Judgement MOHAN, J. :- These writ petitions challenge the validity of the Tamil Nadu Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act. 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1971). (Throughout the course of our judgment, it will be referred to as the Act). 2. Since an identical point is in issue all these writ petitions. It is enough if we refer to the facts in W. P. No. 1485 of 1979 alone. The petitioner purchased portion of the property in R. S. No. 3969 /11, Tondiarpet, Madras from one A. Sundararajan, for a sum of Rs. 6,400 for the purpose of constructing therein a residential house for his living. After raising a loan from his provident fund, the petitioner made necessary arrangements for the construction of the house. Owing to some technical difficulties. The construction could not be taken up immediately. There is an oven space in R.S. No. 3968/2 which is described as Keerai Thottam. 3. The Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board. Madras wanted to acquire this Property. Known as Keerai Thottam, for the purpose of the Slum Clearance Board. Therefore, the Government of Taimil Nadu, the first respondent, initiated proceedings under the Act for the acquisition of the petitioner's property well. The petitioner was served with a notice under S.17 (2) of the Act. He was called upon to show cause why the lands mentioned in the schedule to the notice should not be acquired. The petitioner and the owners of the adjacent plots preferred their objection in the said acquisition contending that the lands were purchased for the purpose of putting up houses and necessary loans are being raised for the purpose of construction of houses, If the land in R.S. 3969/2 alone is acquired it would be more than enough for the purpose: the very fact that the Government have not acquired R. S. 3969/5 itself will show that there was no need to acquire the property of the petitioner. It was further urged. Since R. S. 3969/5 being in line with other survey numbers. Viz. R. S. 3969/7 to 3969/12. if it was acquired there would not be any need for acquiring the property of the petitioner. Several representations were made to the Collector of Madras. Objecting to the acquisition from 19-4-1978 till date. Representations were also made before the Chairman of the Slum Clearance Board as well as the Minister for Housing. Government of Tamil Nadu. if it was acquired there would not be any need for acquiring the property of the petitioner. Several representations were made to the Collector of Madras. Objecting to the acquisition from 19-4-1978 till date. Representations were also made before the Chairman of the Slum Clearance Board as well as the Minister for Housing. Government of Tamil Nadu. Madras. But nothing useful came out of them. The petitioner was served with an order dated 20-12-1978 from the Special Deputy Collector, and Land Acquisition Officer, Madras(3rd respondent), that the request for the exclusion of the lands could not be, considered as the lands are essentially required by the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board. For implementing the Slum Clearance Scheme and therefore the petitioner was directed to hand over possession of the lands. It is at this stage questioning the validity of acquisition. This writ petition has been referred for a writ of certiorari or Mandamus to quash the acquisition proceedings and to forbear the respondents from acquiring the lands for the purpose of Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board under the Act. 4. The leading arguments on behalf of the petitioner in W. P. 683 of 1983. as addressed by Mr. P. Chidambaram. Are as follows:- The general law relating to acquisition is the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. That applies to all acquisitions made for a public purpose. From the point of view of the owner it is immaterial whether the land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act or under this Act since the basis of acquisition under both the Acts is 'public purpose'. However, the provisions relating to compensation under the Act are disadvantageous and more onerous than the provisions for compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. The important differences are five in number and they are- (i) While solatium at the rate of 15% of the market value is payable in addition to the market value of the land for compensation under Central Act I of 1894. S.21 (1) of the impugned State Act specifically prohibits the payment of any solatium: (ii) Under S.23 (1) of Central Act I of 1894, a number of vital factors are required to be taken into account in determining the compensation to be awarded. There is no comparable provision in the impugned State Act and these facts are not mandatorily required to be taken into account. There is no comparable provision in the impugned State Act and these facts are not mandatorily required to be taken into account. (iii) Under Central Act 1 of 1894, a land owner not accepting the award made by the Collector may require the question to, be referred to the court and it is the award of the court which is the original decree. On the contrary, under the impugned State Act. It is the award of the second respondent which is the original decree: (iv) Under Central Act 1 of 1894, there is a first appeal to the High Court against any award of compensation and the appeal is on questions of fact and law. However, under the impugned State Act, the first appeal is only to the Sub. Court/District Court and the second appeal to the High Court is severely restricted. The second appeal is available only in cases where the compensation exceeds Rupees 25.000 as determined by the prescribed Authority and it is also subject to S.100. C.P.C (v) In an acquisition under Central Act 1 of 1894, by virtue of S.28, where the Court awards compensation in excess of a sum awarded by the prescribed authority, the court may direct payment of interest at 6% per annum from the date on which possession of land was taken to the date on which the excess was paid into court. There is no similar provision under the impugned State Act. 5. The differential provisions for payment of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and the impugned Act do not furnish a rational ground to pay more compensation for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act and the less compensation under this Act. The Public purpose under this Act is for developing any slum clearance area or rehabilitating slum dwellers. They do not furnish a rational ground for paying a less compensation than what would be payable under the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore. S.20 and S.21 of the Act are violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. 6. Should the Court be pleased to hold that the said sections viz., Ss.20 and 21 are unconstitutional and void. The entire Act as a whole would be unconstitutional since it would be an Act depriving the owners of the property without Payment of compensation. From that point of view, it will be violative of Art.31 (2) of the Constitution also. 7. The entire Act as a whole would be unconstitutional since it would be an Act depriving the owners of the property without Payment of compensation. From that point of view, it will be violative of Art.31 (2) of the Constitution also. 7. In support of the submission that differential nature of Public purpose does not furnish a rational ground to pay less compensation. Reliance it placed on State of Kerala v. T.M. Peter. AIR 1980 SC 1438 . S.21 (1) of the Act, in so far as it prohibits payment of solatium. Has to be. Struck down as laid down in P.G. Goswami v. Collector of Darrang, AIR 1982 SC 1214 . 