( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against an order dated 22. 8. 1983/26. 8. 1983 passed by the Subdivisional Magistrate, Sambalpur in Cr. Misc. Case No. 152 of 1983 which is an order under sections 145 (1) and 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the passing of the impugned order are as follows: The opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 filed a petition under section 145, Cr. P. C. before the Subdivisional Magistrate, Sadar, Sambalpur on 22. 8. 1983 which was registered as Criminal Misc. Case No. 152 of 1983 impleading the present petitioner and two others as members of the second party. It was alleged by the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 (first party before the Subdivisional Magistrate) that the members of the second party have been trying to dispossess them from the disputed land over which they are in possession. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order started a proceeding under section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. and simultaneously attached the subject matter of the dispute under section 146 (1) Cr. P. c. and restrained both the parties not to enter upon the disputed land till the disposal of the proceeding. He also directed the officer-in-charge, Katarbaga Police Station to appoint a Receiver and to keep the disputed land along with the standing crop, if any, in the charge of a suitable third party, not interested in either of the parties. ( 3 ) THIS revision has been filed by the first member of the second party alleging that he has title and possession in respect of the disputed properties and the preliminary order under section 145, Cr. P. C. as well as the order of attachment is without any legal justification. It has also been alleged that the members of the first party who are opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 in this revision have filed Title Suit No. 60 of 1982 in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Sambalpur against the present petitioner and 9 others praying for declaration of their right, title and interest over the disputed lands along with their sister Indira, who is not a party to this revision. They have also prayed for permanent injunction against the petitioner and other defendants in the said suit. They have also prayed for permanent injunction against the petitioner and other defendants in the said suit. Their further contention is that the present opposite parties Nos 1 and 2 having not moved the civil court for an order of interim injunction or for appointment of a Receiver, their move for an order under section. 145 (1), Cr. P. c. is thoroughly misconceived. According to them the order under section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. as well as under section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. could not have been passed by a composite order and at any rate, the learned Magistrate has passed the said order mechanically without application of judicial mind. ( 4 ) THE argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the initiation of the proceeding under section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. is misconceived and that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order under section 145 (1), Cr. P. c. in view of the pendency of the civil suit is not correct. The primary object of section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. is the prevention of breach of peace arising in respect of and relating to immovable property and not to determine the right and title of the parties. The civil court has got jurisdiction to decide the questions relating to title and matters incidental thereto. Thus, the jurisdictions of the civil court and the criminal court operate in different fields and the institution of any action in one does not take away the jurisdiction of the other, though for keeping harmony in the exercise of such jurisdiction by both, guidelines have been indicated in several judicial decisions. It is well settled in law that mere institution of a civil suit does not take away the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to initiate a proceeding under section 145, Cr. PC. , unless an interim arrangement has been made by the civil court in the matter of possession by an order of injunction or appointment of a Receiver. The Magistrate has always jurisdiction to initiate and continue a proceeding under section 145, Cr. P. C. to prevent breach of peace and to maintain law and order irrespective of the pendency of a civil suit unless an interim order of the civil court with respect to possession of the disputed land is in operation. The Magistrate has always jurisdiction to initiate and continue a proceeding under section 145, Cr. P. C. to prevent breach of peace and to maintain law and order irrespective of the pendency of a civil suit unless an interim order of the civil court with respect to possession of the disputed land is in operation. ( 5 ) THE main contention of the petitioner in this case is that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass a composite order under section 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. The Magistrate is, no doubt, competent to pass a preliminary order under section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. where he is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof within his local jurisdiction. Sub-section (4) of section 145, Cr. P. c. authorises the Magistrate to receive all such evidence as may be produced by the parties and decide whether any and which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute on the date of the preliminary order. If the subject of dispute in a proceeding pending before the Magistrate under section 145, Cr. P. C. is subject to speedy and natural decay, the Magistrate may make an order of the proper custody and sale of such property and upon completion of the enquiry pass appropriate order for disposal of such property or side proceeds thereof. Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. provides for attachment of the property by the Magistrate at any time after making an order under section 1 45 (I ). If the magistrate considers the case to be one of emergency or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession or when he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject matter of the dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute. In the impugned order the Magistrate appears to have proceeded to pass an order under section 146 (I), Cr. P. C. on the basis that it was a case of emergency. Reliance is put on a decision reported in Koltaralhi Mavunni and another v. State of Kerala and another, where it has been held that a composite order under sections 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. on the basis that it was a case of emergency. Reliance is put on a decision reported in Koltaralhi Mavunni and another v. State of Kerala and another, where it has been held that a composite order under sections 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. cannot be passed, as an order of attachment under section 146 (1) can be passed only after the preliminary order under section 145 ( I) had already been passed by the Magistrate. It has been observed