JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for recovery of Rs. 1300/- on the foot of a Sarkhat dated 20th July, 1960 for Rs. 944/- . The rate of interest was Rs. 1 per cent per mensem. The defence was a total denial of the plaintiff,s claim and of the execution of the Sarkhat. The three issues on which the parties went to trial were : 1. Whether defendant took Rs. 944/- on 10-7-1960 and executed Sarkhat in suit? 2. Whether suit is barred by time". 3. To what amount is the plaintiff entitled? The first issue was the crucial one, and inasmuch as the suit was filed on 20th July, 1963, issue No. 2 was answered by the trial Court by saying that the suit having been filed within three years of the date of the execution of the Sarkhat, no question of limitation arises. On the first issue the trial Court found in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit, but the lower appellate Court reversed that finding and dismissed the suit, hence this second appeal. 2. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant attacked the finding of the lower appellate Court that the Sarkhat was a forgery and that the defendant had not borrowed the money claimed, as vitiated in law. It is necessary to state certain more facts in order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant in this case. 3. The plaintiff had examined himself and one Parashuram Rai related to him as a collateral though separated by 8 to 10 degrees as witnesses, to prove the advance of the loan and the execution of the Sarkhat. About the oral evidence of the plaintiff and his witness Parashuram Rai, the trial Court observed that the defendant was not able to discredit these witnesses in cross-examination except showing that they were collaterals. The trial Court then took into consideration the opinion of three experts who had been examined in the case. The first expert to whom the Sarkhat in suit was sent for opinion along with the defendant's specimen writings was Sri Charles Hardless. I may here observe that the whole Sarkhat purported to be written in the hand of the defendant. It was not a case where the disputed writing for expert examination consisted merely of signatures of the party concerned. I may here observe that the whole Sarkhat purported to be written in the hand of the defendant. It was not a case where the disputed writing for expert examination consisted merely of signatures of the party concerned. The entire contents of the Sarkhat were alleged by the plaintiff to have been written by the defendant and he having denied the same, a specimen of his writing containing the matter written in the Sarkhat was probably obtained for purposes of comparison by a handwriting expert in order to have his opinion. By a letter dated 30th Mar, 1964 Sri Charles Hardless wrote back to the Munsif that a definite opinion could not be given on specimen writing and requested that some prior normal writings and signatures of the defendant written in the ordinary course of business such as Vakalatnama, Written Statement or registered deeds may be supplied to enable the expert to know whether the specimen etas been disguised and if so to what extent. There is another letter dated 1st May 1964 from Shri Charles Hardless to the Munsif saying that the signatures on the Vakalatnama cannot be said to be normal signatures as it had been written in the same transaction as the specimen writing and that he may be able to offer a definite opinion if he were supplied with same writing and signature of the defendant written by him prior to the date of the Sarkhat in suit or some registered deeds or documents not connected with the present suit. However, the report dated 28th April 1964 shows that the expert was "inclined to the opinion that the disputed writings and signatures on the Sarkhat marked "X" have been written by the writer of the writings and signatures on the specimen sheets marked S1, S2 and S3. 4. The expert Shri Charles Hardless was examined on commission. His statement on oath in reply to the interrogatories under cross-examination is dated 17th Dec., 1965. 4. The expert Shri Charles Hardless was examined on commission. His statement on oath in reply to the interrogatories under cross-examination is dated 17th Dec., 1965. In his statement on oath also he stated in reply to the 7th interrogatory that he was "inclined to the opinion that the disputed writings and signatures on the Sarkhat Marked X have been written by the writer of the writings and signatures on the specimen sheets marked S1, S2 and S3." However, in reply to the last interrogatory No. 9, he stated that as "there are both similarities and dissimilarities in the letter formations between the disputed and specimen writings and signatures - the presence of normal writings and signatures of the alleged writer written in the ordinary course of business" will enable him to judge "whether the dissimilarities are due to the specimen writings being disguised or not". Under cross-examination he stated that he was not in a position to give definite opinion on account of similarities and dissimilarities in the disputed signature and the specimen signature unless he was supplied with the normal writings and signatures of the alleged writer. According to the trial Court "in order to make his position more strong the defendant sent the disputed and specimen writings to Sri Banmali Dwivedi, expert of Gwalior for comparison", who "after detailed examination gave a definite report that the document in question was written by the same person who wrote the specimen writings i.e. the defendant." After this adverse report, the defendant did not examine the expert Sri Banmali Dwivedi on oath and got the disputed Sarkhat examined by another expert Sri Mohd. Hanif of Arrah, whose report was favourable to the defendant and he was accordingly examined on oath as a witness for the defendant. However, the plaintiff made an application dated 12th May, 1966 for the examination of Shri Banmali Dwivedi on commission. The trial Court observed thereon that the plaintiff had already closed his evidence on 31st Jan. 1966 and that. therefore, he could not be allowed to re-open his evidence at this stage, and rejected the application. I may here observe that the defendant,s statement on oath had also been recorded on 31st Jan. 1966, but the statement of the expert Sri Mohd. Hanif. who was examined at his instance was recorded on 23rd Aug. 1966. 