8. Lastly, it is urged that in view of a similar enactment, viz., Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harjan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (Act 31 of 1978), which provided for a special procedure for acquiring land for Harijan Welfare Schemes and a lesser compensation, was paid, this court held in a batch of writ petitions viz., W. P. 797 of 1980 etc., Anant Ammal v. Collector of Tirunelveli, that the right of equality guaranteed under Art.14 of the Constitution was infringed by the legislation and therefore was held to be ultra vires as offending Arts.14, 19 and 300-A of the Constitution. The ratio of that judgment according to the petitioners, squarely applies. More so when the benefit of Art.31-C of the Constitution which was claimed in that case, is not available in the Present case. 9. Mr. D. Peter Francis, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.Ps. 1485 and 1501 to 1504 of 1979, adopts the arguments of Mr. P. Chidambaram. 10. The learned Advocate General. Contends that the directive principle embodied in the Constitution is that the State should regard the improvements of public health as amongst its primary duties. Therefore. It is not open to the petitioners to invoke the fundamental rights conferred under Arts.14, 19 (1) (g) or even Art.300-A of the Constitution. Tested from the light of the observations made in Kesavananda v. State of Kerala. AIR 1973 SC 1461 at p. 2055 (paragraph 9) if there is a reasonable nexus to the State policy, the Act should be upheld though the benefit of Art.31-C of the Constitution cannot be had for the present Act. 11. Relying on paragraph 39 at page 41 of the rulings in Excel Wear v. Union of India. AIR 1973 SC 1461 at p. 2055 (paragraph 9) if there is a reasonable nexus to the State policy, the Act should be upheld though the benefit of Art.31-C of the Constitution cannot be had for the present Act. 11. Relying on paragraph 39 at page 41 of the rulings in Excel Wear v. Union of India. AIR 1979 SC 25 , it is urged. If the law were to give effect to the policy of the State towards security any of the principles laid down in Part IV, the fundamental right cannot be claimed. 12. The further argument of the learned Advocate General is. Having regard to the scope of acquisition, which is limited to slum clearance, under the Act, which is a peculiar problem to the city of Madras, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that they should be paid the same compensation as under the Land Acquisition Act. No doubt the acquisition in the instant case may constitute a Public purpose. But the State cannot be compelled to pay under the Land Acquisition Act. There is no law which requires that the power of eminent domain should be exercised only in a particular mode. This being a special Act, it is the provisions of the special Act alone which had to be looked into for the procedure as well as the quantum of compensation. Any comparison with the Land Acquisition Act is odious. This court in W. P. 1132 of 1960. Ramaswami Mudaliar v. The State of Madras has upheld the special Act. Even though the compensation was different in that there was no solatium. The ratio of that judgment would squarely apply. 13-14. Since the Constitutionality of Ss.20 and 21 of the Act is questioned before us, first of all we will refer to those provisions of the Constitution, which existed at the time of passing of this Act, Art.31C came to be introduced by the 25th Amendment of the Constitution with effect from 20-4-1972. The Act received the assent of the President on 2nd May 1971. Therefore. At the outset itself we have to mention that the benefit of Art.31-C cannot be had at all. The Act received the assent of the President on 2nd May 1971. Therefore. At the outset itself we have to mention that the benefit of Art.31-C cannot be had at all. In passing we may also mention that Art.31-C protected such a legislation from attack only on the ground of Articles 14, 19 and 31, provided the legislation was to give effect to Arts.39 (b) and 39 © contained in Part IV of the Constitution, Art.39 (b) and © state- "The State shall, in particular. Direct its policy towards securing- (a) ……… (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good:- © that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment …" Therefore, the validity of the Act will have to be tested in the absence of Article 31-C of the Constitution. In this connection we may make an useful reference to Deep Chand v. State of U. P.. AIR 1959 SC 648 . In paragraph 13 the following observations were made as to the combines) effect of Arts.245, 246, 13 and before the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act of 1955. It was observed thus:- "The combined effect of the said provisions may be stated thus: Parliament and the Legislatures of States have power to make laws in respect of any of the matters enumerated in the relevant lists in the Seventh Schedule and that power to make laws is subject to the provisions of the Constitution including Art.13. i.e., the power is made subject to the limitation imposed by Part III of the Constitution. The general power to that extent is limited. A Legislature, therefore, has no power to make any law in derogation of the injunction contained in Art. 13, Art.13 (1) deals with laws in force in the territory of India before the commencement of the Constitution and such laws in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III shall, to the extent of such inconsistency be void. The clause, therefore, recognises the validity of the reconstitution laws and only declares that the said laws would be void thereafter to the extent of their inconsistency with Part III, whereas clause (2) of the Article imposes a prohibition on the State making laws taking away or abridging the rights conferred by Part III and declares that laws made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the contravention be void. There is a clear distinction between the two clauses. Under clause (1) a pre-constitution law subsists except to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III, whereas no post-Constitution law can be made contravening the provisions of Part III, and therefore, the law to that extent, though made is a nullity from its inception. If this clear distinction is borne in mind, much of the cloud raised is dispelled. When clause (2) of Art.13 says in clear and unambiguous terms that no State shall make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III, it will not avail the State to contend either that the clause does not embody a curtailment of the power to legislate or that it imposes only a check but not a prohibition. A constitutional provision against a State making certain laws cannot be whittled down by analogy or by drawing inspiration from decision on the provisions of other Constitutions: nor can we appreciate the argument that the words 'any law' in the second line of Art. 13 (2) posits the survival of the law made in the teeth of such prohibition. It is said that a law can come into existence only when it is made and therefore any law made in contravention of that clause pre-supposes that the law made is not a nullity. This argument may be subtle but is not sound. The words `any law' in that clause can only mean an Act passed or made factually notwithstanding the prohibition. The result of such contravention is stated in that clause. A plain reading of the clause indicates, without any reasonable doubt, that the prohibition goes to the root of the matter and limits the State's power to make law: the law made in spite of the prohibition is