Judgment :- I do not think the Petitioner is entitled to the relief in the matter. The question raised by the Petitioner has been considered by the Supreme Court in A. C. Industries Ltd. v. Their Workmen (AIR. 1962 SC. 1100). There, though they were dealing with the question of S.72 I. D. Act, 1947, as stood prior to the amendment Act of 1956, the Court had to consider the question as to whether an Advocate who was appointed as an Industrial Tribunal, was qualified for appointment as the High Court Judge. The Supreme Court said: "The Constitutional provision bearing on this point is Art.217 which is in so far as it is material is as follows:- "217(l). Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and, in case of appointment of a judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and shall hold office in the case of an additional or acting judge as provided in Art.224, and in any other case, until he attains the age of 62 years. Provided that (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and (a) has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the territory of India; or (b) has for at least ten years been an Advocate of a High Court or of two or more such courts in succession. Explanation" While Art.217(2) prescribes the qualification for appointment as a Judge, Art.217(1) lays down that the judge shall hold office until he attains age of 62 years. The whole of the controversy before us is as to the interrelation between these two clauses. The contention of Mr. Pathak, learned Counsel for the Appellant is that though Art.217 (1) refers in terms, to the termination of the office of judge, in substance, it lays down a qualification for appointment, because the appointment of a person aged over sixty as a judge would clearly be repugnant to Art.217 (1) even though he might satisfy all the requirements of Art.217(2). Pathak, learned Counsel for the Appellant is that though Art.217 (1) refers in terms, to the termination of the office of judge, in substance, it lays down a qualification for appointment, because the appointment of a person aged over sixty as a judge would clearly be repugnant to Art.217 (1) even though he might satisfy all the requirements of Art.217(2). It is accordingly argued that it is an implied qualification for appointment as a judge under Art.217 that the person should not have attained the age of sixty at the time of the appointment. "9. We agree that there is implicit in Art.217 (1) a prohibition against appointment as a judge of a person who has attained the age of 60 years. But in our view, that is in the nature of a condition governing the appointment to the office-not a qualification with reference to a person who is to be appointed thereto. There is manifest on the terms and on the scheme of the Article a clear distinction between requirements as to the age of a person who could be appointed as a judge and his fitness based on experience and ability to fill the office. Art.217 (1) deals with the former, and, in form it has reference to the termination of the office and can therefore be properly read only as imposing, by implication a restriction in making the appointment. In strong contrast to this is Art.217(2) which expressly refers to the qualifications of the person to be appointed such as his having held a judicial post or having been an Advocate for a period of not less than 10 years. We think the to nature construction of the Article the prescription as to age is a condition attached to the duration of the office and not a qualification for appointment to it"." Justice Venkatarama Iyer who rendered the judgment for the Court also referred to the decision of Nagpur High Court reported in AIR. 1952 Nag. 330 and said: "(11) More to the point under consideration is Art.165(1) that the "Governor of each State shall appoint a person who is qualified to be appointed as a judge of a High Court to be Advocate General for the State". The question has been discussed whether on the terms of this Article, a person who has attained the age of 60 could be appointed as an Advocate General. The question has been discussed whether on the terms of this Article, a person who has attained the age of 60 could be appointed as an Advocate General. If the age of a person is regarded as one of his qualifications, then he could not be. The point arose for decision in G. D. Karekare v. T. L. Shevde where a judge who had retired at the age of 60 had been appointed as Advocate General. The validity of the appointment was challenged on the ground that he was disqualified by reason of his age. The learned judges of the Nagpur High Court held that clause (1) of Article 217 of the Constitution prescribed only the duration of the appointment of a judge of the High Court and could not be construed as prescribing a qualification for his appointment. It is argued for the appellant that the appointment of an Advocate General under Article 165 might stand on a different footing from that of a judge under Article 217, because of the special provision in Article 165 (3) that the Advocate General is to hold office at pleasure, whereas judge hold office during good behaviour. But this difference bears only on the power of the appropriate authority-to terminate appointment and not on the qualification of the person to be appointed to the office. In our- view the interpretation put upon Article 217 in G. D. Karekare's case is correct." Mr. Bhaskaran contended that the observations of the Supreme Court in the matter were casual and did not arise for consideration as such in the case. This is certainly not correct. It would be clear from the passages extracted above. 2. Mr. Bhaskaran referred to certain other articles in the Constitution like articles 58,157, 84 and 102. Article 58 under the heading "Qualifications for election as President" has stated that no person shall be eligible for election as President unless he has completed the age of 35 years But then it states that no person shall be eligible for election as President unless he is qualified for election as a member of the House of the People. We find some distinction made there between qualifications and eligibility. We find some distinction made there between qualifications and eligibility. Art.157 which is under the heading "Qualifications for appointment as Governor" states only that no person shall be eligible for appointment as Governor unless he is a citizen of India and has completed the age of 35 years. Art.84 while prescribing qualification for membership of Parliament states that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in Parliament unless he is a citizen of India and in the case of a seat" in the Council of States not less than 35 years of age and in the case of a seat in the House of the People, not less than 25 years of age. No doubt here it may be said that the age fixed is more or less treated as a qualification for becoming a member of Parliament. Article 102 prescribes disqualification for membership to the houses of Parliament. No doubt it is a sound rule of construction as said by Cleasby B. in Courtauld v. Legh (1869) L.R.4 Ex. 126, at 130 to give same meaning to the same words occurring in different parts of an Act of Parliament. But this presumption that same words are used in the same meaning is however very slight and it is proper, if sufficient reason can be assigned to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that it bears in another part of an Act (See Re. National Savings Bank (1866) L.R.1 Ch. App, 547,550 and R. v. Burt (1960) 1. Q. B. 625. Justice Fry said in Re Moddy and Yates Contract (1885) 30 Ch. D. 344) that if a word is used inaccurately in a section of a statute, it must not be assumed to have been used inaccurately when it occurs in another section of the same Statute. A word can be used in different provisions of a Statute in totally different senses. 3. Apart from the fact that I am bound to follow the Supreme Court decision,! would point out, with respect, that in the context in which the word 'qualification' occurs in Article 217 non-attainment of a particular age is not regarded there as a qualification. A word can be used in different provisions of a Statute in totally different senses. 3. Apart from the fact that I am bound to follow the Supreme Court decision,! would point out, with respect, that in the context in which the word 'qualification' occurs in Article 217 non-attainment of a particular age is not regarded there as a qualification. It is only in the nature of a condition governing the appointment to the office, as Justice Venkatarama Iyer pointed out, not a qualification with reference to a person who has to be appointed thereto. Therefore, I find no illegality in the appointment of the 2nd Respondent as Advocate General, though he might have passed the age of 62. The O.P. dismissed in limine.