1966 and that. therefore, he could not be allowed to re-open his evidence at this stage, and rejected the application. I may here observe that the defendant,s statement on oath had also been recorded on 31st Jan. 1966, but the statement of the expert Sri Mohd. Hanif. who was examined at his instance was recorded on 23rd Aug. 1966. The plaintiff thereupon admitted the report of Shri Banmali Dwivedi by an application dated 29th Aug. 1966. The trial Court ordered thereon that "plaintiff may admit it but the report admitted will be read along with the whole case". 5. The trial Court examined and analysed threadbare the reasons given by Shri Mohd. Hanif, the expert who was ultimately examined by the defendant, at great length, and held on a comparative study of the disputed Sarkhat with the specimen writings, that the Sarkhat in question was written by the defendant. About the report of Shri Charles Hardless, the trial Court observed that it appears that the expert did not apply his mind to all the characteristics of the disputed and specimen writings. Having come to that conclusion, the trial Court observed that the report of an expert cannot have the same effect as a document filed by a party in case it is admitted by the adversary and that expert opinion is weak evidence, therefore, even when the report of an expert obtained at the instance of one party is admitted by the opposite-party, it cannot be admitted without scrutiny. But having gone through the report of Shri Dwivedi, the trial Court found that it was quite detailed and the reasons given were quite convincing and in that situation, since the opinion was obtained by the defendant himself, he could not avoid its effect, if it was against him, as it has been admitted by the plaintiff. 6. The trial Court then considered certain other circumstantial, evidence on the record and ultimately came to the conclusion that the defendant did take the loan and executed the Sarkhat Ext. I. 7. The lower appellate Court observed that the main dispute cantered round the writing and execution of the Sarkhat. The defendants contention regarding "the professed incapacity of the respondent to float the loan of Rs. 944/- ........ I. 7. The lower appellate Court observed that the main dispute cantered round the writing and execution of the Sarkhat. The defendants contention regarding "the professed incapacity of the respondent to float the loan of Rs. 944/- ........ is neither here nor there." It then referred to the evidence of Shri Charles Hardless and observed that "it is sufficient to say that regardless of his report, Sri C. R. Hardless, Hand Writing Expert was quite fair and can-did in admitting in his deposition that there are both points of similarity and dissimilarity in the letter formations between the disputed and specimen writings and signatures." and that he "also admitted that none of the two sets of writings constituted the normal writing and signature of the writer." and that he "frankly admitted not being in a position to give any definite opinion on account of similarity and dissimilarity in the disputed signature and the admitted signature, till he was supplied with the normal writings of the alleged writer." The inference raised by the lower appellate Court from the statement of Sri Hardless was that even the writing in the Sarkhat was not the normal writing of the alleged writer and that being so no expert can furnish an opinion acceptable to law Courts that a particular person had signed a disputed handwriting." 8. With regard to the report of Sri Banmali Dwivedi, after noticing that it had been obtained at the instance of the defendant, the lower appellate Court observed that "the learned Munsif appeared to rely on this report of Sri Banmali Dwivedi, possibly because the respondent (plaintiff) admitted that report 3 7-C" and proceeded to observe that "Law is settled on the point that the report of an expert, like a First Information Report or a site plan in criminal cases does not constitute substantive evidence and cannot be used at par with other admissible documents. Unless Mr. Unless Mr. Banmali appeared in the witness-box to support his report and face cross-examination, it would be illegal to usher in that document as an admissible piece of evidence (see Padma Priya Debya v. Dharma Das Deb Sarma, (1911) 10 Ind Cas 965, Peary Lal v. Kidarnath, AIR 1923 All 601, Wadhawa v. Jai Kishan Das, AIR 1928 Lahore 427 (1), Ram Autar Shukul v. Baldeo Shukul, AIR 1932 Patna 352, Tasadaq Hussain v. Basawan Rai, AIR 1933 Patna 159, Bhurey Singh v. Karan Singh, 1935 All WR 76 : AIR 1935 All 142 , Purnima Debi v. Khagendra Narayan Deb, AIR 1955 NUC (Assam) 2304 and Parwat Vedu Patil v. Sukdev Shivram Patil, AIR 1956 Bom 617 . Moreover, the learned Munsif appears to have proceeded on his own reasoning and even observed that Sri Hardless did not apply his mind to all the characteristics of the disputed and specimen writings. There is no dearth of authority to caution courts against treading on the domain of the handwriting experts, even