G.M. LODHA, J.—The State of Rajasthan has filed this appeal against the judgment of Sessions Judge, Pali, by which the appeal of Saviya, the accused respondent was accepted and his conviction under sec. 376, Indian Penal Code, and sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 200/- in default of payment of fine to six months further rigorous imprisonment, ordered by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sirohi, was set aside and the respondent accused was acquitted. 2. On 27th September, 1971, an oral report was made by one, Gajja, at police station Barloot. According to this report, Champa d/o Gajja, aged 11 years, went to the Deldar Forest to fetch wood. The girl prosecutrix was accompanied by Uki. While collecting the wood, the accused-respondent-Saviya came there, felled her down, and committed rape on Mst Champa. Uki slipped away and informed of the incident to the father of Mst. Champa, who lodged a complaint to the police. 3. In the complaint, it was mentioned that the father proceeded to the spot but was met by Joria and Mst. Champa on the way. Thereafter, the father of the girl made search of the accused respondent but could not trace him out and, therefore, now he had come to the police station to make a report of that incident. 4. A case under Section 376, I.P.C. was registered and after usual investigation, a challan was submitted in the court of Munsiff Magistrate, Sirohi, who, after proceeding under S.207A Cr.P.C, committed the respondent-accused to stand his trial in the court of the Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Sirohi, from where the case was transferred to the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sirohi. 5. The respondent-accused did not plead guilty and, claimed trial. The Assistant Sessions Judge recorded the prosecution evidence and statement of the accused-respondent and one defence witness and, then, after hearing the arguments, convicted the respondent-accused, as mentioned above. 6. An appeal was preferred by the respondent-accused in the court of Sessions Judge, Pali, who accepted the appeal of the respondent-accused and acquitted him of the charges levelled against him. Hence the present appeal. 7. In this case, we have got direct evidence of Mst. Champa, the victim of rape, Mst. Uki, another girl who was accompanying her and Joria who came there during the course of the occurrence. Hence the present appeal. 7. In this case, we have got direct evidence of Mst. Champa, the victim of rape, Mst. Uki, another girl who was accompanying her and Joria who came there during the course of the occurrence. Before we deal with this evidence, it would be necessary to consider the reasons given by the Appellate Court for setting aside the judgment of trial court of conviction and, acquitting the accused-respondent. 8. The first reason is that, in the view of the Sessions Court, there was delay of 5 hours and it has not been specifically explained. In his opinion, it would have taken two hours to attend the girl and then to reach police station. According to the Appellate Court, searching of the respondent-accused was not necessary and the report should have been made directly. 9. We are surprised that in a case of rape on minor girl of tender age and that too, in a village, the Appellate Court has held that the delay of five hours has not been explained. In the present society, and more particularly, in the conservative villagers, the chastity of a girl is of great importance for her matrimonial relations. It is not material, whether a girl becomes in-chaste on account of forcible sexual intercourse or, voluntarily. The society looks with apathy hatred and abhorrence unchaste girl and this includes the girl ravished by force. 10. In view of the above social condition of the Indian society, which should not be lost sight by the Indian courts; the parents of the ravished girl are reluctant to lodge a report in the police. There is always struggle in the mind of the parents about the consequence of social non-acceptance of the girl on account of rape incident on the one hand and to get the rapist punished for committing heinous offence. In such circumstances, some time is always taken to make up the mind and that is natural. 11. In the instant case, there is additional evidence to show that, the father of the girl first tried to search out the accused-respondent This is natural instinct and the first Appellate Court should not have held that, in what particular manner, the complainant should have acted in such a moment of tragedy and catastrophe. 11. In the instant case, there is additional evidence to show that, the father of the girl first tried to search out the accused-respondent This is natural instinct and the first Appellate Court should not have held that, in what particular manner, the complainant should have acted in such a moment of tragedy and catastrophe. Sitting in calm and composed atmosphere of the court room, a Judge cannot advise as to what should and, should not be, without realising gravity and seriousness of the various factors which develops on the spot when the parents are between devil and the deep sea and serious predicament to decide to do or not to do. 12. We are convinced that in case of rape of this nature, the lodging of the first information report after 5 hours cannot be treated with an eye of suspicion as has been done by the lower Appellate Court. 