Saikia, J.- This is an appeal under Section 30(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, shortly 'the Act', from the judgment of the Assistant District Judge No. 1 at Gauhati refusing to set aside the Arbitrator's award under Section 30 of the Act. 2. The appellants having accepted on 25.8.77 the tender of the respondents, M/s. Bharat Builders, for construction of the Kendriya Bidyalaya at Khanapara under the Garrison Engineer (shortly 'G.E.'), Narengi for the lump sum of Rs. 14,82,761.93 paise, to be completed within twelve months ending 4.9.78, the work order was issued by the G.E., Narengi in 1.9.77, with the commencement date as 5.9.77. The date of completion was later extended and the work was actually completed on 29.1.80, and the final bill paid on 6.9.80. Disputes having arisen out of the contract between the parties those were referred, in accordance with the arbitration clause of the agreement, to a sole Arbitrator before whom the respondents made several claims totalling Rs. 5,02,698. 80, to which the appellants filed objections; and the Arbitrator after hearing the parties made and published the award dated 23rd July, 1981 with notice to the parties. While the respondent filed a petition in the Court of the Assistant District Judge, along with a copy of the award, for passing a decree in terms of the award, the appellants submitted a petition under Section 30 of the Act for setting aside the award contending that the Arbitrator made the award beyond the terms of the agreement between the parties and without considering all the relevant matters and thereby he misconducted himself. The Court rejected the petition and passed a decree in terms of the award. Hence this appeal. 3. Mr. S.N. Chetia, the learned Additional Central Govern­ment Standing Counsel, assailing the award in respect of Claims A. 1 and A. 3 only, submits, inter alia that to that extent the award is contrary to clause 11 (C) of the agreement between the parties to the contract; that in allowing these two claims the Arbitrator went beyond the agreement and thereby misconducted himself wherefore the award, to that extent, is liable to be set aside; and that the lower Court erred in law in rejecting the appell­ant's petition under Sec. 30 of the Act. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. J. Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents, submits that the award being a non-speaking one and it having not referred to any agreement or appended any note or document it is not permissible for this Court to look into the terms of the agreement; that the Arbitrator has not misconducted himself; and that the learned Court below rightly rejected the petition under Sec. 30 of the Act and passed the decree in terms of the award. 5. The precise questions raised in this appeal, therefore, are whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the impugned non-speaking award it is permissible for this appellate Court to look into the clauses of the agreement and to set aside the award if found to be contrary thereto; and whether giving of the award contrary to the terms of the agreement may amount to misconduct on the part of the Arbitrator ? 6. The reference to the sole Arbitrator was made in this case under Clause 70 of the agreement, the relevant portion of which runs thus : "70. Arbitration.-All disputes, between the parties to the Contract (other than those for which the decision of the C. W. E. or any other person is by the Contract expressed to be final and binding) shall, after written notice by either party to the Contract to the other of them, be referred to the sole arbitration of an Engineer Officer to be appointed by the authority mentioned in the tender documents. The Arbitrator shall t be deemed to have entered on the reference on the date he issues notice to both the parties, asking them to submit to him their statement of the case and pleadings in defence. The Aribtrator may, from time to time with the consent of the parties, enlarge the time upto but not exceeding one year from the date of his entering on the reference, for making and publishing the award. The Arbitrator shall give his award within a period of six months from the date of his entering on the reference or within the extended time as the case pay be on all matters referred to him and shall indicate his findings, along with sums awarded, separately on each individual item of dispute. The Arbitrator shall give his award within a period of six months from the date of his entering on the reference or within the extended time as the case pay be on all matters referred to him and shall indicate his findings, along with sums awarded, separately on each individual item of dispute. The Award of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on both parties to the Contract." Admittedly the procedure prescribed in the arbitration clause has been followed and as such the award was final and binding on both the parties to the contract unless it can be set aside under Section 30 of the Act. 7. As Mr. Chetia's submission is that the terms of Clause II of the agreement have not been complied with we may