Judgment :- 1. The accused in C. C. No. 95 of 1982 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trivandrum, now working as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Detachment, Alwaye, has filed this petition under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the'Code') seeking to quash the proceedings against him. 2. The complaint relates to certain alleged acts of the petitioner in November, 1981 when he was working as Circle Inspector of Police, Crime Detachment, Alleppey and in-charge of investigation of Crime No. 248 of 1981 of Kayamkalam Police Station in which it is said that the complainant 1st respondent herein is the 1st accused. It is alleged in the complaint filed against the petitioner herein that on account of the previous ill-feeling and with the object of implicating the complainant in a capital offence and thereby ruin his status and life and with a view to detain him wrongfully and by threat and intimidation compel him to make a confession, on 21-11-1981 at about noon, the petitioner unlawfully entered the building near R. S. S. office in Trivandrum and took away the complainant from there forcibly in K.L.A. 5666 police jeep to Cantonment Police Station and from thereto Rajadhani Tourist Home in Fort and from there to Palayam Aruna Lodge and from thereto Palayam Cantonment Camp and then to a room in the building housing Alleppey Circle Detachment office and wrongfully confined him there till 3 p. m. on 24-11-1981 without even allowing him facilities to answer calls of nature. During this period the petitioner threatened and intimidated the complainant to make a confession in regard to the case in which the complainant was to be implicated by saying that he will not be allowed to live. Meanwhile a Habeas Corpus petition as O.P.No. 6248 of 1981 was filed in this Court in regard to the unlawful detention and coming to know of this, the petitioner created false records to the effect that the complainant was arrested on 24-11-1981 at 3 P.M. at Thampanoor Bus Stand and showed him as accused in Crime No.248 of 1981 of Kayamkulam Police Station and produced him before the Haripad Magistrate's court. It is further alleged that the petitioner is guilty of offences under S.348,346 and 506(2) IPC. 3. Learned Magistrate took the case on file and issued process to the petitioner. It is further alleged that the petitioner is guilty of offences under S.348,346 and 506(2) IPC. 3. Learned Magistrate took the case on file and issued process to the petitioner. Petitioner thereupon raised a contention that the prosecution is unsustainable for want of sanction. Learned Magistrate overruled this contention under Ext. P2 order dated 13-4-1983. It is this order which is now sought to be quashed. 4. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that arrest of a suspect or an accused in a crime case and interrogation are entirely within the scope and authority of an investigating police officer and the allegations in the complaint disclosed only such official acts, though the allegations are twisted to show that the petitioner has traversed beyond the scope of his authority and committed certain illegal acts. Therefore, it is submitted that sanction for prosecution is necessary under S.197 (1)(b) of the Code. 5. In support of the above contention, learned counsel places reliance on the decisions reported in Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu (AIR. 1955 SC. 309); Somchand Sanghvi v. Bibhuti Bhusaii Chakravarthy (AIR. 1965 SC. 588); Baijnath v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR. 1966 SC. 220); Srivastava v. Misra (AIR. 1970 SC. 1661); B. Saha v. M. S. Kochar (AIR. 1979 SC. 1841); Manohar Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (AIR. 1983 SC. 610); Abdulla Muhammed v. N. Paramasivan Nair (1983 KLT. 942); and in Sanjeeve v. Luis (1980 KLT. 937). 5A. Learned counsel for the first respondent contended that there was no arrest when the complaint was taken away unlawfully and his subsequent detention is not in pursuance of an arrest nor for the purpose of interrogation, but only with a view to obtain a confession forcibly. These acts have no reasonable connection with the official duties of the investigator and therefore sanction is not necessary. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions reported in H. H. B. Gill v. The King (AIR. 1948 P. C. 128); K. Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1960 SC. 266); The State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal and others (AIR. 1964 SC. 33), State of Maharashtra v. Narhar Rao (AIR. 1966 SC. 1783); State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram and others (AIR. 1966 SC. 1786) and some of the decisions relied on by the petitioner. 6. 1960 SC. 266); The State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal and others (AIR. 1964 SC. 33), State of Maharashtra v. Narhar Rao (AIR. 1966 SC. 1783); State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram and others (AIR. 1966 SC. 1786) and some of the decisions relied on by the petitioner. 