13. We may now consider the statement of Mst. Champa, the prosecutrix. According to her statement, at about 7 months back in the afternoon, she alongwith Uki went to collect fuel. There, the respondent-accused caught hold of her and after throwing her down on the ground, inserted his male organ into her vagina. Her petticoat was smeared with blood. Mst Uki who was accompanying her managed to slip away and Joria came there at the spot and separated them. Joriya brought her to village, where she met her father and she told of the incident to her father. 14. The first appellate court has extracted the portion of the statement, with which it was confronted from Ex. D. 3 and that portion has been reproduced, wherein it has been mentioned that Joriya was grazing in the she-buffaloes. Portion marked C to D, E to F, G to H, I to J, K to L have also been reproduced from the statement (Ex. D. 3). 15. The first Appellate Court has mentioned that, there was about two hours time at the disposal of Gajja and, therefore, the possibility of Champa being tutored cannot be ruled out and this is confirmed by the denial of the statement in Ex. D. 3. Surprisingly enough, the learned Sessions Judge has not discussed, how much the important are contradictions by the denial of some portion of Ex. D.3. D. 3. Surprisingly enough, the learned Sessions Judge has not discussed, how much the important are contradictions by the denial of some portion of Ex. D.3. All that the court has said is that under Section 80 of the Evidence Act, there is presumption that their statements have been faithfully recorded and the Public Prosecutor there, had not explained as to why that statement should be disbelieved. 16. A previous statement of a witness can be used for corroboration or contradictions under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. 17. They are not substantive evidence in themselves and therefore, the first Appellate Court was not justified in holding that those statements are to be believed. All that could be seen was, how much credibility or trustworthiness of a witness has been shaken by the contradiction introduction on account of earlier statement having been denied. The cases can be categorised into three categories viz., omissions, contradictions, and improvements. Each one of them can assume importance and may also become insignificant in the context of over-all testimony of the witness. In our opinion, therefore, the approach of first Appellate Court was most perfunctory and superficial. 18. The medical evidence corroborates that rape was committed on Mst. Champa. Dr. Bhojraj (PW 3) who medically examined Mst. Champa, has testified for the same. The statement of Mst. Champa read as a whole and the question and answer put to Mst. Champa by the trial court, whether she is intelligible enough to understand the implications of speaking truth or falsehood and the consequences of it, goes to show that, Mst. Champa is an intelligent girl having love for truth and her whole testimony is natural and consistent. The improvements pointed out in Ex. D. 3 are not of significant nature. The rejection of testimony of Mst. Champa on the grounds mentioned in the judgment is wholly unjustified. 19. Ofcourse, the learned Sessions Judge has pointed one lacuna that as per the earlier statement, this girl never knew the name of the respondent-accused before the occurrence and, therefore, identification parade should have been held by the police before a Magistrate. Assuming that Mst. Champa on the grounds mentioned in the judgment is wholly unjustified. 19. Ofcourse, the learned Sessions Judge has pointed one lacuna that as per the earlier statement, this girl never knew the name of the respondent-accused before the occurrence and, therefore, identification parade should have been held by the police before a Magistrate. Assuming that Mst. Champa has improved her statement in this respect and assuming that, in portion marked A to B the name of respondent was not known to the girl when she came to the village, it is not very unnatural or improbable if the girl immediately after the occurrence came to the village and, there, she could become certain about the name of the accused, from this no doubt is created in her testimony, because there is ample other evidence to prove that it was Saviya who committed rape on Mst. Champa. The testimony of Joriya, is very important in this connection. According to the testimony of Joriya while he was returning from jungle, he met Mst Uki running and then he asked, why she was running. Mst. Uki informed that Saviya accused caught hold of Mst. Champa and sat on her. Thereafter, Joriya reached spot and observed accused committing sexual intercourse with Mst. Champa. Joria further deposed that he tried to catch hold of accused Saviya after removing him but, Saviya managed to escape. Mst. Champa was having pool of blood on her vagina and, therefore, he first took her towards village. In between, Gajja, father of Mst. Champa met him, to whom he narrated the story of the incident. This version of the story is further corroborated by Gajja, Mst. Uki and Mst. Champa. 