JUDGMENT U.L. Bhat, J. 1. The appellant herein, Ouseph alias Ouso, is the accused in Sessions Case 3 of 1980 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Parur who has been convicted under S.302 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the murder of his sister-in-law, Leela. 2. The facts which can be gathered from the prosecution evidence are as follows: The appellant, his wife PW 7, PW 7's youngest sister Leela and mother PW 4 and father lived in the same house at Keezhiilam kara of Rayamangalam village. Leela aged 19 years, having passed S.S.L.C. examination, was attending the typewriting institution of PW 12. Appellant and Leela were in love with each other. While so, Leela fell in love with a quarry worker, PW 5, and this came to the knowledge of the appellant and he was furious with Leela. On 26-9-1979 at about 8.20 a.m., Leela on her way to the typewriting institute met PW 5 who was in the company of a fellow worker, PW 6, and asked PW 5 what the time was and PW 5 gave a reply. The appellant who was watching this, ran up asking PW 5 to stop "xxx" (for the last four or five days, I have been searching of you), picked up a stone and attempted to hit PW 5. PW 5. caught his hands. One Narayanan came and asked the appellant why he wanted to beat PW 5 whereupon appellant put down the stone. He took away the books and umbrella of Leela and told her that she need not continue her studies. He proceeded homewards and Leela followed him. PWs 5 and 6 went to their work-spot which was the quarry of PW 3 situated to the north of the road lying to the north of Leela's house, 3. Appellant went home, deposited the books and umbrella there Leela's mother, PW 4 and father had gone out for work. Appellant's wife PW 7 was in the house. Appellant took MO 3: chopper belonging to PW 4 and went to the nearby hill which is referred in evidence as 606 mala (hill). At that time, he was wearing MO 8 shirt and MO 9 kaili mundu (cloth). Leela also reached home. She found from PW 7 that appellant had gone to the hill. She also went there ostensibly to answer the call of nature. At that time, he was wearing MO 8 shirt and MO 9 kaili mundu (cloth). Leela also reached home. She found from PW 7 that appellant had gone to the hill. She also went there ostensibly to answer the call of nature. Sometime later, appellant was seen by PWs 8 and 9 near the hill. 4. At about 9.30 A.M., PW 1 who was working nearby heard the cry "Run up - Give me water" from the scene, ran up and saw Leela lying with injuries. Leela told him that she was attacked by her brother-in-law Ouseph. PW 1 raised an outcry and on hearing the same, PWs 2, 3, 5, and 6 who were in the neighbourhood ran up; they also came to know from Leela that appellant was the assailant. She was given water. The injuries were bandaged by PWs 1 to 3 using Thorthus, MOs 1, 10 and 11. She was carried in a cot to the road and taken in a jeep to Perumbavoor Government Hospital by PWs 1, 3, 5, 6 and others. 5. At 10.10 A. M., PW 17, an Assistant Surgeon working in the Hospital admitted Leela, He also came to know from Leela that she was injured by her brother inlaw Joseph at about 10 A. M, at Keezhillam, Since her condition was serious she was referred to the District Hospital, Ernakulam. 6. Meanwhile another jeep was sent to fetch Leela's parents (PW 4 and her husband). They reached the Perumbavoor Hospital and boarded the jeep on its' way to Eruakulam. On the way, PW. 4 heard from Leela that she was cut by Chettan. Leela was admitted at the District Hospital a 12.15 P.M. by an Assistant Surgeon, PW 16. At the hospital Leela gave further details of the occurrence to PW 4. 7. P.W. 16 gave information over the telephone to the Central Police Station, Ernakulam from where the Head Constable, PW 18, reached the Hospital. He found Leela unconscious and did not see anyone else who knew about the occurrence. He collected Ext. P8 intimation, went back to the police station at 4.10 P.M. registered a case as Crime No. 554 of 1979 under S.324 IPC against an unknown person as per Ext. P10 F.I.R. The F.I.R. was transferred to Kuruppampady police station within whose limits the occurrence had taken place. He collected Ext. P8 intimation, went back to the police station at 4.10 P.M. registered a case as Crime No. 554 of 1979 under S.324 IPC against an unknown person as per Ext. P10 F.I.R. The F.I.R. was transferred to Kuruppampady police station within whose limits the occurrence had taken place. At that station, the Head Constable PW 19 re-registered the case as per Ext. P11 F.I.R. as Crime No. 123 of 1979. Sub Inspector of Police, P-W. 20 took up investigation. He proceeded to the scene, inspected the scene as pointed out by PW 2 at 1 P.M., prepared Ext. P1 scene mahazar and seized M.O. 2 hair found there. 8. Meanwhile, in the afternoon of 26-9-1979. appellant went to the house of his sister's husband, PW 10 at Vengoor which is 16 Kilometers away from Keezhillam. PW 10, surprised by the unexpected visit of the appellant asked him why he had come. The appellant told him (xxx). DW 1, the elder brother of the appellant was residing close by. PW 10 went to the house of DW i and consulted with him about what had transpired. DW 1 asked him to return home and went to the house of a local teacher, PW 11 . PW 11 asked him to fetch the appellant. Appellant was taken by PW 10 and DW 1 to the house of PW 11. As it was late at night, PW 11 asked them to spend the night there, in the morning he questioned the appellant who made a confession to him also. PW 11 advised the appellant to surrender to the police and PW 10 and DW. 1 to take the appellant to the police. Appellant did not follow the advice then. On the morning of 28-9-1075, PW 10 having come to know of the death of Leela, advised the appellant to go to the police station. The appellant went to the police station and the witness went behind him though he did not go to the station. At that time also, the appellant was wearing M.Os. 8 and 9 clothes. 9. On 28-9-1979 at 5 p.m., the appellant surrendered before PW 20. The clothes worn by the appellant, MOs 8 and 9 were seized under Ext. P4 mahazar attested by PW 14. The appellant was questioned and his statement was recorded, a portion of which is Ext. P12. 8 and 9 clothes. 