JUDGMENT P.N. Bakshi, J. - This is a defendant's revision in a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent in the Court of Judge Small Causes for ejectment of the defendants and for recovery of arrears of rent. The suit related to Flat No. 1 of House No. D-59/105-C situate it Mohalla Chandrika Colony, Varanasi City. It was decreed by the trial Court on 23.2.1982. 2. The plaintiff's allegations were that the defendants were the tenants of the premises in suit on a monthly rent of Rs. 25 that the defendants tenancy was terminated by a notice dated 1.9.1980 sent by registered post; that the defendant's premises was constructed in the year 1974 and as such it was not governed by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 that the defendants failed to vacate the premises inspite of the termination of their tenancy, hence the suit. 3. The defendants filed joint written statements and contested the suit. It was pleaded by them that notice to quit was not served upon defendant No. 2 and that he did not refuse to accept the same. It is also pleaded that the premises including a porch and paved land lying in front of the house was not included in the notice and as such the said notice was illegal. The defendants further pleaded that rent upto February, 1981, has been paid to the plaintiff, the notice terminating their tenancy stood waived. On these grounds inter alia the suit was liable to be dismissed. 4. The trial Court on a consideration of the evidence on record, both oral or documentary, held the case of the plaintiff established and decreed the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent and mesne profits as mentioned above. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also perused the impugned order. It is argued that Para 6 of the plaint does not indicate that the plaintiff has terminated the tenancy of the defendants by registered notice dated 1.9.1980; as such it was submitted that no evidence could be led on this question and the defendant continued to be a tenant of the premises in questions. I have carefully perused para 6 of the plaint. The interpretation sought to be put on the averments of para 6 of the plaint, by learned counsel for the defendant-applicant is not correct. I have carefully perused para 6 of the plaint. The interpretation sought to be put on the averments of para 6 of the plaint, by learned counsel for the defendant-applicant is not correct. It is specifically mentioned there in that the defendants have been directed to vacate the entire flat No. 1 by notice dated 1.9.1980; and that the said notice was personally served upon the defendants, but defendant No. 2 refused to accept the same. A perusal of the notice Ex. ka 4 clearly indicates that the plaintiff had terminated the tenancy of the defendants. In my opinion the pleadings with regards to termination of defendant's tenancy is not legally defective and the plaintiff was thus fully justified in leading evidence both oral and documentary on this score. 6. It is next argued that the suit is bad in law because the plaintiff did not terminate his entire tenancy. It was contended that the porch and paved land lying in rent of the house was also in the tenancy of the defendants and the notice in question did not direct the defendants to vacate this part of the premises, and therefore, the suit must fail for want of valid notice. The question whether the defendants were tenants of the porch and the open paved land as claimed by them is a pure question of fact. On a consideration of the entire material on record, the Court below has come to a specific finding that "the description of the demise property was correctly given in the plaint and that it did not include the porch and the open land as contended by the defendants." This is pure findings of fact arrived at an appraisal of the evidence on record and the circumstances of the case. I do not find any reason to set aside this finding. There is thus no merit in this contention. 7. It is next submitted that the notice terminating the defendant's tenancy has been waived by the acceptance of rent by the plaintiff subsequently upto February, 1981. In this contention it is pertinent to refer to two findings of fact recorded by the court below. A specific finding has been recorded by the Judge Small Causes that the notice Ex. ka 4 was duly served upon the defendant No. 2, but he refused to accept service. In this contention it is pertinent to refer to two findings of fact recorded by the court below. A specific finding has been recorded by the Judge Small Causes that the notice Ex. ka 4 was duly served upon the defendant No. 2, but he refused to accept service. He has also opined that the notice was correctly addressed to defendant No. 2. In these circumstances he has rightly drawn a legal presumption that service of notice Ex. ka 4 was effected on defendant No. 2 by refusal. The next finding recorded by the trial court is that there were two methods of payment of rent adopted by the defendant-one was by tendering the same to the plaintiff personally and the second was by deposit of rent in the joint account of the plaintiff in the Union Bank of India, Sigra Branch through pay in slips. It is not the case of the defendants that personal payment was made to the plaintiff after 1.8.1980. The tenant's contention is that he continued to deposit the monthly rent in the Union Bank of India, Sigra Branch by pay in slips upto February, 1981. On this basis he contents that the notice to quit must be deemed to have been waived. In this connection, it may be pointed out that the notice Ex. ka 4 contained specific directions to the defendant not to deposit rent in the joint account of the plaintiff in the Union Bank of India. Further in the statement of the defendant No. 2 recorded under Order 