B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) BY this group of 40 petitions the respective petitioners who represent the private management of primary approved schools separating within the jurisdiction of different Municipalities or Distict Panchayats in the State challenge the amendments in the Bombay Primary Education Rules 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1949 seeking to regulate the matter of recognition of such schools and their continuance by linking them inter alia with compliance of Schedule F containing the Model Standing Orders governing the teachers-management relations. In all these petitions the challenge to the amendments in the rules is founded on the same contentions though in three of them namely Sp. C. A. Nos. 1353 of 1978 982 of 1978 and 820 of 1978 over and above the common reliefs sought in this group the individual orders or actions of the Government are also challenged. The nature of the school management in the majority of the petitions is by and through public trusts and in a few of them it is a proprietory managment. ( 2 ) SP. C. A. Nos. 820 of 1978 972 of 1979 and 1323 of 1979 are schools run by religious minorities. Except this peculiar feature the contentions urged in all these petitions are by and large common and in similar terms and the reliefs claimed are also the same except in the aforesaid petitions where the individual action is challenged and therefore we propose to dispose of the entire group except the aforesaid three petitions by the minority communities by this common judgment. However in order to appreciate the contentions which have been urged it would be profitable to set out the facts from the first petition which we had taken up for hearing viz. Special Civil Application No. 305 of 1979 which will serve as sample facts. ( 3 ) IT should be noted at the outset that the majority out of this group is by the school managements operating in Ahmedabad city and Ahmedabad (Rural) district. They are as may as 16. The other major group is from Baroda. The rest are from Kheda Mehsana Sabarkantha Banaskantha Rajkot Surendranagar Bhavnagar and Amreli. ( 3 ) IT should be noted at the outset that the majority out of this group is by the school managements operating in Ahmedabad city and Ahmedabad (Rural) district. They are as may as 16. The other major group is from Baroda. The rest are from Kheda Mehsana Sabarkantha Banaskantha Rajkot Surendranagar Bhavnagar and Amreli. The relevant facts which we have taken from Special Civil Application No. 305 of 1979 should be referred to as sample facts representing the facts of these different petitions and they are as under: ( 4 ) AS many as 39 school managements have been approved as petitioners in Spl. C. A. No. 305 of 1979. The schools are managed by public trusts or as proprietory concerns. These school managements charge fees for imparting tuition to the students admitted in standards I to VII in their respective schools in the range of Rs. 10. 00 to Rs. 20. 00per month. All these schools are approved schools and the recognition has been conferred on them under the Bombay Primary Education Act 1947 read with the Rules of 1949. The recognition has been granted to these school managements in different years between 1953 and 1972. None of the schools receive any grant from the State Government under the Grant-in-Aid Code. On 18/11/1971 the Administrative Officer of the Ahmedabad Municipal School Board issued a circular bearing No. 67 whereby the managements of these approved schools were informed that the School Board has decided vide its Resolution No. 10 2/10/1972 and to which sanction was accorded by the Director of Education vide his letter of 26/07/1972 that the teachers serving in all the private schools should be paid minimum pay-scales as prescribed therein namely Rs. 100 per month to untrained teachers Rs. 120-210 to junior trained and senior trained teachers the latter shall be entitled to two increments while fixing their salary in the new scales dearness and other allowances as admissible from time to time under the orders of the District Education Committees. 100 per month to untrained teachers Rs. 120-210 to junior trained and senior trained teachers the latter shall be entitled to two increments while fixing their salary in the new scales dearness and other allowances as admissible from time to time under the orders of the District Education Committees. The managements should pay all the arrears of the salary and allowances with effect from 1-4-1973 by another circular bearing No. 5 of 5-4-73 the managements were informed that the School Board has resolved by Resolution No. 324 of 29/03/1973 and as sanctioned by the Director of Education vide his letter of 7/02/1973 to revise the salary and allowances as prescribed under the earlier Circular of 18/11/1972 The revised scales for untrained teachers were Rs. 110-140 and for trained teachers Rs. 135 The managements were advised to implement the directions accordingly. It was also clarified that the rate of dearness allowance and other allowances remain unchanged. The managements were also advised by the Administrative Officer vide his circular No. 6/04/1973 that the revised pay-scales were to be effective from 1/06/1973 and not from 1/04/1973 By another circular No. 8/01/1973 the rates of dearness allowance house rent allowance and other allowances to be paid to the teachers were prescribed. By a subsequent circular No. 10 of 26/04/1973 the rate of dearness allowance was revised. Again by circular No. 5 5/01/1976 the managements were directed that the revised pay as prescribed by the Second Pay Commission shall have to be paid to primary teachers in the employment of private school managements with effect from 1/01/1973 It should be noted at this stage though it is not specifically averred in Sp. C. A. No. 305 of 1979 and which averment is to be found in other petition being Sp. C A. No. 1899 of 1979 that at the time when it was decided to implement the pay-scales recommended by the Desai Pay Commission to the staff of private primary schools a number of petitions were filed before this Court seeking appropriate writs orders and directions against the payment of salaries and allowances etc. in terms of the recommendations of Desai Pay Commission. However those petitions were required to be withdrawn since the Chapter relating to fundamental rights as a sequel to Presidents declaration of Emergency was suspended. in terms of the recommendations of Desai Pay Commission. However those petitions were required to be withdrawn since the Chapter relating to fundamental rights as a sequel to Presidents declaration of Emergency was suspended. The petitions were allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to move the Court afresh as and when the Emergency was lifted. However this Court had recommended to the State Government to consider the question of payment of appropriate grant to these primary schools so as to enable them to implement the recommendations of Desai Pay Commission since otherwise it was virtually impossible for the school managements to meet with the staggering liability arising as a result thereof. It appears that the Education Department of the State Government has therefore issued a Resolution on 29/06/1977 recording the decision of the State Government on careful consideration of all the relevant aspects that the Government shall bear and pay to the school managements operating in rural area 90% of the actual deficit being the amount of difference between the actual receipts and expenses and to the extent of 80% of such deficit to the schools operating in municipal area. The said Resolution further clarified that for purposes of working out the actual admissible grant the receipts will be calculated on the basis of minimum monthly fee of Rs. 6. 00 and Rs. 8. 00 in rural and municipal areas respectively irrespective of the actual amount of fees charged by the schools concerned operating in either of the areas. However the school managements charging fees in excess of Rs 15/- per month would not be entitled to any grantin aid from the State Government and in cases of those schools which have terminated the services of the teachers in their employment for inability to pay salary and allowances to them in terms of the recommendations of the Desai Pay Commission grant would be paid only if they are reinstated in the services. ( 5 ) THE petitioners of Sp. ( 5 ) THE petitioners of Sp. C. A. No. 305 of 1979 which is the first petition filed in this group of petitions apprehended that their recognitions were likely to be cancelled at any time on the ground that the petitioners ware not paying salary to the employees working in the schools of the petitioners according to the recommendations of Desai Pay Commission and therefore they have this Court for appropriate writs orders and directions to quash and set aside rules 106 107 109 and (4) and 116 of the Rules of 1949 as ultra vires the Bombay Primary Education Act 1947 and also for quashing and setting aside the various circulars of the State Government in the matter of fixation of pay and allowances and enjoining the State Government and the Municipal School Board as well as its Adminis- trative Officer not to enforce the provisions contained in the impugned rules and the circulars and such other appropriate reliefs as may be thought fit and proper by the Court. ( 6 ) THE grounds on which the rules and circulars have been sought to be challenged are as under : (1) The regulations prescribed in the amended Schedule F by the Gujarat Amendment Rules 1978 seeking to govern the conditions of services of the teachers in private schools including the pay and allowances the discipline and conduct and the retirement benefits are ultra vires the Bombay Primary Education Act inasmuch as the Act does not contemplate much less provide in that behalf. (2) The aforesaid amended rules including Schedule F are bad in law and void since they have not been published and/or laid before the State Legislature as required by the Act. (3) Inasmuch as the aforesaid amended Schedule F regulations governing the conditions of services of the teachers including their pay and allowances have no nexus with the standards promotion development and expansion of primary education they