9. On 28-9-1979 at 5 p.m., the appellant surrendered before PW 20. The clothes worn by the appellant, MOs 8 and 9 were seized under Ext. P4 mahazar attested by PW 14. The appellant was questioned and his statement was recorded, a portion of which is Ext. P12. The appellant confessed and told PW 20 that he had placed the chopper in a kuttikkadu near the scene of occurrence. PW 20, appellant and others went to the scene of occurrence. The appellant took out MO 3, from the place indicated by him and it was seized under Ext. P2 attested by PW 2. MO 3 was seen to have bloodstains and a few strands of hair sticking to the blade. PW 20 continued investigation, questioning witnesses. He received information regarding Leela's death and gave a report to alter the section as 302 IPC. 10. On 29-9-1979, PW 22, Circle Inspector of Police, Crime Detachment, Alwaye took over investigation. He visited the hospital and held inquest over the dead body of Leela in the presence of PW 1 3 and others and prepared Ext. P3. ft was found that the blouse and brassiers worn by Leela were torn (evidently by the cuts) and were put in a waste bin and disposed of by the hospital employees. The other clothes worn by Leela and the cloth used for bandaging at the spot MOs 1, 10 and 11, were produced by PW 15 a relation of Leela and were seized by PW 22 under Ext. P5 mahazar. He gave a requisition to the Magistrate concerned for recording the statements of DW 1, PW 10, PW 4 and PW 4's husband under S.164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the statements were duly recorded. The material objects were caused to be examined at the forensic laboratory. A plan of the scene was got prepared. After completing investigation, PW 22 laid the charge. 11. The appellant denied the charge against him. Prosecution examined 22 witnesses and marked Exts. P1 to P14 and MOs 11. 12. The appellant, when questioned by the learned Session Judge denied the circumstances appearing against him. When questioned regarding the recovery of MO 3. he stated that he had taken and handed over a chopper but it was not MO 3. Prosecution examined 22 witnesses and marked Exts. P1 to P14 and MOs 11. 12. The appellant, when questioned by the learned Session Judge denied the circumstances appearing against him. When questioned regarding the recovery of MO 3. he stated that he had taken and handed over a chopper but it was not MO 3. Regarding the earlier incident he stated that there was a tussle and beating between him and PW 5 and he had taken away the books of Leela. He stated that the blood seen in MOs 8 and 9 was his own blood. He claimed to have appeared in the police station on 26-9-1979 at 8.45 a.m. itself (apparently to complain against PW 5). On behalf of the appellant, DW 1 was examined and Exts. D1 to D3 were marked. 13. The learned Sessions Judge, on a consideration of the evidence and circumstances of the case held that the prosecution has satisfactorily established the guilt of the appellant for the offence of committing the murder of Leela and convicted and sentenced him as stated above. 14. There is no dispute that Leela met a violent homicidal death. Ext. P9 is the wound certificate issued by PW 17. As the patient's condition was serious, PW 17 did not note all the injuries. Ext. P6 is the wound certificate issued by PW 16. In Ext. P6, PW 16 stated that there were multiple lacerated wounds in the left hand, left fore-arm, left arm, left shoulder, back of neck right shoulder and right supra-scapular area. He found the patient in shock. He has further deposed that the patient died on 28-9-1979 at 9.05 A.M. Post mortem was conducted by PW 16 himself. Ext. P7 is the post mortem certificate. He , found on the body 14 sutured wounds and a lacerated wound. The injuries were on the right thumb, right index finger, right middle finger, right ring finger, right supra-scapular region, rightside of the neck, back of neck, left fore-arm, left arm, left index finger, left shoulder and left supra-scapular region. Internal examination showed that heart contained only a small quantity of blood. Liver was pale. All the injuries were ante mortem. The witnesses was present when the wounds were sutured in the hospital. He stated that in Ext. P6, he did not note all the injuries or the details of the injuries. Internal examination showed that heart contained only a small quantity of blood. Liver was pale. All the injuries were ante mortem. The witnesses was present when the wounds were sutured in the hospital. He stated that in Ext. P6, he did not note all the injuries or the details of the injuries. In his opinion, death was caused on account of shock due to multiple injuries. 15. There was no eye witness to the actual occurrence. Prosecution placed before the court several dying declarations said to have been made by Leela and spoken to by PWs 1 to 6 and 17, extra judicial confessions said to have been made by the appellant and spoken to by PWs 10, 11 and DW 1, the evidence regarding the seizure from the appellant of MOs 8 and 9 clothes found to have trace of human blood, evidence to show that the appellant was wearing these clothes on the date of the occurrence, the evidence regarding the recovery of MOs 3 Chopper with hair and blood sticking on it in pursuance of the information given by the appellant, the evidence regarding MO 2 hair found at the scene, the evidence of PWs 8 an 9 regarding the presence of the appellant in the locality, the evidence regarding motive and the earlier incident involving Leela and PW 5 as also the failure of the appellant to prove the alibi set up by him. 16. The scene of occurrence is the hill called 606 mala' near the house of Leela. PW 1 has paddy fields about 250 feet to the west of the scene. He had raised gingely cultivation in a portion of his land. On the morning of 26-9-1979 he had gone there to see the crops. At about 9-30 a.m., he heard a cry (xxx)" (Run up, give water). In a low voice from the C adjoining land. He deposed that he rushed to the place and saw Leela lying on the ground in a pool of blood with cut injuries. When he asked Leela what happened, she said, "Ouseph (Ouseph Chettan cut me). When he asked which "Ousu,"' she said, (elder sister's husband). The witness himself cried out in a loud voice. PW 2 who lives about 1 furlong to the south of the scene came first and later PW 3 and others came from the east. When he asked Leela what happened, she said, "Ouseph (Ouseph Chettan cut me). When he asked which "Ousu,"' she said, (elder sister's husband). The witness himself cried out in a loud voice. PW 2 who lives about 1 furlong to the south of the scene came first and later PW 3 and others came from the east. The person who came with PW 3 brought water which the witness gave to Leela. PWs 2 and 3 also asked Leela as to what happened. She said that she was cut by "xxx; when she was asked why she was cut, she did not give a reply. Using towels of PW 1 and others the injuries were bandaged. She was put in a cot and taken to the road and then taken in a jeep to Perumbavoor hospital. On the way, another jeep was arranged to fetch Leela's parents. PW 1 had gone to Ernakulam District hospital also. During the journey Leela was talking. He denied that Leela was unconscious at the scene or on the way. Even when she reached the hospital, she was talking. PW 2 deposed that on hearing PW 1's cry, he went to the scene, saw Leela lying with cut injuries, questioned her and was told by her "xxx" (Elder sister's husband cut me)." The witness saw PW 1 standing nearby. It was PW 1 who gave water to Leela. This witness didn't go to the hospital. There was drizzle on that day. It was PW 2 who showed the scene to the police the next day, when Ext. P1 was prepared and MO 2 hair was taken from there. He was also present