M. RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) THESE two writ petitions arise out of two orders made in the two references pending before the Additional industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, refusing to permit Sri K. Kasturi, learned counsel for the petitioner to represent the petitioner before the tribunal even though he was an office bearer of the employer's Federation of Southern India (Federation for short) of which the petitioner, hotel Ashok, Bangalore, was a member. ( 2 ) W. P. No. 10113/83 arises out of an order dated 4-5-1983 in Reference no. 17 of 1981 and W. P. No. 117 64/83 arises out of an order made in reference No. AID 41/81 dt. 12-5-1983. In both these references, Sri K. Kasturi, a practising Advocate, filed appearance on behalf of the management of Hotel Ashok, Bangalore. According to the petitioner Hotel ashok, as it was a member of the federation and as Sri. K. Kasturi, advocate was a member of the Executive committee of the Federation, he was entitled to appear on behalf of the petitioner before the Industrial tribunal in view of S. 36 of the Industrial disputes Act ('the Act' for short ). The first party workman before the Tribunal disputed the claim of the petitioner to be represented by Sri. Kasturi, on the ground that neither the petitioner can be regarded a member of the Federation nor sri, Kasturi was an office bearrer. ( 3 ) IN both the References, the industrial Tribunal upheld the objection of the workmen and held that Sri. Kasturi was not entitled to appear for the management of Hotel ashok, Bangalore. Aggrieved by the said orders, the petitioner has presented these writ petitions. ( 4 ) IN support of the claim that sri. Kasturi was an office bearer of the Federation and that Hotel Ashok was a member of that Federation, the following documents were produced : (i) Rules of the Federation (An- nexure-A), Cls. 3 (v), 4 (c) and' 27 thereof read:"3. ( 4 ) IN support of the claim that sri. Kasturi was an office bearer of the Federation and that Hotel Ashok was a member of that Federation, the following documents were produced : (i) Rules of the Federation (An- nexure-A), Cls. 3 (v), 4 (c) and' 27 thereof read:"3. The objects for which the federation is established are :- ** ** (v) to advise employers on matters relating to employer-employee relations, to assist them in the settlement of disputes and to represent or arrange for the representation of the employers in any proceedings before conciliation officers, Conciliation boards, Courts of Enquiry, industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or any court or other judicial or quasi-judicial body and any tripartite bodies or other statutory bodies. ** ** 4. (c ). 'officer' means and includes the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, the members of the Executive Committee, the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary and such others as may be decided by the Committee from time to time. ** ** ( 5 ) THE membership of the Federation shall be upon to any person who is an employer and to any association or federation of employers whether incorporated or not. 27. The management of business and the funds of the Federation shall be vested in and the executive duties of the federation shall be conducted by the Executive Committee consisting of the Chairman, Vice chairman and other Committee Members selected or co-opted us hereinafter provided. " (Underlined Italic by me) (ii) A certificate issued by the secretary of the Federation dated 8-9-1982 indicating that Sri. Kasturi was an officer of the Federation (Annexure-B ). t reads :-"'to whomsoever it may concern-Certified that M/s King and Partridge, Advocates (Madras, Ootacamund and bangalore) are members of the Federation and that Mr. K. Kasturi, advocate of M/s King and Partridge, bangalore office, member of the executive Committee of the Employers federation of Southern india, is an officer of the Federation. " (iii) A certificate dated 8-9-1982 issued by the Secretary Of the Federation to the effect that Hotel Ashok, bangalore, was a member of the federation (Annexure-C) it reads :"to whomsoever it may concern-Certified that M/ Hotel Ashok, Bangalore, is a member of the Employers, federation of Southern India. " (iv) An Affidavit of Sri. K. Kasturi, advocate stating that he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Federation (Annexure-E ). (v) An Affidavit of Sri K. Raman, hon. " (iv) An Affidavit of Sri. K. Kasturi, advocate stating that he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Federation (Annexure-E ). (v) An Affidavit of Sri K. Raman, hon. Secretary of the Federation, karnataka Branch. After setting out the relevant facts, in para-8 Sri. K. Raman said thus :-"8. I submit that Hotel Ashok, bangalore, is a member of the efsi Mr. K. Kasturi is an Executive committee Member and as such is an officer of the EFSI. I have seen that two certificates of the EFSI produced by Hotel Ashok, Bangalore. The certificates have been signed by Mr. C. S. Krishnaswamy, who is the Secretary of the EFSI. I state that Mr. Kasturi has been a member of the Executive Committee from the year 1981 and he continue to be a member of the Executive committee. I produce herewith true copies of the circulars of the Federation which disclose election of Mr. Kasturi as an officer of the EFSI". In view of the Rules of the Federation extracted earlier and the documents produced, there cannot be slightest doubt that Hotel Ashok was a member of Federation and Sri kasturi, practising Advocate, was an office bearer of the Federation. 