Judgment :- 1. This appeal is against the judgment by a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing the Original Petition wherein the petitioner appellant challenged Ext. P5 judgment passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the 4th respondent in the Original Petition. The matter concerned the competing claims between the petitioner-appellant on the one hand and the first respondent on the other for a grant of a stage carriage permit on the route Parassinikadavu-Perambra, a route about 88.5 K M. in length. The petitioner and the first respondent applied for the said permit and submitted representations, copies of which are Exts. P1 and P2. The petitioner claimed all operational facilities, such as residence, office, workshop etc. at Cannanore, full sector, experience of more than fifteen years in passenger transport business and two idle buses ready to be put on the route. The petitioner also claimed that being a fleet operator with six regular permits he is entitled to a permit on a long route. The first respondent also claimed residence, office and work-shop arrangement on the route at Cannanore, 8 years experience, clean history, full sector by temporary permits, and partial sector by regular permits and a ready vehicle to be put on the route. Besides this the first respondent also mentioned in his representation that the petitioner has no residence on the route, he has not mentioned a vehicle in his application, he has transferred two permits and surrendered one permit. 2. At the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority Cannanore, the 3rd respondent, the applications came up for consideration. On the basis of the Motor Vehicles Rules marks were awarded to the appellant and the first respondent under Rule I77A in respect of their qualifications. The petitioner and the first respondent each got 5 marks. But then the 3rd respondent found that the petitioner had longer experience, residence nearer the route and possession of a vehicle of a model later than that offered by the first respondent. So the petitioner was preferred to the first respondent and his application was granted by Ext. P3 order dated 12-4-1982. 3. In the appeal by the first respondent before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal he sought stay. But no stay was granted against the operation of Ext. So the petitioner was preferred to the first respondent and his application was granted by Ext. P3 order dated 12-4-1982. 3. In the appeal by the first respondent before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal he sought stay. But no stay was granted against the operation of Ext. P3 order so much so permit was issued to the petitioner on the basis of which the petitioner is conducting the service on the route. It was urged before the 4th respondent by the first respondent that the past performance of petitioner was bad because of surrender of one permit and a transfer of two temporary permits granted to him. The 4th respondent thereupon passed Ext P5 judgment upholding the marks awarded to both the applicants by the Regional Transport Authority but holding that one such mark was awarded for residence/ office and experience as further weightage should not be granted for residence nearer the route or for having more experience in the industry. The 4th respondent proceeded to consider the question of the transfer of two permits, surrender of one permit and non-availing of temporary permit and on this basis held that the petitioner's past performance is not good as that of the first respondent. He therefore held that the order Ext. P3 is bad and consequently he set aside Ext. P3. 4. The challenge before the learned single judge was to Ext. P5 judgment. The petit oner obtained a stay of operation of the judgment Ext. P5 and on that basis continued operation of a bus for which permit had been granted to him by the 3rd respondent. It was contended before the learned single judge that the 4th respondent committed an error of law insetting aside Ext. P3 in as much as he took the view that the petitioner's past performance was bad, that the petitioner was not guilty of violation of any provisions of law and there was no material to prove any bad antecedents of the petitioner. The learned single judge dismissed the Original Petition though he held that the appellant had longer experience as a stage carriage operator and he offered to put on the road a better later model vehicle might be relevant considerations and both these are plus points in his favour. The learned single judge dismissed the Original Petition though he held that the appellant had longer experience as a stage carriage operator and he offered to put on the road a better later model vehicle might be relevant considerations and both these are plus points in his favour. Even so the learned judge upheld the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal only for the reason that the appellant had transferred two permits, surrendered one permit and did not avail of a temporary permit. This was held to be sufficient justification for preferring the 3rd respondent. 