when MO 3 was taken by the appellant and seized under Ext. P2. MO 3 had blood stains and bair. When he asked Leela why she came to the scene, she did not give a reply. PW 3 was working in a quarry along with PWs 5 and 6 about 1/2 furlong north of the scene. He followed PW 2 to the scene and questioned Leela and got the answer that she was cut by her sister's husband Ouseph. He went, along with Leela to both hospitals. He also deposed that Leela was conscious and was able to talk and was frequently drinking water. She was conscious at the hospital also. 17. He followed PW 2 to the scene and questioned Leela and got the answer that she was cut by her sister's husband Ouseph. He went, along with Leela to both hospitals. He also deposed that Leela was conscious and was able to talk and was frequently drinking water. She was conscious at the hospital also. 17. The evidence of PWs 5 and 6 shows that they also heard the cry (Run up)" and heard the words uttered by Leela as spoken to PW 3. PW 5 admitted that Leela used to ask him time and they used to talk to each other. He used to see her in the hill grazing cattle. 18. The evidence given by these witnesses is seriously challenged on behalf of the appellant. It is true that none of them gave information to the police. All of them except PW 2 accompanied Leela to hospital. Obviously they were more concerned with securing medical attention to Leela, From Ernakulam they would have returned to (heir respective places under the belief that Leela's parents would do the needful. They are all persons whose presence near the scene is either natural or is satisfactorily explained. Apart from. PW 5, no interestedness of any sort has been suggested to the witnesses, PWs 1. 2. 3 and 6 are natural and probable witnesses to the dying declarations and are disinterested persons without any axe of their own to grind. They were questioned on the very next day by the police. The words uttered by Leela as spoken 1o by these witnesses are clear, definite and clearly point to the appellant. 19. It is argued for the appellant that according to the witnesses, Leela did not give any answer when asked why Ouseph attacked her or why she had gone to the hill. The dying declarations are thus characterised as incomplete and therefore unreliable. Leela had numerous injuries, though none of them injured any vital organ. She must have been suffering severe bodily pain due to the injuries. In such a state, words would be scarce and the natural impulse would be to say without wasting breath as to details. (See AIR 1976 SC 1519 ). 20. P.W. 16, the doctor who saw Leela at 12.15 p.m. has deposed that Leela was unconscious when she was brought to the Ernakulam hospital. In such a state, words would be scarce and the natural impulse would be to say without wasting breath as to details. (See AIR 1976 SC 1519 ). 20. P.W. 16, the doctor who saw Leela at 12.15 p.m. has deposed that Leela was unconscious when she was brought to the Ernakulam hospital. On the basis of this evidence, it is argued that when the witnesses mentioned above reached the scene, Leela would have been unconscious and therefore the alleged dying declarations are false. We will consider the evidence of PW 16 later. As we have already pointed out, though there were innumerable injuries none of them affected any vital organ of the body. Death was the result not of injury to any vital organ but clue to shock on account of multiple injuries. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that shock appeared immediately after receiving the injuries. Even if there was immediate shock, it does not necessarily follow that Leela became unconscious immediately. Appellant's wife, PW 7 had gone to the scene on hearing the out-cry. She had her child in her arms. She has deposed that when she went near, Leela told her to move away lost the child get frightened. This evidence also shows that Leela was conscious and coherent at the scene. Assuming that at 12.15 P.M. at Ernakulam she was found unconscious, that is no reason to doubt her consciousness at 9.30 a.m. at the spot. 21. As we have already pointed out, PWs 1, 2, 3 and 6 (even discarding PW 5) are all natural, probable and disinterested witnesses. The versions given by them appear to be cogent and free from doubt. The dying declarations attributed to Leela are complete in themselves regarding the actual infliction of injuries and the identity of the assailant. The evidence which is mutually corroborative shows that Leela was conscious, was able to understand questions and give rational answers. There is no material to suggest that her power of observation was impaired. We find it safe to act upon the testimony of these witnesses regarding the dying declarations. 22. The next dying declaration is spoken to by Leela's mother, PW 4. She and her husband were working in a field about one mile away from the scene of occurrence. There is no material to suggest that her power of observation was impaired. We find it safe to act upon the testimony of these witnesses regarding the dying declarations. 22. The next dying declaration is spoken to by Leela's mother, PW 4. She and her husband were working in a field about one mile away from the scene of occurrence. The evidence of witnesses already referred to shows that when Leela was being taken to Perumbavoor, another jeep was arranged to fecth PW 4 and her husband. PW 4 has deposed that one Ramakrishnan came and talked to her husband who ran to the jeep and seeing this, she also went there. When both of them came to Perumbavoor Hospital, Leela was already in the jeep which was about to leave for Ernakulam. She asked Leela what happened and she said (xxx). On being pressed by the witness, Leela said (xxx) After Leela was admitted at Ernakulam District Hospital and her injuries were treated and bandaged, the witness further questioned Leela to which the latter replied (xxx) (When I was going to the school, I met Poulose and asked him the time. Then Chettan told me that I need not go to school and forcibly took away the Umbrella and books and went home. I went to Thekkekuzhi for answering the call of nature. Chettan seeing me ran up and cut me repeatedly. He has cut both my hands.) 23. The witness is definite that Leela was conscious when reaching Ernakulam hospital. But the doctor PW 16 who admitted her, deposed that the patient was unconscious when she was brought to hospital. But in Ext. P6 wound certificate he only noted "Patient is in shock". Ext. P6 does not say that the patient was unconscious. PW 17, the doctor at Perumbavoor who examined her at 10.10 a.m. stated that the patient was in shock but could talk and in fact talked to him. Ext. P9 wound certificate issued by PW 17 also does not mention that the patient was unconscious. If the patient was unconscious when seen by these two doctors, they would have noted so in the accident registers and wound certificates. That they did not do so would certainly support the evidence of PW 4 that her daughter was conscious and could talk immediately after treatment was given at Ernakulam and even previously. If the patient was unconscious when seen by these two doctors, they would have noted so in the accident registers and wound certificates. That they did not do so would certainly support the evidence of PW 4 that her daughter was conscious and could talk immediately after treatment was given at Ernakulam and even previously. There is also the evidence of PW 1 that when Leela was taken to the two hospitals, she was conscious and talking. The F.I.R. was registered at 4. 