stillborn law." In Mahendralal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The result of such contravention is stated in that clause. A plain reading of the clause indicates, without any reasonable doubt, that the prohibition goes to the root of the matter and limits the State's power to make law: the law made in spite of the prohibition is stillborn law." In Mahendralal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh. AIR 1963 SC 1019 : (1963) Suppl 1 SCR 912, it was observed thus (at p. 1031):- "In the case of post-Constitution laws, it would be hardly appropriate to distinguish between laws which are wholly void - and for instance those which contravene Art. 31 - and those which are substantially void but partly valid - as for instance, laws contravening Art.19. Theoretically, the laws falling under the latter category may be valid qua non-citizens: but that is a wholly unrealistic consideration and it seems to us that such notionally partial valid existence of the said laws on the strength of hypothetical and pedantic considerations cannot justify the application of the doctrine of eclipse to them. All post-Constitution laws which contravene the mandatory injunction contained in the first part of Art.13 (2) are void, as void as are the laws passed without legislative competence. And the doctrine of eclipse does not apply to them." In the light of these legal principles, we propose to consider the validity of the Act. 15. The Act is called the Tamil Nadu Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1971. This is an Act to provide for the improvement and clearance of slums in the State of Tamil Nadu. This is clear from the object of the Act. 15. The Act is called the Tamil Nadu Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1971. This is an Act to provide for the improvement and clearance of slums in the State of Tamil Nadu. This is clear from the object of the Act. The preamble states as follows:- "Whereas the number of slums in certain areas in the State of Tamil Nadu is on the increase and the slums are likely to become a source of danger to public health and sanitation of the said areas: And whereas under the existing law, it has not been possible effectively to arrest the growth of slums, to eliminate congestion and to provide for certain basic needs such as streets, water supply and drainage in slums and to clear slums which are unfit for human habitation: And whereas to obviate this difficulty, it is expedient to provide for the removal of unhygienic and insanitary conditions prevailing in slums, for better accommodation and improved living conditions for slum dwellers, for the promotion of public health generally and for the acquisition of land for the purpose of improving or developing slum areas, redeveloping slum clearance areas and rehabilitating slum dwellers: And whereas it is a Directive Principle of State policy embodies in the Constitution that the State should regard the improvement of public health as among its primary duties." 16. The Directive Principles contained in Art.47 of the Constitution of India (Part IV) is as follows:- "The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties. And, in particular. The State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health." It is this embodiment which is talked of in the above preamble. 17. Now we may refer to the salient features of the Act. Under S.3, the power is given to the Government that on its satisfaction that a particular area is or may be a source of danger to the health, safety or convenience of the public, it may be declared to be a slum area. Even the neighborhood may be declared as a slum area. Under S.3, the power is given to the Government that on its satisfaction that a particular area is or may be a source of danger to the health, safety or convenience of the public, it may be declared to be a slum area. Even the neighborhood may be declared as a slum area. This can be on any one of the following grounds:- The area being- (i) low lying: (ii) insanitary: (iii) squalid: (iv) over crowded etc. Chapter III of the Act seeks to prevent the growth of the slum. While Chapter IV aims at improvement of slum areas. Chapter V deals with slum clearance and re-development. Chapter VI is the heart of the Act, which confers power for acquisition of lands. In so far as the petitioners strongly relied on the judgment in W. P. 797 of 1980, where, according to the petitioners similar provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978 came to be struck down, we think at this stage it is worthwhile to set out a comparative table of the provisions in relation to acquisition and payment of compensation. The Tamil Nadu Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1971). Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (Act 31 of 1978). (1) (2) 17. Power to acquire land : 4. Power to acquire land : Where the Government are satisfied that, for the purpose of executing, any work of improvement in relation to any slum area or any building in such area or for the purse of re developing any slum clearance area. Or for purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers, it is necessary to acquire any land within, adjoining or surrounded by any such area, they may acquire the land by publishing in the Tamil Nadu Govt. Gazette, a notice to the effect that they have decided to acquire the land in pursuance of this section. Provided that, before publishing such notice, the Government shall call upon the owner or any other person who, in the opinion of the Government may be interested in such land, to show cause why it should not be acquired, and after considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner or any other person interested in the land, the Government may pass such orders as they deem fit. (1) Whereas the District Collector is satisfied that for the purpose of any Harijan Welfare Scheme, it is necessary to acquire any land he may acquire land by publishing in the District Gazette a notice to the effect that he has decided to acquire the land in pursuance of the said section. (2) Before publishing a notice under sub sec. (1) the. District Collector or any Officer authorised by the District Collector in this behalf, shall call upon the owner in the opinion of the District Collector or the Officer so authorised may be interested in such land to show cause why it should not be acquired (3) (a) The District Collector may where he has himself called upon the owner or other person to show cause under sub sec. (2) pass such orders as he may deem fit on the cause so shown. (b) where any officer authorised by the District Collector had called upon the owner or other person to show cause under sub sec. (2) the Officer so authorised shall make a report to the District Collector containing his recommendations on the cause so shown for the decision of the District Collector. After considering such report the District Collector may pass such orders as he may deem fit. 18. Land acquired to vest in Government free from all encubrances. When a notice under S.17 is published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, the land to which the said notice relates shall, on and from the date on which the notice is so published vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. 5. Land acquired to vest in Government free from all encumbrances. When a notice under subsection (1) of Section 4 is published in the District Gazette the land to which the said notice relates shall on and from the date on which the notice is so published vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. 