JUDGMENT 1. :- This is a special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, dated November 23, 1982, dismissing S. B Civil Writ Petition No. 1413 of 1982. wherein the petitioner-appellants had prayed that the order of the Assistant Collector, cum-Authorised Officer, Kota, dated July 14, 1976, the order of the Additional Collector. Kota, dated December 21, 1978, as well as the order of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan. Ajmer, dated March 14, 1980, be quashed and the petitioner appellants be declared and recognised a separate unit under the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. The petitioners' case before the learned Single judge was that Gauri Lal alias Madan Singh had 667 Bighas and 5 Biswas of land as his Muafi and 15 Bighas of land (Khasra No. 122) as khatedar tenant in village Dhoti, Tehsil Sangod District Kota. Madan Singh died on January 1, 1956, survived by his wife appellant No. 2. Smt. Sausar Bai, his son Mohan Singh and his daughters, Smt Kailash Kunwar and Smt. Ratan Kunwar. At the time of the death of Madan Singh appellant Mohan Singh was a minor and was living under the guardianship of his mother Smt. Sausar Bai. After the death of Madan Singh, land measuring 667 Bighas and 5 Biswas, had been mutated in the name of Mohan Singh and the remaining land, measuring 15 Bighas, had been entered in the khatedari of all the appellants. Sent Sausar Bai filed an application under Section 7 of the Guardian and Waids Act, 1890, in the Court of District Judge Kota. for the appointment of a guard an and the learned District Judge, vide his order, dated December 8. 1964, appointed Tehsildar, Sangod, as guardian of the property of the appellants. The said Tehsildar remained guardian upto April 20, 1979. when Mohan Singh appellant attained in Jority. The Authorised Officer, Kota, sent a draft statement to the appellant No. 1 under Section 12 of the Act. 1964, appointed Tehsildar, Sangod, as guardian of the property of the appellants. The said Tehsildar remained guardian upto April 20, 1979. when Mohan Singh appellant attained in Jority. The Authorised Officer, Kota, sent a draft statement to the appellant No. 1 under Section 12 of the Act. The appellant No. 1 submitted a reply to the drift statement mentioning therein that though the land had been entered in his khatedari after the death of his father, his mother and sisters in tact had a shame therein, as during his life time his father had executed a will in their favour. The learned Authorised Officer, after heating arguments, held that the appellant Mohan Singh and his mother had formed one unit. Out of the total land, measuring 218 Bighas i.e., 87. 20 standard acres, stood resumed by the State Government under the provisions of Chapter III of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. He further held that out of the remaining land 137. 20 standard at:res was resuinable. 3. Aggrieved by the above order, Mohah Sinpth filed an appeal which came up for decision before the Additional Collector, Kota, who vide his order, dated December 21, 1978 partly accepted the appeal and held that Kan Singh was entitled to retain 70 Bighas and 14 Biswas of land and out of the remaining land the land which one unit was entitled to hold should be left out for Mohan Singh and the rest of the land should be resumed. 4. Against the above noted order all the appellants before this court went up in appeal, but they met with no success and thereafter the appellants filed S.B Civil Urit petition No. 1413 of 1982, which was dismissed by the learned Single ,Judge. Hence this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that after the death of Madan Singh, Smt. Sausar Bai, the widow of Madan Singh, became entitled to inherit as much share as the son of the deceased was entitled to. Though the interest devolving upon her was a limited interest, known as Hindu women's estate but she had a right of claiming partition and was entitled to be recognised as a separate unit for the purpose of ceiling law. Though the interest devolving upon her was a limited interest, known as Hindu women's estate but she had a right of claiming partition and was entitled to be recognised as a separate unit for the purpose of ceiling law. He further submitted that under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act he became the absolute owner of the land which devolved upon her and as such the Authorised Officer ought to have sent her a copy of the draft statement, because after the death of Gauri Lal alias Madan Singh his interest devolved upon his heirs and Smt. Sausar Bai could not be considered as dependent of Mohan Singh. She had separately inherited her share and was legally entitled to be recognised as a separate entity. Simply because the entire land was recorded in the name of Mohan Singh, she could not be deprived of her right to hold the land separately coming into her own share and as the land falling in the share of each of the successor of Madan Singh was less than the ceiling area prescribed under the Act, no land could be declared as surplus land under the Act. Besides, Madan Singh had executed a will in favour of the appellants on December 23, 1955, and the execution of that had been proved in another case No. 78 of 1971, instituted under Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The Board of Revenue, the counsel urged, ought not to have ignored the existence of that will. 6. So far as the question of will is concerned, the Board of Revenue has held that the will was not proved in the case before it. Neither the will was a registered document, nor had the probate of the will been obtained. No doubt, it was not necessary for Smt. Sausar Bai to obtain probate of letters of administration and the will was also not required to be registered, but unless the execution and genuineness of the will was proved, it cannot be said that the appellants are entitled to the share in the property of the deceased in accordance with the will dated December 25, 1955. The Board of Revenue has held that the execution of that document was not proved. The question whether a document has been proved or not in accordance with law is a question of fact. The Board of Revenue has held that the execution of that document was not proved. The question whether a document has been proved or not in accordance with law is a question of fact. Both the Board of Revenue and learned Single Judge have unequivocally held that the appellants failed to prove the will and as such there is nothing on record to hold that the appellants acquired any right in the property of the deceased Madan Singh in pursuance of the will in dispute In our considered opinion the learned Single judge was correct in the conclusion arrived at by him on this point. 