JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, petitioner Awadh Kumar Shukla prays for a writ of habeas corpus and seeks to question the validity of his continued detention authorised by the District Magistrate, Allahabad vide his order, dated 9th of August 1982 made under S. 3 (2) of the National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) 2. While the petitioner was in jail custody in connection with Criminal Case No. 256 of 1982 under sections 382, 392 and 411 I.P.C., he was on 10th of August, 1982 served with the District Magistrate's order dated 9th of August, 1982 authorising his detention under section 3 (2) of the Act. The grounds on which he was directed to be detained were also served upon him the same day. In due course the State Government referred the case of the petitioner to the Advisory Board on 19th of August, 1982. The petitioner handed over identical representations addressed to the State and to the Central Governments, to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad on 27th of August, 1982. Thereafter he filed Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982: (Reported in 1983 Cri LJ 192) before this Hon'ble Court on 3rd of September, 1982 and prayed for a writ of habeas corpus. However, the State Government rejected the aforementioned representation made by the petitioner on 8-9-1982. During the course of arguments in that petition, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner questioned the validity of his detention on following grounds : 1. The petitioner was already in jail as an under-trial since before the order for his detention was passed on 9th of August, 1982. He could accordingly not be a risk to public security and public order. 2. There had been non-compliance with the provisions of section 10 of the Act inasmuch as the representation made by the petitioner was placed before the Advisory Board not by the State Government but by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad. 3. The representation made by the petitioner to the State Government had not been dealt with by it expeditiously and that there was un-explained delay on its part rendering petitioner's detention, invalid. 4. The matter referred to in the grounds furnished to the petitioner related to law and order and not to public order. Hence the order for detention stood vitiated. 5. 4. The matter referred to in the grounds furnished to the petitioner related to law and order and not to public order. Hence the order for detention stood vitiated. 5. In one of the two grounds referred to in the grounds for petitioner's detention, namely, that in respect of crime case No. 256 of 1982, the petitioner stood acquitted. Consequently one of the grounds for his detention had become non-existent. 6. Petitioner had asked for some more material so as to enable him to make an effective representation, but the same was not supplied to him before his representation was rejected on 8th of September, 1982. This rendered petitioner's detention invalid. Hearing in that petition was concluded on 14th October, 1982. Eventually this Court by its judgment dated 23rd of November, 1982 repelled all the aforementioned pleas raised by the petitioner and dismissed the petition. 3. In due course, petitioner's representation dated 27th August, 1982 addressed to the Central Government was forwarded by the State Government to the Central Government on 22nd of September, 1982 and it reached the Central Government on 24th of September, 1982. Information regarding its rejection is said to have been communicated to the petitioner on 18th of October, 1982. 4. After the judgment in Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982 was reserved on 14-10-1982, the petitioner made yet another representation to the State Government and the Central Government on 18th of October, 1982 praying for revocation of the order of his detention. The State Government rejected the representation made to it by the petitioner on 25th of November, 1982. 5. Apart from aforementioned representations petitioner's wife also represented to the State Government on 15th of October 1982 and prayed for revocation of petitioner's detention order. Likewise petitioner's brother Kishori Lal also sent representations addressed to the State Government and the Central Government by registered post on 16th of October, 1982 requesting them to revoke the detention order. 6. The petitioner filed the present petition before this Court on 29th of November, 1982. After notices were issued, the opposite parties put in appearance, filed counter-affidavits and justified their action in keeping the petitioner under detention. 6. The petitioner filed the present petition before this Court on 29th of November, 1982. After notices were issued, the opposite parties put in appearance, filed counter-affidavits and justified their action in keeping the petitioner under detention. Learned counsel for the opposite parties raised a preliminary objection to the effect that as the petitioner had already filed a Writ of hebeas corpus before this Court (Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982) questioning the validity of his detention in pursuance of District Magistrate's order dated 9th of August 1982 which has been dismissed, in the circumstances, he cannot maintain the present writ petition for claiming the same relief. According to the learned counsel so far as decision of this Court on the points raised and decided in Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982 are concerned, it is not open to the Court either to review or correct the same. The petitioner is accordingly precluded from raising the same over again. So far as the remaining questions are concerned, the petitioner is debarred from raising them on the principles of constructive res judicata. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner conceded that he would not, in this petition, question the validity of petitioner's detention on grounds which had specifically been repelled by this Court in Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982. He, however, contended that principles of res judicata are inapplicable to proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus and that it is open to the petitioner to maintain the present petition and to question the validity of his detention on grounds which were neither raised nor specifically decided by this Court in Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982. 