5. In fact, on the question that sri. Kasturi, was an office bearer of the Federation, learned counsel pointed out that the same Tribunal had accepted it in its order dated 7-3-1983 (Annexure-F in W. P. 11764/83 in AIR 15/79, in which it had permitted the appearance of Sri. Kasturi on behalf of Motor Industrie's Limited which is also stated to be member of the Federation. The order reads-" (I) In this matter the opposite party has raised an objection that sri. K. Kasturi has no locus-standi to appear for the applicant-management. (2) The applicant Management has filed its objections and contends that Sri. K. Kasturi is an office bearer of the Employers' Federation of Southern India and that he is competent to represent the Management. (3) The parties have been heard. (4) In the affidavit of Sri. Raman it has been stated that since 198! sri. K. Kasturi is an office bearer of the said Employers' Association. Annexures enclosed to his affidavit substantiate the said contention of the management. It was contended for the workman that on the date sri. (3) The parties have been heard. (4) In the affidavit of Sri. Raman it has been stated that since 198! sri. K. Kasturi is an office bearer of the said Employers' Association. Annexures enclosed to his affidavit substantiate the said contention of the management. It was contended for the workman that on the date sri. Kasturi had tiled his vakalat he was not an office bearer of the said Association and that his prayer to represent the management may not be allowed. The vakalat of Sri. Kasturi has been filed in this Court on 24-3-1982. The aforesaid affidavit and annexures thereto disclose that Sri. Kasturi was taken as an office bearer on 16-10-81. I find no force in the contention of the workman. (5) In the result, Sri. K. Kasturi is permitted to represent the Management. The contention of the workman is rejected. "in the above order, the Tribunal has held that Sri. K. Kasturi being an office bearer of the Federation of which the MICO was a member, was entitled to represent it before the tribunal. ( 6 ) THE next question for consideration is whether the petitioner had the right to nominate Sri. Kasturi, an office bearer of the federation of which the petitioner is a member to appear for it before the Tribunal. ( 7 ) THE answer to the question depends on the interpretation of S. 36 of the Act. The section reads :-"36. (1) A workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act. by- (a) Any member of the Executive or other office bearer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; (b) any member of the execu tive or other office bearer of a Federation of Trade Unions to which the trade union referred in clause (a) is affiliated; (c) Where the "workman is not a member of any trade union by any member of the executive or other office bearer of any trade union connected with, or by any other workman employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by - (a) an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member; (b) an officer of a federation of associations of Employers to which the association referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; (c) Where the employer is not a member of any Association of employers, by an officer of any association of employer connected with or by any other employer engaged in the industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) No party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this act or in any proceedings before a court. (4) In any proceeding before a labour Court, Tribunal, or National tribunal a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceedings and with the leave of the labour Court, Tribunal or National tribunal as the case may be". The above section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in paradip Port Trust v. Their workmen, AIR 1977 SC. 36 . The relevant portions of the judgment read-". . . . . . . . . . . . But for a provision like s. 36 (1) of the Act, there may have been difficulty under the general law in the way of the office-bearers of the union representing workmen before the adjudicating authorities under the Act. unless, perhaps, regulated by the procedure under s. 11 of the Act. To put the matter beyond controversy an absolute right is created in favour of the workmen under S. 36 (1) in the matter-of representation. Having made such a provision for the workmen's representation the employer is also placed at part with the workmen in similar terms under the Act and the employer may also be represented by an officer of the association of employers of which the employer is a member. The right is extended to