though on complete data being available, a Court would be justified in accepting or rejecting the Expert's theory. A reliance on the report of Dwivedi without exhibiting it was in my opinion, an act, not warranted by legal procedure. True, it is that the defendant did somersault in regard to the report of Sri Dwivedi but if the respondent wants to use it as his admission. he should have examined Sri Dwivedi either in Court or in commission to use this report as an admissible piece of evidence. In my opinion, none of the reports of the Experts can constitute any helpful matter in this case." 9. The lower appellate Court then proceeded to examine the oral evidence and observed that the plaintiff "had to admit that Parashuram Singh (P.W. 2) was a joint khata-holder with the plaintiff and also his uncle" and that "it is amusing to notice that Parashuram (P.W. 2) stated that the plaintiff was his cousin and he did, not know whether he was a joint khata holder with the plaintiff". Further, according to the lower appellate Court "the plaintiff admitted not knowing whether the appellant (defendant) Mahanth Rai alias Ram Dutt Rai was the adopted son of one Ramdas Rai or not although the Sarkhat in question (Ex. Further, according to the lower appellate Court "the plaintiff admitted not knowing whether the appellant (defendant) Mahanth Rai alias Ram Dutt Rai was the adopted son of one Ramdas Rai or not although the Sarkhat in question (Ex. 1) itself records that fact clearly enough." Again according to the lower appellate Court, "the really starting feature of the evidence of the plaintiff, is not knowing the purpose for the loan represented by the Sarkhat (Ex. 1), and what is more, he asserted not even asking the appellant about such a purpose. The plaintiff stated that the Sarkhat in question was executed in the month of Ashrah while the official Jantri shows that Ex. 1 bearing the date 20th July, 1960 corresponded to Swanbadi Dwadasi. I can understand that there may be some discrepancies between the witnesses for the plaintiff as to the source of the ink or inkpot, but it cannot be believed that a person would advance so heavy a loan as Rs. 1000/- and odd without even caring to ask the purpose for it. It is equally unbelievable that he would not know whether the debtor was the adopted son or whether his real brother had appeared as a witness for the plaintiff or not in a sessions case. Parasuram Singh could not also be taken to bean impartial witness when he did not know whether the interest of 1% was on the monthly or yearly basis or whether the plaintiff was a joint Khatedar with him or not. He made an unusual statement that the appellant first scribed out and executed the Sarkhat, whereupon the respondent went somewhere and brought forth the money. In the end, he made the crowning admission of not reading or knowing the contents of the Sarkhat. In my opinion, such an evidence cannot fasten any effective liability on the appellant for any debt and I am not disposed to agree that on the strength of such worthless evidence, the respondent has succeeded to any degree in proving even the conscious execution of the Sarkhat, nothing to mention of its cash consideration. It is inherently impossible that the appellant, while going to take the loan, would take plaintiffs own uncle to evidence it. This allegation has been made in the deposition of the plaintiff Deo Nandan Rai." 10. It is inherently impossible that the appellant, while going to take the loan, would take plaintiffs own uncle to evidence it. This allegation has been made in the deposition of the plaintiff Deo Nandan Rai." 10. It was urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant that the lower appellate Court was in error in holding that the additional statement of Shri Charles Hardless was honest and not dubious, that the report of Shri Banmali Dwivedi was inadmissible in evidence or that the trial Court was in error in not relying on the oral evidence of the plaintiff and his witness and that the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court was vitiated in law. 11. As to the admissibility of the report of Sri Banmali Dwivedi, learned counsel urged that by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 three new clauses (e) (f) and (g) were added to S. 75 and three new Rules 10-A, 10-B and 10-C were inserted after Rule 10 in Order 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These amendments were not mentioned in any of the several clauses (a) to (z-b) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 97 and were thus fully retrospective, as expressly provided by sub-sec. (3) of S. 97 of the said Amendment Act. 12. Clause (e) of S. 75 authorised a Court to issue a commission "to hold a scientific, technical or expert investigation." Rule 10-A of Order 26 reads as under : "10-A. Commission for scientific investigation : (1) Where any question arising in a suit involves any scientific investigation which cannot, in the opinion of the Court, be conveniently conducted before the Court the Court may. if it thinks it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice so to do, issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit, directing him to inquire into such question and report thereon to the Court. (2) The provisions of Rule 10 of this Order shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to a Commissioner appointed under this rule as they apply in relation to a Commissioner appointed under Rule 9". Learned counsel urged that the expression scientific investigation in the said rule took within its ambit, scientific, technical as well as expert investigation spoken of in clause (b) of S. 75. Learned counsel urged that the expression scientific investigation in the said rule took within its ambit, scientific, technical as well as expert investigation spoken of in clause (b) of S. 75. Therefore, the report of an expert was under clause (2) of Rule 10-A read with clause (2) of Rule was "evidence in the suit" but the Court or, with the permission of the Court, any of the parties to the suit may examine the expert personally in open Court touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report, or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation. 