7. Mr. Mehrish, placing reliance on a judgment of this Court Geeta Devi v. State of Rajasthan 1979 WLN (UC) 19 , argued that under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, after the death of father; the daughters and the widow of the deceased are entitled to share and their share in land cannot be included in the share of the son for determining surplus land under the Act. Madan Singh died on January 1, 1956 i. e. prior to the coining into force of the Hindu Succession Act. The Act No. XXX of 1956, came into force on June 17, 1956. As such the appellants are not entitled to the benefit of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. Geeta Devi's case (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants is distinguishable on facts. The landholder, Ram Kishan, in that case died on September 18, 1956 i. e. much after June 17, 1956. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act applies to a case where a female Hindu is in possession of the property whether acquired after or before the commencement of the Act. It does not apply to the case where the widow has not acquired possession over the land. It is not the case of the appellants that the land had been divided into metes and bounds and separate possession had been given to Smt. Sausar Bai. On the contrary her case is that she herself got the Tehsildar appointed over the entire land of the deceased Madan Singh. It is not the case of the appellants that the land had been divided into metes and bounds and separate possession had been given to Smt. Sausar Bai. On the contrary her case is that she herself got the Tehsildar appointed over the entire land of the deceased Madan Singh. Thus, by her own conduct she claimed no interest in the land in dispute adverse to the interest of Mohan Singh, Unless she acquired physical possession of the land, she cannot claim benefit of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and as such she was rightly not considered as a separate unit under the Act. Moreover, Smt. Sausar Bai is estopped by her own conduct from claiming a separate share in the property of her husband Madan Singh adverse to the interest of Mohan Singh, because at the time when Madan Singh expired Mohan Singh was a minor. She herself got the property of Madan Singh mutated in the name of Mohan Singh. Madan Singh was a Muafider and under the Muafi Rules the property of a Muafidar under the customary law used to devolve on male descendants and not on females. She herself filed an application before the District judge for the appointment of a guardian under Section 8 of the Guardian and 1Vards Act (Act No. XIII of 1980) in respect of the entire land. Thus. she herself had represented that Mohan Singh was the owner of the entire land left by his father. Madan Singh. It is too late in the day to say now that she constitutes a separate unit. Such a plea is an after-thought and has been raised to defeat the provisions of the ceiling laws. It is not understandable if Smt. Sausar Bai claimed any right under the provisions of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act (Act No. XVIII of 1973), why she had not raised such a plea when the property i. e. land in dispute, had been taken over by Court of Wards. The personal law which governs the family of Madan Singh, a Muafidar, raises- questions basically of facts. It would, therefore, be not possible for this Court to permit Smt. Sausar Bai to raise a plea that she had acquired independent right in the land in dispute of on her husband's death. The personal law which governs the family of Madan Singh, a Muafidar, raises- questions basically of facts. It would, therefore, be not possible for this Court to permit Smt. Sausar Bai to raise a plea that she had acquired independent right in the land in dispute of on her husband's death. Such a claim requires investigation into facts which cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in a petition tinder Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, it will not be out of place to mention here that the learned counsel for the petitioner in spite of various adjournments failed to show anything on the basis of which It it could he said that the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act. 1937, was made applicable in Kota prior to its merger in the United State of Rajasthan. The Rajasthan Adaptation of General Laws Ordinance, 1950 (Ordinance No. 4 of 1950). was promulgated by the Rajpramukh on January 24, 1950. A perusal of the list of the Acts adapted to the State of Rajasthan. as shown in Rajasthan Code Vol. I, Pages 147-158, indicates that the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act was not made applicable to the State of Rajasthan Learned counsel for the appellants has also not been able to show any Notification Act or Ordinance by which it can he said that the provisions of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act were applicable to Smt. Sausar Bai at the time when her husband died. Again, sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, provided that "the provisions of Section 3 would not apply to an estate which by a customary or other rule of succession or by the term of the grant applicable thereto descends on a single heir". 8. So far as the last submission that the land in dispute was a muafi-land and compensation was given to all the four heirs of Madan Singh is concerned, suffice it to say that the appellants have failed to lay the foundation for it. Neither such a plea was raised before the Board of Revenue, nor has any document been placed on record on the basis of which it can be said that Smt. Sausar Bai also got a share in the compensation. Neither such a plea was raised before the Board of Revenue, nor has any document been placed on record on the basis of which it can be said that Smt. Sausar Bai also got a share in the compensation. We therefore, find no reason to reverse the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge. 9. The special appeal being devoid of merits is summarily dismissed. *******