cannot be said to be in the nature of reasonable restrictions as permissible under Article 19 of the Constitution and therefore the impugned circulars issued in exercise of the powers conferred by the said Regulations are bad in law and void. (4) Assuming that the aforesaid Schedule F is intra vires the Act the impugned circulars issued by the Administrative Officer under the sanction of the Director of Education prescribing the pay and allowances of teachers working in private schools are bad in law and void inasmuch as the Director of Education being delegate of the State Government had no jurisdiction authority or power to prescribe the pay-scales and allowances under clause 1 of Schedule F on the principle that the State Government could not have sub-delegated its power to the Director while enacting the subordinate legislation. (5) Rule 106 as amended by the Gujarat Amendment Rules 1978 does not apply to the schools which have been recognized prior to coming into force of the amendment and the schools which have been once recognized as approved schools shall continue to be so recognized unless their recognition is capable of being withdrawn under Rule 109 (2 ). (6) The power conferred on the competent authority under Rule 109 (2) for withdrawal of the recognition is uncontrolled and unfettered since the aggrieved management has no statutory right to prefer appeal against it and therefore it is uncanalised and arbitrary power and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) OVER and above the common grounds special ground which has been raised in two other petitions namely Sp. C. A. Nos. 1853 of 1958 and 952 of 1978 is challenging the individual action of derecognition or threatening to de-recognize. By Sp. C. A. No. 1853 of 1978 the chairman of Nutan Shikshan Sangh of village Umalla in Jhagadia taluka of Bharuch district has further challenged the order made by the Administrative officers of Jilla Panchayat cancelling the recognition granted to the Navdurga High School Umalla for terminating the services of one Shri Bhogilal Lallubhai Patel with effect from 19/08/1978 in clear breach of the provisions contained in clause 11 of Schedule F prescribing the procedure before terminating the services. The Special ground raised in this petition is that the impugned order of de-recognition was bad in law and void inasmuch as the Administrative Officer of the District Panchayat has no jurisdiction power or authority to make the order of de-recognition since he was not competent authority and in any case the District Education Committee could not by have done so without the appropriate recommendation in that behalf the Competent Officer as prescribed in Rule 109 (2) of the 1949 Rules. ( 8 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 952 of 1978 one of the petitioners namely petitioner No. 11 who is the representative of the school management running the school in the name of Shakti Vidya Primary School Gita Mandir Road Ahmedabad appears to have been aggrieved by the notice of 2/05/1978 of the Administrative Officer of the Municipal School Board by which he intimated the management that the recognition was liable to be cancelled with effect from 1-6-1978 if the management fails to make payment of the salary and allowance in terms of the recommendations of the Desai Pay Commission with effect from 1/06/1977 since the recognition was continued on that condition upto 31/05/1978. The ground of challenge to this notice is similar to one which we have stated for Sp. C. A. No. 1853 of 1978. ( 9 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 820 of 1978 by Mr. Benson Cnock Samuel Deputy Director of Classical Primary Schools Behrampura Ahmedabad; Sp. C. A. No. 972 of 1979 by Saint Peters Englis School Trust Ahmedabad and Special Civil Appln. No. 1323 of 1978 by Gracious Education Trust Ahmedabad are petitions by the religious minorities challenging the regulatory measures contained in the amended Schedule F of the Bombay Primary Education Rules 1949 as ultra vires Article 30 of the Constitution of India. These three Special Civil Applications have been disposed of by a separate common judgment since over and above the general grounds raised in this group of petitions they raised special ground of the impugned resolution violating Art. 30 of the Constitution. ( 10 ) BEFORE we take up these various challenges it would be profitable to understand the Scheme of the Act and the Rules and the relevant provisions which have a bearing on the questions raised in this group of petitions. ( 10 ) BEFORE we take up these various challenges it would be profitable to understand the Scheme of the Act and the Rules and the relevant provisions which have a bearing on the questions raised in this group of petitions. ( 11 ) THE Bombay Primary Education Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Act) had been placed on the statute book with effect from 29/01/1948 and was adopted and modified by the State of Gujarat by the Gujarat Adoption of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order 1980 It is an Act which seeks to provide for compulsory primary education and to make better provisions for the management and control of primary education in the State. The preamble to the Act reiterates that in the discharge of the duty of the Government to secure the development and expansion of primary education and for the purpose of implementing the declared policy of the Government for universal free and compulsory primary education by a definite programme of progressive expansion and for making better provisions for the development expansion management and control of primary education the Act was placed on the statute book. Broadly stated the objectives for which the Act has been enacted and placed on the statute book are sought to be achieved by imparting primary education through primary schools which can be classified into two broad categories namely public schools and private schools. Public schools comprise of those primary schools maintained by the State Government or by District School Board or by authorised Municipality and the powers exercised by the District School Board constituted under the Act and functioning immediately before the date of the notification by the State Government in exercise of its powers under sec. 155 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 devolved on and are to be exercised and performed by the Taluka Panchayats and District Panchayats functioning in that local area within the jurisdiction of such District School Boards. The public schools therefore now comprise of primary schools maintained by the State Government or by an authorised municipality or by the District Panchayat Private schools are those schools which do not fall within the category of public schools. However in order to maintain the uniform standards and norms in imparting primary education these private schools should be recognized as approved schools. However in order to maintain the uniform standards and norms in imparting primary education these private schools should be recognized as approved schools. In order to be approved schools private schools should be recognized either by the School Board or the State Government or by an authorised officer. Once a private school is recognized as approved school it shall have to abide by the provisions of Rules 122 to 140 of the Bombay Primary Education Rules 1949 It will also be entitled to be placed on the register of approved schools. An approved school continues to enjoy the recognition which has been granted till it is withdrawn by the competent authority which in a case of school maintained by the Municipality the School Board and in case of those maintained by District Panchayat the District Education Committee. The withdrawal of recognition is inter alia for breach of the conditions of recognition. The State Government has been empowered to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and inter alia for any of the matters prescribed under the Act. The relevant provisions which contain the scheme as aforesaid and which have a bearing on the questions which have been raised in these petitions may be briefly referred to. ( 12 ) SEC. 2 (2) defines `approved school to mean a primary school maintained by the State Government or by a school board or by an authorised Municipality or which is for the time being recognized as such by a school board or the State Government or by an officer authorized by it in this behalf. Authorized municipality according to sec. 2 means a municipality which is authorized by the State Government under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 16 of the Act to control all approved schools within its area. `district School Board would mean under sec. 2 (10) of the Act a school board constituted for a district under sec 3 of the Act. Sec. 3 of the Act provides for two different types of school boards namely District School Board for each of the districts and Municipal School Board for each area of an authorized municipality. District School Board has been invested under sec. 2 (10) of the Act a school board constituted for a district under sec 3 of the Act. Sec. 3 of the Act provides for two different types of school boards namely District School Board for each of the districts and Municipal School Board for each area of an authorized municipality. District School Board has been invested under sec. 13 of the Act with a power of control over all approved schools within the district and to grant aid to any approved school other than primary schools maintained by the State Government or by the School Board or by authorised municipality. Sec. 16 empowers the State Government to authorise any municipality constituted under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 or under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 or under any other corresponding law to control all approved schools within its area. The Municipal School Board to responsible under sec. 16 for the management and control of all primary schools which vest in the authorised municipality and also for the control of all other approved schools within the area of authorised municipality excepting such as are maintained by the State Government. Sec. 39 provides for recognition of and grants to the approved