8. In the cases of Kirit Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 1621 and Lallubhai Jogi Bhai v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 728 , the Supreme Court has pointed out that there is a clear distinction between petitions under Article 226 in civil matters and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The doctrine of constructive res judicata is confined to civil actions and civil proceedings. This principle of public policy is entirely inapplicable to illegal detention and does not bar a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus on fresh grounds which had not been taken in earlier proceedings. The doctrine of constructive res judicata is confined to civil actions and civil proceedings. This principle of public policy is entirely inapplicable to illegal detention and does not bar a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus on fresh grounds which had not been taken in earlier proceedings. This Court also has, following the aforementioned two decisions of the Supreme Court, in the case of Sushil Kumar v. Adhyaksha, Kendriya Karagar, Naini Allahabad, (Writ Petn. No. 8372 of 1982: decided on 28th of September, 1982 (reported in 1983 Cri LJ 744) held that a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus on grounds which were not taken in the first writ petition is maintainable. We are accordingly of opinion that the preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the present writ petition raised by the respondents cannot be sustained. In our opinion, it is open to us to examine as to whether or not petitioner's detention in pursuance of the order dated 9th of August, 1982 stands vitiated on grounds which were neither raised nor decided in Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982 filed by the petitioner. However we further feel that it is not our function to scrutinise and comment upon the correctness of the decision of this Court on points which had already been raised and decided by another Bench in Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982. Apart from anything else, decision given ins Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982 being a decision of a Division Bench is binding upon us as a precedent. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that while making the representation dated 27th of August, 1982 to the State Government the petitioner had, in paragraph `9' thereof, clearly stated that certain papers should be made available to him for making an effective representation. Despite this, the State Government, without supplying the requisite copies, rejected petitioner's representation on 8-9-1982, It was only after rejecting the representation that the State Government supplied the copies demanded by the petitioner on 9th September, 1982. This according to the petitioner, has resulted in non-compliance with the provisions of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution vitiating his continued detention. 10. We find that this point was specifically dealt with and considered by the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982: (reported in 1983 Cri LJ 192). This according to the petitioner, has resulted in non-compliance with the provisions of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution vitiating his continued detention. 10. We find that this point was specifically dealt with and considered by the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982: (reported in 1983 Cri LJ 192). The Bench, while repelling this submission made by the petitioner, observed thus at p. 204) : "It was next urged that in the representation the detenu asked for some more materials which were not supplied. It is noteworthy that the list of documents supplied with the grounds to the detenu are contained in the grounds themselves, and on scrutiny of such list it would be found that all the materials upon which subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate was based were supplied with the very grounds. It would no doubt be found that vide the representation the detenu asked for some additional materials. From the record of the District Magistrate it would be found that such materials were also later supplied and the detenu therefore could make any additional representation if he so desired. It would be further found from the representation that a number of grounds were already taken in the representation. Had the State Government delayed the disposal of the representation it would have been urged that rights of the detenu guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution have been violated. In fact argument was also advanced that there was delay in the disposal of the representation of the detenu which was disposed of on 8th of September 1982. It would amount to breathing cold and hot at the same time, on the one hand to urge that the State Government should have disposed of the representation much earlier than that date and on the other hand to argue that the State Government should have waited for any additional representation. In fact, there is nothing to suggest that the detenu made any additional representation after the additional materials asked for were supplied. In the circumstances had the State Government left the present representation undecided rather that would have vitiated the detention. It is not a case in which the detaining authority did not supply the materials in support of the grounds which were taken into consideration. In the circumstances had the State Government left the present representation undecided rather that would have vitiated the detention. It is not a case in which the detaining authority did not supply the materials in support of the grounds which were taken into consideration. It is also not a case in which the detenu did not make any representation before any additional materials were supplied. When that was the position, the State Government had no option but to dispose of the representation already made and the remedy of the detenu lay in making any additional representation which he does not appear to have made." 