representation by the office bearers of the federation of the unions and by the officers of the Federation of Employers. The provisions of Ss. 36 (1) and 36 (2) confer the respective parties absolute rights of representation by persons respectively specified therein. The right is extended to representation by the office bearers of the federation of the unions and by the officers of the Federation of Employers. The provisions of Ss. 36 (1) and 36 (2) confer the respective parties absolute rights of representation by persons respectively specified therein. The rights of representation under S. 36 (1) and S. 36 (2) are unconditional and are not subject to the conditions laid down under s. 36 (4) of the Act. The said two sub-sections are independent and stand by themselves. * * * 16. If, however, a legal practioner is appointed as an officer of a company or corporation and is in their pay and under their control and is not a practising advocate the fact that he was earlier a legal practitioner or has a legal degree will not stand in the way of the company or the corporation being represented by him. Similarly if a legal practitioner is an officer of an Association of Employers or of a Federation of such Associations, there is nothing in S. 36 (4) to prevent him from appearing before the tribunal under the provisions of s. 36 (2) of the Act. Again, an office bearer of a trade union or a member of its executive, even though he is a legal practitioner, will be entitled to represent the workmen before the -Tribunal under s. 36 (1) in the former capacity. The legal practitioner in the above two cases will appear in the capacity of an officer of the Association in the case of an employer and in the capacity of an office bearer of the union in the case of workmen and not in the capacity of a legal practitioner. The fact that a person is a legal practitioner will not affect the position if the qualifications specified in S. 36 (1) and S, 36 (2) are fulfilled by him. 17. It must be made clear that there is no scope for enquiry by the Tribunal into the motive for appointment of such legal practitioners as office bearers of the trade Unions or as officers of the employers' Associations. When law provides for a requsite qualification for exercising a right, fulfilment of the qualification in a given case will entitle the party to be represented before the Tribunal by such a person with that qualification. When law provides for a requsite qualification for exercising a right, fulfilment of the qualification in a given case will entitle the party to be represented before the Tribunal by such a person with that qualification. How and under what circumstances these qualifications have been obtained will not be relevant matters for consideration by the Tribunal in considering an application for representation under s-s. 36 (1) and 36 (2) of the Act. Once the qualifications under Ss. 36 (1) and 36 (2) are fulfilled prior to appearance before Tribunals, there is no need under the law to issue the matter in order to find out whether the appointments are in circumvention of S. 36 (4) of the act. Motive of the appointment cannot be made an issue before the tribunal. "the result of the exposition of provision by the Supreme Court from the aforesaid paragraphs may be summarised thus : (I) A workman or workmen are entitled to be represented before industrial Court through an office bearer of a Trade Union or of a federation to which the trade union is affiliated, (ii) An employer is entitled to be represented before an industrial court through an officer of an Association of Employers of which the concerned employer is a member or an officer, of a Federation of Association of Employers to which such association is affiliated. ( 8 ) THEN the question arises, who are 'officers' within the meaning of the expression used in S. 36 (2) of the Act. In this behalf, it is significant to note that in sub-sec. (1) of s. 36 with reference to representation of trade unions the Legislatures used the expression 'office bearer', whereas in sub S. (2) which provides for representation of employers the expression -used is 'officer'. After noticing the difference in language, the Supreme Court in the case of paradip Port Trust case at paragraph 18 of the judgment said thus-"we may note here the difference in language adopted in Ss. 36 (1) and 36 (2 ). While S. 36 (1) refers to 'any member of the executive" or 'other Office-bearer,' S. 36 (2), instead mentions only an officer. " no 'executive' in relation to a trade union means. the body by whatever, name called to which the management of the affairs of the trade union is entrusted S. 2 (gg ). While S. 36 (1) refers to 'any member of the executive" or 'other Office-bearer,' S. 36 (2), instead mentions only an officer. " no 'executive' in relation to a trade union means. the body by whatever, name called to which the management of the affairs of the trade union is entrusted S. 2 (gg ). 