5. The learned single judge in the judgment under appeal took the view that "longer experience in the field of transport operation, and the offer to put on the road a better, later model vehicle might be relevant considerations, particularly where other things are equal on the basis of the marks awarded under R.177A(4) of the Rules, though there is no invariable rule that the ultimate choice should rest on the marks awarded alone." The learned judge further found that "therefore, there is justification to treat" the longer experience as a stage carriage permit holder and the offer of a better, later model vehicle in respect of the petitioner as an additional qualification while making the choice in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of S.47 of the Act. While the learned judge categorically found that the additional qualifications mentioned earlier might be treated as plus points in favour of the petitioner he took the view that "it might also be necessary to see whether there are any circumstances in evidence which are to be treated as minus points." Reference was made to Exts. P6 and P7 which evidenced transfer of two vehicles operating on stage carriage permits with the permission of the Regional Transport Authority, Ext. P8 which evidenced surrender of a permit to the Regional Transport Authority and Ext. P9 which evidenced the grant of temporary permit in respect of which the case was that there was non-utilisation. Since it is these which have, to a considerable degree, if not wholly, influenced the 4th respondent as well as the learned single judge we may have to advert to Exts. P6 to P9 here. 6. R.177A deals with grant, variation, suspension or cancellation of stage carriage permits. Since it is these which have, to a considerable degree, if not wholly, influenced the 4th respondent as well as the learned single judge we may have to advert to Exts. P6 to P9 here. 6. R.177A deals with grant, variation, suspension or cancellation of stage carriage permits. Sub-rule (3) envisages screening of applicants and those who are found to be unsuitable on one or more of the grounds stated are to be disqualified. Reasons must be given for the decision of the Transport Authority whenever an applicant is disqualified. We are concerned with reason (iii) and that reads: "If there is evidence that the applicant has been trafficking in permits, either benami or otherwise". Trafficking in permits is evidently taboo. An applicant found to be guilty of trafficking in permits would be disqualified. There is no question of comparing his qualifications with that of another. Therefore if the petitioner had been guilty of trafficking in permits there was no question of considering his qualifications vis-a-vis that of the first respondent, but straightaway the petitioner must be found to be out of the eligible field. We are mentioning this here to emphasise that the 4th respondent did not find that the petitioner had been trafficking in permits. Without finding on the question whether there was trafficking the 4th respondent holds thus: "The expression 'trafficking' is not defined in the Act. When the matter is urged against the first respondent in this matter, it is for him to satisfy that an adverse inference shall not be drawn against him in respect of the three transactions mentioned above. In two of the applications the reasons mentioned by the first respondent were quoted. That does not give any explanation for the conduct of the first respondent. No light has been shed about the circumstances under which a permit was got cancelled. To me it appears that this unexplained conduct is a blemish on the past performance of the first respondent." Similar view has been taken about the non-availing of a temporary permit. Evidently therefore the Appellate Tribunal did not favourably notice the petitioner's case of longer experience and a newer model vehicle as plus points in his favour which entitled him to preference over the first respondent who had obtained the same mark as he had under R.177A. The learned single judge made an entirely different approach. Evidently therefore the Appellate Tribunal did not favourably notice the petitioner's case of longer experience and a newer model vehicle as plus points in his favour which entitled him to preference over the first respondent who had obtained the same mark as he had under R.177A. The learned single judge made an entirely different approach. The learned judge found positively that longer experience and a possession of a later model vehicle were plus points. While considering the question whether the petitioner was guilty of trafficking in permits which would disqualify him the Tribunal found that there was blemish on the part of the petitioner without categorically finding whether such blemish would amount to trafficking or not. The learned judge while holding that by Exts.P6 and P7 transfers the petitioner could not be said to be indulging in trafficking in permits, went on to state that the travelling public was denied the benefit of traffic facilities which would have been available had not the perm it been surrendered by the petitioner under Ext. P8. He seems to have been of the view that since the past performance and record of service of the applicants would be relevant the past performance of the petitioner in this case which shows that it is "tainted with inefficiency, indifference and utter disregard to the interest of the public in general" would be of relevance while assessing the relative merits of the applicants. Having found so the learned single judge further found that the fact that the petitioner was having longer experience as a stage carriage operator might be a relevant consideration and so is the assurance to put on road a better, later model vehicle and while these might be plus points in favour of the petitioner, the fact that the petitioner was unable to operate the service on the routes under the two permits which are the subject matter of Exts P6 and P7, the fact of cancellation of permit under Ext. P8 and the failure to utilise permit under Ext. P9 could be viewed as minus points. In this view the learned single judge upheld Ext. P5 and therefore dismissed the Original Petition. 