JUDGMENT - Masodkar B.A., J.-These two appeals can be disposed of by common judgment. The first of it questions the order made by the learned Single Judge of this Court refusing to take cognisance with regard to the grievance that was made before the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Poona, in the proceedings in Civil Suit No. 93 of 1970 and the reference made thereupon by the Civil Court. The prayer was that the defendant has committed contempt of the Court and suitable action should be taken. After perusing the reference and hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge of this Court found that no case existed for taking cognisance and the proper course for the plaintiffs was, in fact, to object to the new construction and obtain necessary preventive order from the Court. Observing thus, the reference was rejected. 2. In the second matter, the learned Single Judge dismissed in limine the appellant's application complaining that contempt has been committed because there was wilful disobedience shown by the respondents to the order made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Appeal from Order No. 842 of 1981. 3. It is not in dispute before us that both these matters are concerning “civil contempt”' within the contemplation of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), which defines that category of contempt in section 2 (b) of the Act. Further, it is apparent that in both these matters by the orders under challenge this Court, acting by the learned Single Judge, refused to exercise the jurisdiction and take cognisance of the alleged contempt. “Civil contempt” has been defined as meaning wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ on other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court.. The learned Single Judge did not findsufficient reason to consider the matters-as having been covered by the definition and, in fact, in the first matter the Court observed that the remedy of the complainant lay somewhere else. 4. When the first of the matters came up for hearing, the question of tenability of the appeals, as is provided by section 19 of the Act, also was raised for consideration and notices were issued to the State of Maharashtra as well as to the Advocate General of Maharashtra. In both the matters, Mrs. 4. When the first of the matters came up for hearing, the question of tenability of the appeals, as is provided by section 19 of the Act, also was raised for consideration and notices were issued to the State of Maharashtra as well as to the Advocate General of Maharashtra. In both the matters, Mrs. Shenoy, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, addressed us on behalf of the State as well as on behalf of the Advocate General. 5. After hearing the learned Counsel for both sides, we do not think that against such judgments or orders refusing to exercise jurisdiction and take cognisance upon the complaints concerning civil contempt, any appeal is provided or would lie, as of rignt, under section 19 of the Act. This is particularly so because of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Baradakanta v. Misra, C. J. Orissa H. C.)1, the ratio of which shows that the present type of question of ten-ability is no more res Integra. That judgment indeed clearly concludes the controversy. 6. As we have indicated above the character of the orders tinder appeal is such that this Court neither took cognisance of contempt nor made any order punishing any party for such contempt or made any other order of that character. No doubt in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court, the matter with which the Court was concerned was one of criminal contempt and with regard to that the eventual judgment was rendered. But that would hardly make any difference wish regard to the tenability of such appeals. It is indeed difficult to hold that on the ratio available in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the similar circumstances where the order under appeal does not take cognisance or the Court refuses to exercise the contempt jurisdiction in criminal contempt an appeal would not lie, while in the identical matter by reason that allegations were the one that would bring out civil contempt, an appeal is intended to be provided. The general principle with regard to such remedy against orders made in proceedings for punishing for civil contempt and in the criminal contempt does not admit any such differentia. Remedy of appeal will have to be made available either in both of the categories or none. This is more so when the matter is one of construction of the terms of the statute. 7. Remedy of appeal will have to be made available either in both of the categories or none. This is more so when the matter is one of construction of the terms of the statute. 7. It is enough to quote from the decision of the Supreme Court, which categorically rules out such a remedy. “It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for con- tempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminous a quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for, contempt is initiated by the Court. Where the Court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not, therefore, fall within the opening words of suction 19, sub-section (1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision.” (Emphasis supplied.) 8. However, what Mr. Walawalkar argued may be briefly noticed so as to indicate that these submissions too are without any merit. Relying on the decision of this Court in the case of (Vishwanath Ramkrishna Rajwade v. Shri Cordeiro, Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate)2, Mr. Walawalkar submitted that the matters of civil contempt are independent matters and the person who moves the Court for taking cognisance and punishing contemnor for civil contempt has an additional entitlement, in that even effective orders and compliance by enforcement is possible as is indicated by this Court in this decision. From this, the learned counsel contended that such a party would be “the aggrieved party” if no cognisance was taken of such com- plaint. The party being aggrieved* by reason of the refusal to exercise the jurisdiction, section 19 of the Act should be available, as of right, so as to question such refusal by filing an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The party being aggrieved* by reason of the refusal to exercise the jurisdiction, section 19 of the Act should be available, as of right, so as to question such refusal by filing an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The learned counsel further relied on the decision of the Calcutta” High Court in the case of Hem Bala Dassi v. Sundar Shaw3, so as to submit that even upon the principles underlying clause 15 of the Letters Patent read with section 19 of the Act, the party would be entitled to the remedy of appeal and that too as of right. All these submissions of the learned counsel are countered by the opposing learned counsel appearing in these matters. 