JUDGMENT Sharad Manohar, J.-Absolutely no justifiable ground has been advanced by the State Government for condoning the delay of 54 days in filing the appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate in favour of the present respondent. I have perused the judgement of the learned Magistrate and, in the first' place, I was not at all satisfied that the judgement, which was based on pure appreciation of evidence on record, called for any interference by this Court in the appeal against acquittal. But that apart, I find that the appeal has been filed by the State after a delay of about 54 days in filing the appeal. A chain of reasons is sought to be given for satisfying this Court that the delay was something which could not be avoided. Buteach of the statements gives rise to the inference that each of the Officers concerned of the Government has been looking at the question of delay in an extremely airy and casual manner. 2. The impugned judgment was delivered on 12.11. 1979. The Public Prosecutor who conducted the' prosecution has given no recommendation to the Government to file the appeal. The Government woke up to the question as to whether as appeal should be filed at all only by virtue of the letter dated 10.12.1979 written by the so-called Complainant, that is to say, the person who had received the injuries in the accident allegedly caused by virtue of the negligence of the respondent driver this letter dated 10.12.1979 was sent by the Government to the Commissioner of Police in order to obtain the certified copy of the judgment for finding out the feasibility of the appeal; but the certified copy was applied for by the Officer to the Commissioner's Office as late as on 201.1980. The copy was ready on 1.2.1980; but the application for condonation of, delay itself states that the Government did not receive the certified copy for a long time thereafter. Ultimately the Government passed a resolution on 21.2.1980 taking decision to file the appeal against the order of acquittal. 3. But now the Public Prosecutor's Office started the entire rigma-role once again. The Office of the Public Prosecutor took its own time for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment from the Office of the Commissioner of Police. Ultimately the Government passed a resolution on 21.2.1980 taking decision to file the appeal against the order of acquittal. 3. But now the Public Prosecutor's Office started the entire rigma-role once again. The Office of the Public Prosecutor took its own time for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment from the Office of the Commissioner of Police. Contention is that during all this time, the Public Prosecutor's Office could' not have processed and prepared the appeal for being filed. 4. As a matter of fact, it would be seen that the' reasons for non-obtaining of the certified copy given at several places in the application for condonation of delay is, more or less, an eye-wash, because there is a statement in the application itself to the effect that the decision to file the appeal was taken by the Government after the Secretary concerned had read the un certified copy of the judgment under Appeal. It is, thus, clear that the Government was having the uncertified copy of the judgement and there was no particular difficulty in the way of the Public Prosecutor to file the appeal after preparing the necessary Memo of Appeal, if necessary, with the help of the uncertified copy of the judgement. It is stated that the appeal could not have been filed without the certified copy. The factual position is that the certified copy was ready as early as on 1.21980; just a messenger could have been sent by the Public Prosecutor's office to the Office of the Commissioner of Police and the certified copy could have been secured from that Office. The appeal could have been filed even without the certified copy by making the necessary application for dispensing with the copy for the present. 5. Moreover, there is no justification shown why one Office of the Government cannot secure the certified copy of the judgement obtained by another office of the same Government for a full period of more than two months. I do not sub-stance to the view that the Government and particularly the Office of the Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor are entitled to look at this question in such an airy and casual manner and to panch themselves on some lofty and sacrosanct Pedestal and called upon the Court to make out to them some differential and convenient treatment. I do not sub-stance to the view that the Government and particularly the Office of the Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor are entitled to look at this question in such an airy and casual manner and to panch themselves on some lofty and sacrosanct Pedestal and called upon the Court to make out to them some differential and convenient treatment. Superior to noted out to the citizencyat large, Law of limitation does not prescribe such differential treatment for the Office of the Government Pleader. With a the manpower at the command of the Government and the Public Prosecutor, they should have been more prompt. On the other hand. they give indication of being immeasurably lazy with no sense of urgency whatsoever. I am, therefore, not inclined to condone the delay of 54 days in the instant case. 6. The application for condonation of delay is. therefore, dismissed. Since the delay is not condoned, the appeal does not survive and, hence, no order separate need be passed on the same. 7. The application stands dismissed; the appeal stands disposed of. Application dismissed