'office bearer' in relation to a trade union includes any member of the executive thereof but does not include an auditor [s. 2 (III)], So far as trade unions are concerned there is no difficulty in ascertaining a member of the executive or other office-bearer and s. 36 (1) will create no difficulty in practical application. But the word 'officer' in S. 36 (2) is not defined in the Act and may well have been, as done under S. 2 (3) of the companies Act. This is bound to give rise to controversy when a particular person claims to be an officer of the Association of Employers. No single test nor an exhaustive test can be laid down for determining as to who is an officer in absence of a definition in the Act. When such a question arises the Tribunal, in each individual case, will have to determine on the materials produced before it whether the claim is justified. We should also observe that the officer under S. 36 (2 ). is of the Association or of the Federation of Associations of employers and r. ot of the company or corporation. "thus it may be seen, the expression 'office bearer' used in S. 36 (1) of the ct has been defined under S. 2 (III) of the Act, to the effect that it include any member of the executive but not include an auditor. Therefore, there is no doubt as to the persons who are entitled to represent a workman or workmen. As regards the meaning of the word 'officer' used in S. 36 (2) of, the Act, the supreme Court observed that the question has got to be decided in each individual case. ( 9 ) THE documents referred to and extracted earlier establish that mr. As regards the meaning of the word 'officer' used in S. 36 (2) of, the Act, the supreme Court observed that the question has got to be decided in each individual case. ( 9 ) THE documents referred to and extracted earlier establish that mr. Kasturi, who is a legal practitioner is an 'office-bearer' of the Federation of which the petitioner, Hotel ashok, is a member, but S. 36 (2) provides that an officer of an Association of which the employer is a member of the Federation of Associations to which the former is affiliated is entitled to represent the employer. The question which arises therefore is whether the word 'officer' includes 'office bearer. ' ( 10 ) THE meaning of the word 'officer' is given at page 82 of Volume 7 of the Oxford English Dictionary. While various shades of meaning of the word are given therein, the meaning which are opposite for the interpretation of S. 36 of the Act read :'officer' 2. One who holds a public, civil or ecclesiastical office; a servant or minister of king, as one of the great functionaries of royal household, etc. , a person authoritatively appointed or elected to exercise some functions pertaining to public life, or to take part in the administration of municipal government, the management or direction of a public corporation, institution, etc. , In early use, applied esp to persons engaged in the administration of law or justice. A person holding office and taking part in the management or direction of a Society or Institution, esp. one holding the office of president, treasurer or secretary ; an office-bearer". The meaning indicates that inter alia two categories of persons fall within the meaning of the word 'officer' (I) Those who hold employment or appointment of responsibility under a public corporation, municipal corporation, institution, etc. , and (ii) Those who are members of a Governing body by whatever name it is called, such as managing committee, board of directors, executive committee, etc. , of a public corporation, company institution, organisation, etc. , in whom the management of the affairs of the concerned body is vested, either as member, director etc. , or as president, chairman, Vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, etc. , of a public corporation, company institution, organisation, etc. , in whom the management of the affairs of the concerned body is vested, either as member, director etc. , or as president, chairman, Vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, etc. , ( 11 ) ONE distinguishing feature between the two categories of persons referred to above is in the first category i. e. , in the case of persons, who are appointed to a post, there would be a relationship of employer and employee between the body or authority who appoints and the appointee, whereas in the case of 'office bearer" i. e. , those elected or nominated to an office connected with the governance or management of the affairs of a company, corporation, organisation etc. , there would be no relationship of master and servant. ( 12 ) THE word 'officer' is a wider import in that it includes not only those, who are appointed to a post of responsibility, but it includes persons elected or nominated to a governing body or executive or managing committee in accordance with the constitution or bye-law of the concerned institution or body. ( 13 ) THUS while the expression 'office bearer' used in S. 36 (I) of the act has a restricted meaning, namely, it covers only persons, who are members of the executive and other office bearers of a trade union such as President, Vice-president, Secretary, etc. , the expression 'officer' used in sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 has a wider