ORDER : - This is a dispute between landlord and tenant. An application was filed by the plaintiff u./O.15, R.5, C.P.C. for striking out the defence of the defendant on the ground that he had failed to deposit the rent due to the plaintiff. The defendant filed a chart along with an application (40/c) showing the dates when the deposit of rent was made. On considering that Chart the trial Court came to the conclusion that the rent due from the defendant had not been deposited by the 7th of every month and there was no explanation forthcoming on his behalf as to why the deposit of rent was belated. In these circumstances, the trial Court, ordered that the defence of the defendant be struck off u/O.15, R.5, C.P.C. Hence this revision. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the impugned order. I have also scrutinised. the record of the case. 3. The plaintiff-respondent flied the instant suit for ejectment of the defendant-applicant in November, 1980. The plaintiff is a widow while the defendant is an Advocate of the High Court. After the filing of the written statement, issues were struck on 29-1-1981. Thereafter several dates were fixed for final hearing. A close scrutiny of the order-sheet of the case indicates that for some reason or the other the case was prolonged. The defendant approached the High Court for a transfer of the case and got the proceedings stayed for some time. The transfer application was finally rejected. The defendant then got the written statement amended and additional issues were framed on 27-2-1982. Three days earlier, the plaintiff had moved the instant application u/O.15, R.5, C.P.C. On 27th Feb., 1982 the court directed the defendant to file a chart showing the details of deposit of rent made by him. The defendant having objected to the valuation of the suit, an issue was framed thereon as to whether the suit was undervalued and this issue was finally decided in favour of the plaintiff on 24th April, 1982. Thereafter again an objection was filed by the defendant for framing additional issues as to whether the suit was bad for non-joinder of sub-tenant. It was prayed by the defendant that this issue be decided as a preliminary issue. The court framed an additional issue. After this an application was filed, the same day, viz. Thereafter again an objection was filed by the defendant for framing additional issues as to whether the suit was bad for non-joinder of sub-tenant. It was prayed by the defendant that this issue be decided as a preliminary issue. The court framed an additional issue. After this an application was filed, the same day, viz. 24-5-1982 praying for time to file a revision in the High Court. This was allowed and he was granted time till 28th May, 1982. No stay order was obtained from the High Court. Ultimately the trial Court passed the impugned order on 5th July, 1982 striking out the defence under O.15, R.5, C.P.C. 4. The defendant again applied for time to file a revision and to bring a stay order from the High Court against the aforesaid order dt. 5-7-1982. Time was allowed to 10th August, 1982. No stay order was obtained. On 21st Sept., 1982 the defendant again applied before the trial Court for further time. The plaintiff objected on the ground that the defendant was taking adjournment after adjournment on one pretext or the other and the hearing was being delayed. However, the trial Court granted time till 4th Oct., 1982. On that date again an application was filed before the trial Court praying for 3 days further time to file a copy of the stay order of the High Court. The High Court at first stage, stayed the proceedings for a limited period and thereafter on 14th Dec.. 1982 the High Court admitted the revision and continued the stay, and on the agreement of counsel for the parties, directed the revision to be listed for hearing in the week commencing January 10, 1983. It appears from the scrutiny of the High Court record that in view of the old age and ailing condition of the plaintiff Smt. Chandra Kala Devi who was to go to Calcutta for major operation, the High Court (Mr. Justice A. Banerji) ordered that her statement would be recorded by the court below. Counsel for the plaintiff (defendant?) - applicant agreed that he had on objection to an early date being fixed for this purpose. In view of this agreement, Justice Banerji directed on 22-10-1982 that the statement of Smt. Chandra Kala Devi would be recorded and further proceedings thereafter shall remain stayed till further orders of this Court. Counsel for the plaintiff (defendant?) - applicant agreed that he had on objection to an early date being fixed for this purpose. In view of this agreement, Justice Banerji directed on 22-10-1982 that the statement of Smt. Chandra Kala Devi would be recorded and further proceedings thereafter shall remain stayed till further orders of this Court. On 25th Oct., 1982, the plaintiff moved an application in the court below in pursuance of the order of the High Court for recording her statement. The Court fixed 30th Oct., 1982 and directed that information be sent to counsel for the defendant. On 30th Oct. 1982, when the case was called out, the plaintiff was present but the defendant was absent. He could not be served with summons. The report of the process-server was that the house of the defendant was found locked. The trial Court then directed that the evidence of the plaintiff be recorded on 3rd Nov., 1982 and information of the date be sent to the defendant again and his counsel. On 3rd Nov., 1982 when the case was called for bearing the plaintiff was again present but none appeared for the defendant. The report dt. 3rd Nov. 1982 of the counsel for the plaintiff indicated that he did contact Sri Prem Prakash Yadav. Advocate, the defendant but Sri Yadav did not accept the notice as the plaintiffs counsel was not accompanied by any process-server. Thereafter it appears that in view at the order of the High Court dated 14-12-1982 mentioned above the proceedings in the trial Court remained stayed without the statement of the plaintiff being recorded. These are the detailed facts with regard to the progress of the case, since the time of the institution which are borne out from the record of the case. On the basis of these facts two inferences are inevitable. The first inference is that the defendant has been trying to delay the trial of this case by seeking adjournments again and again on some ground or the other. He pleaded for amendment of the written statement; he pleaded for framing of additional issues; he pleaded for a transfer of the case from the trial Court. which was refused. Thus on one ground or the other he went on delaying the proceedings. 