A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) IT is seriously asserted in the academic world that Modern India seems to have at least two parallel legal systems : One for the rich and resourceful and those who wield political power and influence and the other for the small men without resources and capabilities to obtain justice or fight injustice [see Origin of Indian Legal System at page 4 by Prof. Upedra Baxi. ] One may or may not agree with this observation he but if any one is in search of evidenc to support the aforesaid proposition the proceedings of this case in general and the impugned order passed by the learned City Session Judge (Court No. 4 Ahmedabad granting bah to the opponent-accsued in particular should serve as a sufficient proof for the coorrectness of the statement. It is bit surprising (and shocking too) that the learned City Sessions Judge (Court No. 4) Ahmedabad did not even refer to the provisions of Section 436 of the Criminal Procedure Code although the Supreme Court had clearly pointed out the same and had directed to keep the said provision in mind while deciding an application for bail. The provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code empower a court to refuse bail in certain situations even in cases where accused is charged with bailable offences. ( 2 ) THE courts dealing with the cases of economic offenders must show their utmost serious concern. Blackmoney not only eats into the vitals of the nations economy but with the widening spread and deepening influence of the blackmoney the very moral fabric of the society gets shattered. If this be the consequences on account of generation of blackmoney should the lower court have not seen that the trial of the case instituted in the year 1974 at least commences before the end of year 1983. To ensure the speedy and unhampered trial of the case was it not imperative for the learned City Sessions Judge to refuse bail in this case ? Was it not necessary for him to take into consideration the larger public interest ? Let us examine the details of the case and make an attempt to answer the aforesaid questions. ( 3 ) APPLICANT-ASSISTANT Commissioner (Acq. Range) Income Tax Department Ahmedabad has preferred this revision application against an order (Annx. Was it not necessary for him to take into consideration the larger public interest ? Let us examine the details of the case and make an attempt to answer the aforesaid questions. ( 3 ) APPLICANT-ASSISTANT Commissioner (Acq. Range) Income Tax Department Ahmedabad has preferred this revision application against an order (Annx. B) passed by the City Sessions Court Court No. 4 Ahmedabad dated August 12 1983 granting bail to the opponent-accused and it is further inter alia prayed that the bail granted to the opponent-accused be ordered to be cancelled. ( 4 ) IT is the case of the prosecution that the opponent-accused along with others is guilty of offences punishable under Sections 183 193 199 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code inasmuch as they attempted to convert their blackmoney into white money by means of cross-word puzzle; and in that process offered resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of the department concerned knowing or having reasons to believe that the authority concerned was a public servant. It was also alleged that in the said process the accused gave false evidence for the purpose of being used in the proceeding before the Income Tax Department and made false statement in declaration which was by law receivable an evidence and it is the further allegation of the prosecution that the accused had entered into a criminal conspiracy to achieve the aforesaid ill-legal act and objects. The allegation of the prosecution appears to be that the accused converted or attempted to convert blackmoney to the extent of Rs. 48 lakhs into white money and the opponent-accused was directly involved for an amount of Rs. 6 lakhs. The complaint in the case was filed in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate Ahmedabad on March 27 1974 The trial court had initially issued a bailable warrant for Rs. 1500/- and the Police at Daman was directed to take surety bond from the opponent-accused for an amount of Rs. 1500/- with an undertaking that he would remain present before the Metropolitan Magistrate 10 Court Ahmedabad on April 15 1974 and on subsequent dates. It appears that the opponent-accused had initially furnished bail and thereafter he might have remained present before the court on somes dates. Howevr some of the salient features of the case may be noted. 1500/- with an undertaking that he would remain present before the Metropolitan Magistrate 10 Court Ahmedabad on April 15 1974 and on subsequent dates. It appears that the opponent-accused had initially furnished bail and thereafter he might have remained present before the court on somes dates. Howevr some of the salient features of the case may be noted. (A) Till 1978 no substantial progress could be made in the proceedings of the case before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate because one or another accused was in detention under MISA or for some other reason further proceedings do not seem to have taken place at all. (B) On September 19 1978 the opponent-accused was absent. Hence non-bailable warrant was issued. (C)THEREAFTER on four adjournments opponent-accused remained present but on subsequent two