meaning, It includes employees appointed to positions of responsibility as also office bearers elected or nominated as members of the managing committee or executive committee and as President, Vice-President, secretary etc. , depending upon the constitution or bye-law or memorandum of Association of the concerned body. ( 14 ) THE above position also becomes evident, if we trace the legislative history. S. 36 (1) of the Act had also used the expression 'officer' prior to its amendment by Act 45 of 1971. It is by that amendment the following provisions were added : (I) Ss. 2 (gg) and (111) which were added to the Act read- s. 2 (gg) 'executive' in relation to a trade union, means the body, by whatever name called, to which the management of the affairs of the trade union is intrusted. 5. It is by that amendment the following provisions were added : (I) Ss. 2 (gg) and (111) which were added to the Act read- s. 2 (gg) 'executive' in relation to a trade union, means the body, by whatever name called, to which the management of the affairs of the trade union is intrusted. 5. 2 (111) 'office bearer', in relation to a trade union, includes any member of the executive thereof, but does not include an auditor. '' (ii) S. 36 was amended by S. 6 of the amending Act. It reads:"6. Amendment of S. 36. In sub-sec (1) of S. 36 of the principal act, for the words 'an officer' whereever they occur, the words 'any member of the executive or other office bearer shall be substituted. "the relevant provisions of the trade Union Act, a Cognate Legislation which regulate the Constitution and Organisation of Trade unions are as follows :"2 (A ). 'executive' means, the body, by whatever name called to which the management of the affairs of a Trade Union is entrusted. (b) 'office hearer' in the case of a trade Union, includes any members of the executive thereof, but does not include an auditor. * * * * 6. Provisions to be contained in the rules of a Trade Union. A trade Union has shall not be entitled to registration under this act unless the executive thereof is constituted in accordance with provisions of this act, and rules thereof provide for the following matters, namely- * * * * (h) the mannef in which the members of the executive and other office bearers of the trade union shall be appointed or removed. * * * * 22. Proportion of officers to be connected with the Industry-Not less than one half of the total number of the office bearers of every registered Trade Union shall be persons actually engaged or employed in an industry with which"the Trade Union is connected:- provided that the appropriate government may, by special or general order, declare that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any Trade union or class of Trade Unions specified in the order. " (Underlined Italic by me) the word 'office bearer' was incorporated into the aforesaid provisions by the Trade Union (Amendment) act, 1964, substituting for the word 'officer' used originally. The trade Union (Amendment) Act 1964 (Act 64) came into effect on 1-4-1965. " (Underlined Italic by me) the word 'office bearer' was incorporated into the aforesaid provisions by the Trade Union (Amendment) act, 1964, substituting for the word 'officer' used originally. The trade Union (Amendment) Act 1964 (Act 64) came into effect on 1-4-1965. ( 15 ) THUS it may be seen that both in Ss. 36 (1) and 36 (2) the word used was 'officer' prior to the amendment of S. 36 (2) by Act 45 of 1971. As pointed out above in the three provisions of the Trade Union act, also,. the word used was 'officer', but was defined to the effect that the word included officebearer. The legislature intended that expression 'officer' used in the three provisions of the Trade Union aet was not appropriate. The relevant part of the statement of objects and reasons appended to the bill reads-"3. The word 'officer' is not considered appropriate in the case of Trade Unions and is therefore, proposed to be substituted by the word 'office bearer. "corresponding amendment was carried out in S. 36 (1) of the Act, it appears that the Bill for effecting amendment of the Act was also introduced in or about the same time but for reasons not known, it was delayed and passed into Act only in 1971 by Act 45 of 1971 referred to earlier. ( 16 ) (1) The expression 'officer' used in S. 36 (1) of the Act i. e. , prior to amendment in 1971, was considered by the Patna High Court in Bihar journals v. H. K. Chaudhari, AIR 1964 pat. 532 . In that case it was held that a vice-President of a Trade Union, who was a practising lawyer was entitled to represent the workman in an industrial dispute as he was an officer of the trade union. This judgment indicates that the expression 'officer' used in S. 36 (1) of the act prior to its amendment was held to include an 'office bearer'. The meaning of the same word in S. 36 (2) of the Act cannot be understand differently. (2) In the case of Workmen of mis B. R. Darbar Ginning and Pressing factory v. The Management of Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory, 1966 (2) Mys. The meaning of the same word in S. 36 (2) of the Act cannot be understand differently. (2) In the case of Workmen of mis B. R. Darbar Ginning and Pressing factory v. The Management of Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory, 1966 (2) Mys. L. J. 189 a Division Bench of this court considered as to whether a practising advocate, who was appointed as Labour and Law Officer of the Karnataka Chamber of Commerce and Industry was an officer within the meaning of the word used in S. 36 (2) of the Act. In that case the Management claimed that the Advocate so appointed was ml officer in the sense that he was in the employment of the Chamber. On considering the terms of appointment, the Division Bench negatived the claim. Relevant part of the judgment reads-". . . . Besides the power to appoint, the employer should have the power to control and give directions as to the manner in which the discharge of the duties ought to be performed. The employer should have powers of discipline and dismissal over the employee. The question of remuneration may be one of the matters to be taken into account. Though it is difficult to define the term 'officer' the aforesaid elements may be decisive of the question. In the instant case, beyond the resolution which leaves everything to the volition of Mr. Apte and to the sweet will of the chamber or the individual members to utilise the services of Mr. Apte on payment of his fees themselves, we have no other evidence to hold that mr. Apte was holding any office (considered in the light of the criteria indicated above) under the Chamber. We have therefore no doubt in holding that the Labour Court was in error in concluding that Mr. Apte was a regular officer of the Chamber and was entitled to represent the gokak Mills and Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory under S. 36 (2) of the Act". From the above judgment, it is clear that, whenever the claim is that a person is an officer Employed by the Association of Employers the tests laid down in the above case should be established in order to entitle the employer to be represented by such person before an Industrial court. From the above judgment, it is clear that, whenever the claim is that a person is an officer Employed by the Association of Employers the tests laid down in the above case should be established in order to entitle the employer to be represented by such person before an Industrial court. The question whether an office bearer of employers' Association is an officer within the meaning of the word used in S. 36 (2) did not arise in that case as in fact the advocate concerned in that case was not an office bearer of the chamber. (3) In the case of P. Mallesh v. Industrial Tribunal, Lab. I. C. 249, a Division bench of the Andhra Pradesh high Court held that, the Joint Secretary of the Federation of Andhra pradesh Chamber of Commerce and industry, who appeared for the concerned employer before the Industrial tribunal by filing a memo of appearance and not vakalat nama, had appeared as an officer of the employers' Federation and he was entitled to so appear. ( 17 ) IN the light of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that the 'officer' used in S. 36 (2) of the act includes both categories of persons, namely, employees, who hold responsible posts, under the Employers association of which the concerned employer is a member or of a Federation to which the Association is affiliated and legal practitioners, who are office bearers of such Association or Federation. (2) In the context, it is also pertinent to note that if a legal practitioner accepts whole time employment, he ceases to be a legal practitioner during the period he holds such employment. This is clear from r. 44 of the rules framed by the Bar council of India under S. 49 of the advocates Act. It reads :-" 44. An advocate shall not be a full time salaried employee of any person. Government, firm, corporation or concern, so long as he continues to practise and shall, on taking up any such employment intimate the fact to the Bar Council on whose roll his name appears, and shall thereupon cease to practice as an Advocate so long as he continues in such employment. Government, firm, corporation or concern, so long as he continues to practise and shall, on taking up any such employment intimate the fact to the Bar Council on whose roll his name appears, and shall thereupon cease to practice as an Advocate so long as he continues in such employment. Nothing in this rule shall apply, to a Law Officer of the Central Government or the Government of a state or of any public Corporation or body constituted by statute who is entitled to be enrolled under the rules of his State Bar Council made under S. 28 (2) (d) read with s. 24 (1) (e) of the Act despite his being a full time salaried employee. "therefore no objection could be raised to the right of each a person to appear before the Industrial Court on the ground that he was also a legal practitioner, because during the period of such employment he cannot be regarded as a legal practitioner at all. ( 18 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Paradeep