5. He pleaded for amendment of the written statement; he pleaded for framing of additional issues; he pleaded for a transfer of the case from the trial Court. which was refused. Thus on one ground or the other he went on delaying the proceedings. 5. The second inference is that in spite of the fact that he gave an undertaking to the High Court that he had no objection to the statement of the plaintiff an old ailing lady to be recorded by the trial Court, he refused to accept service of process when the information of the date fixed was given to him by the plaintiffs counsel. After having agreed in the High Court for getting the statement of the plaintiff recorded early, he should not have avoided to honour his commitment by not accepting process tendered to him by the plaintiffs counsel. 6. Coming now to the question of deposit of monthly rent during the continuance of the proceedings, the following Chart may be taken into consideration : (A) Deposit chart as per Annaxure-4 filed along with the stay application. (A) Deposit chart as per Annaxure-4 filed along with the stay application. Sl. No. Date of Deposit Month and Year 1. 16-2-1981 Dec., 1980 to Jan., 1981 2. 9-4-1981 Feb. and Mar., 1981 3. 25-5-1981 April, 1981 4. 25-8-1981 May, June, July, 1981 5. 19-11-1981 Aug., September, Oct., and Nov., 1981 6. 23-2-1982 Dec., 1981, Jan. and Feb., 1982 7. 18-3-1982 March, April, 1982 8. 25-5-1982 May, and June, 1982. (B) : - Deposite chart as per para 3 of the affidavit D/- 16th Feb. 1988 filed in this Court : Sl. No. Date of Deposit Month and Year 1. 21-7-1982 July, Aug. 1982 2. 15-10-1982 Sept., Oct., Nov., 1982 3. 15-2-1983 Dec., 1982, Jan., Feb, and March, 1983. 7. According to the contention of the defendant, rent is due for payment after the conclusion of the month and by the 7th of the succeeding month i.e., rent for December, 1980 would be due for payment on 7th Jan. 1980. Calculating according to this submission one would find from a scrutiny of the above chart that for the month commencing December, 1980 to the month ending November, 1982, the defendant had defaulted 14 times in the payment of rent and had paid advance rent in 9 months. The revision was heard by me on 14th February. 1983. 1980. Calculating according to this submission one would find from a scrutiny of the above chart that for the month commencing December, 1980 to the month ending November, 1982, the defendant had defaulted 14 times in the payment of rent and had paid advance rent in 9 months. The revision was heard by me on 14th February. 1983. During the course of the argument, the payment of arrears due was disputed, as such I gave the parties 2 days time to file affidavits disclosing the details of the payment. From the perusal of the affidavit sworn on 16th February, 1983 detailed above, it appears that the rent for the month of December. 1982. January and February, 1983 had not been paid at all till 14th February. It was on 15th February, 1983. that the deposit was made for December, 1982. January, February. and March 1983. It is thus clear that till the date of hearing rent for the months of December, 1982, January, 1983 and February 1983 was not deposited at all. The defendant is not a rustic villager who is unable to understand the implications of law and the liability which the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, places upon the defendant-tenant for the regular payment of his dues. It appears to me that in order to harass the old lady, landlady, the applicant has been deliberately delaying the payments of rent due even according to his own showing for varying periods extending between one week to two and half months. 8. If however calculation of rent due is made on the basis of the submission of the plaintiffs counsel to the effect that each months rent is payable in advance and must be paid by the 7th of each month in that case the defendant has committed defaults in the payment of rent in practically all the months commencing from December, 1980 till March. 1983, when the defendant deliberately and consistently defaulted in the payment of rent. An educated lawyer tenant who deliberately and consistently defaults in the payment of rent cannot be extended indulgence at the cost of an old harassed lady unaware of the intricacies of law. 9. 1983, when the defendant deliberately and consistently defaulted in the payment of rent. An educated lawyer tenant who deliberately and consistently defaults in the payment of rent cannot be extended indulgence at the cost of an old harassed lady unaware of the intricacies of law. 9. It is further noticeable that the defendant after having given an undertaking to this court did not care to honour his agreement to diligently attend the Court below so that the statement of the old lady and her cross-examination might have been conducted, as ordered by the High Court. In my opinion, the circumstances of the case narrated above clearly disentitle the defendant to any indulgance and the limping deposits made in these circumstances cannot exonerate him from the liability which is attached to these defaults. 