7. Learned counsel Sri. S. Narayanan Poti urges that the view taken as to "blemish" in the order of the 4th respondent and the view expressed by the learned single judge on the question of 'past performance' based on Exts. In this view the learned single judge upheld Ext. P5 and therefore dismissed the Original Petition. 7. Learned counsel Sri. S. Narayanan Poti urges that the view taken as to "blemish" in the order of the 4th respondent and the view expressed by the learned single judge on the question of 'past performance' based on Exts. P6 to P9 are unwarranted and there is no basis for the approach made. There is another approach also made in this appeal. Differing from the Appellate Tribunal the learned single judge had held that there were plus points in favour of the petitioner which plus points were not noticed by the 4th respondent. The learned single judge ought not to have weighed these plus points against what he considered as minus points in order to sustain the judgment, Ext. P5. It is counsel's cast that such an approach would be unjustified in exercise of the power of judicial review by this court. That would be to arrogate to itself the appellate power which is not conferred on the court. 8. The rules having specifically dealt with the kind of transfer of permits that could be said to be objectionable we fail to appreciate how routine transfers of permits envisaged under the provisions of the Act and Rules could without anything more, be said to be objectionable or could be said to reflect on the performance of an operator. The Motor Vehicles Act and Rules contemplate transfer of a vehicle from an operator to another. This is to be done with the sanction of the Regional Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Authority may permit such transfer taking due note of the circumstances. The transfer of vehicle by an operator operating the vehicle on a permit does not by itself mean that it amounts to trafficking in such permits. Such transfer is contemplated in law and is not by itself an objectionable act. At the same time it must be said that merely because a transfer is with the sanction of the Regional Transport Authority is no circumstance and such a transfer amounts to trafficking. It is found by the learned single judge that such trafficking has not been established in this case. In fact it was not argued before us that the petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of trafficking. Then the only question is whether the transfer is objectionable. It is found by the learned single judge that such trafficking has not been established in this case. In fact it was not argued before us that the petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of trafficking. Then the only question is whether the transfer is objectionable. The circumstances of the transfer or any material which would indicate that the transfer in the particular instance should for some special reason be held to be against public interest has not been brought to our notice. If a transfer is permitted by law it is open to any operator to transfer a vehicle belonging to him and that by itself should not lead to any assumption against him. Exts. P6 and P7 show nothing more than transfers of two vehicles by the petitioner who was operating those vehicles as stage carriages. If that cannot be found to be a part of trafficking activity on the part of the petitioner it cannot be found to be something else, some blemish or something bad in the past performance. In other words what is permitted by law cannot, without anything more, be found to be objectionable. So is the case with the surrender. Here again it is agreed that the surrender is contemplated by the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules and as such it cannot be said to be against the rules or the Act. But what is said is that when a person who operates a vehicle surrenders the vehicle the public would be put to difficulty and therefore the person surrendering the vehicles must be taken to have acted against public interest. It law permits surrender it must be assumed that the question of public interest has been noticed by the legislature making a provision for surrender. There may be any number of reasons why sanction for transfer is sought or a permit is surrendered. It may be that the road covering the route is not negotiable or it may be for other reasons such operation will not be possible. It may be that public are in no way affected since the route is properly serviced by temporary permits. We need not speculate about all the possible reasons Suffice to say that the assumption that a transfer of vehicle with a permit or surrender of a permit without anything more, would reflect on past performance, is not warranted. Ext. It may be that public are in no way affected since the route is properly serviced by temporary permits. We need not speculate about all the possible reasons Suffice to say that the assumption