ocassions he remained absent. (D) The opponent-accused remained present on two occasions but the matter was adjourned for some reason or other. Thereafter on nine occasions the opponent-accused was absent and there-fore on Mrarch 17 1980 non-bailable warrant was issued against him and also against other accused who were absent. (E) Thereafter on five occasions the opponent accused was absent and he was absent on September 16 1980 and since he was absent on the aforesaid date his advocate one Mr. Gohil assured the court that the opponent-accused would remain present on Sept. 30 1980 On September 30 1980 the opponent-accused was absent and hence a nonbailable warrant was ordered to be issued and it was issued on October 9 1980 (F) On October 27 1980 the opponent-accused was absent. Therefore again on November 3 1980 when the accused was absent another non-bailable warrant was issued and it was delivered to the Collector of Daman for being executed. (G) Even thereafter the opponent-accused was absent and a non-bailable warrant was handed ever to the Collector of Daman and was affixed at the residence of the opponent-accused again. (H) On November 5 1981 another non-bailable warrant was issued and it was delivered to S. D. P. O. Daman. Even thereafter the warrant could not be served. (I) On July 27 1982 another non-bailable warrant was issued by the Magistrate and this was the 5th nonbailable warrant. On the strength of this warrant the accused was arrested on July 31 1982 and was brought before the Court. (J) The accused was a proclaimed absconder and necessary proclamation was issued at the relevant time. (I) On July 27 1982 another non-bailable warrant was issued by the Magistrate and this was the 5th nonbailable warrant. On the strength of this warrant the accused was arrested on July 31 1982 and was brought before the Court. (J) The accused was a proclaimed absconder and necessary proclamation was issued at the relevant time. (The aforesaid detail is given by the counsel for the petitioner on the basis of the judgment delivered by my learned Brother Bedarkar J. in Gri. R. A. No. 432 of 1982 delivered on August 6 1983 and the name has not been controverted by the other side.) ( 5 ) IT appears that after the accused was arrested on July 31 1982 he applied for being released on bail and the lower court had granted bail on certain conditions. That order passed by the learned Magistrate was challenged by the Income Tax Department in this High Court by filing Criminal Revision Application No. 432 of 1982 and the opponent-accused had preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 433 of 1982 for relaxation of the conditions of bail. Both the aforesaid revision applications were heard together by the High Court (Coram: V. V. Bedarkar J.) and were disposed of by a common judgment on August 6 1982 (now reported in 23 (2) GLR 317 ). The court had ordered to cancel the bail granted by the court of Metropolitan Magistrate Ahmedabad. . During the course of the judgment the High Court observed in paragraph 30 thereof to the effect that the Magistrate should proceed with the case as expeditiously as possible and see that within a period of two months the committal proceedings are over and also observed that after the trial starts on account of special circumstances which may be available to the accused he may apply to the court for being released on bail. In such an event the application for bail was required to be considered on merits. Thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and Sessions Case No. 211 of 1982 was registered against the opponent-accused along with other accused. In the Sessions Court the opponent-accused submitted an application being Misc. Criminal Application No. 358 of 1982 and prayed that he be released on bail. Thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and Sessions Case No. 211 of 1982 was registered against the opponent-accused along with other accused. In the Sessions Court the opponent-accused submitted an application being Misc. Criminal Application No. 358 of 1982 and prayed that he be released on bail. The application was rejected by the City Sessions Judge by his order dated January 19 1983 on the ground that in the opinion of the Court there were no special circumstances for granting bail. The opponent-accused preferred Criminal Misc. Application No. 79 of 1982 before the High Court and prayed that he be released on bail. That application came up for final hearing before me and after hearing the parties the same was rejected by order dated March 28 1983 The opponent-accused preferred petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 1049 of 1933 before the Supreme Court and prayed that he be released on bail. The Supreme Court rejected the same by its order dated August 9 1983 However the Supreme Court kept it open for the opponent-accused to make fresh application for bail and urge whatever circumstances which might have transpired since the date of the order passed by the High Court including the fact that the opponent-accused had then been released from his detention under COFEPOSA. The Supreme Court also directed that in the event of such an application being made by the opponent-accused for bail the court should keep in mind the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 ( 6 ) IT appears that the opponent-accused was released from detention under COFEPOSA on August 8 1983 It also appears that the