10. Another reason for not granting indulgence to the applicant is that he has not shown my sufficient cause for the delayed payment. Since there have been defaults in the payment of arrears of rent, it was open to the defendant to have applied to the court below and to have requested that court to condone the delay in the deposit of rent. O.15, R.5, C.P.C. contemplates a situation where a court after considering any representation made by the defaulting tenant allows him further time and condones the delay. No such application was made to the court despite the fact that there has been innumerable defaults spread over a period of about 2 years. Even in this court no application was filed for condonation of the delay. On the contrary the argument is that there has been no default and that the payment of a number of instalments of rent due have been made in advance. In other words the applicant claims that he has been diligent in the payment of rent and has not committed any default. In these circumstances, this is not a fit case for condonation of delay. 11. Counsel for the applicant had in the last resort suggested that the impugned order may now be set aside and in order to safeguard the future interest of the plaintiff, the defendant may be put to terms. In these circumstances, this is not a fit case for condonation of delay. 11. Counsel for the applicant had in the last resort suggested that the impugned order may now be set aside and in order to safeguard the future interest of the plaintiff, the defendant may be put to terms. I have already shown above that the defendant had agreed before the High Court that he would co-operate with the recording of the statement of the old lady before the trial court, but in spite of that agreement he acted otherwise as is obvious from the facts and findings which are recorded above. In these circumstances no sanctity can be attached to any agreement by the applicant. The conduct of the defendant, therefore, does not justify the acceptance of any such undertaking by the defendant, which in all probability would delay and defer the final disposal of the suit with no material result. 12. The applicants counsel has cited a decision of the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petn. No. 6671 of 1982. Bimal Chandra Jain v. Gopal Agrawal. Relying upon that decision counsel has argued that even in the case of Bimal Chandra Jain several defaults had occurred and yet because the deposits of rent had been made, the Supreme Court condoned the delay. As such he submits that since the deposits of arrears of rent due has now been made the same may be accepted as due payment and the defence of the applicant be not struck off. It may be mentioned here that no principle of law was enunciated in the above case by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court for reasons best known to it was of the view: that "this is not the kind of case in which the defence of the appellants-tenants could be struck off." In the present case, however, there are several other distinguishing circumstances and findings which have to be borne in mind. The Supreme Court for reasons best known to it was of the view: that "this is not the kind of case in which the defence of the appellants-tenants could be struck off." In the present case, however, there are several other distinguishing circumstances and findings which have to be borne in mind. The deliberate and intentional delay in the making of monthly deposits of rent, the delaying tactics adopted by the defendant in the progress of the suit, the attempt to choke the proceedings by getting the case transferred without success, the applications for framing of additional issues from time to time resulting in delaying proceedings and the avoidance of the agreement arrived at before the High Court are the circumstances which do not find mention in the impugned order of the Supreme Court nor in the judgment of the learned single Judge, which was set aside by that court. 13. Learned counsel for the applicant hat also relied upon a single Judge decision of this court reported in 1982 All LJ 1052. Viswanath v. A.D.J., Bijnol and on that basis also he has argued that since the arrears of rent due have now been deposited his defence should not be struck off. As I have mentioned above, in the instant case there are a large number of circumstances against the defendant apart from the default in the deposit of rent which disentitles the defendant to any indulgence. I need not repeat those circumstances again. It is nowhere laid down either in the judgment of the learned single Judge or in the judgment of the Supreme Court that if circumstances exist, which do not justify any indulgence or latitude being granted to the defendant for his defaults, then merely on the ground that the arrears of rent have been irregularly and belatedly deposited by the tenant, the defence of the defendant must not be struck off. As I have mentioned above, O.15, R.5, C.P.C. gives a discretion to the trial Court to condone the delay in the deposit of instalments due and even to grant further extension of time for making the deposit. Far from a satisfactory explanation, no explanation at all has been given by the defendant for condoning these defaults. The trial Court has exercised a discretion vested in it by law. It would not be appropriate for this court to interfere with that discretion without adequate reason. Far from a satisfactory explanation, no explanation at all has been given by the defendant for condoning these defaults. The trial Court has exercised a discretion vested in it by law. It would not be appropriate for this court to interfere with that discretion without adequate reason. In view of all the facts and circumstances mentioned above. I am satisfied that there is no ground for interfering with the impugned order of the trial Court. In my opinion this is a fit case in which the defence of the applicant should be struck off. 14. There is no merit in this revision which is hereby dismissed with costs. The interim order passed by this Court on 4-10-1982 is hereby vacated. Revision dismissed.