refer to that clause which deals with time, delay and extension. Sub-clause (c) thereof says - "No claim in respect of compensation or otherwise, howsoever arising, as a result of extensions granted under Conditions (A) and (B) above shall be admitted". Sub-clause (A) says that time is the essence of the contract and is specified in the contract documents or in each individual works order. The time may be extended if the works be delayed by the reasons mentioned thereunder. Extension may similarly be granted under sub-clause (B) if the works be delayed by the reasons mentioned thereunder. Admittedly in this case extension was granted and at the end of the extended period the work was completed and final bill already paid and the disputes arose only thereafter as provided in the agreement. 8. The relevant portion of the award says: "WHEREAS certain difference arose between the parties out of a Contract in writing for provision of Kendriya Vidyalaya at Khanapara at Gauhati pertaining to Contract Agreement No. CW 8 N 77. AND WHEREAS request was made to me to act as Sole Arbitrator in the matter. Now, I, Lt. Col SK Malhotra, having taken upon the burden of reference, and heard and examined and considered the pleadings submitted by and on behalf of the parties and documentary and oral evidence produced before me by them as also their oral submission and arguments. I DO HERBY make and publish this my Final Award, in writing of and concerning the matters referred to me. I AWARD AND DIRECT THAT A. Claims of Claimants (M/s. Shree Bharat Builders) 1. Claim Rs. I DO HERBY make and publish this my Final Award, in writing of and concerning the matters referred to me. I AWARD AND DIRECT THAT A. Claims of Claimants (M/s. Shree Bharat Builders) 1. Claim Rs. 1,05,043.00 for loss on account of establishment. Claim is partly upheld. A sum of Rs. 80,327.00 (Rupees eighty thousand three hundred twenty seven only) is awarded in favour of Claimant. * * * 3. Claim of Rs. 87,500.00 for increase in prices from 4.9.78 to 29.1.80. Claim is partly upheld. A sum of Rs. 44,944.00 (Rupees forty four thousand nine hundred and forty four only) is awarded in favour of claimant. * * * As WITNESS my hand this 23rd day of July, 1981. Sd. (SK Malhotra) Lt. Col Sole Arbitrator." 9. There is no dispute that the award is a non-speaking one and it does not refer to any proposition of law, and it does not refer to any agreement or append any document. Only in the recital it mentions about the contract. Mr. Chetia's contention is that the statement of claims of the respondents clearly made out that the above Claims A.1 and A. 3 were due to 17 months delay in completion of the work and thus due to reasons for which the appellants were, but the respondents were not, responsible. The claims, according to the counsel, were clearly contrary to sub-clauses (A) and (B) of Clause 11 of the agreement and, by entertaining them the Arbitrator miscon­ducted himself. 10. Mr. Chetia relies on the Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs. The U.P. Electricity Board, AIR 1973 S.C. 683 , where in computing the market value of the appellants' transferred electricity undertaking for the purpose of compensation, the conditions of the licence and the provisions of the Electricity Act, 1910, pointed only in one direction : that the appellant-licensee was entitled to receive compensation for the 'service lines' laid at the cost of the consumers, but in the award the Umpire computed the market value expressly excluding there from the "value of the portion of services installed at the cost of the consumers", the Umpire was held to have miscon­ducted himself in law, thereby rendering the award erroneous on its face and liable to be set aside under Section 30 of the Act which reads : "30. Grounds for setting aside award.-An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely :- (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings ; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35 ; (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid." The error which occurred in that award having related to a matter which was distinct and separate from the rest of the award, the invalid part was held to be severable from its valid part and the invalid part was set aside. Admittedly that award was a speaking one. The Umpire recorded therein : "The company is not entitled to claim from the Board the value of the portion of the service lines which were laid at the cost of the consumers". It was therefore beyond the pale of controversy that the Umpire did not award compensation to the appellant in respect of the 'service' lines for the sole reason that they were laid at the cost of the consumers. Some market value the service lines must have had, even if it be no more than the scrap value. But to the way of thinking which the Umpire adopted, that consideration had no relevance. The service lines were paid for by the consu­mers and that, for the Umpire, was the end of the matter, which was held to be patently wrong. 