10 p.m. by PW 18. Before that, at Ernakulam hospital he found Leela unconscious. This does not mean that when Leela allegedly talked to PW 4, she was unconscious. In these circumstances, we see no reason to doubt the voracity of PW 4. In deposing about the dying declarations, she was implicating her own son inlaw. There has been no suggestion that she was not on happy terms with him. They were living together in the same house. We are satisfied that she is a witness of truth. 24. The dying declaration spoken to by PW 4 gives more details than the earlier dying declarations; that was only natural since Leela was speaking to her own mother. Except regarding the actual incident, all other matters mentioned in the dying declaration are supported by other evidence. PWs 5 and 6 have deposed regarding the earlier incident. This is admitted by the appellant. The appellant's own wife, PW 7 has deposed to the appellant taking MO 3 chopper and going to the hill followed later on by Leela. 25. The other dying declaration is the one spoken to by PW 17 who examined Leela at Perumbavoor hospital. He has deposed that "Leela was alleged to have been "xxx". He also deposed that the cause of the injuries was stated to him by the patient herself. He was confronted with Ext. D3, a portion of his earlier statement to the Police which reads "on 26-9-1979 at 10.10 a.m. one Leela was brought to the hospital with multiple injuries over her hands, neck etc. by her relations, stating that she was cut with chopper by one Joseph". He denied having made the statement though it is supported by the investigating officer. It is therefore argued that the description of the appellant as the assailant must have been given to PW 17 not by Leela but her relations. by her relations, stating that she was cut with chopper by one Joseph". He denied having made the statement though it is supported by the investigating officer. It is therefore argued that the description of the appellant as the assailant must have been given to PW 17 not by Leela but her relations. We are not impressed by this argument. A record of a statement under S.161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure need not necessarily contain all details. The sentence in Ext. D3 is a jumbled one. not necessarily indicating that the version to the doctor was not given by Leela. The dying declaration spoken to by PW 17 is fount) word by word in Ext. P9 certificate. Ext. P9 is a contemperanous document and it describes the assailant as (xxx) (Elder sister's husband Joseph)." That it the evidence of PW 17 also. But the CD. statement Ext. P3 refers to the assailant as 'one Joseph." It is clear that there are inaccuracies in Ext. D3. We find no reason why the medical officer PW 17 should make out a false case that it was Leela who gave him the information. We find no reason to differ from the conclusion, of the learned Sessions Judge that evidence of PW 1 7 could be acted upon. 26. P.W. 7 is the wife of the appellant. She has deposed that on the morning of the day of the occurrence, appellant went out for work and returned at about 9 a.m. She stated that when he came, she had gone out to attend on her cow. This was contrary to her case dairy statement and therefore she was cross examined by the prosecutor with leave of court. When so cross examined, she stated that she told the police that the appellant took a chopper and went out, that Leela also returned home and was informed by the witness that the appellant had gone to the 606 mala with chopper and later Leela also went to the hill. The witness affirmed that this was only the truth. She further deposed that the appellant took the chopper MO 3 and went out. She had seen Leela 's books and umbrella placed on the table. Sometime later, she heard a cry from the hill and saw people running up. She also went and saw Leela lying down with the injuries. The witness affirmed that this was only the truth. She further deposed that the appellant took the chopper MO 3 and went out. She had seen Leela 's books and umbrella placed on the table. Sometime later, she heard a cry from the hill and saw people running up. She also went and saw Leela lying down with the injuries. She had her baby in her arms and when she approached Leela, Leela asked her to go away lest the baby should get frightened. She also deposed that on that day, appellant was wearing MOs 8 and 9 clothes. No doubt, as the wife of the appellant, she would be very much interested in helping the appellant and in fact attempted to help him. But the total effect of the evidence given by her supports the prosecution case. It helps the prosecution in establishing that the appellant armed with MO 3 had gone to the hill followed by Leela She identifies MO 3 as the chopper used in their house. The appellant's mother inlaw, PW 4, Iras deposed that the chopper belongs to her and was in the house. The learned Sessions Judge has acted on this testimony and we see no reason why it should not be acted upon. 27. P.Ws. 8 and 9 speak to the presence of the appellant near about the scene at the relevant time namely at about 9.30 a.m. PW 8 has paddy fields on the western side of 606 mala. He was ploughing his field and while so, he saw the appellant proceeding northwards by the side of the field wearing MOs 8 and 9 clothes. He was proceeding towards the road. He is a neighbour of the appellant. PW 9 also saw the appellant at about 9.30 a.m. on the day of occurrence The witness was sitting in a tea-shop. The appellant came from the paddy fields and reached the road. The appellant was wearing a shirt and kaily mundu. These witnesses are disinterested witnesses against whom nothing is suggested. There is no reason why their evidence should not be acted upon. The evidence, particularly of PW 8. puts the appellant near the 606 mala sometime after the time of occurrence. 28. The investigator, PW 20, Sub Inspector of Police, Kuruppampady, went to the scene at 1 p.m. on the next day. It was PW 2 who showed the scene to him. The evidence, particularly of PW 8. puts the appellant near the 606 mala sometime after the time of occurrence. 