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that various representations including those made by the petitioner's wife and petitioner's brother to the State and the Central Governments praying for revocation of the order for petitioner's detention have either remained undisposed of or have been disposed of with considerable delay rendering petitioner's continued detention invalid. Various representations relied upon by the petitioner in this regard are as follows: 1. Representation dated 27th of August, 1982 made by the petitioner to the Central Government, 2. Representation dated 15th of October, 1982 made by petitioner's wife to the State Government; 3. Representation dated 16th of October, 1982 made by Kishori Lal, brother of the petitioner addressed to the State Government and the Central Government; and 4. Representation dated 18th of October, 1982 made by the petitioner addressed to the Central Government. 12. We will first of all consider the question with regard to the representations dated 15th of October and 16th of October, 1982 said to have been made by petitioner's wife and brother respectively. The scheme underlying the National Security Act, 1980 is that once a person is detained in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3 of the Act, section 8 enjoins upon the detaining authority to, as soon as may be, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and to afford him the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order to the appropriate Government. Section 14 empowers the Central Government and in certain cases the State Government to revoke the order of detention. Section 14 empowers the Central Government and in certain cases the State Government to revoke the order of detention. In a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court it has been held that the power like the one given by section 14 of the National Security Act, to revoke a detention order, implies that the detenu can make a representation for exercise of that power and once such a representation is made by the detenu, the representation has to be dealt with, with reasonable expedition (See the case of Shyam Amba Lal Siroya v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 789 wherein the Supreme Court recognised such a right of the detenu under the similar provisions contained in Section 11 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act). The section, in our opinion, does not carry any such implication that the Central or the State Government as the case may be is bound to take into consideration the representation made by any person other than the detenu and to dispose of the same expeditiously. Reading of any such implication in the section is likely to make the task of the Government difficult and it may be flooded with all types of representations made by so many unconnected persons and the detenu would get an advantage even if there is some delay on the part of the Government in considering any of such representations. While making the aforesaid observations we do not mean to say that representations under section 14 of the National Security Act must invariably be made by the detenu personally. For purposes of the Act, a representation can be said to have been made by a detenu not only when he makes the same personally but also when somebody makes it under his instructions and on his behalf. In the case of Balchand Chorasia v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 297 , the Supreme Court held that while dealing with the submission that the Central Government was not obliged to consider the representation made by a person other than the detenu or to deal with it, observed thus : "In support of the rule, Mr. Jethmalani submitted a short point before us. It was argued that the representation filed by the detenu through his counsel, has not been considered by the Government at all. Jethmalani submitted a short point before us. It was argued that the representation filed by the detenu through his counsel, has not been considered by the Government at all. The High Court was of the view that the aforesaid representation was not given by the detenu himself but by Mr. Jethmalani in his capacity as a member of the Parliament. The representation has been placed before us and it clearly recites that Mr. Jethmalani acted not as a member of the Parliament but on instructions from his client, namely, the detenu. In the circumstances. therefore, the High Court was in error in construing the representation made by the petitioner as being made not by him but by his counsel. It is manifest that the counsel had no personal matter and he was only advocating the cause of his client. In matters where the liberty of the subject is concerned and a highly cherished right is involved, the representations made by the detenu should be construed liberally and not technically so as to frustrate or defeat the concept of liberty which is engrained in Article 21 of the Constitution. As the representation has not been considered at all by the Government which it was duty bound to consider, that by itself vitiates the order of detention. We, therefore, allow this appeal and direct the appellant to be released forthwith. The order of this Court releasing the appellant on parole passed by us on last hearing, is vacated as having become in fructuous." 13. These observations in our opinion clearly indicate that the Supreme Courts recognised the fact that if the said representation had not been made under instructions from the detenu the detention of the petitioner would not have been vitiated merely for the reason that there had been delay in its disposal. In the case before us we find that throughout, the petitioner was being offered the facility of making representation and that he was making the same personally. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the representations dated 15th of October, 1982 and 16th of October, 1982 said to have been made by petitioner's wife and brother respectively had been made under his instructions. We are accordingly of opinion that even if there has been some delay in considering those representations by the concerned Government, it would not affect the validity of petitioner's detention. 14. We are accordingly of opinion that even if there has been some delay in considering those representations by the concerned Government, it would not affect the validity of petitioner's detention. 