JUDGMENT - Deshpande D.B. J. - One Bhikchand was declared as the owner of the land to the extent of 27 acres and 30 gunthas of survey No. 14 of village Hinglaj Wadi, of Taluka and District Osmanabad under section 38(E) of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Tenancy Act”). Thereafter the present Respondent No. 1 started interfering with the possession of Bhikchand and that is why on this allegation Bhikchand filed Regular Civil Suit No. 82/72 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Osmanabad, for a perpetual injunction against the Respondent No. 1 and an application for temporary injunction was given by Bhikchand in this suit and accordingly temporary injunction was granted by the Civil Court. Bhikchand died on 25-10-1978 and the present petitioner claimed this property on the strength of a will alleged to have been made in his favour by Bhikchand on 13-10-1978. The present Respondent No. 1 who was the defendant in that suit resisted the plaintiff's claim and he contended that Bhikchand had leased out to him half of the land admeasuring 13 acres and 35 gunthas of the eastern side on Batai basis, and that this lease was made in his favour in the year 1969-70. He, therefore, claimed that he was a tenant of 13 acres and 35 gunthas of eastern side land of Bhikchand. 2. Naturally an issue of tenancy against Respondent No. 1 was framed by the Civil Court and was referred to the Tenancy Court. 3. It is not disputed that once this matter came up to the Maha- rashtra Revenue Tribunal and it was remanded to the trial Court and that is why I need not state all that happened before this order of remand by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. 4. After the remand the matter went before the Naib Tahsildar who considered the entire oral evidence and also the legal position. He held that on the strength of the oral evidence also it was not possible to hold that the present Respondent No. 1 was a tenant in respect of the eastern half of this land. The Naib Tahsildar further held that the alleged lease was clearly in contravention of section 50(B) of the Tenancy Act and as such it was contrary to law. The Naib Tahsildar further held that the alleged lease was clearly in contravention of section 50(B) of the Tenancy Act and as such it was contrary to law. It is an admitted fact that Bhikchand was declared as an owner under the Tenancy Act and hence it was held that under section 50(B) he could not lease out the land to the present Respon-dent No. 1 without previous sanction as required by section 50(B) of the Tenancy Act. On both these counts the learned Naib Tahsildar held that present respondent No. 1 was not a tenant and he directed that a copy of this decision be sent to the Civil Court. 5. The present Respondent No. 1 went in appeal to the Dy. Collector, Land Reforms, Osmanabad. Before the Dy. Collector neither party touch- ed the oral evidence, and this is apparent from the judgment of the Dy. Collector dated 27-10-1978. The learned Dy. Collector, therefore, did not at all consider the oral evidence and held that the alleged tenancy was clearly contrary to the statutory provisions of section 50 (B) of the Tenancy Act and, therefore, he dismissed this appeal. Feeling aggrieved the Respondent No. 1 filed revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal disagreed with the lower authorities on the question of legality of tenancy and thereafter he proceeded to appreciate the entire oral evidence on record and held that the present respondent No. 1 was a tenant of Bhikchand in respect of the eastern side 13 acres and 35 gunthas of land since 1969-70. It is this order which is being challenged by the present petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Shri K. G. Navendar, appearing on behalf of the petitioner urged before me that the order of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal is clearly con- trary to law. It is an undisputed fact that Bhikchand was a declared owner of this whole land under section 38 (E) of the Tenancy Act. In this back- ground section 50 (B) of the Tenancy Act is very material, which runs as under: “50B. It is an undisputed fact that Bhikchand was a declared owner of this whole land under section 38 (E) of the Tenancy Act. In this back- ground section 50 (B) of the Tenancy Act is very material, which runs as under: “50B. (i) No land purchased by a tenant under sections 38, 38A, 38E, 38F, 38G, 38H, or 46D or 48, or sold to a person under sec- tion 53F, 53G, 53H or 98C shall be transferred by sale, gift, mortgage, lease or assignment or partition without the previous sanction of the Collector. (2) (A) Any transfer or partition of land in contravention of sub-section (1) shall be invalid.” 7. It will, therefore, be seen that Bhikchand was incapable of mak- ing a lease of this property, if any, in favour of Respondent No. 1. In this context Shri Navendar invited my attention to the definition of word 'tenant' in section 5 of the Tenancy Act, wherein it is provided that the person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant...etc. The stress of Shri Navendar was on the word 'lawfully'. In the instant case it is apparent that the alleged lease by Bhikchand to Respondent No. 1 was not lawful and was clearly contrary to the provisions of section 50(B) of the Tenancy Act. Moreover such a contract of lease, if any, is against the public policy and is also, therefore, invalid by virtue of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The public policy is that the land declared in favour of the tenants should be cultivated by them personally and the very object of the Tenancy Act is that the persons actually cultivating land should be the owners of the land. Thus, even if such a contract is there, it is clearly against the public policy and it cannot be recognised by any Court of law. And, therefore, the Naib Tahsildar and Dy. Collector were right in holding against the present respondent No. 1 and the learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal has clearly committed an error of law and has come to a wrong conclusion. 8. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether the respondent No. 1 has proved the tenancy but, in this respect also Shri Navendar has a grievance against the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. 8. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether the respondent No. 1 has proved the tenancy but, in this respect also Shri Navendar has a grievance against the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. I have already stated above that the learned Naib Tahsildar considered oral evidence also and held against the respondent No. 1. I have further pointed out that before the Dy. Collector the oral evidence was not touch- ed at all. It means that the submissions were not made to the Dy. Collector on the basis of the oral evidence and that is why the learned Dy. Collector did not consider the oral evidence. It is apparent from the judgment of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal that the Revenue Tribunal has proceeded to appreciate the entire oral and documentary evidence. Shri Navendar was right when he urged that if Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal felt that the Dy. Collector should have considered the oral evidence it was incumbent upon him to remand the matter back to the Dy. Collector and it was not at all proper for him to reappreciate the evidence to decide the question on oral evidence. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal should bear in mind that the Tribunal cannot reappreciate the evidence and come to any conclu-sion. If the Tribunal felt that discussion of oral evidence was necessary by Dy. Collector the Tribunal should remand the matter to Dy. Collector for considering the evidence and then to give decision. But in the instant case such a contract of lease cannot at all be recognised by the Courts of law. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal should bear in mind that it is not the function of the Tribunal to appreciate the oral evidence and to come to the conclusion in such cases. If the Courts below have given perverse finding or if their finding is based on no evidence or if they have ignored any evidence then alone Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal can go into the evidence otherwise not. 9. The result is that whatever may be the position of oral evidence such a contract of lease if any, cannot be recognised by the Court of law and, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 10. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed. The order of Maha-rashtra Revenue Tribunal is hereby set aside and that of the Dy. 9. The result is that whatever may be the position of oral evidence such a contract of lease if any, cannot be recognised by the Court of law and, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 10. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed. The order of Maha-rashtra Revenue Tribunal is hereby set aside and that of the Dy. Collector declaring the respondent No. 1 not to be a tenant of the petitioner, is restored. 11. Shri B. N. Deshmukh appearing for respondent No. 1 contended that Bhikchand, original defendant No. 1 is dead and present petitioner is not the legal representative. The present petitioner claims on the strength of the will and the Civil Court will decide whether the petitioner is legal representative of the original defendant No. 1. This point is left open for the decision of the Civil Court. 12. Rule made absolute. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. ----