28. The investigator, PW 20, Sub Inspector of Police, Kuruppampady, went to the scene at 1 p.m. on the next day. It was PW 2 who showed the scene to him. There is evidence that there was drizzle and therefore obviously bloodstains could not be seen. PW 20 has deposed that he found tuft of hair MO 2 at the scene and the same was recovered under the scene mahazar Ext. P1. This is also spoken to by PW 2, 29. No doubt, in the final report submitted by the investigator he has stated that the appellant and Leela were in love and while so, the appellant got angry with Leela because he thought that Leela fell in love with PW 5. The prosecution has not been able to show either that the appellant and Leela were in Love or that Leela fell in love with PW 5. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to show that all was not well between appellant and Leela. 30. We have already referred to the dying declarations of Leela spoken to by PW 4, in which Leela stated that on her way to the typewriting institute, she met PW 5 and asked him time and then the appellant came there, took away her umbrella and books, told her that she need not go to school and went home followed by her. Later, she went in the southern direction for answering the call of nature. It was then that the appellant came and cut her. The earlier incident in. the morning is spoken to by PWs 5 and 6, co-workers, who were proceeding to the quarry. That here was such an incident is admitted by the appellant also. It has to be remembered that appellant, Leela and others were living together in the same house. Leela was only 19 years old. The appellant must have regarded himself as responsible for Leela. That he picked a quarrel with PW 5 is sufficient to show that he bore resentment towards PW 5 in connection with latter s attitude towards Leela. The fact that he snatched away the books of Leela and asked her not to continue her studies clearly shows that he suspected that Leela was developing friendship with PW 5. Obviously. he resented this. The fact that he snatched away the books of Leela and asked her not to continue her studies clearly shows that he suspected that Leela was developing friendship with PW 5. Obviously. he resented this. The resentment might not have arisen because of his own love for Leela. It might have arisen because he might have regarded himself as responsible for Leela. This certainly provides a background for the occurrence as propounded by the prosecution. 31. We now turn to the evidence regarding extra judicial confession and recovery of MO 3, ostensibly at the instance of the appellant. PW 10 is the husband of appellant's sister. He lives about 16 kilometers away from the appellant's sister. He lives about 16 kilometres away from the appellants residence. He has deposed that on the afternoon of 26-9-79, the appellant came to his house. His last visit was about three years previously. That was because the appellant married PW 7 against the wishes of his relations. Naturally, PW. 10 asked him the purpose of the visit and the appellant said (xxx) (I have come after cutting my sister-in-law)." Without putting further questions, witness went to the house of DW 1 who is none other than the brother of the appellant. Witness informed DW 1 about what the appellant told him. He was sent back by DW 1. PW 11 is a high school teacher living nearby. He has deposed that on the evening of that day, DW 1 came to him stating that his brother had cut. his sister inlaw and had come to PW 10's house. PW 11 asked him to bring the appellant to his own house. PW 10 has deposed that later DW 1 came to his house and both of them took the appellant to PW 11 "s house. PW 11 has deposed that as it was late in the night, he arranged for them to sleep in a room in his house. PW 11 has further deposed: xxx. PW 10 (On the morning of 26th when Leela and her lover were talking in the road, the appellant saw it. there was an exchange of words between Leela's lover, PW 5, and the appellant, the appellant took away the books and umbrella from Leela and went home. Leela followed him. PW 11 has further deposed: xxx. PW 10 (On the morning of 26th when Leela and her lover were talking in the road, the appellant saw it. there was an exchange of words between Leela's lover, PW 5, and the appellant, the appellant took away the books and umbrella from Leela and went home. Leela followed him. later the appellant left the books and umbrella in the house, took a chopper and went to the hill, Leela also followed him and there he cut Leela. Then he went to PW 10's house). The evidence of PW 10 and DW I shows that PW 11 advised that the appellant should appear in the police station which is only one furlong away from PW 11 s house. He advised PW 10 and DW 1 to take the appellant to the police station. They had come to consult him. PW 10 and DW. 1 sometimes worked for him. He himself did not inform the police. That was because he did not think the injuries to be serious. He was questioned only two weeks later PW 10 has deposed that on 27th he asked the appellant to surrender to the police but the latter did not do so on the 28th, hearing about Leela's death, he again asked the appellant to go to the police station which the latter did and he want behind the appellant. It was thus that the appellant reached the police station. He also stated that on further questioning the appellant stated that Leela and appellant were conducting themselves as husband and wife and she lived with him. He has identified MOs 8 and 9 as the clothes worn by the appellant when he came to his house and went to the police station. The appellant told him that he had washed the clothes. 32. DW 1, the brother of the appellant was a charge witness and was given up by the prosecutor. He was examined by the defence to challenge the alleged date of surrender to the police. As we have noticed, when questioned by the Trial Court, the appellant suggested that he had gone to the police station on 26-9-1979 at 8.45 a.m. evidently to lodge a complaint against PW 5. The underlying suggestion is that he did not leave the police station thereafter. If that be so, the appellant could not have surrendered later. As we have noticed, when questioned by the Trial Court, the appellant suggested that he had gone to the police station on 26-9-1979 at 8.45 a.m. evidently to lodge a complaint against PW 5. The underlying suggestion is that he did not leave the police station thereafter. If that be so, the appellant could not have surrendered later. Yet, he examined DW 1 who deposed in chief examination that the appellant surrendered in the police station on 28th. He was asked whether in his statement recorded by the Magistrate under S.164 of the Code, he had stated that the appellant surrendered on the 27th and he affirmed that he mentioned the date of surrender as 28th. He was confronted with a portion of his C.D. statement reading: xxx He admitted having made this statement. This statement does not make it clear that the surrender was on 27th, though there is some ambiguity in the manner in which the statement had been recorded. When cross examined by the prosecutor he again reiterated that the surrender was on 28th. He explained that surrender did not take place on 27th because there was nobody available to go with the appellant and Leela did not die on that day, and because the appellant was not