Port Trust case has clearly stated that an employer is entitled to be represented by a person who is an officer of Association of Employers or of a Federation of such associations notwithstanding the fact that he was a legal practitioner. Relevant portion at page 42 reads:". . . . . . . . SIMILARLY if a legal practitioner is an officer of an association of Employers or of a Federation of such Associations, there is nothing in S. 36 (4) to prevent him from appearing before the Tribunal under the provisions of S. 36 (2) of the Act. Relevant portion at page 42 reads:". . . . . . . . SIMILARLY if a legal practitioner is an officer of an association of Employers or of a Federation of such Associations, there is nothing in S. 36 (4) to prevent him from appearing before the Tribunal under the provisions of S. 36 (2) of the Act. "the situation in which a person nominated by an employer to represent him before an Industrial Court is also a legal practitioner at that time would arise only when he is an office-bearer of an Employer's Association or of a Federation to which the association is affiliated and not as an officer in employment, ( 19 ) IN the light of the above discussion, i hold that expression, 'officer' used in S. 36 (2) of the Act includes two categories of persons, namely- (i) Officers, who are employed by the Association or Federation referred to in S. 36 (2) of the Act; and (ii) Office-bearers, namely members of the meaning or executive committee and other office-bearers such as president, Vice-president, secretary Joint Secretary with whatever designation in whom the management of the affairs of Association or Federation referred to in s. 36 (2) of the Act, is vested according to the constitution or bye-laws of the concerned Association or federation, ( 20 ) IN the present case, as already held, hotel Ashok, was a member of the federation, which is an Association of Employers and Sri Kasturi was an office-bearer, in that he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Federation. Therefore, the petitioner had a right to be represented through Sri Kasturi before the Industrial court through a memo of appearance, notwithstanding the fact he was a legal practitioner. But his appearance before the industrial court would be in his capacity as 'office bearer' and not as a member of the legal profession. In this behalf, it should be remembered that the right conferred under S. 36 (2) of the Act is the right of the employer to be represented through such 'office bearer' who might happen to be a legal practitioner and not the right of the legal practitioner to appear before the industrial court. In this behalf, it should be remembered that the right conferred under S. 36 (2) of the Act is the right of the employer to be represented through such 'office bearer' who might happen to be a legal practitioner and not the right of the legal practitioner to appear before the industrial court. ( 21 ) IT would not also be possible to hold that the expression 'officer' used in S- 36 (2) means only employees and that it does not include 'office bearers' such an interpretation of the provision would at once bring the provision into conflict with Art. 14 of the Constitution for, the effect of such interpretation would be, one party to a dispute, namely workmen would have the right of being represented through a trained practicising lawyer by making him an office bearer of trade union and another party to the same dispute would be disentitled to be represented by a trained lawer even if he were to be an office-bearer of employer's association, resulting ip patent discrimination against the latter. It is a cardinal rule of construction that when there are two plausible interpretations of a provision, the one which comes into conflict with the provisions of the Constitution should be reschewed and the other which does not -should be preferred. On this aspect, the Supreme Court in the case of K. P. Varghese v. I. T. Officer air 1981 SC 1922 at I936said thus :-'' The Court must obviously prefer a construction which renders the statutory provision constitutionally valid rather than the which makes it void. (Underlined by me ). ( 22 ) IN fact in the present case before the Tribunal both the parties also proceeded on the basis that if mr. Kasturi was an office bearer of the Federation the petitioner was a member of the Federation, the petitioner would be entitled to be represented through Mr. Kasturi. Obviously for this reason, the Industrial tribunal procceeded on that basis. But the Tribunal went into the question raised by the workmen, namely, as to whether Hotel Ashok, Banlore could have become a member of the Federation without the permission of the ITDC whose constituent it was and if it had become a member of the Federation without the permission of the ITDC whether it could be regarded as a member of the Federation at all. The Industrial tribunal held that permission of the ITDC was necessary for Hotel ashok to become a member of the federation and as no evidence to prove that ITDC had given permission to Hotel Ashok Bangalore, to become a member of the