13. Learned counsel for the defendant-respondent objected that this provision did not exist then the suit was tried or the appeal was heard by the lower appellate court. The lower appellate Court could not, therefore, be said to have committed any error of law in holding that the report of the expert Sri Banmali Dwivedi was not admissible without proof because the expert had not been put into the witness-box and examined on oath. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant replied by urging that if the law had not been amended as aforesaid by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 the plaintiff-appellant would have surely been justified in requesting the court for a direction to summon Sri Banmali Dwivedi for examination inasmuch as his application for examination of Sri Banmali Dwivedi should have been allowed by the trial court in case the correct view of the law was that the report of an expert could not be read in evidence unless the expert was examined on oath before the Court. That being so, urged learned counsel the result would be that the judgment of the lower appellate court was liable to be set aside on the ground that it should have, in the view that it took, directed the examination of Sri Banmali Dwivedi on oath. This Court could do what the lower appellate court ought to have done. But today the law had been amended in the meanwhile and the report of Sri Banmali Dwivedi could be read in evidence without the examination of the expert on oath. This Court could do what the lower appellate court ought to have done. But today the law had been amended in the meanwhile and the report of Sri Banmali Dwivedi could be read in evidence without the examination of the expert on oath. The result is that it must be held today that the report of Sri Banmali Dwivedi is admissible in evidence although he was not examined on oath, and that being so the judgment of the lower appellate court is erroneous in law. It was also urged, and I think rightly, that the expert Sri Banmali Dwivedi having been required to give a report at the instance of the defendant and the plaintiff having admitted that report, it was for the defendant to have applied for the examination of Sri Banmali Dwivedi on oath so as to have enabled him (the defendant) to cross-examine the expert. All the cases relied upon before the lower appellate court and cited at the bar before me on this point show that a party cannot rely upon the report of an expert in his favour without producing that expert in the witness box so as to enable the opposite-party to cross-examine him. It stands to reason that in case the report of an expert goes against the party at whose instance the opinion of the expert has been sought, but is evidence in the suit under Rule 10-A(2) read with Rule 10(2) of Order 26 of the Civil P.C. has now amended, it is for that party to declare the expert hostile and to seek the permission of the Court to cross-examine him and for that purpose to summon him for parole evidence. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent did not throw any suggestion during the arguments that he would like to cross-examine Sri Banmali Dwivedi in case his report was deemed to be admissible in evidence in view of the aforesaid retrospective amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. It is also noticeable that in spite of the fact that the report of Sri Banmali Dwivedi was deemed by the trial Court to be admissible evidence after the plaintiff had admitted it, treating it as evidence tendered by the defendant, no attempt was made by the defendant to summon Sri Banmali Dwivedi for purposes of cross-examination. It is also noticeable that in spite of the fact that the report of Sri Banmali Dwivedi was deemed by the trial Court to be admissible evidence after the plaintiff had admitted it, treating it as evidence tendered by the defendant, no attempt was made by the defendant to summon Sri Banmali Dwivedi for purposes of cross-examination. He remained content with examining another expert Sri Mohd. Hanif who. gave a favourable report in his favour. Under the circumstances I do not think that the case needs to be remanded for summoning Sri Banmali Dwivedi and giving the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine him. The matter must be decided on the material already on the record. 15. It was urged for the defendant-respondent that the finding arrived at by the lower appellate court that the Sarkhat was a forgery and the plaintiff did not advance any loan was a finding of fact and was based on an appraisal of the oral evidence. It has been seen above that the first ground on which the lower appellate court reversed the finding of the trial court was that the opinion of Sri Banmali Dwivedi was inadmissible in evidence. The lower appellate court was not right in that. Moreover, the trial court did not base its finding primarily on the report of Sri Banmali Dwivedi. It based its finding on the oral evidence of the plaintiff and its own opinion on the question about the genuineness of the Sarkhat after a close examination and analysis of the reasons given by the expert Sri Mohd. Hanif. I must also say that the learned Munsif has very adequately dealt with the reasons