schools under the private management. This provision has an important bearing on the questions raised in these petitions and it is necessary to set out the said provision which reads as under:"39 (1) Every Primary School other than a primary school maintained by the State Government or by a school board or by an authorised municipality which fulfils the conditions prescribed in this behalf shall be entitled to recognition as an approved school. (2) Such recognition shall be given by the school board or by the State Government or by an officer authorised by it in this behalf and the manner in which grant-in-aid is to be given to such approved school shall be as prescribed". ( 13 ) SECTION 39 (2) provides that the manner of granting recognition and also grant-in-aid is as prescribed in the Rules. ( 13 ) SECTION 39 (2) provides that the manner of granting recognition and also grant-in-aid is as prescribed in the Rules. Section 63 provides for a rule making power for the State Government which is another important provision in the context of which contentions have been urged challenging the vires of the provision and it would be therefore necessary to set out the material part of the said section So far as relevant for our purposes which reads as under:"63 (1) The State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision such rules may be made for all or any of the following matters : (a) to (e) xx xx xx (ca) provident funds gratuities and pensions for the primary school teachers maintained by an authorised municipality; (f) the rates of subscriptions and contributions and other conditions of the provident fund established for the staff maintained by district school boards. (fa) the conditions of gratuities and pensions for the staff referred to in clause (f): (g) to (i) xx xx x (j) matters to be prescribed under this Act. (3) Rules made under sub-secs. (1) and (4) shall be made after previous publications (4) All rules made under this Act shall be laid for not less than thirty days before the State Legislature as soon as possible after they are made and shall be subject to such modifications as the State Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid or the session immediately following. The modifications so made shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall thereupon take effect. ( 14 ) THE relevant rules which have bearing on the questions raised in these petitions are contained in Chapter VII which is captioned as Approved Schools. Rule 103 provides that every approved school shall conform to the conditions prescribed in rules 122 to 140 of the said Rules subject to the exemption being granted by the Deputy Educational Inspector of the District to any particular school or class of schools in the locality. Rule 105 provides for maintenance of a register of approved schools. Rule 103 provides that every approved school shall conform to the conditions prescribed in rules 122 to 140 of the said Rules subject to the exemption being granted by the Deputy Educational Inspector of the District to any particular school or class of schools in the locality. Rule 105 provides for maintenance of a register of approved schools. Rule 106 is an important rule and the validity of clause (c) of sub-rule (3) thereof has been challenged and it is therefore necessary to set out this rule so far as material for our purposes:"106 An application for recognition of a private school as an approved school shall be made to the Deputy Educational Inspector of the District in which the School is situated. (2) Such application shall be made after the school has been actually started and has been in existence for at least three months and shall be accompanied by a statement in Form A set out in Appendix C to these rules together with an undertaking in writing that the conditions of employment of teachers in the school shall be as near as possible to those specified in Schedule F. No such application shall be entertained for any school year unless it is made before the 1 November of the year. 15 It should be noted at this stage that the said clause (c) has been brought in by the amendment in the rules known as Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1978 In order to appreciate the contentions which have been urged in support of the challenge to the validity of clause (c) it is necessary to refer as to what the rule was before the amendment was effected and what is precisely the amendment made in 1978. Rule 106 comprised of three sub-rules. Sub-rule (1) provided that an application for recognition is to be made to Deputy District Educational Inspector of the District concerned. Sub-rule (2) provided that such an application can be made three months after the school comes into existence and shall be accompanied inter alia by written undertaking on behalf of the school management that the conditions of employment of teachers in the school shall be as near as possible to those appointed in Schedule F. Sub-rule (3) enjoined that every approved private school shall have a duly authorised correspondent whose name and address shall be communicated to the school board. Now this sub-rule (3) of rule 106 was amended for the first time with effect from 9/05/1967 by the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1967 Formal amendments were made in sub-rules (1) and (2 ). In sub-rule (1) instead of words the Deputy Educational Inspector of the District in which the school is situated the words competent Officer were substituted. The amendment made is sub-rule (2) need not be referred as it is not important. The new sub-rule (3) was substituted in place of the old one. The main enactment of sub-rule (3) provided that every primary school which fulfils the conditions specified in clauses (a) to (f) thereof shall be entitled to recognition as approved school. The first condition provided in clause (a) is that there should be a need in the locality and would not involve unhealthy competition with any existing primary school. The second condition was that the school must be maintained by a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 which must be financially stable and in a position to pay salaries of the teachers regularly and also to make provision for adequate accommodation furniture equipment sanitary arrangements playgrounds and other necessary amenities for the students. The third condition in clause (c) of sub-rule (3) enjoined the managing body of the trust or the society to give undertaking to abide by the orders or instructions issued by the competent authority regarding the working of the school. The 4th condition in clause (d) provided for regulations of admissions according to the rules approved by the competent authority. Clause (a) which is material for our purposes is as under:" (A) subject to the orders of the Director of Education the fees rates the pay scales and allowances are regulated according to the scales approved by the Competent Authority; clause (f) enjoined that the Managing Body of the trust or the society which maintains the school shall indicate the name and address of person to whom the communications should be addressed. ( 15 ) BY the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat 3rd Amendment) Rules 1970 again sub-rule (2) is amended with effect from 10/09/1971 Again this is an important amendment and therefore the new sub-rule (2) which has substituted sub-rule (2) as it then existed should be set out which reads as under:" (2) Such application shall be made before the school has been actually started and shall be accompanied by statement in Form A set out in appendix-C appended to these rules together with an undertaking in writing that the conditions of employment of teachers in the school shall be those specified in Schedule-F. No such application shall be entertained for any school unless it is made before 31 December preceding the academic year from which recognition is applied for". ( 16 ) BY the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1978 which came into force with effect from 28/12/1978 clause (e) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 105 was again amended which reads as under:" (E) The managing body of the Trust or the Society shall pay to the staff of the school conducted by it such salary on such pay scale as may be approved by the State Government from time to time". ( 17 ) AT this stage it should be noted that Schedule F as it originally prescribed in the Rules laid down model conditions of employment of teachers in private schools. It is not necessary to set out elaborately as to what were the precise terms of these model conditions Suffice it to say that it provided for the minimum and maximum age limits of the appointee (vide clause 4 (a) their qualifications (cl. 7) their confirmation cl. (6) their promotion (cl. 5) their leave (cl. 8 9 and 10) conduct and discipline (cl. 4) procedure for imposition of penalties (cl. 11) penalties (cl. 16) appeal (cl. 17) and retirement benefits (cl. 27 ). As regards the scales of pay there were no prescribed scales in clause 1 which provided for pay. This Schedule F was amended for the first time by the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1967 Clause 1 was amended so as to read that the scales of pay and allowances for the teaching staff shall be in accordance with the scales of pay and allowances laid down by the Director from time to time. This Schedule F was amended for the first time by the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1967 Clause 1 was amended so as to read that the scales of pay and allowances for the teaching staff shall be in accordance with the scales of pay and allowances laid down by the Director from time to time. There were minor amendments in other clauses to which we need not refer to since they are not of much relevance to us in this group of petitions. ( 18 ) SCHEDULE F as it stood after the amendment in 1967 was drastically altered and entirely new set of conditions was incorporated in Schedule F which has given rise to this state of litigation. By clause 1 the manner of appointment of teachers was prescribed. Clause 1 provided for minimum age qualification of 18 years. The maximum age bar of 25 years was removed. Sub-clause (2) of clause 1 is an important provision which requires to be met out. It