6. Right to receive amount. Every person having any interest in any land acquired under this Act shall be entitled to receive and be paid an amount as hereinafter provided. 20. Compensation: (1) The compensation payable in 7. Determination of amount: 19. Right to receive compensation: Every person having any interest in any land acquired under this Act shall be entitled to receive and be paid compensation as hereinafter provided. 20. Compensation: (1) The compensation payable in 7. 20. Compensation: (1) The compensation payable in 7. Determination of amount: 19. Right to receive compensation: Every person having any interest in any land acquired under this Act shall be entitled to receive and be paid compensation as hereinafter provided. 20. Compensation: (1) The compensation payable in 7. Determination of amount: respect of any land acquired under this Act shall be the market value of such land on the date of the publication of the notice, referred to in S.17. (2) The prescribed authority shall after holding an enquiry in the prescribed manner determine by order the amount of compensation under sub sec. (1) and publish the said order in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette. A copy of the said order shall be communicated to the owner of the land and every person interested therein. (3) Where the owner of the land and the owner of the building on such and are different, the prescribed authority shall apportion the amount of compensation between the owner of the land and the owner of the building (in the same proportion as the market value of the building on the date of the acquistion). (1) The amount payable in respect of any land acquired under this Act shall be the market value of such land on the date of publication of the notice under sub sec.(1) of S.4. (2) In addition to the market value of the land as provided above. The prescribed authority shall in every case award a sum of fifteen percentum on such market value as solatium in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The prescribed authority shall, after holding an inquiry in the prescribed manner determine by order the amount payable under sub sec. (1). A copy of the said order shall be communicated to the owner of such land and every person interested therein. 21. Matters to be neglected in determining the compensation. In determining the amount of compensation under S.20 (1) No solatium shall be payable in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition: (2) The following factors shall not be taken into account, namely. (a) the degree of urgency which has led to the acquisition: (b) any disinclination of the person interested to part with the land acquired. © any damage sustained by him which. (a) the degree of urgency which has led to the acquisition: (b) any disinclination of the person interested to part with the land acquired. © any damage sustained by him which. If caused by a private person, would not render such person liable to suit: (d) any damage which is likely to be caused to the land acquired after the date of the publication of the notice under sub sec. (1) of S.17, by or in consequence of the use to which it will be put: (e) any increase to the value of the land acquired likely to acquire from he use to which it will be put when acquired: (f) any increase to the value of the other land of the person interested to accrue from the use to which lad acquired will be put: (g) any increase to the value of the land by reason of the use thereof in a manner which is detrimental to the health of the occupants of the land or to the public health: (h) any outlay or improvement on, or disposal, of the land acquired, commenced made or effected without the sanction of the prescribed authority after the date of the publication of the notice under sub-sec. (1) of S.17 8. Matters to be ignored in determining the amount. In determining the amount under S.7, the following factors shall not be taken into account, namely (a) the degree of urgency which has led to the acquisition: (b) any disinclination of the person interested to part with the land acquired: © any damage sustained by him which, if caused by a private person would not render such person liable to suit: (d) any damage which is likely to be caused to the land acquired. After the date of publication of the notice under sub sec. After the date of publication of the notice under sub sec. (1) of Sec. 4 by or in consequence of the use to which it will be put: (e) any increase to the value of the land acquired likely to accrue from the use to which it will be put when, acquired: (f) any increase to the value of the other land of the person interested likely to accrue from the use to which the land acquired will be put: (g) any increase to the value of the land by reason of the use thereof in a manner which is detrimental to the health of the occupants of the land or to the public health: (h) any outlay or improvement on or disposal of, the land acquired commencement made or effected without the sanction of the prescribed authority after the date of the publication of the notice under sub-sec. (1) of S.4. 22. Appeal against order of compensation. Any person 9. Appeal against the order of amount determined Any 22. Appeal against order of compensation. Any person 9. Appeal against the order of amount determined Any who does not agree to the amount of compensation determined by the prescribed authority under sub section (2) of Section 20 may prefer an appeal to the court within such period as may be prescribed. Person who does not agree to the amount determined by the prescribed authority under sub sec. (2) of S.7 may prefer an appeal to the court within such period as may be prescribed. 23. Apportionment of compensation: (1) Where several persons claim to be interested in the amount of compensation determined, the prescribed authority shall determine the persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive compensation and the amount payable to each of them: (2) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the compensation or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable the prescribed authority may refer such dispute to the decision of the court and the court shall in deciding any such dispute follow as far as may be, the provisions of Part III of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894). 10. Appointment of amount determined. 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894). 10. Appointment of amount determined. (1) Where several persons claim to be interested in the amount determined the prescribed authority shall determine the persons, who in its opinion, are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of them. (2) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the amount or any part thereof is payable, the prescribed authority may refer such disputes to the decisions of the court and the court shall. In deciding any such dispute follow as far as may be, the provisions of Part III of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894). 11. Payments of amount: (1) After the amount has been determined. The prescribed authority shall tender payment of the amount to the persons entitled thereto and shall pay it to them (i) in a lump sum in a case where it does not exceed two thousand rupees; and (ii) in all other cases, in such number of equal instalments not exceeding five as may be determined by the prescribed authority and the amount of each such annual instalment shall not be less than two thousand rupees: Provided that, where the balance of the amount due in any instalment is less than two thousand rupees, only the actual amount so due shall be paid. (2) If the persons entitled to the amount do not consent to receive it or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the amount as to the apportionment of it, the prescribed authority shall deposit the amount in the court, and the court shall deal with the said amount so deposited in the manner laid dawn in Ss.32 and 33 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894). 