Federation, was adduced membership of Hotel ashck, Bangalore, of the Federation could not be recognised and consequently mr. Kasturi could not be permitted to appear on behalf of the hotel Ashok, Bangalore, ( 23 ) SRI Anantharam representing the respondents-workmen, submitted that the view taken by the industrial Tribunal was correct as hotel Ashok, Bangalore was a constituent of ITDC and as no material was adduced to show that the Board of Directors of the ITDC in whom the control and management of ITDC was vested, had given permission to Hotel Ashok, Bangalore to become a member of the Federation. ( 24 ) IN my opinion, the only question relevant for consideration by the Tribunal having regard to the provision of S. 36 of the Act, was whether 'hotel Ashok, Bangalore, had become a member of the Federation and whether Sri Kasturi was an officer of that Federation. Both these aspects were clearly established by the documentary evidence produced and the affidavits filed by sri Kasturi also Sri K. Raman. Once these facts were established, the tribunal ought to have allowed the petitioner to be represented by Sri kasturi. ( 25 ) THE question as to how and with whose permission Hotel Ashok, bangalore, could have or had become a member of the Federation, was not at all a relevant question for consideration of the Tribonal. No specific rule was also pointed out which required that Hotel Ashok, Bangalore should have secured the permission of the ITDC before becoming a member of the Federation. Even assuming that such permission was necessary, that is a matter entirely between the ITDC and Hotel Ashok, bangalore, and had nothing to do with the question arising for consideration before the Industrial Tribunal. ( 26 ) SRI Anantharam submitted that as the management and control of the ITDC is vested in the Board of directors of the ITDC, Hotel Ashok being only its constituent it had to seek the permission of the ITDC to become a member of the Federation. ( 26 ) SRI Anantharam submitted that as the management and control of the ITDC is vested in the Board of directors of the ITDC, Hotel Ashok being only its constituent it had to seek the permission of the ITDC to become a member of the Federation. If the contention is correct then itdc would be employer of the Second party-workman and if so it is difficult to understand as to how the management of Hotel Ashok, Bangalore, can be treated as management of an Industrial establishment and a dispute raised against it. I find no substance its his submission. ( 27 ) THE summary of my conclusion is :- (1) Under S. 36 (2) of the Act, an employer, who is a party to a dispute under the Act is entitled to nominate: (i) a person, who is an employee of Employers' Federation of which such Association is a member who holds a post of responsibility i. e. , who is regarded as an officer by the Association or federation notwithstanding the fact he was a legal practitioner prior to his appointment; and (i?) a person, who is an officebearer, either as an ordinary member of an executive or managing committee or as President, Vice-President, secretary, Treasurer as the case may be, in which the management of the affairs of the association is vested notwithstanding the fact such person is a legal practitioner. (2) A legal practitioner, who appears before the Tribunal representing an employer, as an officebearer, appears as the authorised representative of employer and not as a member of the legal profession. 3. (i) In the present case, it is established that Hotel Ashok, Bangalore, is a member of the Employers' federation of Southern India and the Federation is an Association of Employers. (ii) Mr. Kasturi, Advocate, being a member of the Executive committee of the Federation in which the management of the affairs of the Federation is vested, he is an office bearer of the Federation falls within the meaning of the expression 'officer' used in S. 36 (2) of the act. (iii) The petitioner has the right to be represented by Mr. Kasturi so long he continues to be an office-bearer of the Federation and the petitioner continues to be its member before the Tribunal in any of the dispute to which it is a party notwithstanding the fact Mr. Kasturi is a legal practitioner. (iii) The petitioner has the right to be represented by Mr. Kasturi so long he continues to be an office-bearer of the Federation and the petitioner continues to be its member before the Tribunal in any of the dispute to which it is a party notwithstanding the fact Mr. Kasturi is a legal practitioner. ( 28 ) IN conformity with my conclusions, I make the following order:- (I) The writ petitions are allowed. (ii) The orders of the Additional labour Court, Bangalore, dated 4-5-1983 (Annexure-F) impugned in w. P. No. 10113/83 and of the Additional industrial Tribunal, bangalore, dated 12-5-1983 (Annexure-E) impugned in W. P. No. 11764/83 are quashed. (iii) The Additional Labour court, Bangalore and the Additional industrial Tribunal, bangalore, are directed to accept the appearance of Mr. Kasturi on behalf of the petitioner in the two disputes pending before them. (iv) No costs. --- *** --- .