reads as under:" (2) The managing body of the trust of the Society shall constitute for the purpose of selecting teachers for appointment in the school a selection committes consisting of the following persons namely : (i) One representative of the managing body of the trust or the society; (iii) The head master of the school; (iv) One representative of the Administrative Officer. ( 19 ) CLAUSE 1 (3) requires a candidate for a post in the staff of the school to submit his application to the Head of the School stating his qualifications experience etc. and on his appointment either as a temporary or on probation or on a permanent vacancy a clear order of appointment containing the conditions governing the employment is to be furnished to him. Such appointment order is to make it specifically clear whether it is temporary probationary or permanent; the scale of salary and the duration of appointment in case it is either temporary or on probation. Clause 2 provides for letter of acceptance of appointment of the teacher concerned. Clause 3 provides as to what is the distinction between temporary and permanent employee. Clause 4 provides for the period of probation. Clause 6 provides for qualifications. Clause 7 provides for training. Clause 9 which provides for scale of salaries is important. Clause 2 provides for letter of acceptance of appointment of the teacher concerned. Clause 3 provides as to what is the distinction between temporary and permanent employee. Clause 4 provides for the period of probation. Clause 6 provides for qualifications. Clause 7 provides for training. Clause 9 which provides for scale of salaries is important. It provides as under:"9 Scale of Salaries Scales of pay and allowance payable to the teaching and non-teaching staff shall be such as may be approved by the State Government from time to time". ( 20 ) CLAUSE 10 to Clause 12 provide for leave. Clause 15 provides for termination of services of a teacher. This is again an important clause which reads as under:"13 (1) Termination of Services of a Teacher the management of a private school shall not terminate otherwise than as a measure of penalty the services of any permanent trained teachers without the previous permission of an Administrative Officer. (2) A permanent trained teacher whose services are terminated with the permission of the Administrative Officer after three years of his service shall be entitled to a compensation (a) equal to 6 months salary including allowances if the employee has put in service in the school for a period not exceeding five years and (b) equal to six months salary including allowances for the first five years and a months salary for every year of the period exceeding five years if the employee has put in service in the school for a period exceeding five years: Provided that total compensation payable under clause (a) or (b) shall not exceed twelve months salary including allowances: Provided further that in the case of a teacher on Inquiry Committee shall be constituted consisting of the following persons namely : (i) one representative of the management (iii) the Head Master of the school and (iii) a representative of the concerned teacher and accordingly the formal inquiry against the teacher shall be held by the said committee instead of the management or an inquiry officer as if where the context so requires for the words the management or inquiry officer the word Inquiry Committee had been substituted. Clause 14 provides for confirmation of employees on completion of probation. Clause 15 provides the procedure to be followed at the inquiry to be held for terminating the services of a permanent employee. Clause 14 provides for confirmation of employees on completion of probation. Clause 15 provides the procedure to be followed at the inquiry to be held for terminating the services of a permanent employee. Clause 16 provides for the minor and major penalties. Clause 18 provides the procedure for imposing major penalties of reduction in rank compulsory retirement removal or dismissal from service. Clause 19 provides for the procedure for imposing minor penalties. Clause 20 provides for joint inquiry and clause 21 provides for dispensing with the inquiry in case where the delinquent is convicted. Clause 22 provides for payment of subsistance allowance to a suspended employee. Clause 23 provides for appropriate directions in the matter of pay and allowances and how the absence from duty to be treated in case of reinstatement. Clause 24 provides for appeals against the orders of suspension or imposition of penalties. Clauses 25 to 28 provide for consequential matter in connection with the appeals. Clause 29 provides for revision. Clause 30 provides for appeals against orders other than those of suspension or penalty. Clause 31 provides for termination of services of probationary teacher. Clause 34 provides for the age of superannuation of teachers. The other clauses thereafter are pertaining to discharge certificate general conditions of service marking attendance in the school provident fund and vacation period and the teachers record and service book which are again not of much importance for our purposes. . ( 21 ) THE next set of rules it should be noted is rules 108 and 109. Rule 108 provides for the benefit of recognition. Recognition as an approved school entitles the management of the school to send its pupils at any public examination held by the Education Department of the State Government; present its pupils as candidates for scholarships and to claim such other benefits as Government may from time to time declare. Rule 109 is an important rule since the validity of sub-rules (2) and (4) thereof are challenged in these petitions. It should be noted that Rule 109 as it originally stood in the Rules before its amendment by the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1967 comprised of two sub-rules which read as under:"109 Withdrawal of recognition- (1) A private school which is once recognised as an approved school shall continue to be so recognised unless its recognition is withdrawn under sub-rule2 ). (2) Such recognition may at any timee be withdrawn by the school board on the recommendation of the Deputy Educational Inspector if any of the conditions on which the school was recognised is not observed or if the standard of instruction in the school falls materially below the level obtaining public schools or for other reasonable and sufficient cause. Provided that due warning has been given to the managers of the school and that reasonable time has been allowed to them to carry out requirements of the School Board; provided further that a school which is aggrieved by the decision of the School Board withdrawing recognition may submit an appeal to the Educational Inspector of the District whose decision shall be final. ( 22 ) THE effect of the aforesaid amendment in sub-rule (2) is that the ranks of the officer to make recommendation for withdrawal of recognition and the authority to take decision in that behalf were slightly changed and they are described as Competent Officer and Competent Authority as defined in Rule 102-A (a) which was inserted for the first time in Chapter VII in the preliminary section A thereof. The Competent Authority would now mean District Panchayat in cases of primary schools situated in areas other than those of Gandhinagar and Dangs districts where the School Boards would be Competent Authority. Similarly Administrative Officer of the District Panchayat and Deputy Educational Inspector would respectively be Competent Officers for the aforesaid two areas. By the same amending Rules of 1967 two more sub-rules were added in rule 109 as sub-rules (3) and (4 ). Sub- rule (3) provides for a period of limitation of thirty days for preferring an appeal against the decision of the Competent Authority withdrawing recognition. Sub-rule (4) in effect provided that if a private primary school recognized as an approved school under the Rules fails to get registration either under the Bombay Public Trusts Act or the Societies Registration Act within six months from the commencement of the said Rules that is 9/05/1967 the recognition was liable to be withdrawn. Sub-rule (4) in effect provided that if a private primary school recognized as an approved school under the Rules fails to get registration either under the Bombay Public Trusts Act or the Societies Registration Act within six months from the commencement of the said Rules that is 9/05/1967 the recognition was liable to be withdrawn. Rule 109 was again amended by Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat 2nd Amendment) Rules 1969 with effect from 26/11/1969 In the second proviso to sub-rule (2) as it stood before the 1969 amendment the order of District Educational Inspector on an appeal preferred by a management aggrieved by the decision of the Competent Authority to withdraw recognition was made final. This was amended and the effect thereof is that his decision is final subject to any orders passed by the State Government under sub-rule (5) which again was sought to be inserted in Rule 109 by the 1969 Rules. Sub-rule (5) in effect invested the State Government with the revisional power to satisfy itself about the correctness of the order made by the Competent Authority or the order made by the District Educational Inspector in appeal in the matter of withdrawal of recognition and the State Government can after holding such inquiry as it may think fit modify annull or reverse the order as it may deem fit provided that if such order is likely to adversely affect a school the school would be given a reasonable opportunity of hearing. In the present group of petitions sub-rules (2) and (4) have been challenged. ( 23 ) THE next important rule is Rule 107. Sub-rule (1) thereof provides that the Deputy Educational Inspector has to arrange for the inspection of the school immediately on receipt of the application for recognition and for submission of this report containing his recommendation in that behalf. The School Board has to consider the inspection report and the recommendation of the Deputy Educational Inspector and grant the recognition to the school as an approved school if it is satisfied about the need of the school in the locality the standards of working