that a transfer of vehicle with a permit or surrender of a permit without anything more, would reflect on past performance, is not warranted. Ext. P9 evidences the grant of temporary permit The learned single judge refers to grant of permit on 25-2-1982 and observes that the petitioner should have.put the bus atleast on 6-3-1982 and notices that the stay of operation of temporary permit was obtained in appeal only on 10-3-1982 and therefore finds that in the meanwhile he could have put the vehicle on the route and having not done so it must be found to reflect on his past performance. It is pointed out by the petitioner's counsel that he has no case that the order was served on him on 26-2-1982 and that really before the time for putting the vehicle on the road expired the stay had been obtained and ultimately the temporary permit itself was cancelled. We do not think that the circumstance relating to Ext. P9 is also of any justification to find minus points for the petitioner. 9. Now we will come to another important general question. Assume that the petitioner has plus points and minus points not noticed by the Appellate Tribunal, as such the question is whither it is for this court to re-evaluate these and to come to a decision of its own. The learned judge was not making the same approach as the appellate authority. The appellate authority had found no plus points for the petitioner. When once the learned single judge found plus points a fresh evaluation was called for. Should the evaluation be by the learned single judge or should it be by the 4th respondent, the Appellate Authority? The learned judge finds that there are certain plus points and certain minus points. The 4th respondent had no occasion to weigh these plus points against the minus points and nevertheless the learned single judge has, on evaluation of these points, held against the petitioner. Could he have done so? It is also said that how the plus points found could be offset against the minus points found by the learned judge is not evident from the learned single judge's order. 10. Could he have done so? It is also said that how the plus points found could be offset against the minus points found by the learned judge is not evident from the learned single judge's order. 10. The case law of the last three decades in the courts of our country abound in cases examining the scope and extent of the power of judicial review vested in courts. We do not propose to refer to them here as the principles have become well-settled. We have richly drawn inspiration from the decisions of English courts. We think it would be appropriate to advert to a recent case, Chief Constable v. Evans, (1982) 3 All. E. R.141 before the House of Lords. The case concerned the dismissal of a probationer constable by the Chief Constable. It would be profitable to refer to the following passage in the speech of Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone LC at page 143 of the decision. That reads:' "The first observation I wish to make is by way of criticism of some remarks of Lord Denning M.R.which seem to me capable of an erroneous construction of the purpose of the remedy by way of judicial review under RSC Ord. 53. This remedy, vastly increased in extent, and rendered, over a long period in recent years, of infinitely more convenient access than that provided by the old prerogative writs and actions for a declaration, is intended to protect the individual against the abuse or power by a wide range of authorities, judicial, quasi-judicial, and, as would originally have been thought when I first practised at the Bar, administrative, It is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers and discretions properly vested in them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions. It is intended to see that the relevant authorities use their powers in a proper manner. Since the range of authorities, and the circumstances of the use of their power, are almost infinitely various, it is of course unwise to lay down rules for the application, of the remedy which appear to be of universal validity in every type of case. Since the range of authorities, and the circumstances of the use of their power, are almost infinitely various, it is of course unwise to lay down rules for the application, of the remedy which appear to be of universal validity in every type of case. But it is important to remember in every case that the purpose of the remedies is to ensure that the individual is given fair treatment by the authority to which he has been subjected and that it is no part of that purpose to substitute the opinion of the judiciary or of individual judges for that of the authority constituted by law to decide the matters in question. The function of the court, is to see that lawful authority is not abused by unfair treatment and not to attempt itself the task entrusted to that authority by the law. There are passages in the judgment of Lord Denning MR. (and perhaps in the other judgments of the Court of Appeal) in the instant case and quoted by, my noble and learned friend which might be read as giving the courts carte blanche to review the decision of the authority on the basis of what the courts themselves consider fair and reasonable on the merits. I am not sure whether Lord Denning M.R. really intended his remarks to be construed in such a way as to permit the court to examine, as for instance in the present case, the reasoning of the subordinate authority with a view, to substituting its own opinion. If so, I do not think this is a correct statement of principle. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court. Lord Brightman in a speech referred to a speech of Lord Evershed in (1963 2 All E.R 66 at. page 91) "a danger of usurpation of power on the part of the courts... Lord Brightman in a speech referred to a speech of Lord Evershed in (1963 2 All E.R 66 at. page 91) "a danger of usurpation of power on the part of the courts... under the pretext of having regard to the principles of natural justice ...I do observe again that it is not the decision as such which is liable to review; it is only the circumstances in which the decision was reached, and particularly in such a case as the present the need for giving to the party dismissed an opportunity for putting his case". and then Lord Brightman concluded thus: "Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power" Though Lord Brightman's view may call for comment in that it adopts narrower view of the scope of judicial review it is evidently the cautious approach to the use of the power of judicial review. It is interesting to notice the comments on these observations of Lord Brightman in the editorial notes in Law Quarterly Review, Volume 99 at page 171 on Administrative Decisions, Powers and Remedies. At page 173 reference is made to Lord Brightman's speech: "Lord Brightman's concern that there should be no usurpation of the powers of the Chief Constable was elaborated in a passage of somewhat negative character on the jurisdiction of the court to review the exercise of administrative powers for unreasonableness. He went so far as to say that "judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process," after quoting from Lord Evershed's dissenting speech in Ridge v. Baldwin, a speech far out of line with established law. He went so far as to say that "judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process," after quoting from Lord Evershed's dissenting speech in Ridge v. Baldwin, a speech far out of line with established law. But since Lord Brightman went on to approve the hallowed principle of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K. B. 223, it is clear that his remark need not be regarded as startling.or as intended to unsettle the numerous decisions in which administrative decisions have been set aside for inherent unreasonableness, i. e. for abuse of power, with no procedural element." In the Cambridge Law Journal (1983 CLJ.) at page 13 Andre Grubb writing on the topic 'Dismissal, Natural Justice and Judicial Review' refers to the views of Lord Hailsham and Lord Brightman. Reference may be made to the following paragraph at page 15: "One final point relates to some wide dicta of Lord Denning M. R. that not only must the disciplinary procedure adopted be fair, but the decision itself must be fair and reasonable. Both Lords Hailsham and Brightman went out of their way to emphasise that judicial review (where a breach of the rules of natural justice was alleged) was concerned only with the decision-making process and not with the decision itself. Clearly this is correct. However, this is not the whole story because in some cases, as Lord Brightman recognised, judicial intervention under R. S. C., Ord. 53 can come very close to an evaluation of the public body's decision, when the court is considering the reasonableness of the decision on the "Wednesbury principles" (1948) 1 K. B. 223." 11. That the ultimate decision cannot be that of the court exercising the power of judicial review is a point on which there could now be no controversy. The power of judicial review is not intended to take away the powers and discretion vested in the authorities by law. It is not the purpose of judicial review to substitute the opinion of the court or of any individual judge for that of the authorities constituted by law. The functioning of the court is to see that the power vested in such authorities is not abused. That does not enable the court to review the decision on what the court considers fair and reasonable or to substitute its own views in the matter. The functioning of the court is to see that the power vested in such authorities is not abused. That does not enable the court to review the decision on what the court considers fair and reasonable or to substitute its own views in the matter. 12. In the above view the learned single judge who has found that there are certain plus points which plus points were not noticed by the 4th respondent and that there are also some minus points could have only found as a consequence that the matter required to be looked into by the Appellate Tribunal afresh. We need not be taken to have agreed with the view of the learned single judge that there are minus points, a matter on which we have already spoken earlier in this judgment. The final evaluation of the claim to the grant of a permit must necessarily be by the authority in whom the power is vested in this behalf. If this court on judicial review finds that the approach of the authority is erroneous and unsustainable and on the facts found a fresh evaluation is called for such fresh evaluation must be by that authority. In this view we set aside Ext. P5 judgment and remit the case back to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal for disposal afresh in accordance with law. No costs.