opponent-accused was under house arrest from July 19 1983 till August 8 1983 during which period he was transferred from Ahmedabad jail to Daman and was allowed to stay in his house so that he might be able to look after the health of his ailing wife. Immediately on the next day subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court i. e. on August 10 1983 the opponent-accused preferred an application in the City Sessions Court praying that he be released on bail. Immediately on the next day subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court i. e. on August 10 1983 the opponent-accused preferred an application in the City Sessions Court praying that he be released on bail. In this application he submitted the following two grounds only in support of his prayer for bail: (A) The Supreme Court has directed this Honourable Court to take particular notice of the fact that the said accused No. 13 has now been released from COFEPOSA by revocation of the order of detention under COFEPOSA by the order of Supreme Court dated the 4th August 1983 (Date appears to be incorrect. In the copy of the order of Supreme Court produced in the case at Annexure `c it is dated August 9 1983 (B) That the wife of accused No. 13 was seriously ill and hospitalised and also there was nobody to take proper care of family of the accused No. 13. The accused No. 13 has also small children. Under the circumstances the Supreme Court has been by its order dated 11th July 1983 pleased to direct that the accused No. 13 be transferred from Ahmedabad Central Jail to his residence at Daman and be held under Home arrest so that the accused No. 13 may have access and look after his wife and small children. The aforesaid application was heard and decided by the learned City Sessions Judge Court No. 4 Ahmedabad and he granted the application by his order dated August 12 1983 and ordered to release the opponent-accused on bail on certain conditions. It is a very short order. The only ground for releasing the opponent-accused on bail appears to be that there is an order of the Supreme Court to this effect. It would be proper to reproduce the relevant part of the order passed by the learned City Sessions Judge which reads as follows:heard the learned Advocate and the P. P. The application is opposed by the P. P. THE accused has to stand trial before this Court for offences all of which are bailable for the reasons of which the Honble Supreme Court has taken the notice accused must be released on bait especially when the trial with the framing of charge is likely to commence from 19-8-1983. . . . . . . THE remaining portion of the order deals with the amount of bah bond and other conditions of bail bond and it is not necessary for us to reproduce the same herein. The aforesaid order dated August 12 1983 passed by the lower court has been challenged by the Income Tax Department in this criminal revision application and he is prayed that the order be quashed and set aside and the bail granted to the opponent-accused be cancelled and he be ordered to be taken into custody. ( 7 ) IT is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the learned City Sessions Judge has not correctly read the order of the Supreme Court dated August 9 1983 which is produced in the case at Annexure `c correctly. There is no direction whatsoever given by the Supreme Court to release the accused on bail. Analysing the order passed by the Supreme Court it comes to this: (1) Special leave petition for appeal (criminal) was rejected. (2) It was kept open to the petitioner-accused to make fresh application for bail and urge whatever changed circumstances that may have transpired since the date of the order made by the High Court i. e. from March 28 1983 (3) The Supreme Court also specifically mentioned that the fact that the petitioner was released from detention under COFEPOSA may be considered as a changed circumstance. (4) The Supreme Court also directed that in the event of such an application being made the court should decide the same on merits keeping in mind the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 (5) The Supreme Court observed that the case was fixed before the trial court on August 19 1983 and directed that the trial court should proceed further with the case day to day and to dispose of the same at an early date. ( 8 ) IT is difficult to read anything more than what is stated hereinabove in the order of the Supreme Court It is not understood as to how the learned City Sessions Judge felt that br the reasons noticed by the Supreme Court the accused must be released on bah. ( 8 ) IT is difficult to read anything more than what is stated hereinabove in the order of the Supreme Court It is not understood as to how the learned City Sessions Judge felt that br the reasons noticed by the Supreme Court the accused must be released on bah. As per the order of the Supreme Court learned City Sessions Judge was at least required to do two things namely (1) to consider the application on merits and (2) while deciding the application to keep in mind the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973but he has not referred to the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code at all nor has he applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. He has not even discussed the merits of the case. Without considering the merits of the case he has straightaway passed the impugned order inter alia stating