and general management of the school. It may also simultaneously direct that the school be treated as eligible for grant-in-aid from Primary Education Funds. It may also simultaneously direct that the school be treated as eligible for grant-in-aid from Primary Education Funds. Sub-rule (3) provides that a school board may for reasons to be recorded in writing reject an application for recognition and the Administrative Officer shall forthwith communicate the decision to the school management. The aggrieved management has a right to prefer an appeal against this decision to the District Educational Inspector whose decision is made final. However this decision will not preclude the school management from applying afresh in the next academic year. By the Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1967 sub-rules (1) (2) and (3) are amended. The effect of the amendment is almost similar to the amendments made in sub-rule (2) of Rule 109. Instead of Deputy Educational Inspector who has to inspect and make recommendations in the matter of recognition and the School Board who has to grant the recognition these powers are vested in the Competent Officer and the Competent Authority as defined respectively in Rule 102-A. The period of limitation has been also introduced in preferring an appeal as prescribed in the first proviso to sub-rule (3 ). It should be noted that in this group of petitions sub-rule (3) of Rule 107 in challenged. ( 24 ) ANOTHER important rule is Rule 115 which provides as to how the grant-in-aid is to be determined. This rule is also challenged in this group of petitions. ( 25 ) RULES 110 to 121 provide for the grant-in-aid to the private schools. Rules 122 to 140 are contained in section C of Chapter VII prescribing the conditions to be observed in approved schools. These conditions inter alia provide for infra-structure such as accommodation equipment etc. curricula and standards of teaching time-tables attendance hours of instruction holidays fees admission of pupils and their leaving and age certificates attendance roll-call annual examination and necessary registers records and correspondence. ( 26 ) IT is in this background that we have to determine as to whether the petitioners are entitled to all or any of the reliefs prayed for in their petitions. ( 27 ) RE: Contentions Nos. 1 2 3 and 4:the first limb of the argument articulated as per contentions Nos. 1 and 3 is in our opinion not well-founded. It is no doubt true that sec. ( 27 ) RE: Contentions Nos. 1 2 3 and 4:the first limb of the argument articulated as per contentions Nos. 1 and 3 is in our opinion not well-founded. It is no doubt true that sec. 63 of the Act containing rule making power does not in terms particularise the matter of salary and allowances or retirement benefits or discipline and conduct of the employees in respect of which the State Government is invested with the power to make rules as found in sec. 271 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 The rule making authority has no plenary power and it has got to act within the limits of the power granted to it (see B. C. Banerjee and Ors. v. State of M. P. and Ors. 1970 (2) S. C. C. 467 ). It was therefore strenuously urged that the State Government could not have prescribed the model conditions of employment of staff in private schools in the State of Gujarat as was sought to be done under Schedule F as amended by the 1978 Gujarat Amendment Rules. This limb of argument appears to be attractive on the face of it but on close scrutiny it would not stand the test whether it is well-founded. The matters which have been particularised in sec. 53 (2) are without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-sec. (1) where the Government has been invested with the power of widest amplitude so as to enable it to prescribe rules for implementing the purposes of the Act. The purposes of the Act as we have seen earlier and which have been envisaged and set as objectives before the State Government are to be found in the preamble of the Act. It is inter alia provided in the preamble that the Act has been enacted since it has been found expedient by the State Government to make better provisions for the development expansion maintenance and control of primary education. It cannot be gainsaid much less it can be a matter of serious debate that the teachers working in private schools of the State are live mechanism to expand develop and control primary education in the State. It cannot be gainsaid much less it can be a matter of serious debate that the teachers working in private schools of the State are live mechanism to expand develop and control primary education in the State. The programme of the progressive expansion by itself and in disregard of the known sense standards of its quality would be selfdefeating inasmuch as the State would be thereby embarking upon the programme involving huge financial implications so as to turn out the mediocre and stuffless millions so-called educated young people who would be eternal source of discontent and breeding ground of revolt against the establishment. It will be too late in the day to urge successfully that the rules prescribing the conditions of employment of teachers including their appointment scales of pay and discipline and conduct are not germane to efficiency and excellence in educational sources (see: St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1389 at page 1396 ). There is another aspect of the matter which the petitioners have completely lost sight of when they attempted to challenge these model conditions of employment contained in Schedule F inter alia in the matter of scales of pay since the petitioners are more aggrieved with this particular provision in respect of scales of pay that it is with a view to achieve uniformity in all approved schoolswhether public or private that this provision has been inserted requiring the State Government to approve the scales of pay and allowances payable to teaching and non-teaching staff in private schools. If the scales of pay and allowances is left to the collective bargaining of employer and employees it would have resulted into distorted wage policy by which the teachers in private management would have been meted out in discriminatory treatment if they had been denied the same scales of pay granted to their counter parts working in approved public schools. If the scales of pay and allowances is left to the collective bargaining of employer and employees it would have resulted into distorted wage policy by which the teachers in private management would have been meted out in discriminatory treatment if they had been denied the same scales of pay granted to their counter parts working in approved public schools. We do not think therefore that Schedule F to the Bombay Primary Education Rules 1949 as amended by the Gujarat Amendment Rules of 1978 can be challenged on the ground that they are ultra vires the Act inasmuch as the Act does not particularise the matter of conditions of employment as within the rule making power of the State Government and that the conditions of employment cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to have nexus with the standards promotion development and expansion of education. In view of the settled legal position by the decision of the Supreme Court in St. Xaviers Colleges case (supra) we do not think that this limb of argument as urged in contentions Nos. 1 and 3 can be sustained. 25 The learned Advocates for the petitioners therefore advanced their second limb of challenge to Schedule F provisions by urging that the 1978 Amendment Rules by which new Schedule F has been inserted in the Rules which made material and fundamental departure from the original Schedule F conditions so as to circumscribe the right and initiative of private management in the field of education are bad in law and void inasmuch as they have not been published and/or laid before the State Legislature as required by the Act. This contention is merely to be stated for being rejected since the notification issued by the State Government in Education Department dated 28/12/1978 clearly recites that the draft rules to amend the Bombay Primary Education Rules 1949 were published as required by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 63 of the Act in the Government Gazette Part I-A at pages 159 to 172 on 16/03/1978 under the Government Notification of Education Department of 28/02/1978 inviting objections and suggestions from all persons likely to be affected thereby till 31/05/1978 and that objections and suggestions received from the public on the said draft have been considered by the Government and therefore in exercise of the power conferred by sec. 63 of the Act and all other powers enabling in that behalf the Government of Gujarat made the rules to amend the Rules of 1949. The grievance that these Rules have not been laid before the State Legislature for not less then 30 days as soon as possible after they were made requires some consideration. Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 63 as stated above enjoins that all rules made under the said Act would be laid for not less than thirty days before the State Legislature as soon as possible after they are made and they would be subject to such modifications as the State Legislature man make during the session in which they are laid or the session immediately following. Two questions would arise in this connection. Were these rules laid before the State Legislature for the required period and if not what is its effect ? This grievance has been made in paragraph 57-A of Special Civil Application No. 305 of 1979 which has been inserted by the amendment therein. By the averments made in this amended part the petitioners make a grievance that the procedure as required by sub-sec. (4) of sec. 63 of the said Act of previous publication laying requirement has not been complied with. To this amended petition reply affidavit dated 19/04/1983 of one Shri A. S. Makwana who happened to be Under Secretary in Education Department State of Gujarat at the relevant time has been filed on behalf of the State Government. In paragraphs 4 and 5 it is stated as under:"4 I say that the draft amended rules were published in Official Gazette dated 5/04/1978 (Government Gazette Extraordinary Part-IX.) Objections were invited upto 31-5-78. Final rules were published in Gujarat Government Gazette Part-IA dated 25-1-79. They were laid before Gujarat Vidhan Sabha in VII Session. The Vidhan Sabha referred it to its Subordinate Legislation Committee but the modifications suggested are not finally passed". "5 This reply may be taken into consideration in all other similar Special Civil Applications": ( 28 ) SINCE these averments in the reply affidavit have not been controverted by the petitioners the assertion made on behalf of the State Government in the reply affidavit remains uncontroverted that the laying down clause requirement was satisfied. "5 This reply may be taken into consideration in all other similar Special Civil Applications": ( 28 ) SINCE these averments in the reply affidavit have not been controverted by the petitioners the assertion made on behalf of the State Government in the reply affidavit remains uncontroverted that the laying down clause requirement was satisfied. However it was urged that the reply affidavit does not furnish sufficient particulars so as to satisfy the Court that the laying down clause has been observed in spirit and letter of law. We have therefore assumed that the laying down clause is not satisfied as the stand of the State Government lacks in furnishing particulars necessary to repel the contention of non-compliance with the laying down clause urged on behalf of the petitioners inasmuch as as to when the State Legislature was convened and whether the Rules were laid for about 30 days before the State Legislature. We have therefore proceeded on the above assumption that the laying down requirement has not been fulfilled. What is the effect of non-compliance of this obligation of laying down of the Rules is therefore to be looked into. ( 29 ) IN Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1149 the Supreme Court was concerned with a similar question in the context of laying requirement of an order issued under sec. 3 (6) of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 3 required that an order issued under the section shall be laid before both the Houses of Parliament as soon as may be after it is made. The instrument which was required to be placed before the Houses of Parliament in Atlas Cycles case was the notification of the Central Government fixing maximum selling prices of various categories of iron and steel including the black plain iron sheets passed under the Iron and Steel Control Order 1956 The Court ruled that the requirement of laying before both the Houses of Parliament of any order under sec. 3 (6) of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 is only directory and not mandatory and the Legislature never intended that on compliance with the requirement of laying as envisaged by sub-sec (6) of sec. 3 (6) of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 is only directory and not mandatory and the Legislature never intended that on compliance with the requirement of laying as envisaged by sub-sec (6) of sec. 3 of the said Act should render the order void and that consequently nonlaying of the notification fixing the maximum selling prices of various categories of iron and steel including the black plain iron sheets passed under cl. 15 (i) of Iron and Steel Control Order 1956 before both the Houses of Parliament cannot result in nullification of the notification. The Supreme Court also indicated as to the relevant considerations which the Court has to bear in mind in determining as to whether a provision before it is mandatory or directory. Two relevant considerations which have been pointed out by the Supreme Court are: (1) absence of any provision for the consequence of non-compliance of the legislative mandate and (2) serious general inconvenience and prejudice resulting from invalidating the Act of the Government for such non-compliance. The Supreme Court speaking through Jaswant Singh J. in Atlas Cycles case (supra) referred to the different statutes. This is what the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 20 of the said judgment:"20 Now the policy and object underlying the provisions relating to laying the delegated legislation made by the subordinate law making authorities or orders passed by subordinate executive instrumentalities before both Houses of Parliament being to keep supervision and control over the aforesaid authorities and instrumentalities the laying clauses assume different force depending on the degree of control which the Legislature may like to exercise. As evident from the observations made at pages 305 to 307 of the 7th Edition of Craias on Statute Law and noticed with approval In Hukum Chand v. Union of India (1973) 1 SCR 895 : ( AIR 1972 SC 2427 ) there are three kinds of laying which are generally used by the legislature. Where three kinds of laying are described and dealt with in Craias on Statute Law (supra) as under: (i) Laying without further procedure (ii) Laying subject to negative resolution iii) Laying subject to affirmative resolution. Broadly stated the implications of these three types of laying clauses are (1) that the provision for laying rules etc. Where three kinds of laying are described and dealt with in Craias on Statute Law (supra) as under: (i) Laying without further procedure (ii) Laying subject to negative resolution iii) Laying subject to affirmative resolution. Broadly stated the implications of these three types of laying clauses are (1) that the provision for laying rules etc. for a period during which time they were not in operation and could be thrown out without ever having come into operation (2) the laying subject to negative resolution would mean that the rules etc. would have immediate operative effect but are subject to annulment within the specified period without prejudice to new rules etc. being made. The appropriate phraseology which is employed by the Legislature is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament and (3) laying subject to the affirmative resolution normally means that no order shall be made unless the draft has been laid before Parliament and has been approved by the resolution of each House of Parliament. The present provision with which we are concerned does not gall strictly within any of these categories. The only subjection to which the Rules laid before the House has been put to is that they would be subject to such modifications as the State Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid or the session immediately following and such modifications are to be published in the Official Gazette. It therefore cannot be urged successfully that the necessary consequence of such a provision is to invalidate the Rules for noncompliance thereof. In other words sub-sec. (4) of sec. 63 does not provide any penalty for non-observance or non-compliance of the direction as to laying of the Rules before the State Legislature. It would also be noticed that the requirement as to laying of the Rules before the State Legislature is not a condition precedent but subsequent to the making of the Rules the only limitation is that if any modification is made during the course of laying before the State Legislature in the same session in which they are laid or in session immediately thereafter the Rules would be subject to modifications. In other words there is no prohibition of the making of the Rules without the approval of the-State Legislature. In other words there is no prohibition of the making of the Rules without the approval of the-State Legislature. This was substantially the position in the Act with which Supreme Court was concerned in Atlas Cycles case (supra ). The present Rules with which we are concerned came into force on the publication thereof since there is no provision as to on a particular day the Rules would be effective. Therefore the only purpose underlying the laying down clause is to make them subject to modifications if any made by the State Legislature in the session in which they are laid or in the session immediately succeeding thereto. The laying requirement is therefore directory particularly when it is not coupled with the requirement of laying the Rules in draft form in which case the Rules cannot come into force without being laid before the House (see: Jan Mohammad Noor Mohammad v. State of Gujarat A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 385 the provision in sub-sec. (4) is a simple laying formula and the failure to lay the Rules would not effect their legal validity. ( 30 ) THE learned Advocates for the petitioners therefore advanced the point which they have raised in contention No. 4. The grievance was that according to clause 9 of Schedule F scales of pay and allowances payable to the teaching and non-teaching staff shall be such as may be approved by the State Government from time to time and inasmuch as the impugned circulars applying the pay scales as recommended by the Desai Pay Commission to teaching and nonteaching staff were issued by the Administrative Officer under the sanction of the Director of Education the circulars are bad in law and void on the principle that the State Government which was a delegate of legislature could not have sub-delegated this power to the Director in that behalf. It is no doubt recognized in principle and on authority that a delegate cannot further delegate his power. This principle postulates that the power should be exercised by the authority on whom it has been conferred by the law in question and not by any other authority. There is no assumption that this principle applies only to sub-delegation of delegated legislative power and to subdelegation of other powers delegated by the superior administrative authority. This principle postulates that the power should be exercised by the authority on whom it has been conferred by the law in question and not by any other authority. There is no assumption that this principle applies only to sub-delegation of delegated legislative power and to subdelegation of other powers delegated by the superior administrative authority. It applies to the delegation of all charges of powers and it was invoked originally in the context of delegation of judicial powers (sec: Judicial Review of Administrative Action 4 Edn. by de Smith