11. While setting aside the erroneous portion the Supreme Court referred to Hodgkinson vs. Fernie, (1857) 3 CB (NS) 189 where it was stated : "Where a cause or matters in difference are referred to an arbitrator,----he is constituted the sole and final judge of all questions both of law and fact----The only exceptions to that rule are, cases where the award is the result of corruption or fraud and one other, which though it is to be regretted, is now, I think firmly established., viz., where the question of law necessarily arises on the face of the award, or upon some paper accompanying and forming part of the award". This view was also followed in Union of India vs. Bungo Steel Furniture (P) Ltd. (1967) 1 SCR 324 =AIR 1967 S. C 1032 as well as in Allen Berry and Co. This view was also followed in Union of India vs. Bungo Steel Furniture (P) Ltd. (1967) 1 SCR 324 =AIR 1967 S. C 1032 as well as in Allen Berry and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1971 S. C. 696. The Supreme Court held that "it is well settled that if parties constitute an arbitrator as the sole and final judge of the disputes arising between them, they bind themselves as a rule to accept the award as final and conclusive. An award is ordinarily not liable to be set aside on the ground that either on facts or in law, it is erroneous". The appellant's application for setting aside an award can succeed only if there is an error of law on the face of the award. In our instant non-speaking award we cannot ascertain the reasons which weighed in the mind of the Arbitrator in allowing the two claims and there appears no error on its face. 12. It is common knowledge that arbitration and litigation are two alternative modes of settling disputes and when the parties have decided to arbitrate they cannot be treated as if they have litigated. The law of arbitration only prescribes the limiting principles within which the Arbitrator is allowed to make his award final and binding on the parties. In all cases of reference to arbitration the Court may from time to time remit the matters referred or any of them for re-consideration of the Arbitrator or Umpire. Where an Arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings, or an arbitration or award has been improperly procured, the Court may set the award aside. Subject to the provisions of the Act the question whether an award should be remitted or set aside altogether is one for the Court's discretion and an appellate Court will not interfere unless that discretion has been obviously misused or unless the award is liable to be set aside under section 30 of the Act. This is because in every reference to arbitration the Arbitrator is empowered to make an award on the differences or disputes comprised in the agreement and reference, and by this agreement the parties may confer such other powers incidental to making the award as they may in their discretion think fit. This is because in every reference to arbitration the Arbitrator is empowered to make an award on the differences or disputes comprised in the agreement and reference, and by this agreement the parties may confer such other powers incidental to making the award as they may in their discretion think fit. As an Arbitrator obtains his jurisdi­ction from the agreement for his appointment, it is not open to him to reject any part of that agreement or to disregard any limitation placed on his authority; nor can he confer jurisdiction upon himself by deciding in his own favour some preliminary points upon which his jurisdiction depends. Never­theless he is entitled to consider the question whether or not he has jurisdiction to act in order to satisfy himself that it is worthwhile to proceed, and an award which expressly or impliedly refers to such a finding is not thereby invalidated, A party may however protest that the Arbitrator is acting either without authority or beyond the scope of the agreement of reference. In the instant case there is no such objection. 13. It was observed by Lord Dunedin in Champsey Bhara Com­pany vs. The Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd., AIR 1923 P. C. 66 : "The question of whether an arbitrator acts within his jurisdiction is, of course, for the Court to decide, but whether the arbitrator acts within his jurisdiction or not depends solely upon the clause of reference", It is, therefor, for the Court to decide in this case whether the dispute as arisen is within the arbitration clause of the agreement. The Court may interfere with an award when there is an error of law on the face of the award. "An error of law on the face of award" means, in their Lordships view, "that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. It does not mean that if in a narrative a reference is made to a contention of one party that opens the door to seeing first what that contention is, and then going to the contract on which the parties' rights depend to see if that contention is bound". It does not mean that if in a narrative a reference is made to a contention of one party that opens the door to seeing first what that contention is, and then going to the contract on which the parties' rights depend to see if that contention is bound". When it is impossible to say, from what is shown on the face of the award, what mistake the Arbitrator made, it cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the award. It is now established that where the question of law necessarily arises on the face of the award or upon some paper accompanying and forming part of the award then only interence may be justified. 