prepared to surrender. When it was known that Leela died, it became dangerous to keep the appellant in any house and therefore the appellant was prevailed upon to surrender on that day, that is the 28th- In his statement to the police, he stated that was if on 28th that the appellant surrendered. He further stated that when questioned the appellant told him that he had cut his sister inlaw with a chopper, and asked his brother to somehow save him. 33. Confession may be the outcome of conflict of emotions, a conscious effort to react to the prick of conscience. It is argued that in crimes of secrecy one does not expect the perpetrator to blurt out his guilt, however it is not wise to assume that different people react in the same way in similar situations. This. was a crime in secrecy in the sense that there were no eye witnesses to the crime. The appellant might not have known that the crime had not been seen by anyone. This. was a crime in secrecy in the sense that there were no eye witnesses to the crime. The appellant might not have known that the crime had not been seen by anyone. Whatever may be the emotion which makes a person to inflict such injuries on a close relation like sister-in-law, one can well understand the remorse and regret which overtake him after the crime. 34. As far as possible, the exact words used must be presented before court: Court must carefully examine the evidence regarding extra judicial confession to satisfy itself that it is voluntary and true. If there is any genuine doubt regarding these aspects, the court has to discard the evidence. If, however, the evidence regarding confessions appears to be free from suspicion and the confession has a ring of truth, it can be acted upon, even if retracted. Of course, the confession must be compared with the other evidence in the case and it must satisfy the test, of probability. The court may ordinarily look to corroboration in regard to material particulars. But that is only to satisfy itself that the confession is true. In appropriate cases, a confession can be acted upon even without corroboration, though normally the court looks to corroboration. (See Balbir Singh v. Punjab State ( AIR 1957 SC 216 ), Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1957 SC 637 ). Subramania Goundan v. Stale of Madras ( AIR 1958 SC 66 ), Sahoo v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1966 S.C. 40 ), Ram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1967 SC 152 ), Mahar Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1975 SC 1320 ), Piara Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1977 SC 2274 ), Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1978 SC 1248 ) and State of U.P. v. Boota Singh ( AIR 1978 SC 1770 ). 35. P.W. 11 is an absolutely independent witness against whom nothing is suggested. PW 10 is the brother-in-law and. DW 1 the elder brother of the appellant. No doubt, they were not on happy terms with the appellant because of the marriage of the appellant with PW 7 which obviously the family did not like. But that does not mean that when the appellant found himself in a difficult situation, he would not have sought their help. DW 1 the elder brother of the appellant. No doubt, they were not on happy terms with the appellant because of the marriage of the appellant with PW 7 which obviously the family did not like. But that does not mean that when the appellant found himself in a difficult situation, he would not have sought their help. It is only natural that he should do so. The evidence of DW 1 clearly shows that the appellant sought his help though the appellant did not directly go to him but went to his brother-in-law. It is only natural that appellant, having inflicted injuries on Leela, would have been perplexed what to do next. He would be afraid to go to the police directly. Naturally, he would have sought the help of PW 10 and DW 1. They are labourers occasionally working under a local teacher, PW 11. There is nothing unnatural in their seeking the help of PW 11 to take a decision in the matter. We agree with the learned Sessions Judge in finding that there is nothing unnatural in the conduct of the appellant or these persons and that the confessions are natural, voluntary and true. These confessions are corroborated and buttressed in several material particulars by the evidence already discussed. 36. It is thus clear that the appellant reached the police station on 28-9-1979. PW 20 has deposed that the appellant surrendered on that date and the witness recorded his statement. The appellant was wearing MOs 9 and 10 at that time and they were seized under Ext. P4 mahazar attested by PW 14. This part of the evidence is supported by PW 14. PW 20 has further deposed that the appellant having confessed, stated: xxx. (I have placed chopper near the scene. I will show the place)." This part of the confession is marked and proved as Ext. P12. PW 20 has deposed that he took the appellant to the scene of occurrence and the appellant took out MO 3 chopper from kuttikkadu and it was seized under Ext. P2 mahazar. This part of the evidence is supported by PW 2. Their evidence further shows that MO 3 had stains of blood and long hair sticking to it. No doubt, Ext. P2 describes the place as full of "kuttichedi and grass." There is no difference between the two descriptions. P2 mahazar. This part of the evidence is supported by PW 2. Their evidence further shows that MO 3 had stains of blood and long hair sticking to it. No doubt, Ext. P2 describes the place as full of "kuttichedi and grass." There is no difference between the two descriptions. Having considered the evidence of these witnesses carefully, we find no reason not to act on the testimony regarding recovery of MO 3 as pointed out by the appellant. 37. M.Os. 2, 3, 8 and 9 were sent to forensic laboratory for examination. Ext. P14 is the report. Ext. P14 shows that the clothes and the chopper had stains of blood. The blood found in the kaili MO 9 was of sufficient quantity for analysis and it was seen to contain human blood. The quantity was insufficient for grouping. The hair found at the scene and on the chopper were subjected to examination and were found to be similar in nature and of human origin. Since hair was not taken from the body and subjected to examination, it cannot be conclusively stated that the hair belonged to Leela but the broad probabilities are in favour of such a view. Since blood grouping could not be made, it cannot be conclusively stated that the blood found on the clothes of the appellant and the chopper were of the same group as that of Leela's blood. The appellant attempted an explanation regarding the blood found on his clothes by stating that it was his own blood. But he did not explain how his clothes came to be stained with his own blood. The argument on behalf of the appellant is that the appellant being a quarry worker, his blood may be found on his clothes. It may be so or may not be so. There is no material to prove it to be so. 38. The foregoing discussion establishes the following: (a) that Leela was found lying in a pool of blood with cut injuries; (b) Immediately thereafter, she told P.Ws. 1 to 3 and others that she was cut by her brother inlaw, Ouseph. There were similar statements made to PWs 4 and 17. (c) Appellant was wearing M.Os. 8 and 9 clothes on that day, before the occurrence and after the occurrence. 