page 198 ). There is no doubt a strong presumption against construing a grant of delegated legislative power as empowering the delegate to sub-delegate the whole or any substantial part of the law-making power entrusted to it (vide: de Smiths Judicial Review of Administrative Action 4 Edition page 300 ). It should be noted that this maxim delegatus non potest delegato is more strictly applied to the further over delegation of sub-delegated powers than to the sub-delegation of primary delegated powers (vide: de Smiths Judicial Review of Administrative Action 4 Edition page 305 ). The general principle therefor is that sub-delegation may take place when the law either expressly or impliedly provides for such a possibility. In view of these settled legal principles we have to see whether sub-delegation is permitted. Sec. 60 of the said Act empowers the State Government to further delegate its powers and duties to any officer or authority subordinate to it and Government to delegate any of his powers or duties under the said Act or the Rules or delegated to him by the State Government to any officer subordinate to him. The material part of sec. 40 reads as under: (1) Subject to conditions if any as may be specified (i) the State Government may delegate any of its powers or duties under this Act or the rules made thereunder to any officer or authority subordinate to it and (ii) the Director may also with the previous sanction of the State Government delegate any of the powers or duties under this Act or the rules made thereunder or delegated to him by the State Government under clause (i) to any officer subordinate to him. ". . ( 31 ) IN view of this clear provision contained in sec. ". . ( 31 ) IN view of this clear provision contained in sec. 60 (1) we do not think that it can be urged successfully that the impugned circulars were ultra vires the powers of the Director or the Administrative Officer on the principle that a delegate cannot sub-delegate his power. No contention has been urged that in fact no sub-delegation has been made. We are therefore of opinion that contentions Nos. 1 to 4 should be rejected. ( 32 ) RE: Contention No. 5:the argument in support of this contention runs as under: rule 109 (1) entitles a private school which is once recognized as an approved school to continue to be so recognized unless its recognition is withdrawn under sub-rule (2 ). Sub-rule (2) empowers inter alia the competent authority on the recommendation of the competent officer to withdraw the recognition if any of the conditions on which the school was recognized was not observed. It is urged that in almost all the schools the recognition has been granted before the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1978 came in force. These schools had furnished undertakings to abide as nearby as possible by Schedule F conditions as were in force before 1978 Amendment Rules. By the earlier Amendment Rules of 1970 sub- rule (2) of Rule 106 was amended so as to provide for furnishing an undertaking in writing by the school management seeking recognition that the conditions of employment of the teachers in school shall be those as specified in Schedule F. Now this schedule as it stood before the 1978 Amendment Rules has been substituted by new Schedule F of the 1978 Rules. It is therefore urged that the schools which have been once recognized as approved schools continue to enjoy the recognition unless the recognition is capable of being withdrawn under Rule 109 (2) and Rule 106 (2) as amended by the Amendment Rules of 1970 or 1978 cannot prescribe new obligation the breach of which would result into curtailment of the right ensured to the management under Rule 109 (2) of the Bombay Primary Education Rules. The neat question of law which arises is whether the repeal of Schedule F and enactment of a new Schedule in its place would affect the rights which have been already acquired under the relevant rules as they stood before 1970 or 1978 amendment. The neat question of law which arises is whether the repeal of Schedule F and enactment of a new Schedule in its place would affect the rights which have been already acquired under the relevant rules as they stood before 1970 or 1978 amendment. In other words what is the effect when a repeal if followed by a fresh legislation an the same subject on the rights and liabilities accrued before the repeal of a statute and regulation and enactment of a new one in its place. The principle underlying sec. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act is that every later enactment which supersedes on earlier one or puts an end to an earlier state of law is presumed to intend the continuance of rights accrued and the liabilities incurred under the superseded enactment unless there are sufficient indications express or implied in the latter enactment envisaging to completely obliterate the earlier state of law (see: State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch and Co. A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1284 ). The problem with which we are concerned in these matters is not merely as to what is the effect of repeal of an enactment or rules or regulations. We are concerned with the situati on when the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject. It is in that context that we have to decide the contention which has been urged on behalf of the petitioners. The legal position is well settled in this respect that when an existing statute or regulation is repealed and the same is replaced by a fresh statute or regulation unless the new statute or regulation specifically or by necessary implications affects the rights created under the old law these rights must be held to continue in force even after the new statute or regulation comes into force (see: Jindas Oil Mill v. Godhra Electricity Co. A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1228 ). A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1228 ). The Court is in the context of this situation where repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject obliged to look into the provisions of the new Act only for purposes of determining whether they indicate a different intention and the line of inquiry would be not whether the new Act keeps alive the old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests any intention to destroy them (see: State of Punjab v. Mohan Singh A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 84 ). It should also be recalled that rule 106 (2) which before its amendment in 1970 enjoined a school management seeking recognition as an approved school to furnish an undertaking in writing that the condition of employment of teacher in the school shall be as near as possible to those specified in Schedule F is modified by the amendment made in the Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1970 providing that written undertaking should be to the effect that the condition of employment of teachers in the school shall be those as specified in Schedule F. We have therefore to bear in mind the proper canon of construction where a subsequent Act amends the earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself as a part of itself into the Act. In such a situation the earlier Act after the amendment is to be read and construed as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. (see: Shamrao v. District Magistrate Thana A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 324 ). ( 33 ) IN Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 614 the effect of an Act amending the earlier Act has been stated as under:"it is perfectly true that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of the amendment the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with the amended provision as though they are part of it. This is for the purpose of determining what the meaning of any particular provision of the Act as amended is whether it is in the unamended part or in the amended part. This is for the purpose of determining what the meaning of any particular provision of the Act as amended is whether it is in the unamended part or in the amended part. But this is not the same thing as saying that the amendment itself must be taken to have been in existence as from the date of the earlier Act. That would be imputing to the amendment retrospective operation which could only be done if such retrospective operation is given by the amending Act either expressly or by necessary implication. . . . . . " ( 34 ) IT is trite position of law to say that there is a strong presumption that the Legislature does not impose new liabilities in respect of something that has already happened because generally it would not be reasonable for the Legislature to do so that but this presumption may be Overcome not only by express words in the Act but also by circumstances sufficiently strong to displace it. (see: Sunshine Porcelain Potteries v. Nash (1961) 3 All E. R. 203 at p. 206 ). The meaning of words shall be substituted is not capable of much debate and the process of substitution comprises of a repeal and a fresh enactment and the two are part and parcel of single individual process (see: State of Maharashtra v. C. P. M. Ore. and Co. 1977 (1) SCC 643 ). The scope of the amendatory Acts has been explained in Crawfords Statutory Construction at p. 110 in paragraph 78 dealing with Repeating and Amendatory Acts as under:" Amendatory statutes are sometimes nearly anonymous with curative acts so far as effect is concerned since they are sometimes enacted to serve the same purpose. Yet their scope is more comprehensive. They may be defined as those statutes which make addition to or operate to change the original law so as to effect an improvement therein or to more effectively carry out the purposes for which the original law was passed. Strictly speaking however an amendatory act is not regarded as an independent act. All or part of the old act is permitted to remain. But where a section of a statute is amended the original ceases to exist and the new section supersedes it and becomes a part of the law just as if the amendment had always been there. Strictly speaking however an amendatory act is not regarded as an independent act. All or part of the old act is permitted to remain. But where a section of a statute