that for the reasons of which the Supreme Court has taken notice of the accused must be released on bail. To say the least the learned City Sessions Judge has passed the impugned order without application of mind and in most unsatisfactory manner. ( 9 ) TRUE the offences alleged against the accused are all bailable offences. But in view of the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 and in view of de decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Assistant Collector Customs Bombay reported in AIR 1967 SC 1639 this circumstance pales into insignificance and it becomes almost irrelevant. In the case of Ratilal Mithani (supra) after discussing the provisions regarding grant of bail in non-bailaob-offences the Supreme Court has served as follows:the Code of Criminal Procedure makes no express provision for the cancellation of a bail granted under Section 496. Nevertheless if at any subsequent stage of the proceedings it is found that any person accused of a bailable offence is intimidating bribing or tampering with the witnesses or is attempting to abscond the High Court has inherent power to cause him to be arrested and to commit him to custody for such period as it thinks fit. Nevertheless if at any subsequent stage of the proceedings it is found that any person accused of a bailable offence is intimidating bribing or tampering with the witnesses or is attempting to abscond the High Court has inherent power to cause him to be arrested and to commit him to custody for such period as it thinks fit. This over-riding inherent power can be invoked in exceptional cases only when the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeated unless the accused is committed to custoday. The person so committed to custoday cannot ask for his release on bail under Section 496 but the High Court may by a subsequent order admit him to bail again. (Emphasis supplied.) In view of this decision it is clear that the opponent-accused could not have pressed his application for being released on bail on the ground that he is charged with bailable offences only and that his case falls within the purview of Section 436 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This was the position of law even when there was not expess provision such as contained in Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 by which the Court is empowered to refuse to release an accused on bail who has failed to comply with the conditions of bail bond as regards time and place of attendance and who on subsequent occasion in the same case appears before the court or is brought in custody. ( 10 ) IT should have been noted by the learned City Sessions Judge that the Supreme Court had given clear direction that the court should consider the application on merits keeping in mind the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 The learned City Sessions Judge has clearly disregarded this direction and has failed to comply with the direction given by the Supreme Court. Why the learned City Sessions Judge did not even refer to the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 is simply not understandable. It is rather curious and puzzling. Why the learned City Sessions Judge did not even refer to the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 is simply not understandable. It is rather curious and puzzling. He ought so have referred to the previous history of the case and conduct of the accused and ought to have referred to the two decisions of this High Court in respect of this very accused in Criminal Revision Application No. 432 of 1982 decided on August 6 1982 by V. V. Bedarkar J. and in Criminal Revision application No. 79 of 1983 decided by me on March 28 1983 The learned City Sessions Judge ought to have realised that he was dealing with an application for bail submitted by an accused involved in economic offences and who was a proclaimed absconder and who had not complied with the conditions of bah on which he was released and who had evaded the non-bailable warrant issued for his arrest on several occasions in past. The Supreme Court had left it open to the opponent-accused to apply again on restricted ground only namely on the basis of the circumstances which might have transpired after the passing of the order by the High Court on March 28 1983 The learned City Sessions Judge ought to have seen that the opponent-accused has not pointed out any new and special ground whatsoever which has come into existence after the aforesaid date. The ground sought to be made out by the accused was that he was transferred from Ahmedabad Jail to Daman for some time in July 1983 and that he was kept under house arrest during that period. When the Supreme Court decided the petition for Special Leave to Appeal preferred by the opponent-accused this ground was in existence and even then the Supreme Court did not think it proper to release the accused on bail and only kept it open for the opponent-accused to apply for bail afresh before the lower court. The ground on which the accused was transferred from Ahmedabad jail to Daman and was kept under house arrest for some time was no more in existence and the said ground namely illness or hospitalisation of his wife has not been advanced by the opponent-accused and on that ground he has not prayed that he should be released on bail. The ground on which the accused was transferred from Ahmedabad jail to Daman and was kept under house