1 to 3 and others that she was cut by her brother inlaw, Ouseph. There were similar statements made to PWs 4 and 17. (c) Appellant was wearing M.Os. 8 and 9 clothes on that day, before the occurrence and after the occurrence. He was wearing these clothes when he met PW 10 and DW 1 and when he surrendered before the police on 28th. These clothes had stains of blood. The stains on the M.O. 9 kaili were found to be of human blood; (d) just before the occurrence, appellant was found going to 606 mala with M.O. 3 chopper and Leela followed him a little later. She did not come back. At that time, appellant was wearing M.Os. 8 and 9; (e) M.O. 2 hair found at the scene and the hair sticking on M.O. 3 were found to be of human origin and of the same nature; (f) M.O. 3 chopper belonging to PW 4 and used in their house where the appellant also resided, was recovered on the information given by the appellant and it was found to contain stains of human blood as well as hair; (g) The appellant told P.Ws. 10, 11 and D.W. 1 that he had cut his sister inlaw with chopper; (h) The appellant objected to Leela talking to P.W. 5 and in that background, picked a quarrel with P.W. 5 an hour before the occurrence; (i) he was found in the locally by P.Ws. 8 and 9; and (j) he set up an alibi by stating that he was in the police station on 26-9-1979 at 8.45 a.m. and continued to be there and he failed to prove the alibi. 39. The above evidence and circumstance overwhelmingly proves that it was the appellant and the appellant alone who inflicted the cut injuries on Leela. The evidence and circumstances proved by the prosecution are consistent only with his guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. In these circumstances we find that the learned Sessions Judge was justified in holding that it was the appellant who inflicted cut injuries on Leela and caused her death. 40. What then is the offence committed by the appellant? The evidence and circumstances proved by the prosecution are consistent only with his guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. In these circumstances we find that the learned Sessions Judge was justified in holding that it was the appellant who inflicted cut injuries on Leela and caused her death. 40. What then is the offence committed by the appellant? Learned Sessions judge, though conscious of the unhelpful nature of the medical evidence in the determination of the degree of culpability of the appellant, proceeded to hold that the appellant committed culpable homicide amounting to murder as definited in "thirdly'" of S.300 IPC and convicted him under S.302. IPC. That 15 injuries were inflicted with a chopper like MO 3, a deadly weapon and of them eight injuries were could have been caused in warding off cuts and six injuries on different parts of shoulder and neck which are vital parts of body weighed with the learned Judge in arriving at such a conclusion. This conclusion is seriously challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant. 41. All murder is culpable homicide, but all culpable homicide is not murder. Subject, of course, to the five exceptions to S.300 IPC every act which fails within one or other of the four clauses of the section is murder and necessarily it also falls within the definition of culpable homicide in S.299 IPC. Where death is caused by an act with intention of causing death, it is culpable homicide under the first clause of S.299 and also murder under "firstly" of S.300. Where death is caused with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death it is only culpable homicide under second clause of S.299. Such an act, in the presence of certain aggravating circumstances, amounts to murder under "secondly" or "thirdly" of S.300. An act causing death with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death amounts only to culpable homicide under the last clause of S.299. The same act, in the presence of certain aggravating circumstances laid down in Fourthly" of S.300, amounts to murder. Learned Sessions Judge did not hold and it is also not argued before us by the learned public prosecutor that the actus reus in the case attracts 'Firstly- 'Secondly' or 'fourthly' of Sec, 300. The same act, in the presence of certain aggravating circumstances laid down in Fourthly" of S.300, amounts to murder. Learned Sessions Judge did not hold and it is also not argued before us by the learned public prosecutor that the actus reus in the case attracts 'Firstly- 'Secondly' or 'fourthly' of Sec, 300. According to learned Public Prosecutor, the appellant's act attracts "thirdly" of S.300 IPC while according to learned counsel for appellant, it may only be grievous hurt as defined in "Eighthly" of S.320 or at worst, culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the second or third clause of S.299 IPC. 42. The broad distinction to be noticed is that culpable homicide of a higher degree is murder punishable under S.302 and culpable homicide of a lesser degree is not murder and is punishable under S.304. "Thirdly" of S.300 applies where the act causing death is done with the intention of causing bodily and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The second clause of S.299 IPC is attracted to an act causing death where it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Broadly speaking the distinction is one of degree of probability. "Likely" means probably. When chances are even with or greater than the event not happening, it can be said that the event will probably happen. If the chances are very high, the event happening is must probable. Where death is the most probable consequence of an injury, one can say that the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Where death is not most probable and the degree of probability is less, one can only say that the injury is of a type likely to. cause death. Whether one or the other clause is attracted depends on the degree of probability of death in consequence of the injury. 