is amended the original ceases to exist and the new section supersedes it and becomes a part of the law just as if the amendment had always been there. Neverthless from the standpoint of ultimate effect an amendment and a repeal have a great deal in common":. ( 35 ) IN view of these settled legal principles we are afraid that the present contention as advanced on behalf of the petitioners deserves to be sustained. If rule 106 (2) is amended as indicated above so as to oblige the school management to file a Written undertaking that the condition of the employment of teachers in the school shall be those as specified in Schedule F in place of the original obligation to furnish a written undertaking that the condition of tie employment of teachers in the school shall be as near as possible to those specified in Schedule F on the recognized principle of interpretation as se out above the original provision of sec. 106 (2) before the amendment in 1970 ceases to exits and the new section supersedes it and becomes a part of the law just as if the amendment had always been there. It therefore cannot be urged successfully that since the obligation which is now prescribed after amendment in 1970 is materially different the schools which are once recognized as approved schools would continue to be so recognized unless their recognition can be withdrawn for the breach if any of the original undertaking only. The contention that the rights of the schools which were recognized prior to the amendment in 1978 when the old Schedule F was substituted by the present one cannot be disturbed is also not well-conceived. It is in the ultimate analysis the question of legislative intent as evinced in the amended rule to indicate that the legislature intended to destroy those rights. It is in the ultimate analysis the question of legislative intent as evinced in the amended rule to indicate that the legislature intended to destroy those rights. The amendment in rule 106 (2) in 1970 clearly manifests the clear legislative indicate that the Legislature wanted to impose an obligation on the school managements to undertake that the conditions of teaching and non-teaching staff in the employment of such recognized schools to be as those specified in Schedule F. The presumption that the Legislature which generally does not impose new liabilities in respect of some thing that had already happened is rebutted by the express words used in the amending rule as well as the substitution of new Schedule F in place of the old one. In that view of the matter therefore the 5th contention deserves to he rejected. ( 36 ) RE: Contention No. 6 ( 37 ) THE contention that the power conferred on the competent authority under rule 109 (2) for withdrawal of recognition is uncontrolled and unfettered particularly because there is no statutory right of referring appeal against it and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution is though prima facie attractive would not stand the close judicial scrutiny. The reasons are obvious. It cannot be said that the power conferred on the competent authority which after addition of rule 102-A by the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1967 would mean District Panchayat in case of primary schools situated in the area other than Gandhinagar district and the Dangs district where the School Board would be the competent authority and the competent officer to make recommendation is the Administrative Officer of the District Panchayat and the Deputy Educational Inspector in Gandhinagar and Dangs districts cannot be said to be unfettered and uncanalized for the obvious reasons which are as under:31 In the first place second proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 109 entitles a school which is aggrieved by the decision of the competent officer withdrawing recognition to file an appeal to the Educational Inspector within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the decision of the competent authority. By the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Second Amendment) Rules 1969 in the second proviso of sub-rule (2) of Rule 109 as it stood before the 1968 amendment the order of the District Educational Officer on an appeal preferred by a management aggrieved by the decision of the competent authority to withdraw recognition which was made final was amended with the result that his decision is now final subject to any orders that may be passed by the State Government which was again sought to be inserted in Rule 109 by the 1969 amendment Rules. Sub-rule (5) in effect invested the State Government with the revisional power to satisfy itself about the correctness of the order made by the competent authority or made by the District Educational Inspector in appeal in the matter of withdrawal of recognition and the State Government can after holding such inquiry as it may think fit modify annull or reverse the order as it may deem fit and if such an order is likely to affect the school adversely the school management is to be given a reasonable opportunity of hearing. It therefore cannot be said that the power of withdrawal or recognition is unfettered and uncanalized since there is no procedural safeguard and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The 6th contention therefore deserves to be rejected. ( 38 ) WE may now go to the particular contentions which arise specifically in other group of petitions which we have set out above. ( 39 ) RE: Spl. Civil Appln. No 1853 of 1978 ( 40 ) IN this petition by Navdurga High School Umalla managed by Shri Nutan Shikshan Sangh Umalla Taluka Jhagadia in Bharuch district the order made by the Administrative Officer Jilla Panchayat dated 31/07/1978 cancelling the recognition under Rule 109 (2) of the Bombay Primary Education Rules is challenged as bad in law and void inasmuch as the Administrative Officer of the District Panchayat has no jurisdiction power or authority to make the order of de-recognition. It should be recalled that by the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Rules 1967 rule 109 (2) has been amended so as to substitute the competent authority in place of the School Board and the competent officer in place of the Deputy Educational Inspector The said Rules have inserted a new Rule namely. Rule 102-A defining the terms competent authority and competent officer. Rule 102-A defining the terms competent authority and competent officer. The effect of the aforesaid amendment is that in respect of the primary schools situate in the areas other than Gandhinagar and Dangs districts the competent authority would mean the District Panchayat and the Administrative Officer of the District Panchayat would be competent officer in the said areas for making recommendations for withdrawal of the recognition. The grievance of the petitioner that the Administrative Officer Bharuch Jilla Panchayat has no power or authority to cancel the recognition appears to be well-founded since nothing has been placed on the record by the respondents to show that the District Panchayat which is the competent authority for withdrawal of the recognition after the amendment of Rules in 1967 has resolved to withdraw the recognition. In any case the District Panchayat could not have acted on its own save and except on the recommendation made in that behalf by the Administrative Officer. In the present case it appears that the Administrative Officer himself has exercised this power which he does not possess under the relevant rules. The said order of 31/07/1978 is therefore clearly beyond his jurisdiction power and authority and deserves to be quashed and set aside. . ( 41 ) RE: Spl. Civil Appln. No. 952 of 1978:the School Management of Shakti Vidyalya Primary School Geeta Mandir Road Ahmedabad Petitioner No. 11 is aggrieved by the notice of 2/05/1978 of the Administrative Officer of the Municipal School Board by which the management has been intimated that the recognition was liable to be cancelled with effect from 1-5-1978 if the management fails to make payment of the salary and allowances in terms of the recommendations of the Desai Pay Commission with effect from 1/06/1977 The impugned notice has been issued by the Administrative Officer of the School Board of Ahmedabad. The ground on which this notice has been challenged is that the authority which could have issued the notice can be the Deputy Educational Inspector and in any case no order can be made by the authority other than the competent authority as defined in Rule 102-A of the said Rules. We are of the opinion that since this is merely an initiation of proceedings it cannot be said that the Administrative Officer is not entitled to initiate proceedings. We are of the opinion that since this is merely an initiation of proceedings it cannot be said that the Administrative Officer is not entitled to initiate proceedings. The question of cancellation of the recognition would arise only after the explanation is submitted by the school management concerned. We do not therefore think that this particular challenge is well-founded. ( 42 ) THE result is that for the reasons aforesaid the group of Special Civil Applications other than Special Civil Application No. 1853 of 1978 is dismissed. Rule in each of the said petitions is discharged with no order as to costs. ( 43 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 1853 of 1978 the impugned order of 31/07/1978 made by the Administrative Officer of the Jilla Panchayat is quashed and set aside with liberty to the Jilla Panchayat to take fresh action according to the correct legal principles if the Panchayat is so advised. Rule in this petition is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. ( 44 ) THE learned Advocates representing the respective petitioners pray for the stay of the implementation of the judgment in this group of petitions so as to enable them to file appeal in the Supreme Court and obtain necessary interim relief in the matter on the condition that the school managements concerned which are the respective petitioners in this group of petitions will not terminate the services of any member of teaching or non-teaching staff without the permission of the Court. The stay as prayed for is granted for the period of six weeks. Petitions dismissed: Leave to appeal granted. .