arrest for some time was no more in existence and the said ground namely illness or hospitalisation of his wife has not been advanced by the opponent-accused and on that ground he has not prayed that he should be released on bail. He has only pointed out that such circumstance did exist in past and when that circumstance existed he was given certain facilities as per the order of the Supreme Court. With the disappearance of that circumstance he can-not advance the plea for being released on bail on the ground non-existing at the time of making application. ( 11 ) THE learned City Sessions Judge has gone contrary to the decision of this High Court and directions given by the Supreme Court. This High Court specifically observed in its earlier orders that no such application would be enterta ineddurring the course of the trial unless new and special circumstances had come into existence and on the bash of such new and special circumstances an application for bail was made. The Supreme Court also gave clear direction that the application for bail may be made on the basis of the circumstance which might have transpired after the passing of the order dated March 28 1983 by the High Court. As discussed hereinabove no such new ground has been made out nor has been pointed out even before me by the counsel for the opponent-accused. Therefore the order passed by the learned City Sessions Judge is clearly illegal and improper and cannot be sustained. ( 12 ) COUNSEL for the opponent-accused submitted that as directed by the Supreme Court the circumstance that the opponent-accused has been released from detention under COFEPOSA should be sufficient to release the accused on bail Had this been the only direction given by the Supreme Court the submission made by the counsel for the opponent-accused would have force and the same should be accepted without any further discussion at all. But the Supreme Court has given clear direction that the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 should be kept in mind by the court while deciding the aplication. But the Supreme Court has given clear direction that the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 should be kept in mind by the court while deciding the aplication. As per the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Code the court has been granted power to refuse bail even in bailable offences when the accused has not complied with the conditions of bail. In view of the previous history of the case and conduct of the accused which has been narrated hereinabove and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ratilals Case (supra) the release of the opponent-accused from detention under COFEPOSA though a relevant ground cannot be considered to be sufficient for releasing him on bail. Once the accused is proved not to have complied with the conditions of bail bond it was not open to the learned City Sessions Judge to consider the application of the accused on the ground that he was involved in bailable offences. ( 13 ) COUNSEL for the opponent-accused submitted that the opponent has remained in jail for about one year and mere passing of time in jail for such a long period should be considered to be a sufficient ground for releasing the accused on bail. Be it noted that this was not the ground stated in the application nor it was the ground urged before the learned City Sessions Judge. Assuming that such a ground was made out and assuming that the opponent-accused can be permitted to make out such a ground even before me in the present proceedings the said ground cannot be considered to be a new and special circumstance. Had it been so this High Court while passing the orders in past and the Supreme Court while disposing of the petition for Special Leave to Appeal would have stated that in case the trial of the case against the accused is not over within a specified time limit it would be open to him to apply for bail after that specified time limit and the court would have been directed that without there being anything more i. e. to say whether the trial of the case was over or not the accused should be released on bail simply on the ground that a particular time gap had elapsed. Moreover it may be noted that during this time the opponent-accused was under detention under COFEPOSA and for some time he was under house arrest and it is clear that the prosecution is not at all responsible for the delay in further proceedings of the trial. On one ground or another one or another accused has submitted some application and has seen to it that the actual trial of the case does not commence. Therefore if the opponent-accused is given the benefit of this ground it would mean that the opponent-accused is permitted to take the advantage of the wrong of adopting delaying tactics employed by him on his associates or at any rate by other co-accused. ( 14 ) COUNSEL for the opponent-accused further submitted that this time the bail was granted by the City Sessions Court after the case was committed to the court of sessions. Earlier when the bail application was granted by the learned Magistrate and the same was cancelled by the High Court the proceedings were pending before the Court of Magistrate and now since the committal proceedings are over and the case is pending before the Sessions Court the bail granted by the Sessions Court should not be cancelled by the High Court. In his submission the unholy past of the accused