10, Rule 2, C.P.C., it was clearly stated by him that he was not asked by Baldeo Prasad on or after 1st August, 1980 to deposit rent in the Bank. In this view of the matter, if the defendant still continued to make deposit of rent in the Bank, despite the specific directions to the contrary given by the plaintiff, it cannot be said that such deposits amounted to waiver of notice on behalf of the plaintiff. In this connection a reference may be made to Harcharan Singh v. Shiv Rani, where the question of the presumption of service under Section 29 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act was considered. In this connection a reference may be made to Harcharan Singh v. Shiv Rani, where the question of the presumption of service under Section 29 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act was considered. It has been held therein that 'when service is effected by refusal by a postal communication, the addressee must be impugned with the knowledge of the entire contents thereof. Their Lordships have further gone to observe as follows : "It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited within the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice." In the instant case specific direction has been given to the defendants not to deposit the rent in the joint account of Union Bank of India. The defendant inspite of specific directions has disobeyed them and made the deposit, as such it cannot be said that the plaintiff has waived the notice on a account of this unilateral deposit made in this Bank. I do not find any merit in the contention of the applicant that only part of the contents of the notice should be accepted in so far as they relate to termination of tenancy while the part which directs the defendant not to deposit any rent in their account in the Union Bank of India should be discarded. To my mind this submission is unreasonable and cannot be accepted in law. 8. Learned counsel for the applicant has then relied upon Single Judge decision of Justice K.B. Asthaha, as he then was, in Ram Dayal v. Jwala. The facts of that case were totally different. Therein the rent had been sent by money order after the institution of the suit and the same had been accepted by the plaintiff, in these circumstances the learned Single Judge had upheld the plea of waiver. This is not the correct and factual position in the instant case. 9. The facts of that case were totally different. Therein the rent had been sent by money order after the institution of the suit and the same had been accepted by the plaintiff, in these circumstances the learned Single Judge had upheld the plea of waiver. This is not the correct and factual position in the instant case. 9. As the matter of fact in Bhawaniji Lakshmi Ji and others v. Himatlal Jaundas Dani and others, the Supreme Court has gone to the extent of observing that "Mere acceptance of amounts equivalent to rent by a landlord from a tenant in possession after a lease had been determined, either by efflux of time or by notice to quit, and who enjoys statutory immunity from eviction except on defined grounds as in the Act. (Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1972) cannot be regarded as evidence of new agreement of tenancy." 10. In Hari Shankar v. Chaitanaya Kumar a Division Bench of this court has held that mere acceptance of rent for a period after the time mentioned in notice had expired, did not amount to waiver of notice to quit under Section 113 of the T.P. Act. In any opinion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case and the findings recorded by the courts below, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has waived the notice terminating the tenancy of the defendants. 11. It appears that in this case the documents which had been filed by the plaintiff had been returned to him after the decision of the suit by the Judge Small Causes. When the case was listed for hearing, on the last occasion, I had directed the plaintiff to refile those documents, which has been done. Counsel for the applicant objects that these documents, should not be allowed to be refiled, I have passed this order in the interest of justice. A revision arising out of Small Causes Courts matter would not be strictly covered by the provisions of Order 13, Rule 9, C.P.C. which applies to appeal. Counsel for the applicant objects that these documents, should not be allowed to be refiled, I have passed this order in the interest of justice. A revision arising out of Small Causes Courts matter would not be strictly covered by the provisions of Order 13, Rule 9, C.P.C. which applies to appeal. Section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure , specifically exempts the application of Sections 96 to 113 and 115, C.P.C. In any case even if I had not asked the defendants to file these documents it is abundantly clear that the trial court has recorded its finding on the basis of documentary as well as oral evidence which has been led by the parties. No criticism has been levelled against the judgment of the trial court that he has misread or misunderstood the contents of any documentary evidence or oral statement. As such I have no reason to doubt the correctness of the observations which have been made by the court below with respect to the contents of the documents and the inference that he has drawn there from. Learned counsel has not been able to point out as to what prejudice has been caused to him by my order directing the documents to be refiled in this court. In any case not much turns upon it. The findings of fact recorded by the Judge Small Causes are based upon valid and proper appreciation of the evidence and the materials on record and they cannot be set aside in revision. 12. There is no merit in this revision, which is hereby dismissed with costs.