given by Sri Mohd. Hanif for his opinion and has in a very careful and reasoned manner arrived at, the inference that the Sarkhat was genuine. The lower appellate court did not think it worthwhile to . meet that part of the judgment of the learned Munsif and based its findings on certain circumstances. Hanif for his opinion and has in a very careful and reasoned manner arrived at, the inference that the Sarkhat was genuine. The lower appellate court did not think it worthwhile to . meet that part of the judgment of the learned Munsif and based its findings on certain circumstances. The first circumstance taken into account by the lower appellate court was that "the plaintiff had to admit that Parashuram Singh (P. W. 2) was a joint khata holder........and also his uncle and that it is amusing to notice that "Parashuram (P. W. 2) stated that the plaintiff was his cousins and he did not know whether he was a joint khata holder with the plaintiff." I do not think that this was enough for disbelieving - the plaintiff or his witness Parashuram Singh particularly when they had been believed by the trial court. The lower appellate court then proceeded to observe that the plaintiff "admitted not knowing whether the appellant (defendant) Mahanth Rai alias Ram Dutt Rai was the adopted son of one Ramdas Rai or not although the Sarkhat in question (Ex. 1) itself records that fact clearly enough, and that the "really starting feature" of the plaintiffs evidence was that he did not know the purpose for which the loan was taken. This again would not be enough to disbelieve the plaintiff. On the other hand if the Sarkhat had really been forged the plaintiff would have taken care to remember that the defendant was the adopted son of Ramdas Rai and would have also taken care to state some purpose for which the loan had been taken. I say so, because a person who forges a Sarkhat and sues upon it is clever enough to know and state all these things in the evidence in order to give credence to his story. The discrepency in the date that has been pointed out by the lower appellate Court is again a circumstance which tends to show that the plaintiff had not concocted evidence for the purposes of the case but was stating facts as he remembered them. In my opinion the reasons given by the learned Judge of the lower appellate court for his findings show that his findings were based more on conjectures and surmises than on the proved facts and circumstances brought out by the evidence on the record. In my opinion the reasons given by the learned Judge of the lower appellate court for his findings show that his findings were based more on conjectures and surmises than on the proved facts and circumstances brought out by the evidence on the record. The trial Court had the advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses and believed the plaintiffs evidence. That finding could not in the circumstances of the present case be reversed by the appellate court unless it came to the positive conclusion that the Sarkhat was a forgery. That conclusion was not possible unless the Court agreed with the report of Sri Mohd. Hanif on an examination of the Sarkhat. The lower appellate court did not do that. Instead it placed reliance on the dubious additions made by Sri Hardless under cross-examination to the effect that he was not in a position to give any definite opinion of account of similarities and du-similarities in the absence of natural writings. The fact remains that Mr. Hardless had reported and also stated on oath that he was inclined to the opinion that the Sarkhat was in the hand-writing of the defendant. 16. A noticeable feature of the case was the fact that the Sarkhat does not purport to bear only the signatures of the defendant, but purports to be written by him. Sri Mohd. Hanif suggested that it was a case of simulated forgery. Now, that was impossible unless the plaintiff had a model in the defendant's handwriting of the words and the figures written in the Sarkhat. It is reasonable to assume that a person who dares to forge Sarkhat and to sue upon it in a court tries to do it in such a manner that the forgery may not be detected. Therefore, the number of the words or the figures forged are kept to the minimum. Normally, it is only the signatures which are forged in such cases. To forge an entire Sarkhat is comparatively very much more difficult and the chances of detection are also greater. The fact that the entire Sarkhat purports to have been written by the defendant is a circumstance which points to the inference that it was genuine rather than forged. 17. To forge an entire Sarkhat is comparatively very much more difficult and the chances of detection are also greater. The fact that the entire Sarkhat purports to have been written by the defendant is a circumstance which points to the inference that it was genuine rather than forged. 17. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances I am of the opinion that the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court that no loan was advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant and that the Sarkhat in suit is a forgery is vitiated in law. Further, in view of the convincing reasons given by the trial Court for the finding arrived at by it I am relieved of the necessity of appraising the evidence and giving any more reasons for holding that the findings arrived at by the trial Court are correct. 18. In the view that I have taken, it is not necessary to refer to or discuss the several cases cited at the bar on the value of the expert evidence or the other aspects of the case. 19. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside. The decree of the trial Court is restored with costs throughout.