should not be made the basis for refusing bail to the opponent-accused. In criminal trials either holy or unholy it is the past which has got to be taken into consideration by the Court. It is on the basis of the past which may he established before the court that the court has to pass order which will have effect for the future. If the past is unholy the opponent-accused cannot expect to get holy and noble results or the basis thereof. Even for a moment I am not suggesting that the past of the opponent-accused in this case is unholy. The nature of the past is yet to be decided by the court. Prima facie at this stage what the court has to see is as to whether the accused who has not complied with the conditions of bail granted to him is entitled to be released on bail or not ? The nature of the past is yet to be decided by the court. Prima facie at this stage what the court has to see is as to whether the accused who has not complied with the conditions of bail granted to him is entitled to be released on bail or not ? While doing so the court has got to look at the past conduct of the accused and the argument that if such past is unholy the same should not be taken into consideration has no basis. If the court does not take into consideration the history of the case and past conduct of the accused the court will be failing in its duty enjoined upon it under the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 The argument based on the basis of the stage at which now the bail is granted by the City Sessions Court has no merit whatsoever. It is forgotten that a previous bail application was rejected by the City Sessions Court when the case had already been committed to the court of sessions. Criminal Revision Application No. 79 of 1983 preferred by the opponent-accused iagainst that decision was rejected on March 28 1983 by the High Court. On this date the case was already committed to the court of sessions and it was pending before the sessions court. Hence the argument that since the case is now pending before the court of sessions the accused should be released on bail and that the order granting bail should not be cancelled has no merit whatsoever. 15 Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that for the speedy trial of the case it is necessary that the opponent-accused be kept in custody and the bail granted to him be cancelled. This circumstance found favour with my learned Brother V. V. Bedarkar J. when he decided Criminal Revision Application No. 432 of 1982 on August 6 1982 and he observed in paragraph 27 of the judgment as follows: Now having considered the circumstances of the case it clearly transpires from the petition filed by the complainant here before me on sworn affidavit that on various occasions the concerned accused did not rematn present. There are 22 other accused also. On some occasion some accused remained present and on another occasion they remained absent and thus the conduct of the trial is delayed. There are 22 other accused also. On some occasion some accused remained present and on another occasion they remained absent and thus the conduct of the trial is delayed. It is apparent that the prosecution case as argued by Mr. Mehta is that the concerned accused is practically the leader of all the other accused. Experience in Court shows that if all the accused are on bail then proceedings are delayed by absence of one or the other accused and the Court cannot proceed with the trial in absence of any of the accused if exemption is not requested and granted. But if one of them is in jail especially a person like the concerned accused then those who are concerned with him will see that the trial is taken up specially and will remain present and by that the progress of the case will not be impaired. This is one of the considerations which has to weigh with the Court. ( 15 ) HAD the learned City Sessions Judge read this judgment and particularly the aforesaid paragraph and had he looked at the proceedings of the case he would have realised that in the facts and circumstances of the case to ensure expeditious trial of the case it was necessary that the opponent-accused be kept in custody rather than be released on bail. Once the accused and especially the principal accused in such cases is on bail the innumerable clauses and sub-clauses are being invoked in their favour and the trial of the case never gets on. Look at the proceedings of this very case. The complaint has been filed on March 27 1974 The committal proceedings could be completed so me time in the year 1982 and now even in September 1983 the trial has not commenced because on one ground or another applications are being submitted by one or another accused and the further progress of the trial is successfully stalled. It has not even been contended by the counsel for the opponent-accused that the prosecution is responsible for the delay in the further proceedings of the case and the counsel for the `opponent-accused has not been able to explain the conduct of the opponent-accused which has resulted in inordinate delay of the further proceedings of the case. No other contention is urged by the counsel for the opponent-accused. No other contention is urged by the counsel for the opponent-accused. ( 16 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion it becomes clear that- (1) Even in a bailable offence if an accused released on bail has not complied with the conditions of bail and who has been committed to custody on this ground has no right to invoke the provisions of Section 436 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 and claim that since he is involved in bailable offences only he be released on bail. (2) In view of the provisions of Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 where the accused had failed to comply with the conditions of bail bonds as regards time and place of attendance it will be within the discretion of the court to refuse to release him on bail. Therefore whether or not to release such an accused on bail becomes a matter of discretion of the court. (3) While exercising such discretion the court should take into considertion- (a) nature and seriousness of the offence (b) the character of the evidence (c) the circumstances which are peculiar to the accused including the previous conduct of the accused (d) a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial. (e) reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with and (f) the larger interests of the public or the State. The fact that the court is given discretion under Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 whether or not to release the accused on bail charged with bailable offences in certain circumstances means that in such a situation the case is to be considered as if the accused is involved in non-bailable offences. As per the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The State v. Captain Fagjit Singh reported in AIR 1963 SC 253 the considerations mentioned here in-above are required to be taken into account by a court while deciding whether bail should be granted to an accused charged with non-bailable offences. Therefore when a court is required to exercise its discretion under Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code a similar situation arises and hence the same considerations will have to be taken into account by a court while exercising discretion. Therefore when a court is required to exercise its discretion under Section 436 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code a similar situation arises and hence the same considerations will have to be taken into account by a court while exercising discretion. ( 17 ) IN the instant case the learned City Sessions Judge has not at all taken into account any of the aforesaid considerations. No new and special circumstance has come into existence since the passing of the order by the High Court on March 28 1983 The learned City Sessions Judge ought to have realised that in this case the following considerations are most relevant and must have been kept in mind by the court at the time of deciding bail application. They are: (1) Will the judicial process be not exposed to the charge that the rich and resourceful persons can protract the trial of a case as long as they desire without undergoing slightest discomfort and that too under the cover of the order of a court ? (2) The larger interest of the public or the State. (3) A reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial. (4) The circumstances which are peculiar to the accused including the the previous conduct of the accused since the inception of the case. (5) Nature and seriousness of the offence. Simply because the offences are bailable the seriousness of the offence is not minimised. None of these points have been taken into account by the learned City Sessions Judge. In this case having regard to the history of the case and the past conduct of the accused it should be clear that if the accused is released on bail it would not be unreasonable to infer that his presence would not be secured at the trial and that it will become almost impossible to ensure expeditious trial of the case. On the basis of the observations made by my learned Brother V. V. Bedarkar J. Criminal Misc. Applications Nos. On the basis of the observations made by my learned Brother V. V. Bedarkar J. Criminal Misc. Applications Nos. 600 to 604 of 1983 the counsel for the petitioner has stated that as on May 1 1983 within the area of the jurisdiction of Customs Collectorate Ahmedabad alone 87 criminal cases relating to the economic offences of customs and smuggling are required to be placed on dormant file because as many as 197 accused involved in these cases have jumped the bail and are absconding. In this background and having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case was it not imperative for the lower court to refuse bail to the opponent-accused in the larger public interest so that the basic objective of the criminal law-to secure the fair trial of a case-is not frustrated. In above view of the matter the impugned order (Annexure E) passed by the learned City Sessions Judge Court No. 4 Ahmedabad below Misc. Criminal Application No. 262 of 1983 dated August 12 1983 is ordered to be quashed and set aside and the bail granted to the opponent-accused Sukar Narayan Bakhia is ordered to be cancelled and he is ordered to be taken into custody. Rule made absolute accordingly. ( 18 ) AT this stage counsel for the opponent-accused requested that the operation and implementation of the order passed hereinabove be stayed for period of 15 days so as to enable the opponent-accused to approach the Supreme Court and obtain suitable orders. In the facts and circumstances of the case it will not be just and proper to grant time as prayed for. Hence the request is rejected. Rule made absolute. .