JUDGMENT 1. - This Civil second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur, dated February 10, 1983, affirming the judgment and decree of Civil Judge City, Jaipur, dated July 5, 1982 in a suit for eviction. 2. The plaintiff-respondent had filed a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity, default in payment of rent and material alterations. Both the lower Courts have passed a decree for eviction holding the question of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. During the pendency of first appeal before learned District Judge, the defendant-appellant had submitted an application for amendment in the written statement. The said application was dismissed by learned District Judge by order, dated November 20, 1982. The defendant filed a revision petition in this Court against the order, dated November 20, 1982. The said revision petition was dismissed by Hon'ble Sidhu, J. on merits on January 6, 1983. The defendant has alleged in the grounds of second appeal that he had submitted petition for special leave before January 6, 1983. Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition but reserved the liberty to the defendant to argue the question as regards the legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Judge dismissing the application for amendment of the written statement in any proceedings which may be brought to Hon'ble Supreme Court against the final order passed by the High Court. Mr. Lekh Raj Mehta, learned counsel, appearing for the defendant-appellant frankly conceded that so far as this Court was concerned the order, dated January 6, 1983 dismissing the revision petition against the order of the District Judge dated November 20, 1982, had become final and the defendant-appellant was not entitled to raise any ground in the second appeal regarding the propriety of the order passed by the District Judge, dated November 20, 1982. 3. Mr. Mehta then tried to assail the finding of learned District Judge on the question on reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and the question of comparative hardship but was unable to persue it as these question were questions of fact and were binding in this Court in second appeal. 3. Mr. Mehta then tried to assail the finding of learned District Judge on the question on reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and the question of comparative hardship but was unable to persue it as these question were questions of fact and were binding in this Court in second appeal. I am also clearly of the opinion that learned District Judge has discussed the entire evidence on these points and has committed no error in arriving at the conclusion that the suit premises were required reasonably and bonafidely for the personal necessity of the plaintiff-respondent and the question of comparative hardship was also in his favour. Learned District Judge in this regard has considered all aspects of the case and has given cogent reason in support of the finding given on these issues. Mr. Mehta, however, paid great emphasis on the point that the lower appellate Court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the following provision of Section 14(2) the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 :Section 14(2) "Where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in-respect of part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only." It was argued that even if no plea was taken by the defendant-appellant in the written statement, it was incumbent on the Court to record a finding and as no specific issue was raised in this regard, the case should be remanded for giving an opportunity to the defendant-appellant on this point. Mr. Mehta in this regard placed reliance on an order, dated April 9, 1981 passed in (I) Ugamraj Pannalal v. Dhanna Lal, S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 82 of 1981, decided on 9.4.1981 Dhund Singh v. Smt. Satwant Kaur, Civil Second Appeal No. 16 of 1979, decided on 22.9.1980, Firm Loonaram Sohanlal v. Smt. Pushpa Devi S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 53 of 1982, decided on 15.4.1982. Seema Sandesh and others v. Smt. Gayandevi, decided on 16.9.1982. 4. On the other hand it was argued by Mr. Rastogi that parties were fully, alive to this question and the plaintiff had clearly mentioned in the plaint that whole of the suit premises were requested by the plaintiff-respondent. He had given detailed description of his need for whole of the premises. 4. On the other hand it was argued by Mr. Rastogi that parties were fully, alive to this question and the plaintiff had clearly mentioned in the plaint that whole of the suit premises were requested by the plaintiff-respondent. He had given detailed description of his need for whole of the premises. The plaintiff had also led evidence and submitted a site-plan for proving his need for the entire premises. The defendant had cross-examined the plaintiff on this aspect of the matter and when there was sufficient material on record there does not arise any question of remanding the case. It was also argued by Mr. Rastogi that this point was argued in detail before the first appellate Court also and the learned District Judge had clearly held that the entire suit premises were required by the plaintiff-respondent for his office and residence on this account it could not be said that the parties were not given any opportunity or were not heard on this point. 5. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and have thoroughly perused the record and the cases cited by Mr. Mehta. 6. In the first case of Ugamraj Pannalal v. Dhanna Lal a certified copy to the order, dated April 9, 1981, has been produced in which S.K. Mal Lodha, J. has only admitted the appeal by the aforesaid order and has framed following substantial questions of law involved in that appeal; (1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the learned Addl. District Judge was the right in recording finding regarding reasonable and bonafide necessity and comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff-respondent ? 