14. So far as the representations dated 27th of August, 1982 and 18th of October, 1982 said to have been made by the petitioner for revocation of the order of his detention are concerned, we are, on the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the cases of Shyam Ambalal, Siroya v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 789 , Tara Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1980 SC 1361 and AIR 1980 SC 2133 , Sabir Ahmad v. State, 1980-3 SCC 295, Smt. Raziya v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1751 and Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1 , of opinion that like the implications contained in Section 11 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. Section 14 of the National Security Act also obliges the Central Government or the State Government as the case may he, to consider the said representations made by the petitioner expeditiously and further if there is some improper delay on the part of the concerned Government to dispose of the same it would render petitioner's continued detention invalid. Section 14 of the National Security Act also obliges the Central Government or the State Government as the case may he, to consider the said representations made by the petitioner expeditiously and further if there is some improper delay on the part of the concerned Government to dispose of the same it would render petitioner's continued detention invalid. We may also point out that after considering the cases of Harish Pahwa v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 1126 , Khatoon Begum v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 1077 , Frances Coralie v. W.C. Khambra, AIR 1980 SC 849 , Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 3 SCR 225 : AIR 1970 SC 675 , Narendra Puroshotam Umrao v. B.B. Guzral, (1979) 2 SCR 315 : AIR 1979 SC 420 , Ram Chandra A. Kamat v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 765 , Prabhakar Shanker Dhuri v. S.G. Pradhan, (1971) 3 SCC 896 (2), Kanti Lal Bose v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1623 , Shyam Ambalal Siroya v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 789 , Tara Chand v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1361 and Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1 this Court in Petitioner's earlier Writ Petition No. 9704 of 1982: (reported in 1983 Cri LJ 192 at p. 199) (All) observed thus : "The ratio of the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court can thus he summed up as follows : (a) there should be no inordinate delay. (b) the representation should not be dealt with in a cavalier fashion, (c) it should be disposed of with reasonable expedition. (d) allowance should be made for necessary consultations. The matter has to be examined in the background of the facts of individual case and then to apply the law. It will be needless to multiply citations. As laid down in Satpal's case (supra) ( AIR 1981 SC 2230 ) courts cannot be too technical in their approach and as observed in the case of Frances Coralie ( AIR 1980 SC 849 ) (supra) things do not move mechanically and the time-imperative can never be obsessive." 15. It will be needless to multiply citations. As laid down in Satpal's case (supra) ( AIR 1981 SC 2230 ) courts cannot be too technical in their approach and as observed in the case of Frances Coralie ( AIR 1980 SC 849 ) (supra) things do not move mechanically and the time-imperative can never be obsessive." 15. We may also observe that where a detenu claims that the concerned Government has, in dealing with the representations made by him, acted in cavalier fashion or had inordinately delayed in deciding the same, it is for the concerned Government to place material before the Court to satisfy it that having regard to the entire circumstances of the case, the representation made by the detenu has been dealt with expeditiously and that it had not acted in a cavalier fashion. While considering the explanation offered by the concerned government, the Court will certainly keep in mind the fact that a question of liberty of a citizen is involved before it. Where on the face of it a number of days have been taken by the concerned Government in disposing of the representation and it chooses not to offer any explanation whatsoever, the delay can be said to be unexplained and can be attributed to lethargy or indifference on its part. 16. We now proceed to consider the facts with regard to the representation said to have been made by the petitioner on 27th of August, 1982. This representation was addressed to the Central Government. The said representation was forwarded by the State Government on 22nd September, 1982 and was received by the Central Government on 24th of September, 1982. The counter-affidavit sworn by Sri R. S. Maurya. Desk Officer in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, filed on 10th of January, 1983 shows that information with regard to the rejection of the said representation by the Central Government was sent to the petitioner on 18th of October, 1982. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there was no explanation for the delay as between 27th of August, 1982 and 22nd of September, 1982 on the part of the State Government and its agencies in forwarding the said representation to the Central Government. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there was no explanation for the delay as between 27th of August, 1982 and 22nd of September, 1982 on the part of the State Government and its agencies in forwarding the said representation to the Central Government. Further there was nothing in the counter-affidavit to indicate the date on which the said representation was disposed of by the Central Government before sending the information about its rejection to the detenu on 18th of October, 1982. There was thus an unexplained delay on the part' of the respondents in dealing with petitioner's representation as between 27th of August, 1982 and 22nd of September, 1982 and again as between 24th of September, 1982 and 18th of October, 1982 rendering petitioner's continued detention invalid. 