauthorised on the premises of the Board. Reliance in this connection was placed on Annexure “I”. We have already given the gist of the said annexure. It is well settled that one of the essential ingredients to attract the principles of estoppel is that a representation made by one party to another and that the said representation is acted upon. In order to e a binding representation it has to be made3 by the party itself or a person in authority who can bind the party. The alleged representation in Annexure “1” is by the secretary to the Chief Engineer (Technical). It is obvious that a Secretary to the Chief Engineer cannot make a representation of the nature said to have been made in Annexure "1" on behalf of the Board. Even the Chief Engineer (Technical) himself would not be a proper person to make any statement on behalf of the Board in relation to whether a particular piece of land has been acquired by the Board. This, in our view, is sufficient to answer, the contention of the petitioners. Moreover, it is well known that properties acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, are notified in the Gazette under, section 4 as well all under lection 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In this situation it is difficult to appreciate as to why was it necessary to address a letter, a reply whereto is Annexure "1". Any one who wanted to know the correct position could consult the Gazette notifications. It, therefore, appears to us that attempt had been made to create some 80rt of evidence in favour of the petitioners by bringing into collusion persons working in the office of the Board. That is the only explanation for getting a letter of the typo written by a junior officer like secretary to the Chief Engineer (Technical). 14. It was contended that the Act, should not be so read as to authorise the eviction from or demolition of a religious building belonging to a Religious Trust, which has been allowed to be constructed at a heavy cost and without which practice and profession of rellgion by a religious denomination becomes impossible. 14. It was contended that the Act, should not be so read as to authorise the eviction from or demolition of a religious building belonging to a Religious Trust, which has been allowed to be constructed at a heavy cost and without which practice and profession of rellgion by a religious denomination becomes impossible. If the Act, authorises the eviction or demolition of a building in the circumstances aforesaid, it is violative of Article 26 (c) and Article 19 (1) (c) of the constitution. Article 26 (c) gives a right to every religious denomination or any section thereof to own and acquire movable and immovable property. Assuming that the Ashram or the Trust was a religious denomination or a section thereof, it is clear that the Act, does not prevent the owning or acquiring movable and immovable property. What it contemplates is that if there is encroachment on Board premises, the Board is entitled to have the encroachment removed or the encroacher evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. There is no infringement of the Article aforesaid by any of the provisions of the Act. Similarly Article 19 (1) (c) has no application. It gives the right to all citizens to form associations or unions. The Act, does not infringe on the right of citizens as mentioned above. 15. It was contended that the drastic actions taken against tile petitioners is violative of Article 14 of the constitution as no constructions like the petitioners constructions by other religious denominations have been subjected to similar drastic actions. Necessary averments in that connection have not been made in the writ application. It has not been shown that it is a calc of pick and choose without any basis for the same. This argument, therefore, cannot be accepted. 16. We have dealt with all the arguments which have been raised by learned counsel for the petitioners in the course of arguments. A resume of the contentions has been given under the signature of the senior counsel dated 27.5.83 which shall be kept on the record. 17. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents contended that there has been suppression of material facts and as such the writ application is fit to be dismissed. But in the view that we have taken in relation to the main reliefs it is not necessary to express any opinion on this submission. 17. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents contended that there has been suppression of material facts and as such the writ application is fit to be dismissed. But in the view that we have taken in relation to the main reliefs it is not necessary to express any opinion on this submission. 18 We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the action already taken or the action which may be taken in future by the authorities for evicting the petitioners from the Board premises in exercise of powers under section 59 (8) of the Act, is legal and valid. The petitioners cannot be held to be entitled to the main reliefs in relation to eviction as claimed in this writ application. 19. There is one matter which does not appear to have been specifically raised in the Court of argument but since we find infirmity in that regard in the impugned order, we propose to deal with the same. The claim of the Board was that it was entitled to award of damagea. The application filed before the Competent authority (which is a part of the record which was produced before this Court) shows that damages to the extent of Rs. 1,97,143.04 P was claimed up to August 1980 and thereafter damages at the rate of Rs. 382.48 P per day was claimed from September 1980 till the vacation of the Board premises. The Competent Authority has allowed the claim of the Board in that regard and baa awarded damages to the extent of Rs. 4,09,516.80 P and future damages as claimed. The order does not disclose as to what was the basis for coming to the conclusion that the claim of damages at the rate of Rs. 382, 48 P per day was justified. The Competent Authority, therefore erred in allowing the damages as stated above without disclosing any basis for the same. We would, therefore, quash that part of the order of the competent Authority (Annexure (D) which awards the damages as aforementioned. But we would make it clear that it would be open to the said authority to re-determine the damages in accordance with law after giving notice to the parties concerned and after permitting them to adduce materials or evidence in support of their respective contentions in relation to the award for past and future damages. 20. But we would make it clear that it would be open to the said authority to re-determine the damages in accordance with law after giving notice to the parties concerned and after permitting them to adduce materials or evidence in support of their respective contentions in relation to the award for past and future damages. 20. In the result, this writ application is dismissed except in relation to that portion of the order of the Competent Authority dated 11.2.82, a copy whereof is Annexure D to the counter-affidavit, which relates to the award of past and future damages. The Competent Authority must proceed in relation to the determination of the claim of damages in accordance with law and in the light of the directions as given above. Application dismissed.