9. As far as the decision of this Court in the case of (Vishwanath Ram-krishna Rajwade v. Shri Cordeiro, Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate) (supra) is concerned, it is enough to observe that the Court was not concern- ed with the question of tenability of the appeal and is no authority for the proposition that in the matters of civil contempt, section 19 of the Act is available as of right even though no penal order is made. The observations that what could be done in the matters of civil contempt if cognisance is taken can hardly further such a submission. Even for giving reliefs of such a kind involving submission to the order, the Court must decide to exercise the contempt jurisdiction by taking cognisance and then make such order. Only after such decision, it is conceivable, as this decision states, that the orders of the type that may be in the interest of the complaining party, could be made by the Court apart from holding the person guilty for contempt. Such order then would be the order in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 10. The decision rendered by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Hem Bala Dassi v Sundar Shaw (supra) similarly is not available in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court. Strictly speaking, remedy of appeal when provided by the special statute can hardly be spelt out by relying orn clause 15 of the Letters Patent which itself is a remedy of inina Court appeal. Strictly speaking, remedy of appeal when provided by the special statute can hardly be spelt out by relying orn clause 15 of the Letters Patent which itself is a remedy of inina Court appeal. If the initiation of the proceedings as well as its procedure and further the matters of making competent orders are all the matters governed by the enacted statute and such statute provides for the remedy of an appeal, it is indeed difficult to find force in the submission that we should still rely on clause 15 of the Letters Patent so as to interfere with the orders which are non-appealable under the Act. Such a position bristles with the danger that affects the basic principles with regard to the uniformity in the administra-tion of justice. Surely, we cannot conceive two remedies in the same and; identical cause, particularly when we are concerned with aspecial statute. If the remedy has to be found out under the special statute like the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, undoubtedly, the foundation for the same must be the special statute particularly when it enacts a limited specific right of appeal-. Appeals by their very nature are the creatures of the statute. Unless those are clearly provided, by mere implication the remedy cannot be made avail-able. We' cannot, therefore, persuade ourselves to hold that such orders, which are non-appealable under section 19 of the Act, should be appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. This is more so because no party can claim a right in the matter of contempt, the principle being that the matters of contempt are between the conteannor and the Court. If we were to hold otherwise, we would be providing two parallel remedies for appeals. Such a construction by the very reason of the fact that we are dealing with the special statute will be against the principles of harmonisa-tion and providing for uniformity in the matters of administration of justice. The reliance placed on clause 15 of the Letters Patent, therefore, by the learned counsel is not of much avail. 11. Even in the text of the statute, we do not find that with rega:rd to providing for the remedy like that of an appeal, any real distinction of differentiation can be made on the basis of categorisation of the matters in contempt. 11. Even in the text of the statute, we do not find that with rega:rd to providing for the remedy like that of an appeal, any real distinction of differentiation can be made on the basis of categorisation of the matters in contempt. No doubt, the definition of the term “contempt of Court” indicates merely the categorisation of civil contempt or criminal contempt, as is available in section 2 of the Act. The principal distinction between these two categorisations is made clear by clauses (b) and (c) of section 2 which is the defining provision. As far as the procedural part is concerned, the contemnor is required to be dealt with by the same procedure. The provision of section 9 of the Act has been enacted by way of abundant caution and is a declaratory one so as to make it clear that nothing contain-ed in the enactment will be construed as implying that any disobedience, breach, publication or other act would be punishable as contempt of Court which would not be so punishable apart from the Act. These provisions of section 9 of the Act are by themselves clarificatory and on the matters enacted in other parts of the Act, no further implication is possible. To the extent of the enactment, both the matters of contempt and punishment therefor will have to be treated as having been fully and exhaustively pro-vided for by the special statute. 12. It is true that every Court of Record, like that one of High Court, should and is possessed of the power to punish for contempt so as to main- tain the majesty and dignity of the Court and keep the administration of justice unsullied. But, nonetheless, the power to institute proceedings and impose punishment in such proceedings are the matters of special jurisdiction which is inherent in Courts of Record. See (Sukhdeo Singh v. Teja Singh C. J).4 and (Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor)5. That such special jurisdiction exists and is made the foundation of the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act providing for the institution of the proceedings for contempt and also for making orders of penalty itself shows that all remedial measures must also be founded on the text of the said statute and not by recourse to any other law. 13. 13. The provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the Act deal with matters of punishment for contempt of Court. The punishment can only be imposed after the cognjsance is taken and the person is found guilty for contempt of Court, either civil or criminal, depending upon the allegations and facts in each case. Section 14 of the Act deals with the procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court. Section 15 of the Act deals with cognisance in the matters of criminal contempt. Section 17 of the Act lays down the procedure after cognisance and section 18 of the Act deals with the hearing of cases of criminal contempt. Though the provisions of sections 15, 17 and 18 in this manner deal with the matters of criminal contempt, the following section 19 of the Act is not intended to apply only to the matters of criminal contempt. The provisions of section 19 of the Act are not, in other words, subject to nor are governed by sections 15, 17 and 18 of the Act. On the other hand, that is an independent provision with regard to the remedy of appeal. Read in its entirety, section 19 of the Act and its sub-sections are in the nature of self-contained remedy by which the orders or decisions made in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt can be subjected to the scrutiny at the higher forum, sub-section (1) enacting a right of appeal when the order or decision is in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt, sub-section (2) enabling the appellate Court to order suspension of such punishment or the order made in exercise of such jurisdiction and similarly providing for release on bail, sub-section (3) being of the same species, while sub-section (4) dealing with limitation. Sub-section (1) itself clearly indicates that the order or decision should be such which is rendered in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and not of any other type. Such a decision would partake of that character which is provided for by section 12 of the Act and it would follow that unless the person is found guilty of contempt, he can- not be subjected to the order or decision of that character. Such a decision would partake of that character which is provided for by section 12 of the Act and it would follow that unless the person is found guilty of contempt, he can- not be subjected to the order or decision of that character. These provi-sions equally apply to the matters, of civil contempt and we see no reason to treat the matters of civil contempt differently for the purpose of an appeal under section 19 of the Act than the one arising under the category of criminal contempt. 14. In the result, we hold that the present appeals are not tenable. Neither the provisions of section 19 of the Act confer any such right nor the provisions of clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court are available to the appellants to maintain such type of appeals, the matters being governed by the provisions of special statute and arising under special jurisdiction. 15. The appeals thus fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs. No order on Civil Application No. 4189 of 1981, Appeal held not tenable. -----