14. As defined in Section 2(a) of the Act-"arbitration agree­ment" means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not. "It covers both an arbitration clause by which the parties agreed that if disputes arose they shall be referred to arbitr­ation, and also an actual submission of a particular dispute or disputes to the authority of a particular arbitrator, Thus the first part is the agreement to refer and the second part is submission to arbitration. Under Section 3 of the Act an arbitration agreement, unless a different intention is expressed therein, shall be deemed to include the provisions set out in the First Schedule in so for as they are applicable to the reference. Under clause 7 of the First Schedule the award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively. 15. Under Clause 70 of the agreement in this case all dis­putes between the parties to the contract other than those speci­fically excluded, shall be referred to the sole arbitrator. All disputes arising out of the contract will not cover disputes as to whether a contract was entered into at all or where it was void ab initio, or whether it sets out the true intention of the parties. But if the parties are agreed that a binding contract was made, and it is necessary to have recourse to the contract to settle the dispute that has arisen, then it is a dispute arising out of the contract. But if the parties are agreed that a binding contract was made, and it is necessary to have recourse to the contract to settle the dispute that has arisen, then it is a dispute arising out of the contract. As was observed by Lord Porter in Heyman vs. Darwins Ltd.; (1942) A.C. 356 the words 'arising out of a contract' have a wider meaning than the words 'under a contract' and this view was repeated by Lord Justice Sellers in Government of Gibraltar vs. Kenney, (1965) 2 Q.B. 410. The impugned claim in the instant case can, therefore, be said to have arisen out of the contract so as to be covered by the arbitration clause, namely, Clause 70 of the agreement. 16. Once a dispute is found to be within the scope of the arbitration clause it is not part of the province of the Court to enter into the merits of the dispute. In A. M. Mair and Co. vs. Gordhandas Sagarmull, AIR 1951 SC 9 the principal dispute was whether the extension of time for the delivery of the goods sold was granted within the time limited in the con­tract. It was held that dispute was certainly covered by the arbitration clause; and that assuming that the respondents were bound to have recourse to the contract to establish their claim that the appellants were not bound, the dispute arose out of the contract. The test was also laid down in Heyman vs. Darwins Ltd., (1942) A. C. 356 that; "If a party has to have recourse to the contract, that dispute is a dispute under the contract," and as the respondents in that case must have had recourse to the contract to establish their case, it was a dispute falling within the arbitration clause and that once this dispute was found to be within the scope of the arbitration clause, it was no part of the province of the court to enter into the merits of the dispute. In Union of India vs. Salween Timber and Construction Co., AIR 1969 SC 488 it has been held that the test for determining whether a dispute is one "arising out of the contract" or "in connection with the contract," is whether recourse to the contract by which both the parties are bound is necessary for the purpose of determining whether the claim of the respondent is justified or otherwise. If it is necessary to take recourse to the terms of the contract for the purpose of deciding the matter in dispute, it must be held that the matter is within the scope of the arbitration clause and the arbitrators have jurisdiction to decide the case. In the instant case there is no doubt that the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide the disputes arising out of the contract. 17. In Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Pearey Lal Kumar, AIR 1952 SC 119 , interpreting the arbitration clause of an insurance policy which provided that : "All differences arising out of this policy shall be referred to the decision of an arbitrator........", it was held that the test in such cases was whether recourse to the contract by which the parties were bound was necessary for the purpose of determining the matter in dispute between them. If such recourse to the contract is necessary, then the matter must come within the scope of the Arbitrator's jurisdiction. The difference between the parties was, therefore, a difference arising out of the policy and the arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide it, the parties having made him the sole judge of all differences arising out of the policy. 