2. Whether the decree for eviction passed by the learned Addl. District Judge in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and against the defendant-appellant is not sustainable in as much as, the learned Addl. District Judge has not gone into the question that no hardship would be caused either to the defendant-appellant or to the plaintiff-respondent by passing a decree in respect of a part of the shop in it ?The above case is no authority as there is no decision on any question as only appeal has been admitted so far and substations of law have been framed. In Dhund Singh v. Smt. Satwant Kaur , Deedwania, J. held that the landlord and the tenant both could be adjusted in the suit and the requirement of the plaintiff shall be satisfied if she was given a decree for a part of the suit premises measuring 14' x 14'. In the above case in the memo of appeal filed by the plaintiff before first appellate Court a ground was taken by the plaintiff himself that both the parties would be adjusted in the suit premises. The plaintiff succeeded before the first appellate Court and the suit was decreed in his favour for the entire premises. The defendant in the second appeal before the start of the arguments moved an application that the shop in dispute was about 40' long and 14' wide. The plaintiff's case was that her son wanted shop for starting repairing and charging of battery business. For this purpose, the respondent did not require such a big shop. The appellant was prepared part with a portion of shop, and give a shop of the size of about 14' 14' to the respondent. In view of these circumstances Deedwania, J. held that the landlord and the tenant both can be adjusted in the shop in dispute and the requirement of the plaintiff shall be satisfied if a decree for a part of the suit premises measuring 14' x 14' was passed. It was further observed that normally he would have remanded the case for decision on this aspect of the question but there were admitted facts pertaining to the size and situation of the shop. In Firm Lunaram Sohanlal v. Smt. Pushpa Devi (supra) Dwarka Parshad, J. thought. It desirable that the following question required to be decided by a larger Bench as these questions were frequently raised in second appeals for eviction of tenants on the ground of personal necessity :1. Whether the reasonable requirement of the landlord may be satisfied by evicting the tenant from a party only of the premises, as contemplated in sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 ?2. Whether such an objection regarding partial eviction should be allowed to be raised for the first time in second appeal, in the absence of any pleading or issue on the question ?3. Whether such an objection regarding partial eviction should be allowed to be raised for the first time in second appeal, in the absence of any pleading or issue on the question ?3. Even if the appellant Court allows the ground regarding partial eviction to be raised for the first time in second time appeal, whether it is necessary for that to remand the case to the lower Court so as to allow the parties a further opportunity to lead fresh evidence on the question ? 7. In my view it would not be necessary to refer the present case to a larger Bench as evidence has already come in this case regarding the size of the suit premises and also about the need of the entire premises by the plaintiff. 8. In Seema Sandesh and others v. Smt. Gyan Devi , Dwarka Prasad, J. remanded the case to the first appellate Court with a direction that it should redecide the question of partial eviction in the light of the provisions contained in second part of Section 14(2) of the Act. 9. As I would presently discuss there does not arise any question of remanding the present case for deciding the question of partial eviction. 10. In the present case the plaintiff-respondent is a practising Advocate and he has come forward for eviction of the suit premises on the ground of personal requirement for having his residence as well as office in the suit premises. It is undisputed that the size of the entire suit premises is 41.7'x 70'. The total are as such is near about 300 sq. yards. The plaintiff has already led evidence to show that he needs one library hall, one chamber one small room for his clerk or junior and a place for toilet (sic) his conveyance for his office purpose. As regards his residential accommodation he has led evidence to show that he has three children. His two daughters are in Saint Angela School and one son in Central School. He required one drawing room, one dining room, two big rooms, store, staircase, toilet etc. for himself and his family members for residence. he has also filed Ex. 31 a site-plan according to which he wants to renovate the entire premises and construct rooms according to the above-mentioned needs. He required one drawing room, one dining room, two big rooms, store, staircase, toilet etc. for himself and his family members for residence. he has also filed Ex. 31 a site-plan according to which he wants to renovate the entire premises and construct rooms according to the above-mentioned needs. Both the lower Courts have believed the evidence of the plaintiff regarding his reasonable and bonafide necessity and that being so, there does not arise any question of partial eviction in the facts and circumstances in this case when the entire area of the suit premises is itself is 300 sq. yards. Once it is established that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his office and residence, there hardly arises any question of remanding the case on the point of partial eviction in the present case. So far as the question of reasonable and bonafide requirements of the plaintiff and question of comparative hardship is concerned, I have already held above that the finding of the learned district Judge in this case is unassailable and is binding in second appeal. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the defendant, was also unable to press this point and show any fault in the finding of the Court below so as to make out substantial question of law to bring the case within the purview of Section 100 CPC. 11. Thus, taking in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case on substantial question of law arises in the case and there is no necessity to remand on the point of partial eviction. 12. In the result, I find no force in this appeal and it is dismissed accordingly. The appellant is however, allowed three months, time to vacate the suit premises.Petition dismissed. *******