6. I do not think, a detailed reference to these decisions is necessary since the correct position has been fairly well established. The purpose underlying the provisions in the Code relating to sanction is to protect public servants who in the discharge of their official duties commit certain acts which may subsequently be regarded as criminal acts. This is necessary in order to ensure that public servants perform their duties without fear or favour. At the same time, public interest requires that this protection should not be available when offences are committed by public servants not under the colour of office and not in the discharge of duties or purported discharge of duties. S.197(1) of the Code refers to any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. If the words are construed too narrowly, the section itself will be otiose; i. e. because it is no part of an official duty of a public servant to commit an offence. If the words are interpreted too liberally they can take in every act constituting an offence committed in the course of the transaction in which official duties are performed or purported to be performed. Courts have accepted the golden mean between these two extremes. While it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duties which is entitled to protection; an act constituting an offence and which is directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution for such act. There must be a reasonable nexus between the act and the official duty. They must be so interrelated that one can reasonably say that the act was done by the public servant in the discharge of his official duties. There must be something in the nature and character of the act that attaches to it official character of the person doing it. They must be so interrelated that one can reasonably say that the act was done by the public servant in the discharge of his official duties. There must be something in the nature and character of the act that attaches to it official character of the person doing it. The usual test is, can the public servant when his action is challenged reasonably claim that what he did, he did in virtue of his office. When he claims that he did the act in the course of performance of his official duties, that must be a reasonable claim and not a fanciful or pretended one. It does not matter if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of his official duty and if it is in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation or if it is done under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such a duty or even in dereliction of duty. The question is whether the act is so integrally connected with the duties attached to the office as to be inseparable from them. I that be so, public servant is protected. If there is no necessary connection between the act and the performance of his duty and if the official status furnishes only an occasion or opportunity to the act, there could be no protection. It is the quality of the act that is important. If it falls within the scope and range of his official duties, though in excess of his authority or in dereliction of his official duty, he will be protected. If it falls outside the scope and range of his duties there can be no protection. If the act complained of is done under the colour of his office and is reasonably connected with his official duty, he would be protected. 7. No doubt, arrest of an accused person or a suspect and interrogation falls squarely within the scope and range of official duties of an investigating officer. But it is no part of his duty to forcibly take a person away without arrest and wrongfully detain him and subject him to threats and intimidation. The materials before the court at present consist of only the complaint and the sworn statement. They do not disclose that the acts alleged therein were preceded by an arrest. But it is no part of his duty to forcibly take a person away without arrest and wrongfully detain him and subject him to threats and intimidation. The materials before the court at present consist of only the complaint and the sworn statement. They do not disclose that the acts alleged therein were preceded by an arrest. It is unnecessary for me in this case, at this stage, to consider what would be the position if at the time when the complainant was alleged to have been taken away forcibly there was an arrest, for such an arrest is not disclosed on the materials now on record. What is disclosed is only the act of forcibly taking away sans arrest, unlawful detention and attempt to obtain a false confession by force and intimidation. The fact that all these acts are attributed to an officer investigating a crime case does not necessarily mean that these acts are done or purported to have been done by him by virtue or under the colour of his office or that they are so integrally connected with his duties as to be inseparable from them. The acts disclosed at this stage cannot have any reasonable nexus with his official duties. In these circumstances, I have to hold that the provisions of S.197 of the Code are not attracted to the materials disclosed in this case at this stage. This is not to say that at a future stage, on the materials then on record, the petitioner will be precluded from contending that sanction is necessary. I see no reason to quash the proceedings as they now stand. In the result, the Crl. M.C. is dismissed.