17. Learned counsel appearing for Union of India, however, contended that as no specific ground with regard to delay in disposal of petitioner's representation made on 27th of August, 1982 had been taken, the Union of India had failed to offer, in the affidavit filed on its behalf, a detailed explanation in respect of the time consumed by it in dealing with the representation. Learned counsel for the Union of India requested that some time be granted to him to obtain instructions from the Central Government in this regard, and he was permitted to do so. Learned counsel then placed before us a radiogram received from the Central Government according to which petitioner's representation received by it through the State Government on 24th of September, 1982 was considered and rejected on 8th of October, 1982 and the petitioner was informed about it through the Superintendent, Central Jail vide letter dated 8th of October, 1982. Subsequently after the close of hearing but before the judgmet could be pronounced, the Union of India moved an application that a supplementary counter-affidavit sworn by Sri M. L. Miglani, Desk Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India in which further details about the manner in which the aforesaid representation of the petitioner had been dealt with by Government of India had been given, be permitted to be filed and the same be also taken into consideration while deciding the case. Learned counsel for the petitioner objected to the reception of this supplementary counter-affidavit at this late stage. Learned counsel for the petitioner objected to the reception of this supplementary counter-affidavit at this late stage. However, in the interest of justice we permit the Union of India to file the said supplementary counter-affidavit and to rely upon it. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not seek any time for filing any further affidavit and the parties were given an opportunity to make fresh submissions in the light of the facts disclosed in the supplementary counter-affidavit. 18. According to the aforementioned supplementary counter-affidavit, petitioners representation dated 27th of August, 1982 was received in the Central Government with comments of the State. Government thereon on 24th September, 1982. The said representation was scrutinised in the Central Government immediately and it was found that some information required for its processing further was wanting. This information was asked for from the State Government in a wireless message dated 27th of September, 1982 (26th of September, 1982 was Sunday). The wanting information was received from the State Government through a wireless message on 2nd of October, 1982 (2nd October, 1982 was a closed holiday and 3rd of October, 1982 was Sunday). Petitioner's representation, with all the relevant information, thus became available to the Central Government for consideration on 4th of October, 1982. The representation was processed for consideration and final decision thereon was taken on 8th of October, 1982 and the detenu was informed of the decision of the Central Government on 18th of October, 1982, Learned Council for the petitioner contended that despite the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by Sri Miglani, the case of the respondents did not improve a bit. According to him the Central Government could not seek to explain the delay in disposal of petitioner's representation by contending vaguely that it asked for certain further information from the State Government on 27th of September, 1982 which was received by it on 2nd of October, 1982. 19. Sri Girdhar Malviya, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh, placed strong reliance on the case of Satpal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 2230 and contended that there is essential difference in the nature of representation which a detenu makes for revocation of an order of his detention in pursuance of the provisions contained in Section 8 of the Act and that which he makes otherwise. So far as the representations made in pursuance of the visions of Section 8 of the Act are concerned, they partake the nature and character of a representation contemplated by Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Any delay in consideration of such a representation may result in contravention of the constitutional provisions rendering his detention invalid. So far as the representations praying for revocation of a detention order other than those contemplated by Section 8 of the Act are concerned, the right to make the same merely flows as an implication from the statutory provisions contained in Section 14 of the Act and they stand on a different footing. Whereas if a representation made under Section 8 of the Act is not dealt with expeditiously, it has the effect of vitiating the detention, the same principle would not apply to a representation made otherwise than under Section 8 of the Act. He submitted that so far as the representations under Section 8 of the Act are concerned, the view of the Supreme Court is, that if there is unexplained delay either on the part of the agency to which it is handed over for transmission to the State Government or on the part of the State Government in deciding the same expeditiously, detention of the detenu is rendered invalid. But in Satpal's case ( AIR 1981 SC 2230 ) (supra) even though there was delay on the part of the State Government in forwarding a representation made under Section 11 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (a provision parallel to Section 14 of the National Security Act) the Supreme Court held that there was no denial of the right of the detenu of making a representation to the Central Government for revocation of the order of detention under section 11 and that any unexplained delay on the part of the State Government in forwarding the representation to the Central Government, was by itself not sufficient to invalidate the order of detention. This according to him supported his submission that the representation made for revocation of a detention order under section 8 of the Act and that made otherwise than under S. 8 of the Act has to be dealt with on different footing and any delay in deciding representation of the second type will not have the effect of vitiating the continued detention. 20. 20. In Satpal's case ( AIR 1981 SC 2230 ) (supra) the petitioner had been directed to be detained under the provisions of S. 