18. In the instant case we have no doubt that the claim arose out of the contract and the parties made the Arbitrator the sole Judge of all the disputes arising out of it. It is, therefore, not within the province of this Court to find any error in the award resorting to the terms of the contract between the parties, 19. It was held in Thawardas Pherumal vs. Union of India, AIR 1955 SC 408 that an arbitrator is not a conciliator and cannot ignore the law or misapply it in order to do what he thinks is just and reasonable. He is a tribunal selected by the parties to decide their disputes according to law and so is bound to follow and apply the law, and if he does not, he can be set right by the Court provided his error appears on the face of the award. He is a tribunal selected by the parties to decide their disputes according to law and so is bound to follow and apply the law, and if he does not, he can be set right by the Court provided his error appears on the face of the award. The single exception to this is when the parties choose specifically to refer a question of law as a separate and distinct matter, in which case it is evident that the parties desire to have a decision from the Arbitrator rather than from the Courts, and the Courts then will not interfere. In the ins­tant case no specific question of law was referred and the ques­tion of law stated to have arisen may be said to be incidental. 20. In Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar vs. Ct. A. Ct. Subramaniam Chettiar, AIR 1960 SC 307 it has been observed that in appreciating the effect of the words used in the award we must bear in mind that the arbitrators were laymen not familiar with the technical significance of legal expressions, and so we must read the relevant clauses as a whole with a view to deter­mine what in effect and substance they intended to decide. Examining the isntant award, as above, we find that the decisions are clear and unambiguous. It was ruled in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan vs. Hukumchand Mills Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1030 that the Court cannot review his award and correct any mistake in his adjudication, unless an objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of it. We have already referred to the observation of the Privy Council that an error in law on the face of the award means, that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. None of the kind is to be found in the instant award. The award on both fact and law is final and there is no appeal there from. This was reiterated in M/s. Allen Berry and Co. None of the kind is to be found in the instant award. The award on both fact and law is final and there is no appeal there from. This was reiterated in M/s. Allen Berry and Co. Private Ltd. vs. The Union of India, AIR 1971 S.C. 696 emphasising that as the parties choose their own arbitrator, they cannot, when the award is good on the face of it, object to the decision either upon the law or the facts. Therefore, even when an arbitrator commits a mistake either in law or in fact in determining the matters referred to him, but such mistake does not appear in the face of the award or in a document appended to or incorporated in it so as to form part of it, the award will neither be remitted nor set aside notwithstanding the mistake. Mere reference to the contract in the award is not to be held as incorporating it. The question whether a contract or a clause of it is incorporated in the award is a question of construction of the award. The test is, does the arbitrator come to a finding on the wording of the contract. If he does, he can be said to have impliedly incorporated the contract or a clause in it, whichever be the case. But a mere general reference to the contract in the award is not to be held as incorporating it. The principle of reading contracts or other documents into the award is' not to be encouraged or extended the parties having chosen their own arbitrator to be the Judge in the dispute between them. This was reiterated in Iftikhar Ahmed vs. Syed Meharban Ali, AIR 1974 S.C. 749 that if an award sets forth a proposition of law which is erroneous then the award is liable to be set aside under Section 30 of the Act. In Fuller Fenwick 3 C.B. 282 it was emphasised that a court will not decide or refer back, an award for an objection in point of law Dot apparent on the face of it. 21. Mr. Chetia's submission that in cases of palpable disre­gard of the terms of the contract by the Arbitrator, it will amount to misconduct and the Court should intervene in interest of justice, is not acceptable in view of the settled law as discussed above? 21. Mr. Chetia's submission that in cases of palpable disre­gard of the terms of the contract by the Arbitrator, it will amount to misconduct and the Court should intervene in interest of justice, is not acceptable in view of the settled law as discussed above? the parties themselves having decided to arbitrate rather than to litigate. It cannot, therefore, be held to be a misconduct. 22. In the result this appeal is found to be without merit and is dismissed, but without costs.