20. The statement of Joriya had been disbelieved by the Sessions Judge on the ground that he has contradicted his previous statements (Ex. D. 1) in which he had deposed that he was grazing she-buffaloes and heard of hue and cry from 40 Panwadas and these cries were of Uki. 21. We are of the opinion that these are very minor facts of insignificant nature and statement of Joriya cannot be rejected on the sole ground of these minor contradictions from the earlier statement. Much capital has been made by the Sessions Judge that this witness could not give direction of the accused and Champas face. 21. We are of the opinion that these are very minor facts of insignificant nature and statement of Joriya cannot be rejected on the sole ground of these minor contradictions from the earlier statement. Much capital has been made by the Sessions Judge that this witness could not give direction of the accused and Champas face. But, we feel that this ommission of giving observations is too insignificant to discard testimony of Joriya. Nothing has been shown in the cross-examination why Joria should be interested in false involvement of the accused Saviya and leaving real accused scot-free. Some minor discrepancies have been pointed out from the statement of Mst. Uki in respect of Joria. In as much as, Joriya deposed that Mst. Uki gave name of Saviya but Mst. Uki had not corroborated it. Obviously, it is not the case that, Joria was not knowing Saviya accused from before. Joria and Saviya were of the same village and, therefore, there was nothing surprising if they were knowing each other, Joria observed real occurrence and removed Saviya and therefore, there is no doubt about his observing accused and there cannot be any mistake in identification. In her cross-examination, Mst. Uki has clearly deposed that, she knew Saviya accused by name and has given out the name of Saviya accused to Joria. Mst. Uki further gave out the details of accused, Saviya and told that Saviya is Chandias maternal nephew. We, are, therefore, of the opinion that Mst. Ukis description of the details of the occurrence and that, she informed Gajja father of girl Mst. Champa, a fact which is corroborated by statement of Gajja, shows that she is a truthful witness. 22. It appears that the Sessions Judge was obsessed by the previous statements (Ex. D.3 and D. 5). As we have discussed above, these statements are not admissible in evidence. They can only be used for corroboration or contradiction and, therefore, the learned Sessions Judge could not have relied upon these statement and had committed a serious error in mentioning that, "there is no reason to disbelieve the fact contained in these statements, in the lower court, these two witnesses have elicited certain facts which they have totally denied". The defence evidence of Babar Singh (DW1) to prove that Mst. Uki was employed by him on the day of occurrence is totally vague and useless. 23. The defence evidence of Babar Singh (DW1) to prove that Mst. Uki was employed by him on the day of occurrence is totally vague and useless. 23. We are convinced that the statements of Joria (PW1) and the two girls namely, Mst. Champa and Mst. Uki corroborated by the medical evidence of Dr. Bhojraj and report of Chemical Examiner conclusively proves that the rape was committed by the accused, Saviya on Mst. Champa. 24. In our considered opinion, the learned first Appellate Court committed a serious error in holding that, the case was doubtful and the prosecution has not removed the doubts. The finding that, Mst. Champa is a witness not worthy of credence given by the learned first Appellate Court, appears to be based on giving undue emphasis to minor variations in the statements which have been well explained. 25. It is true that, the standard of proof in a criminal case is that all benefit of doubt goes to the accused and the prosecution is required to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, it does not mean that the court should discard the evidence, merely because there are some insignificant minor discrepancies or improvements which are neither of substantial character nor of any material importance in the case. We are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court (Asstt. Sessions Judge) convicting the accused was passed on correct appreciation of evidence and cogent reasons for the same. The trial court rightly took notice of the fact that the blood smeared Ghaghra of prosecutrix and Dhoti of the accused were sent to the Chemical Examiner for examination and Chemical Examiner reported that they were positive for the blood. The blood smeared Dhoti and Ghaghra were recovered immediately after the incident and the accused has not come with explanation as to how his Dhoti was got smeared. The Appellate Court has not considered this circumstance which was relied upon by the trial court and rightly so against the accused. 26. We, therefore, hold that the judgment of the Appellate Court is most unsatisfactory and based on complete wrong approach and further ignoring material evidence produced in the case. We have not hesitation in holding that the approach of the Sessions Judge, i.e. the Appellate Court, was perverse in the facts and circumstances of the case and it has resulted in a perverse judgment. 27. We have not hesitation in holding that the approach of the Sessions Judge, i.e. the Appellate Court, was perverse in the facts and circumstances of the case and it has resulted in a perverse judgment. 27. The result is, that this appeal succeeds and the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court, Sessions Judge, Pali, setting aside the conviction awarded by the trial court to the accused is set aside. The conviction of the respondent-accused, Saviya S/o Boka under Sec. 376, I. P. C. and sentence imposed by the trial court, Asstt. Sessions Judge, Pali with head quarter Sirohi vide judgment dated the 12th August, 1972 in Sessions Case No. 4/72. of four years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 200/- in default six months R. I. is restored. The sentence of 4 years R. 1. in such cases where minor girl of 11 years of age is raped is inadequate but, since no notice of enhancement was given and the offence is of year 1971 we would not like now to give a notice of enhancement of sentence. All that, we would like to observe is that the cases of rape of minor girls and that too of weaker segment of society like Harijans should be dealt with seriously, once the offence is proved and the normal sentence should be of seven to ten years R. I. 28. We are in complete agreement with the view expressed by another Division Bench (consisting of G.M. Lodha and N. M. Kasliwal J.), of this court in Bhansingh vs. State of Rajasthan (D. B. Cr. Appeal No. 401/1980 decided on 21st March, 1983) (i) that sentence in such cases should be severe, deterrent and exemplary. We too feel that it is gravest crime against human dignity as it results in deathless shame to women and gravity aggravated when the victim is child or minor girl. It was observed as under : "In Rafiqs case (1980 (4) Sec. p. 261) the girl was middle aged and working as Balsevika Field Welfare Organisation and yet the sentence of 7 years was not reduced nor treated as too severe. In the instant case, there is additional aggravating circumstances against the accused. It was observed as under : "In Rafiqs case (1980 (4) Sec. p. 261) the girl was middle aged and working as Balsevika Field Welfare Organisation and yet the sentence of 7 years was not reduced nor treated as too severe. In the instant case, there is additional aggravating circumstances against the accused. The girl of 7-8 years only and further she belongs to Harijan segment of the society, which is treated as weaker section of the society, should the court allow girls and women of weaker section of society as chattes or second class citizens, who can be easily made victims of satisfying sexual lust of the affluent and traditionally privileged section of the society. In our opinion, the barbaric offence of rape on a tiny aged girl of 7-8 years and that too belonging to weaker section being a harijan, assumes much more seriousness and is extremely heinous. The non-acceptance by community of Harijans as untouchable and treating them as undignified weaker section, available for mass rapes or rapes of tiny kids is hair raising, and alarming and the increase in such anti-social and inhuman crimes deserve examplanary deterrent punishments. So shocked is the humanity, can be judged from the fact that former Chief Justice of India Shri Hidayuttullah, Vice President of India pleaded for public whipping and flogging for such criminals who are shame and stigma on the society. Another former Chief Justice, Hon. K. N. Wanchoo awarded sentence of 10 stripes in Bal Mukan Vs. State (1952 RLW p.95) for rapist of women in Rajasthan case when Whipping Act was in force. Abolition of Whipping Act, has encouraged such crimes and there is need for rethinking for it. We are firmly of the opinion that these circumstances aggravate the offence and warrants maximum punishment so that society knows it that such criminals cannot play with the life, dignity, chastity, of weaker sex and that too from weaker section of the society which makes it an offence of ripple severity." 29. With the above observations, the appeal is therefore, allowed, as indicated above. The respondent accused is on bail. The learned trial court would take appropriate steps to get the respondent-accused arrested and send him to jail to undergo the sentence imposed by the trial court and restored by this court, as mentioned above.