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities in pursuance of an order passed by the Government of Punjab. The detenu then made a representation for revocation of the said order to the Central Government on 4th of July, 1981. The said representation remained lying with the State Government for about 2 months and after being forwarded by the State Government was received by the Central Government only on 23rd of September, 1981. The Central Government disposed of the said representation on 28th of September, 1981. No one contended that there was any inordinate delay on the part of the Central Government in disposing of the representation made by Satpal after it received the same on, 24th of September, 1981. The only question at issue before the Supreme Court was whether the failure of the State Government of Punjab to forward the representation made by the detenu to the Central Government for revocation of his order of detention under S. 11 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act with reasonable dispatch rendered his continued detention invalid. The Supreme Court after considering the scheme of that Act and the constitution as also after distinguishing the case of Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1 held that inasmuch as the Central Government had after receiving the said representation acted with great promptitude the detention of the detenu was not rendered invalid merely because there was 2 months' unexplained delay on the part of the State Government in forwarding the same for consideration by the Central Government. The decision in Satpal's case ( AIR 1981 SC 2230 ) cannot be construed as laying down that even if there had been an unexplained delay on the part of the Central Government in dealing with the representation made by the detenu, his continued detention could still be countenanced. 21. The decision in Satpal's case ( AIR 1981 SC 2230 ) cannot be construed as laying down that even if there had been an unexplained delay on the part of the Central Government in dealing with the representation made by the detenu, his continued detention could still be countenanced. 21. Applying the ratio of Satpal's case ( AIR 1981 SC 2230 ), it may be said that any unexplained delay on the part of the State Government and its agencies as between 27th of August, 1982 and 22nd of September, 1982 in forwarding petitioner's representation for consideration by the Central Government may not effect the validity of petitioner's detention, but then the question that still remains for consideration is whether there is any delay on the part of the Central Government in disposing of petitioner's representation after it received the same on 24th of September, 1982. 22. So far as the time consumed by the Central Government after receiving petitioner's representation on 24th of September, 1982 is concerned, the respondents seek to explain it by saying that scrutiny of the papers forwarded by the State Government revealed that some information required for processing the same was wanting and that information was asked for from the State Government in a wireless message dated 27th September, 1982 and was eventually furnished by the State Government through a wireless message dated 2nd October, 1982. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondents have not cared to disclose in their affidavit the nature of information that was required by the Central Government for deciding petitioner's representation and as such the inactivity of the Central Government during 27th of September, 1982 and 2nd of October, 1982 in dealing with petitioner's representation cannot be justified. We are unable to accept this submission. In our opinion there can be no objection to the Central Government seeking any further information on the representation made by the detenu from the State Government which it may consider relevant for purposes of dealing with detenu's representation. It is true that the nature of the information sought for has not been disclosed in the counter-affidavit, but then we have no reason to suspect that the information sought for by the Central Government was not bona fide or that it had been sought merely as a pretext for delaying disposal of petitioner's representation. It is true that the nature of the information sought for has not been disclosed in the counter-affidavit, but then we have no reason to suspect that the information sought for by the Central Government was not bona fide or that it had been sought merely as a pretext for delaying disposal of petitioner's representation. After the information sought for by the Central Government was received, it disposed of the petitioner's representation on 8th of October, 1982 (2nd and 3rd October being holidays). In the circumstances neither can it be said that petitioner's representation has been dealt with in a cavalier fashion resulting in inordinate delay nor can it be said that it had not been disposed of with reasonable expedition. We are accordingly of opinion that petitioner's continued detention is not rendered invalid for any delay on the part of the Central Government in disposing of petitioner's representation dated 27th August, 1982. 23. So far as delay in disposal of petitioner's representation dated 18th of October, 1982 is concerned, we find that the said representation was after the comments made by the State Government forwarded to the Central Government and was received by it on 10th of December, 1982. the Central Government promptly dealt with that representation and disposed it of by an order dated 15th December, 1982, Contention of the petitioner that no explanation has been offered to explain the inordinate delay on the part of the State Government in between 8th October, 1982 and 10th December, 1982 in forwarding the said representation for consideration of the Central Government (sic). Inasmuch as the Central Government has after receiving the representation made by the petitioner dealt with it promptly and expeditiously, any unexplained delay on the part of the State Government in forwarding the said representation to the Central Government cannot, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Satpal's case ( AIR 1981 SC 2230 ), have the effect of rendering petitioner's continued detention invalid. 24. In the result, we find no merit in any of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed.