Judgment :- 1. This original petition is filed by the Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., Bombay, seeking to quash Ext. P6 order dated 23-4-1980 passed by the Revenue Board, mainly on two grounds. The first ground taken by the petitioner is that the order is vitiated as there has been violation of the principles of natural justice and the second ground of attack is that the Board has not properly understood the scope of S.55 of the Kerala Stamp Act in as much as it has wrongly held that for invoking the power to make a reference under the section the case in question must be pending. The petitioner-company is engaged in construction works and has entered into a contract with the Kerala State Electricity Board for the construction of Idukki, Cheruthoni and Kulamavu dams. As per the terms of the agreement the K.S.E. Board has to advance an amount not exceeding Rs.150 lakhs to the petitioner for the purpose of the construction work. This advance amount was to be given to the petitioner on execution of an agreement in favour of the Board hypothecating the equipments brought to the site ana belonging to the petitioner. In pursuance of this clause, an agreement hypothecating the equipments brought to the site and belonging to the petitioner was executed, as evidenced by Ext. R1. The dispute between the petitioner and the respondents concerns the payment of the correct stamp duty on Ext.Rl. This dispute was referred to the District Collector, Idukki for adjudication under the Kerala Stamp Act, hereinafter called the" Act. As the District Collector felt certain doubts regarding the nature of the document a reference was made by him under S.54(2) to the Board of Revenue. After hearing the petitioner, the Board of Revenue as per its proceedings Ext.P4 dated 9-1-80 held that Ext. R1 is liable to be charged as a mortgage deed falling under Art.137(b) of the Schedule to the Act. Thereafter, a petition Ext. After hearing the petitioner, the Board of Revenue as per its proceedings Ext.P4 dated 9-1-80 held that Ext. R1 is liable to be charged as a mortgage deed falling under Art.137(b) of the Schedule to the Act. Thereafter, a petition Ext. P5 was filed under S.55 of the Act to the Board of Revenue praying that as the matter involved an important and intricate question of law concerning the construction of a document the Board of Revenue may be pleased to refer the following question of law to the High Court as envisaged under S.55 of the Act: "Whether the Hypothecation Deed in question attracts stamp duty under Art.6(1)(a)(iii) as an agreement relating to deposit of title deeds, pawn or pledge; that is to say, any instrument evidencing any agreement relating to the pawn or pledge of movable property where such deposit, pawn or pledge has been made by way of security for the repayment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan of an existing or future debt or under Art.37(b) of the Schedule to the Kerala Stamp Act as a mortgage deed, not being an agreement relating to deposit of title deeds, pawn or pledge (No. 6), Bottomry Bond (No. 14), mortgage of a crop (No. 38), Respondent in Bond No. (49) or Security Bond (No. 50) when possession is not given or agreed to be given as aforesaid?" The Board of Revenue by its order Ext. P6 dated 23-4-80 treating Ext. P5 petition filed by the petitioner as a Review Petition rejected the prayer of the petitioner on the ground that the power to make a reference conferred by S.55 of the Act is only in respect of the pending cases. 2. As stated earlier, it is this order that is assailed before this Court. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that no opportunity has been given to the petitioner to represent his case before the Board of Revenue and it was without giving him a hearing that the impugned order was passed. The counsel appearing for the Government submitted that the statement of the counsel for the petitioner that no opportunity was given is not true and that Ext. P6 itself will show that an opportunity was given to the petitioner. This does not appear to be fully correct. In Ext. The counsel appearing for the Government submitted that the statement of the counsel for the petitioner that no opportunity was given is not true and that Ext. P6 itself will show that an opportunity was given to the petitioner. This does not appear to be fully correct. In Ext. P4 order it has been specifically stated that the counsel for the petitioner was heard while there is nothing in Ext. P6 either to show or indicate that the petitioner or his counsel was heard before Ext. P6 was passed. On the other hand, what has been stated in Ext.P6 is that it was after hearing the counsel of the petitioner on 19-2-1979 that the Board took its decision communicated in its proceedings dated 9-1-80. The proceedings referred to in Ext. P6 is Ext. P4. Ext. P5 is an independent petition filed long after the passing of Ext. P4, claiming a reference under S.55 of the Act. 3. This apart, as stated earlier, it was only on the ground that the power to make a reference under S.55 of the Act is only in respect of pending cases and it cannot be made applicable to settled cases, that the prayer of the petitioner was rejected. The important question that arises for decision is therefore whether the pendency of the casein question is a condition precedent or prerequisite to the exercise of power under S.55 of the Act to make a reference. It is true that there were divergent views expressed by different High Courts on the point, some of the High Courts talcing the view that in pending cases alone the power to make a reference can be exercised and some others taking a contrary view. The question has been settled finally by the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Banarasi Das v. Chief Controlling R.A. Delhi (AIR. 1968 SC. 497). The divergent views expressed by the various High Courts have been referred to in this decision, where it has been held: "The principle underlying the decision is that S.57 affords a remedy to the citizen to have bis case referred to the High Court against an order of revenue authority imposing stamp duty and/or penalty provided the application involves a substantial question of law and imposes a corresponding obligation on the authority to refer it to the High Court for its opinion. Such a right and obligation cannot be construed to depend upon any subsidiary circumstance such as the pendency of the case before the Authority." The divergent views have now been finally resolved by the Supreme Court. No doubt the Supreme Court was considering the provisions in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The relevant sections which were considered were S.57(1) and 59(2). S.57(1) of the Indian Stamp Act corresponds to S.55 of the Kerala Stamp Act. In all material particulars the provisions in S.57(1) of the Indian Stamp Act and those in S.55(1) of the Kerala Stamp Act are identical. There is, therefore, no difficulty in applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision aforesaid to the case on hand. As the law now stands, it is not necessary that the case in question must be pending consideration to invoke the power of reference under S.55 of the Act. In view of the violation of principles of natural justice and in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, Ext. P6 cannot be sustained. In the result, this Original Petition is allowed; Ext. P6 order is hereby quashed and the first respondent is directed to dispose of Ext. P5 dated 8-4-1980 after hearing the petitioner and in the light of this judgment, as expeditiously as possible. No costs, in the circumstances.