JUDGMENT 1. - This is a husband's appeal against the order of the learned District Judge, Bhilwara, dated March 15, 1982, dismissing his application for grant of divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 2. The short facts giving rise to this appeal are that Shri Ramesh Kumar filed an application before the learned District Judge, Bhilwara against his wife Smt. Badami alleging that the marriage of the parties took place according to the Hindu rites about 8 years back. However, since then the parties have not been living together amicably and in a matrimony except that about 3 years back the non-petitioner Smt. Badami came and stayed with the petitioner for two-three days. But during those two three days also there was no consummation of the marriage and Smt. Badami did not carry out her duties as a wife. It was further alleged that Smt. Badami has deserted the petitioner for more than three years past, that she had been living in adultery with other persons and that she had been treating the petitioner and his parents with cruelty, therefore, it was not possible for the petitioner to continue the matrimony with the non- petitioner and therefore, he prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion, adultery and cruelty. The non-petitioner Smt. Badami denied all these allegations except that she admitted that she was married to the petitioner. Her case was that she had been living with the petitioner for the last more than 10 years and had been rendering her marritable duties. It was the petitioner who did not want to live with her as she was illiterate and the petitioner had been telling her that he would like to marry another girl who may be literate. She had asked for particulars of the persons with whom the petitioner thinks she was living in adultery. The petitioner however, could not furnish any of those details and could not name any person with whom the non-petitioner had adulterous relations. Aft framing the necessary issues and taking the evidence of the parties the learned District Judge found that none of the above three grounds had been established by the petitioner. He accordingly rejected his application The petitioner has, therefore, now come tip in appeal. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. The respondent has not cared to appear despite service. 4. He accordingly rejected his application The petitioner has, therefore, now come tip in appeal. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. The respondent has not cared to appear despite service. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has reiterated all the three grounds on which divorce was asked for. So far as the ground of adultery is concerned, the main emphasis of the learned Counsel was on the fact that the non-petitioner's father had been out-casted on the ground that the petitioner had been living an immoral life. I do not find any force in this connection. In the first place the fact that the non-petitioner's father had been out-carted on the ground that the non-petitioner was living an immoral life has not been established. The non-petitioner's father has appeared in the witness-box and has denied this allegation and the evidence. On behalf of the petitioner in this respect is wholly unreliable as has rightly been found by the learned District Judge. I need not recapitulate, the grounds given by him. 5. In the second place even if it is assumed that the non-petitioner's father had been out-casted on such grounds this fact by itself is not at all sufficient to establish that in the fact the non-petitioner had any adulterous relation with any person. It may be pointed out that in the application itself the petitioner did not come out with the names of the persons with whom he thought the non-petitioner was carrying on adulterous relations. An opportunity was offered to him to disclose the names of those person when their particulars were asked for, even then the petitioner came out with four or five names of persons with whom according to him the non petitioner had adulterous relations. Not only this he goes further to state that the non-petitioner had been caught red handed with some of these persons on certain occasions. Now,if this was fact it would not have been difficult foe the petitioner to disclose the names of those persons in the application and impleaded them and also state the fact of the non-petitioners being caught red handed as now alleged by him in his evidence. Now,if this was fact it would not have been difficult foe the petitioner to disclose the names of those persons in the application and impleaded them and also state the fact of the non-petitioners being caught red handed as now alleged by him in his evidence. This goes to show that the petitioner is not at all a reliable person and has been out to fish out something or the other in order to obtain divorce from his wife and is doing so he had no compunction in making false allegations of adultery 6. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the learned District Judge was correct in holding that the petitioner had failed to establish that non-petitioner had committed adultery. 7. Coming to the ground of desertion, the learned counsel placed reliance upon Ex. 1 an application under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, said to have been filed by both the parties for a consent decree of divorce and urged that in this application the non-petitioner had clearly admitted that the parties have not been living together for the last more than three years. According to the learned counsel this was enough to establish desertion. I do not find any force in this contention also. In the first place this application under Section 13B was an infructuous application because thereafter no decree for divorce was passed on its basis and the non-petitioner had withdrawn her consent on the allegation that she was made to sign this application on misrepresentation that it was a compromise. She consistently stated before the learned District Judge also that she never freely consented to the application under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act and had signed it on the understanding that it was an application for compromise. The very allegations of the petitioner himself go to show that this application was not a bonafide application, inasmuch as in that application which was filed on July 18, 1979, it was alleged that the parties have been living separately for the last more than three years whereas in the present application which has been filed on June 1, 1979, it has been mentioned that the non-petitioner had stayed with the petitioner in June 1978 for two-three days when she tried to administer poison to him and thus the two statements are clearly contradictory. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that even if it is accepted that the non- petitioner lived with the petitioner for two-three days it does not necessarily mean that they were living in matrimony because it may sometimes happen that though the parties may be living under the same roof they may live in matrimony. To my mind this contention also has no substance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Because if that was so, the petitioner should have clearly stated that although they were living under the same roof they did not live together as husband and wife, and did not consummate the marriage. In the absence of such an allegation the contention is wholly farfetched. In this view for the matter the learned District Judge was justified in holding that the petitioner had failed to establish that it was the non-petitioner who had withdrawn from the society of the petitioner and had deserted him. 8. Coming to the last ground of cruelty it may at once be stated that the petitioner had neither pleaded any specific ground of cruelty nor has proved any. The mere assertion in the application that the non petitioner had been treating the petitioner and his parents with cruelty, and in equally vague statement in witness-box does not prove any cruelty on the part of the non-petitioner. It may be stated here that the parents of the petitioner who are living and who have been alleged to have been treated with cruelty by the non-petitioner have not been produced in evidence to corroborate whatever vague statement the petitioner gave and, therefore, there is no evidence to establish the ground of cruelty I do not see any reason to disagree with the learned District Judge. 9. Lastly it was contended by the learned Counsel that even if none of the grounds viz. desertion, cruelty or adultery has not been established the fact remains that it is not at all possible for the parties to live together and, therefore, it would he proper that their marriage be dissolved. 9. Lastly it was contended by the learned Counsel that even if none of the grounds viz. desertion, cruelty or adultery has not been established the fact remains that it is not at all possible for the parties to live together and, therefore, it would he proper that their marriage be dissolved. Although this contention of the learned counsel may not be altogether without sentimented force but the fact remains that when the case has not been brought under any of the grounds mentioned under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act this court would not be justified in granting a decree of divorce to the petitioner merely because it may appear that the parties may not be able to live together. 10. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any substance in this appeal and hereby dismiss it. The non-petitioner has not appeared and therefore, I do not make any order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******