in the said decision that the order under section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. becomes complete only when the Magistrate puts his signature therein and it is only thereafter he is expected to exercise jurisdiction under section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. requiring attachment of the property if contingencies contemplated in the latter section are satisfied. In that view of the matter his Lordship has held that the subsequent part of the composite order where the. Magistrate had attached the property under section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. should be regarded as without jurisliction. Reliance has been placed by his Lordship on a case reported in Lilly Franklm v. Wilson2 (2), for the proposition that composite order under both the aforesaid sections is not warranted under the provisions of the Code. Similar view has also been expressed in a decision reported in Dandapani Pala and others v. Madan Mohan Pala and others3 The reason adopted by their Lordships in those decisions is that section -146 (1) Cr. P. C. does -not contemplate a simultaneous exercise of. ( 6 ) THE next contention of the petitioner is that the order of attachment passed by the jurisdiction under section 146 (1) and that section (146 (1) ). I am unable to agree with the aforesaid view. The Code of Criminal Procedure vests jurisdiction on the Magistrate to exercise powers both under sections 145 (1) and 146 (1 ). The language of section 146 (1) requires a Magistrate to pass an order of attachment after making the order under section 145 (1 ). This means that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order of attachment under section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. even in the- case of an emergency before drawing up the preliminary order. In other words, the Magistrate assuming jurisdiction to attach the property under section 146 (1), Cr. This means that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order of attachment under section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. even in the- case of an emergency before drawing up the preliminary order. In other words, the Magistrate assuming jurisdiction to attach the property under section 146 (1), Cr. P. c. has to pass an order under section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. preceding the order of attachment. The Magistrate could pass the order on the same sitting one after the other which would comply with the language meaning of the word after making order under section 145 (1 ). There is nothing in the Code to prevent the Magistrate to pass a composite order from which it can be known that he had to exercise jurisdiction under section 146 (1) only after he took up a proceeding and decide to promulgate a prelimmary order under section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. There would be practically no difference between the cases where the Magistrate first passes an order under section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. put his signature therein and thereafter passes an order of attachment under section 146 (1) in the same sitting and a case where he exercises powers under both the sections of Criminal Procedure Code the first dealing with the preliminary order under section 145 (1) and then attachment of the subject of dispute under section 146 (1 ). Separate recording of the order under both the sections would be a matter of form and Instead, if the Magistrate decided and records a preliminary order under sections 145 (1) and then attaches the subject of dispute under section 146 (1) at a stretch in the same order, at best it amounts to an irregularty which is curable. It would not vitiate the attachment itself. In a decision reported in Theophil Xess and another v. Ghuyam Ekka. 4 Honble Justice S. Acharya has expressed that a composite order under the aforesaid sections is not opposed to law. Thus, the impugned order cannot be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction so far as it relates to attachment of the subject of the dispute under section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. learned Subdivisional Magistrate suffers from inherent defect that the Magistrate has not applied his mind in order to find out whether there is any jurisdiction to exercise the powers under section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. learned Subdivisional Magistrate suffers from inherent defect that the Magistrate has not applied his mind in order to find out whether there is any jurisdiction to exercise the powers under section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. From the text of the order I find that the Magistrate has not recorded that he considers the case to be one of emergency. The counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties has argued that the sentence as a case of emergency the subject matter of dispute is hereby attached, implies the Magistrates satisfaction that it was a case of emergency. It is the settled position of law that the existence of the ingredients necessary for passing an order under section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. would not automatically attract the provisions of section 146 (1) for attachment of property. Therefore, the Magistrate must satisfy himself as to whether emergency exists inspite of the order under section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. before he passes an order of attachment under section 146, Cr. P. C. The object of attachment is to keep the subject of dispute in custodia legis so as to prevent the contesting parties from their attempt to obtain the actual possession of the subject of dispute. The order of attachment made under section 146 (1) may have the effect of driving the rightful occupier of his possession of the disputed properties. Therefore, the said power should be exercised with due care and caution and should be limited to cases in which the likelihood of a breach of peace is so imminent as to call for immediate action to prevent the same. ( 7 ) THE language of the impugned order does not show that the Magistrate was satisfied that it was a case of emergency and, therefore, the order of attachment passed by him cannot be supported. There is no illegality in passing the preliminary order under section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. as the impugned order clearly mentions that the Magistrate was satisfied that there is serious apprehension of breach of peace between the parties with respect to the possession of the disputed land. ( 8 ) THUS, in the result while confirming preliminary order passed under section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. the order of attachment passed by the learned Magistrate under section 146 (1) is set aside. ( 8 ) THUS, in the result while confirming preliminary order passed under section 145 (1) Cr. P. C. the order of attachment passed by the learned Magistrate under section 146 (1) is set aside. The Magistrate is free to exercise such jurisdiction under section 146 (1), Cr. P. C at any time if circumstances warrant its exercise. The revision is accordingly disposed of with the aforesaid observations. There would be no order as to costs of this Court. .