25. Payement of interest: When the amount of such 12. Payment of interest : When the amount is not paid 24. 25. Payement of interest: When the amount of such 12. Payment of interest : When the amount is not paid 24. Payement of compensation: (1) After the amount of compensation has been determined, the prescribed authority shall tender payment of the compensation to the persons entitled thereto and shall pay it to them: (2) If the persons entitled to the compensation do not consent to receive it or if there be no person competent to alienate the land or if there is any dispute as to the title to receive compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the prescribed authority shall deposit the amount of compensation in the court, and the court shall deal with the amount so deposited in the manner laid down in Sections 32 and 33 of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894). 25. Payement of interest: When the amount of such 12. Payment of interest : When the amount is not paid compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land the prescribed authority shall pay the amount with interest thereon at the rate of four per cent per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so raid or deposited and such interest shall be paid or deposited by the prescribed authority in the same manner as provided for the amount of compensation. Or deposited on or before taking possession of the land. The prescribed authority shall pay the amount with interests thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited and such interest shall be paid or deposited by the prescribed authority in the same manner as provided for the amount. 26. Appeal to High Court : Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Central Act v of 1908) applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment of the time being in force a second appeal shall only lie to the High Court from any decision of the court under this Act if the amount of compensation as determined by the prescribed authority exceeds rupees twenty five thousand. 13. 13. Anneal to High Court: Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908) applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force a second appeal shall lie to the High Court from any decision of the court under this Act, if the amount as determined by the prescribed authority exceeds such sum as may be prescribed. 14. Power of prescribed authority in relation to determination of amount. (1) The prescribed authority may. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act. By order require any person to furnish such information in his possession relating to any land which is acquired under this Act. (2) The prescribed authority shall. While holding an inquiry under this Act, have all the powers of a civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908) in respect of the following matters, namely (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath: (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document: © reception of evidence on affidavits: (d) requisitioning any public record from any court or office: (e) issuing commission for examination of witnesses. 28. Use of land acquired- 15. Use of land acquired 27. Power of prescribed authority in relation to determination of compensation etc. (1) The prescribed authority may, or the purpose of carrying out the provisions of Ss.20, 21, 23, 24 and 25 by order, require any person to furnish such information in his possession relating to any land which is acquired under this Act as may be specified in such order. (2) The prescribed authority shall, while holding an inquiry under this Act, have all the powers of a civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908) in respect of the following matters, namely (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath: (b) requiring the discovery and production of any documents: © reception of evidence on affidavits: (d) requisitioning any public record from any court or office: (e) issuing commission for examination of witnesses. 28. Use of land acquired- 15. 28. Use of land acquired- 15. Use of land acquired (1) Where any land has been acquired under this Act, the Government may undertake or cause to be undertaken such measures as may be necessary for the improvement, clearance or redevelopment of the land or the erection of buildings thereon, in accordance with such plan as may be approved by them. (2) (i) For the purpose of undertaking the measures referred to in sub-sec: (1) the Government may either hold the land under their own control; and management and undertake such measures themselves or through the Board on such terms and conditions as may be determined by them, or transfer the land to the local authority concerned or the Board for the purpose of undertaking these measures. (ii) Where the land is transferred as provided in clause (i) such land shall vest in the local authority concerned or the Board, as the case may be, and the local authority or the Board shall (a) pay to the Government the cost of acquisition of the land or such portion thereof as the Government may determine in each case; and (b) undertake the measures referred to in sub sec. (1) in accordance with such plans as may be approved by the Government, and subject to such directions as may from time to time be given by the Government. (1) Where any land has been acquired under this Act, the Government may undertake or cause to .be undertaken such measures as may be necessary for carrying out the Harijan Welfare Scheme. (2) (i) For the purpose of undertaking the measures referred to in sub-sec. (1), the Government may either hold the land under their own control and management and undertake such measures themselves or through the Corporation on such terms and conditions as may be determined by them, or transfer the land to the local authority concerned or the Corporation for the purpose of undertaking these measures. (ii) Where the land is transferred as provided in clause (i) such land shall vest in the local authority concerned or the Corporation, as the case may be and the local authority or the Corporation shall undertake the measures referred to in sub-sec. (1) in accordance with such plans as may be approved by the Government, and subject to such directions as may from time to time, be given by the Government. (1) in accordance with such plans as may be approved by the Government, and subject to such directions as may from time to time, be given by the Government. Section 20 of the Act as seen above, states:- "Compensation : (1) The compensation payable in respect of any land acquired under this Act shall be the market value such land on the date of the publication of the notice referred to in S.17. (2) This prescribed authority shall, after holding an inquiry in the prescribed manner, determine by order the amount of compensation under sub-section (1). A copy of the said order shall communicated to the owner of the land and every person interested therein: (3) Where the owner of the land and the owner of the building on such land are different, the prescribed authority shall apportion the amount of compensation between the owner of the land bpd the owner of the building in the same proportion as the market value of the land bears to the market value of the building on the date of the accusation." 18. A careful reading of the above tabular statement clearly establishes that identical language is used with regard to acquisition and payment of compensation in both the enactments. This is a relevant point to be noted to determine whether the petitioners are entitled to contend that, since similar provision under the Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978 came to be struck down because of the differential treatment accorded to the owners of the lands in relation to campensation by not applying the Land Acquisition Act. The ratio of that judgment would conclude these cases as well. 19. Before answering the above, we will now note the difference between, the Act in question and the Land Acquisition Act 1. Matters to be considered in determining compensation- S.23 of the Land Acquisition Act requires the court to take into consideration in determining the award of compensation- (i) market value as on the date of 4 (1) notification: (ii) damage to standing crops or trees (iii) severance -compensation (iv) the acquisition injuriously affecting other property: (v) the acquisition requiring the owner change his residence or place of business: (vi) damage bona fide resulting from diminution of profits. The Act in question does not contain any comparable provision. The Act in question does not contain any comparable provision. (2) Solatium : S.23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act provides for 15 per cent solatium on the market value of the property acquired. S.21 (1) of the impugned Act specifically prohibits payment of any solatium. Under the Land Acquisition Act, a reference to civil Court is provided under S.18 and that constitutes the original decree, while under the Act the award under S.20 (2) constitutes the original decree. Under the Land Acquisition Act, an appeal is provided to the High Court against the award of compensation. Such an appeal could be both on question of fact as well as law. Under this Act. Section 26 provides for a second appeal to the High Court only if the compensation exceeds Rs. 25,000. Under S.28 of the Land Acquisition Act, where the court awards compensation in excess of the sum awarded by to Collector, it may direct payment of interest of 6 per cent per annum, while There is no similar provision under the impugned Act. 20. In view of the above, therefore, the important question arises, whether the petitioners can be treated differentially in a disadvantageous fashion from the point of view of compensation. 21. Of course. There could be differential treatment. The sine qua non for the exercise of power of eminent domain 'public purpose'. Where, therefore, such public purpose if special enactiments are made for acquiring the lands, it is very essential to establish a nexus between the object of the legislation and payment of lesser compensation. The object of the Act, as has already been noted, is for the improvement and clearance of slums and we have not the slightest hesitation to hold that this is a very laudable object. Millions of our country men are below the poverty line. They have no roof over their heads. They live in most unhygienic conditions. There is an urgent need to improve the conditions of those persons. Eradication of slums, therefore, is very essential. In this connection we may quote the eloquent words of Hubert Horatio Humphrey: "The enemy today within our gates is slumism. We must make our declaration of war against slumism. It is a war in which all of us must enlist. And our goal can be nothing than total victory". Eradication of slums, therefore, is very essential. In this connection we may quote the eloquent words of Hubert Horatio Humphrey: "The enemy today within our gates is slumism. We must make our declaration of war against slumism. It is a war in which all of us must enlist. And our goal can be nothing than total victory". But what is the nexus from the point of view of the owner who is deprived of his land? Certainly for quick eradication of slums. If an emergent procedure is adopted. One may not have quarrel, But, why pay different compensation? We are unable to discern any ground for doing so. State of Kerala v. T.M. Peter. AIR 1980 SC 1438 is a case wherein the validity of the Town Planning Act, Act 4 of 1108 M. E. as applicable to Kerala, came up for consideration. It was observed in paragraph 16 as follows:- "The more serious submissions pressed tersely but clearly, backed by a catena of cases by Shri Viswanathan merits our consideration. The argument is shortly this: _ As between two owners of property, the presence of public purpose empowers the State to take the lands of either or both. But the differential nature of the public purpose does not furnish a rational ground to pay more compensation for one owner and less for another and that impertinence vitiates the present measure. The purpose may be slum clearance, flood control or housing for workers; but how does the diversity of purposes warrant payment of differential scales of quantum of compensation, where no constitutional immunity as in Art.31-A, B or C applies? Public purpose sanctions compulsory acquisition, not discriminatory compensation whether you take A's land for improvement scheme or irrigation scheme, how can you pay more or less, guided by an irrelevance viz. the particular public purpose? The State must act equally when it takes property unless there is an intelligent and intelligible differential between two categories of owners having. A nexus with the object. Namely. The scale of compensation. It is intelletcual confusion of constitutional principle to regard classification flood for one purpose as obliteration of differences for unrelated aspects. the particular public purpose? The State must act equally when it takes property unless there is an intelligent and intelligible differential between two categories of owners having. A nexus with the object. Namely. The scale of compensation. It is intelletcual confusion of constitutional principle to regard classification flood for one purpose as obliteration of differences for unrelated aspects. This logic is neatly applied in a series of cases of this court." Then, again in Vairavelu Mudaliar's case, (1965) 1 SCR 614 : ( AIR 1965 SC 1017 ), it was held, where there was no rational relation in the matter of quantum of compensation between one public purpose and another differentiation between owners was improper. 22. In Om Prakash case, AIR 1974 SC 1202 , it was observed (at p. 1205)- "There can be no dispute that the government can acquire land for a public purpose including that of the Mahapalika or other local body, either under the unmodified Land Acquisition Act 1894 or under that Act as modified by the Adhiniyam. If it chooses the first course. Then the land-owners concerned will be entitled to better compensation including 15% solatium, the potential value of the land etc., nor will there be any impediment or hurdle - such as that enacted by S.372 (1) of the Adhidyam - in the way of such land owners, dissatisfied by the Collector's award approach the court under S.18 of that Act…. It is not necessary to dilate further on this point as this matter stands concluded by this court's decision in Nagpur Improvement Trusts case. ( AIR 1973 SC 689 ) by the ratio of which we are bound. It will be sufficient to lose the discussion by extraction here what Sikri C. J. speaking for the Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust's case said- Can the Legislature say that for a hospital land will be acquired at 50% of the market value, for a school at 60 % of the value and for a Government building at 70% of the market value? All three objects are public purposes and as far as the owner is concerned, it does not matter to him whether it is one public purpose or the other. Art.14 confers as individual right and in order to justify a classification there should be something which justifies a different treatment to this individual right. All three objects are public purposes and as far as the owner is concerned, it does not matter to him whether it is one public purpose or the other. Art.14 confers as individual right and in order to justify a classification there should be something which justifies a different treatment to this individual right. It seems to us that ordinarily a classification based on the public purpose is not permissible under Article 14. for the purpose of determining compensation. The position is different when the owner of the land himself is the, recipient of benefits from an improvement scheme and the benefit to whiten is taken into consideration in fixing compensation. Can classification be made on the basis of authority acquiring the land? In other words, can different principles of compensation be laid if the land is acquired for or by an Improvement Trust or Municipal Corporation or the Government? It seems to us that the answer is in the negative because as far as the owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether the land is acquired by one authority or the other. It is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired. If the existence of two Acts could enable the State to give one owner different treatment from another equally situated the owner who is discriminated against. can claim the protection of Art.14." 23. P.C. Goswami v. Collector of Darrang. AIR 1982 SC 1214 . is a case which arose under the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act of 1948. The non-payment of solatium under that Act in contradistinction to an acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act was held to be bad in the following terms (at P. 1215):- "7. There is, however, one contention advanced by Mr. Nandy which, in our opinion. deserves to be accepted. He contends that in the matter of payment of solatium. no discrimination can be made, between acquisitions under the Assam Act and those made under the Land Acquisition Act. S.4 (3) of the Assam Act itself says that if a land is acquired under that Act. the State Government shall be empowered to apply to such land any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. In a judgment (judgment dated April 1. S.4 (3) of the Assam Act itself says that if a land is acquired under that Act. the State Government shall be empowered to apply to such land any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. In a judgment (judgment dated April 1. 1980 in C. A. 848 of 1977, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1438 ) entitled State of Kerala v. T. M. Peter. given by this court, very recently, to which Mr. Nandy has drawn our attention, it was held that there is no justification for discriminating between an acquisition under one Act and an acquisition under another Act insofar as payment of solatium is concerned. This should be more so in respect of an acquisition to which the State Government is empowered to extend the provision of the Land Acquisition Act. Mr. Naunit Lal has not been able to controvert this position in view of the judgment to which we have referred above. We accordingly direct that the State Government shall pay to the appellant solatium at the rate of 15 per cent on the compensation awarded to him by the High Court. Except for this modification, the decree passed by the High Court is confirmed. The order of remand passed by the High Court will stand." 24. All these cases fully support the stand of the petitioners, that, there being no nexus between the payment of lesser compensation and the object of acquisition, there cannot be differential treatment with regard to the payment of compensation and the other points of distinction noted above. That certainly would amount to hostile discrimination. 25. We have already noted that the umbrella protection under Art.31-C of the Constitution cannot be had as far as this Act is concerned. Notwithstanding the fact therefore that this legislation is in furtherance of the directive principles embodied in Art.47, it is bad as violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention advanced by the learned Advocate General. 26. Lastly we may refer to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in W. P. 797 of 1980 batch Ananthi Ammal v. Collector of Tirunelveli. That case, as previously mentioned, dealt with the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijans Welfare Schemes Act, 1978. The protection claimed therein was under Art. 31-C of the Constitution. 26. Lastly we may refer to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in W. P. 797 of 1980 batch Ananthi Ammal v. Collector of Tirunelveli. That case, as previously mentioned, dealt with the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijans Welfare Schemes Act, 1978. The protection claimed therein was under Art. 31-C of the Constitution. The Division Bench held- "On a consideration of the decisions noticed by us and applying the principles laid down therein, we find that the land of an individual will come within ambit of material resources of the community. The present legislation is for acquiring certain lands for the purpose of fulfilling the Harijan Welfare Scheme as envisaged in S.3 (g) of the Act. Such scheme avowedly is to promote the economic interests of the Harijan community. It will not come under the category envisaged by Art.39 (b) or (c) since no material resources of the community are acquired for distribution to sub-serve the common good, nor does it aim at doing away with the concentration of wealth and means of production which is to the common detriment." As rightly put forth by Mr. G. Ramaswami, the pith and substance of the present legislation is to acquire any land for Harijan Welfare Scheme. That power to acquire without any reference to the owner of the land - poor or rich - is not in pith and substance a law regarding distribution of 'material resources'. The very definition of 'Harijan Welfare Scheme' contained in S.3 (g) of the Act shows that the Act is intended to provide some welfare scheme to the Harijans. This has no reference or nexus to distribution among the community as a whole or to the expression 'as best to serve the common good'. If the law is to acquire any land of any person and provide amenities to a particular section of the community, there is no element of `distribution' as contemplated in Article 39 (b) of the Constitution or prevention of concentration of wealth or means of production in any one individual as contemplated in Art.39 (c). On a consideration of the relevant factors and circumstances and the decisions of the Supreme Court. On a consideration of the relevant factors and circumstances and the decisions of the Supreme Court. we are of the view that even though in Sec. 2 of the Act a declaration is made that the Act it intended to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles laid down in Part IV. and in particular, Art. 46 of the Constitution, in pith and substance it is to give effect to the Directive Principles contained in Art. 46 of the Constitution. Further, the declaration contained in the Act is deceptive and hence it cannot be held to be satisfying the Constitutional requirements under Art.31-C. If so, the law will stand to lose the protection of Art. 31-C and it will be open to attack under Arts.14 and 19. The declaration given in S.2 of the Act is general and particularly it refers to the directive principles of the State Policy in Art.46 of the Constitution of India. Although the Act is a social welfare legislation. the object of the Act cannot be squarely fixed in clause (b) or (c) of Art.39. Art. 31-C does not give any protection to a law passed for securing the principles laid down in Art.46 of the Constitution. The other part of the declaration is general and vague and eludes from judicial review. It cannot be said categorically that the Act was passed to give effect to the objectives of clause (b) or (c) of Art.39 of the Constitution. In the result, the Act fails to get the constitutional protection of Art.31-C. The moment of the act fails to get the constitutional protection under Art.31-C. it is open to attack under Arts.14 and 19." After repeating that Art.31-A (1) (a) was also not available. the Division Bench proceeded to consider whether the Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978 was liable to be struck down since it did not give equality before law or equal protection of law. It was held:- "At the risk of repetition we may mention that from the scheme of the impugned Act and that of the Central Act 1 of 1894, and also from the procedure out, two different procedures are envisaged for payment of compensation which will definitely affect similarly situated persons from whom lands are acquired." 27. When protection under Art.46 of the Constitution was sought, that was to repelled. When protection under Art.46 of the Constitution was sought, that was to repelled. after distinguishing Union India v. K.S. Subramaniam. AIR 1976 SC 2433 , wherein it was observed as lows:- "But a discrimination made by a law order to give effect to the Directive Principles enshrined in Art.46 of the Constitution, cannot itself be taken as discrimination made by constitutional provisions as contemplated in the abovesaid decision". 28. After pointing out the differences between the Land Acquisition Act and the Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978 it was finally concluded thus- "Thus, there is difference in the procedure, remedies available, mode of payment of compensation and principles in determining compensation between the Central Act and the impugned Act. Thus the lands similarly situated are acquired both under the Central Act and under the impugned Act, the person whose land is acquired under the impugned Act, is placed on a disadvantageous position because of the procedure followed and the compensation paid is detrimental and works out to his disadvantage. Thus there is unjust discrimination between owners of land similarly situated by the mere accident of some land being acquired under the impugned Act and some lands being acquired under the Central Act. Discrimination between persons whose lands are acquired under the impugned Act and those whose lands are acquired under the central Act is violative of Art.14. The discrimination is writ large on the impugned Act and it cannot be justified on principle of reasonable classification as the classification is not founded on any intelligible differential and the difference has no nexus or rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned legislation. The fundamental right of equality before law and equal protection of law guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution is thus infringed by the impugned legislation" The ratio of this case squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 29. It is true Srinivasan J. in W. P. 1132 of 1960 - Ramasami Mudaliar v. State of Madras. upheld the validity of the Tamil Nadu Requisitioning and Acquisitioning Act (Act 42 of 1956). 29. It is true Srinivasan J. in W. P. 1132 of 1960 - Ramasami Mudaliar v. State of Madras. upheld the validity of the Tamil Nadu Requisitioning and Acquisitioning Act (Act 42 of 1956). Though that Act directed payment of different compensation and also did not provide for solatium, the learned Judge upheld the provisions as follows- "Apart from the principles gatherable from the above decisions, the broadly phrased contention that the State cannot resort to the Madras Act, if resort to the Central Act would confer a greater benefit upon the citizen whose lands are acquired, fails to impress me, as involving any violation of Art.14. If the State Legislature was competent as it undoubtedly is. to enact Madras Act XLII of 1956, and it cannot be denied that this Act, in so far as it deals with compulsory acquisition, lays down the principles upon which the compensation has to be assessed and paid, the validity of the measure is beyond acquisition. Not only is the quantum of compensation provided by the Act not justifiable, but it is not also the case of the petitioner that the compensation provided is illusory. The denial of the 15 % solatium in the case of other enactments has been upheld by other High Courts including ours as not offending Art.14 of the Constitution and the position in the present case is no different. It follows that the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be acceped." 30. But we are of opinion that in view of the plethora of authorities of the Supreme Court. this decision cannot be said to lay down the correct law. 31. We have already held that the object of the Act is indeed a laudable one. It cannot be gainsaid that at its heart the law enforcement problem has always been and will remain a human problem. Inhuman living conditions. lack of hygiene and sanitation prevalent in slums produces serious crime problems. The day of the silent poor must come to an end. There is anger and bitterness in the contemporary slum. The slum dweller is giving, notice that he is only a temporary resident. Slums in an affluent society constitute an anachronism. Many a children born in slums is diseased at birth sticken with hereditary illness, but the greatest of all illness is poverty, since it is the most deadly and prevalent disease. The slum dweller is giving, notice that he is only a temporary resident. Slums in an affluent society constitute an anachronism. Many a children born in slums is diseased at birth sticken with hereditary illness, but the greatest of all illness is poverty, since it is the most deadly and prevalent disease. More often than not lack of job and money is not the cause of poverty but the symptom. The cause lies deeper in our failure to give fellow citizens a fair habitation and decent living. 32. It is in the above back-ground, we examined the validity of the provisions of the Chapter IV. We have pondered on the cases before us with anxious deliberations. We entertained great respect for the legislation, whose Acts are in question. We have no less respect for the enlightened objects of the legislation which we are called upon to review. We have endeavored to keep our steps super antiquas vias of the law under the guidance of authority and principles. So examined we find the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act are clearly unconstitutional being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. At the same time, we have to hold that we see no justification for holding the other provisions unconstitutional. The Act can exist even dehors Chapter VI. Applying the doctrine of severance, we strike down Chapter VI as unconstitutional. We have nothing to do except to pronounce the law as we find it and having done this. 33. Under similar circumstances. Justice Story in Dartmouth College case said:- "We have nothing to do but to pronounce the law as we find it; and .... Having done this, our justification must be left to the imperial judgment of our country." 34. So, we leave. 35. Rule nisi made absolute. No costs. Petitions allowed.