43. On what factors is the conclusion on this question to rest? The nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it is used, the force used while wielding the weapon, the parts of the body on which the weapon is used, the nature of the injuries external and internal caused are some of the factors which are relevant in this connection. The nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it is used, the force used while wielding the weapon, the parts of the body on which the weapon is used, the nature of the injuries external and internal caused are some of the factors which are relevant in this connection. The court not being an expert on these matters will naturally seek the help of medical evidence. This however does not mean that court is dependent entirely on the medical evidence or that the medical evidence is conclusive. The court is not bound to accept medical evidence in a given case. But there can be no two opinions on the utility and importance of medical evidence in these matters. In a given case, the court, on an appreciation, of medical evidence in the light of its own knowledge common-sense and experience may chose to reject medical evidence. But that is not to say that medical evidence is unnecessary or irrelevant. Even where medical evidence is absent, the court has to arrive at a conclusion on an appreciation of all the relevant circumstances. (See Brij Bhukhan and others v. The State of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 474 ) 44. The prosecution has a duty to place the relevant medical evidence before court. When the doctor who performed the post mortem examination of the dead body is before court, it is the duty of the prosecutor to bring out all necessary particulars regarding the injuries, their dimensions, nature and effect. Prosecutor has to show to the doctor the weapon, which, according to the prosecution was used to inflict the injury and elicit from him whether it would or would not be possible for such an injury to be caused by such a weapon. It is also his bounden duty to elicit from the expert witness, the materials which will help the court to arrive at a conclusion regarding the degree of culpability of the act involved in the case. The injury may be necessarily fatal or it may be of such a nature as to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature or it may be only of such a nature as likely to cause death. The doctor's attention must be drawn to these matters. Whatever answer the expert gives must be supported by reasons which can be tested by the court. 45. The doctor's attention must be drawn to these matters. Whatever answer the expert gives must be supported by reasons which can be tested by the court. 45. Criminal court has to control the trial of a criminal case in accordance with law. It has a duty to see that admissible evidence is allowed to be let in and inadmissible material is shut out. It has to play its role in enabling the prosecution to prove its case and at the same time fully protect the valuable rights of the accused. The court has a right and duty to put questions to witnesses wherever it is necessary to do so. This is much more so in the case of expert witnesses. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the court to arrive at a just decision in the case. The court has to he vigilant and see that all materials necessary are elicited from expert witnesses to enable the court to arrive at a just and correct decision. Where the prosecutor fails to discharge his duty by putting necessary questions to an expert witness, it is the duly and the right of the criminal court to put such questions and bring necessary materials on record. Of course this must be done without any hint of partisanship and in a just and fair manner (See Ramchandar v. The State of Haryana ( AIR 1981 SC 1036 ). It is unfortunate that neither the prosecutor nor the Sessions Judge asked PW 16 regarding the nature of the injuries, that is, whether the injuries were necessarily fatal or were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or were only likely to cause death. 46. P.W. 16 has not indicated that the injuries found on the dead body, singly or cumulatively were necessarily fatal or were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or were likely to cause death or were such as to endanger life. The court is left with the responsibility of deciding these matters without the benefit of expert evidence. No doubt, the weapon used is chopper, a deadly weapon. Fifteen cut injuries were inflicted on Leela. Eight of them were on different parts of her arms. Perhaps these injuries were caused while Leela was trying to protect herself. The court is left with the responsibility of deciding these matters without the benefit of expert evidence. No doubt, the weapon used is chopper, a deadly weapon. Fifteen cut injuries were inflicted on Leela. Eight of them were on different parts of her arms. Perhaps these injuries were caused while Leela was trying to protect herself. There were two injuries on the left shoulder, one on the right shoulder, one on the back of neck and two on the right side of neck. PW 16 has not given the depth of the injuries. Learned Sessions Judge took the view that shoulder and neck are vital parts of the body. We agree that neck can be regarded as vital parts of the body. We fail to see how shoulder can be so regarded. It is not every injury on a vital part that is regarded as serious. PW 16 has not stated that any of these injuries are of a grievous or serious nature. Corresponding to the injuries on the shoulder and neck, post mortem did not reveal any internal injuries. PW 16 does not say that any major blood vessel or vein was affected. Injuries on a vital part assumes significance only when there is an internal injury. A minor external injury on a vital part is nevertheless only a minor injury. The opinion of the doctor is that Leela died on account of shock due to multiple injuries. We underscore the fact that there was no internal injury on any vital organ. We cannot therefore agree that the injuries caused were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The probability of death cannot be held to be of such a high degree. Therefore "Thirdly" of S.300 IPC is not attracted. The cumulative effect of the numerous injuries cannot however be brushed aside as merely endangering life. In the light of all the circumstances, we hold that the injuries were such as likely to cause death by their cumulative impact. The offence therefore does not amount to murder but only to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We do not also agree that the act attracts only S.320 IPC and not S.299 IPC. The facts and circumstances of the case do not enable us to hold that death was caused with the intention of causing death. The offence therefore does not amount to murder but only to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We do not also agree that the act attracts only S.320 IPC and not S.299 IPC. The facts and circumstances of the case do not enable us to hold that death was caused with the intention of causing death. The appellant inflicted cut injuries with the intention of causing such bodily injuries as are likely to cause death. The offence committed by him is not punishable under S.302 IPC hut one punishable under Part I of S.304 IPC. The conviction and sentence entered against the appellant under S.302 IPC are set aside. Instead he is convicted under S.304 Part 1 IPC. The circumstances of the case warrant the imposition of a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a term of ten years and we do so. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.